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THE CHART AND SCALE OF TRUTH,

BY WHICH TO FIND

THE CAUSE OF ERROR.

LECTURES

READ BEFORE THE

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,

AT THE LECTURE

FOUNDED BY

The Rev. JOHN BAMPTON, M.A.

By EDWARD TATHAM, D.D.

VOL. I.

I have not made it my buſineſs either to quit or follow any authority in the enſuing diſcourſe: Truth has been my only aim; and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footſteps of any other lay that way, or not. Not that I want a due reſpect to other men's opinions; but, after all, the greateſt reverence is due to Truth. Locke Hum. Und. B. 1. C. 4. § 23.

ΤΩ ΑΛΗΘΕΙ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΣΥΝΑΔΕΙ.

Ariſtot. Eth. Nicom. lib. i. cap. 8.

OXFORD:

SOLD BY J. FLETCHER, D. PRINCE AND J. COOKE; J. F. AND C. RIVINGTON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD, BY T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND, AND RICHARDSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE, LONDON.

M DCC XC.

18426.

TO THE

HEADS of COLLEGES.

RIGHT REVEREND AND REVEREND SIRS,

I Apologize, as I ought to do, for the delay in printing theſe Lectures, by ſaying, that, when I had the honour to be appointed by you, my particular engagements, beſide my ordinary employments, were ſo many that I could

not take my ſubject till january 1789; that ſome of theſe engagements continued upon my hands all the enſuing ſpring; and that, after I had finiſhed at St. Mary's, ſome important concerns called me away the whole ſummer to a diſtant part of the kingdom. On account of the haſte in which they were compoſed, I wiſhed to reviſe them, and found the ſubject increaſing upon me in every page.

Such as they are, I now beg leave to preſent them to you, in a form, which, I judge, will give my extenſive ſubject the beſt advantage, accompanied with a hearty wiſh for your health and proſperity in all things; that

that you may ſee the arts and ſciences, virtue, religion, and all good learning flouriſh under your auſpice; that as your Univerſity improves in ſplendour it may advance in reputation; and that, as it is the firſt in ORNAMENT, it may be the firſt in DISCIPLINE.

I am, Gentlemen,

your moſt obliged,

and obedient Servant,

The AUTHOR.

LINC. COLL. July 10, 1790.

18426.

TO THE

HEADS of COLLEGES.

RIGHT REVEREND AND REVEREND SIRS,

I Apologize, as I ought to do, for the delay in printing theſe Lectures, by ſaying, that, when I had the honour to be appointed by you, my particular engagements, beſide my ordinary employments, were ſo many that I could

or proficiency in the ARTS:[a] others raiſed it to the comprehenſion of the SPECULATIVE SCIENCES, whilſt they excluded from its meaning all *Practical Virtue*; which, in their miſtaken eſtimate of the value of things, was to confer upon it, as they thought, the higheſt honour:[b] and others, anticipating the ſuperior dignity to which it was in future to be exalted, gave it a conſtruction more enlarged and liberal; allowing it to

[a] Τὴν δὲ ΣΟΦΙΑΝ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, τοῖς ἀκριβεςάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν· οἷον Φειδίαν, λιθουργὸν σοφὸν, καὶ Πολύκλειτον, ἀνδριαντοποιόν· ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν, ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐςίν.

Ariſtot. Ethic. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 7.

[b] Εἶναι δέ τινας σοφὲς οἰόμεθα ὅλως· ἀ κατά μέρος, ἀθὲ ἄλλό τι ἢ σοφὲς, ὥσπερ Ομηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργείτῃ,

Τὸν δ' ἔτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν, ἔτ' ἀροτῆρα,
Οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

ὥςε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεςάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιςημῶν εἴη ἡ ΣΟΦΙΑ. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥς' εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νῦς καὶ ἐπιςήμη, καὶ ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιςήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων. ἄτοπον γὰρ, εἴ τις τὴν ἐπιςήμην πολιτικὴν, ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριςον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ἄνθρωπός ἐςιν ——

Ariſtot. Ethic. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 7.

embrace

embrace every Virtue both of the HEART and UNDERSTANDING, and making it to comprehend all MORAL, as well as INTELLECTUAL, Good. [c]

In this more comprehenſive and exalted ſenſe WISDOM was applied by the moſt illuſtrious of her children, who, in his animated and almoſt enthuſiaſtic deſcriptions, has adorned this Queen of Virtues with a ſplendour and magnificence of diction peculiar to himſelf, and celebrated her in terms of the ſublimeſt eulogy — "She is the "brightneſs of the everlaſting LIGHT, "the unſpotted mirror of the POWER of "of God, and the image of his GOOD-"NESS." [d] And the ſame extenſive and divine prerogative was given to her by ONE who was wiſer than Solomon, who was himſelf both the Architype and Exemplar of all Good, "CHRIST THE POWER OF

[c] Πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη ΔΙΑΙΚΟΣΥΝΗΣ καὶ τῆς ΑΛΛΗΣ ΑΡΕΤΗΣ, πανουργία ἀλλ' ἡ ΣΟΦΙΑ φαίνεται.
Plato in Epitaph.

Princeps OMNIUM VIRTUTUM eſt illa Sapientia quæ ΣΟΦΙΑΝ Græci vocant. Cic. de Off. lib. ii.

[d] Wiſdom vii. 26.

"GOD AND THE WISDOM of GOD,"[e] whoſe Evangelical Diſpenſation divides this Univerſal Virtue into two cardinal collateral and co-exiſtent branches, TRUTH and CHARITY,[f] the foundation and the conſummation of all things, correſponding to the two conſtituent parts of Human Nature, the INTELLECT and the WILL, thoſe ſingular and ſupereminent diſtinctions by which Man becomes the ſubject of a RELIGION which will make him WISE UNTO SALVATION.

THERE is no expreſſion by which our Lord preſents Himſelf and his Holy Goſpel to our apprehenſion, with a more ſanguine

[e] 1 Cor. ii. 24. and Luke iii. 52.

[f] Ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο — καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενῦς παρὰ πατρὸς, πλήρης ΧΑΡΙΤΟΣ καὶ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ. John i. 14.

Η ΧΑΡΙΣ καὶ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ διὰ Ἰησῦ Χριςῦ ἐγένετο. Ibid. 17.

Ἐν τύτῳ γνώσονται πάντες ὅτι ἐμοὶ μαθηταί ἐςε, ἐὰν ΑΓΑΠΗΝ ἔχητε ἐν ἀλλήλοις. Ibid. xiii. 35.

ΧΑΡΙΣ has a more extenſive ſenſe than ΑΓΑΠΗ, and includes its meaning—Gratia, Beneficium, ſed in ea ſignificatione qua ponitur pro Amicitia ſeu Benevolentia fratrum geminorum, See Steph. Theſ. Ling. Gr.

devotion,

devotion, or which he enforces with a ſtronger emphaſis, than that of TRUTH. "Sanctify them through thy TRUTH. — "Thy WORD is TRUTH."[g] He joins it with LIFE, as connected by a cloſe and neceſſary tie, and as conſtituting the WAY which leads immediately to the End of his Religion. "I am the WAY, and the TRUTH, "and the LIFE; no man cometh to the "Father but by ME."[h]

Deſcended from a celeſtial parent, and allied to a ſiſter of ſuch purity and perfection, for its own ſake, and more eſpecially for the ſake of HIM who had all Truth, who, "from his good-will to men," hath given us thoſe ſublime and ſupernatural portions of it, which are moſt accommodated to our neceſſities, and who, "knowing what "is in man," hath conveyed them to us in a manner in which we can receive and improve them to our beſt advantage, this branch of WISDOM is a ſubject at all times moſt deſerving our cultivation and regard. It is

[g] John xvii. 17. [h] Ibid. xiv. 6.

the

the brighteſt object and ornament of the *Underſtanding*, as its ſiſter CHARITY is of the *Heart*.

To open this vaſt and important argument of TRUTH IN GENERAL, by a formal, and what is called a logical, *Definition*, would betray both ignorance and preſumption, and promiſe little ſucceſs in the concluſion. Ariſtotle, indeed, is ſaid to have reproached Democritus as a Teacher and Philoſopher, becauſe he dealt in *Similitudes*, and *Analogies*, and did not define and diſpute in form:[1] And, under the ſanction of his authority, the method of defining has been attempted by ſome philoſophers, perhaps with more confidence than ſucceſs.[k]

TRUTH is of the nature and eſſence of God, like him *Incomprehenſible* in the whole, and *Ineffable* in its ſublimer parts. For theſe and other reaſons it cannot admit of an *adequate Definition*: and who, in the beginning

[1] See Bacon De Augm. Scient. lib. vi. cap. ii.

[k] How imperfect and illogical is that of Wollaſton? Def. 2. Sect. 1.

of his reſearches, ſhould preſume to define that, which, after all his longeſt and beſt-conducted labours, he can only hope partially, and often imperfectly, to comprehend; and of which an important part can neither be *directly* expreſſed, nor *directly* underſtood?[1] We may, indeed, eſteem ourſelves highly favoured by the author and finiſher of all Truth, if, at the end of our reſearches, we ſhall be able any way to underſtand, to define, and to apply, a few particular portions and detachments of it, and to guard them from ERROR and corruption.

When upon a ſolemn occaſion the queſtion was put to our Lord by a Roman Governor, "What is TRUTH?" though it was what

[1] See Butler's Analogy, p. 84.

'What faculties other ſpecies of creatures may have 'to penetrate into the nature and inmoſt conſtitutions of 'things, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, 'that we want other views of them beſides thoſe we have, 'to make diſcoveries of them more perfect. The *in-* '*tellectual* and *ſenſible* world are in this perfectly alike, that 'the parts which we ſee of either of them hold no propor- 'tion to that we ſee not; and whatſoever we can reach 'with our eyes, or our thoughts of either of them, is but 'a point in compariſon of the reſt.' Locke, Hum. Und. B. iii. Ch. 3.

he

he fully and perfectly knew, and what he came purpoſely and profeſſedly to teach,[m] he did not define it. He knew that *Definition* was never the beſt method of inſtruction, and that, in its common uſe and application, it was ſeldom the friend of Truth. Philoſophically viewed Words do not conſtitute Truth. They are only the vocal inſtruments by which it is communicated, or the written ſigns by which it is recorded. By an Enquirer, therefore, Things are to be examined, rather than Words defined. By a Teacher Things are to be conveyed by Words in ſome form or other, which are, doubtleſs, to be explained to the underſtanding, if not ſufficiently underſtood before. But *Explanation* is one thing, and *Definition* quite another. Explanation is the *firſt* office of a Teacher: Definition, if it be good, is the *laſt* of the Enquirer, after the Truth be found; and is then the moſt *advantageouſly* employed by the Teacher, when his previous inſtructions have prepared him for it.

[m] Καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἐλήλυθα εἰς τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα μαρτυρήσω τῇ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ. Πᾶς ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀκούει μου τῆς φωνῆς. John xviii. 37.

But

But let us mark the conduct of a Teacher ſent from God. Himſelf the fountain and conductor of TRUTH, he is repreſented in the ſacred oracles *as* the SUN,[a] the fountain of LIGHT, and *as* the DAY-SPRING FROM ON HIGH,[b] the harbinger of LIGHT: and of theſe apt *Similitudes*, familiar to all even without an explanation, which had been employed by Solomon in ſome of his ſublime portraits of Wiſdom, He often availed himſelf, expreſſing Truth by the ſignificant emblem of LIGHT and the LIGHT OF LIFE.

Whatever opinion we may, therefore, entertain of the doctrines and tenets of the two antient philoſophers, from the example of ONE who was wiſer and "greater" than they, we may venture, in the preſent inſtance, to prefer the native of Abdera to the maſter of the Lycæum: and, inſtead of inſtituting the preſent inveſtigation, by vainly attempting to *define*, it may be ſafer to follow the example of HIM, who in manner as well as in matter was infinitely above the

[a] Pſ. lxxxiv. 11. Mal. iv. 2. [b] Luke i. 78.

Stagyrite,

Stagyrite, and to avail ourſelves of his *Similitude* as a fit illuſtration of TRUTH IN GENERAL.

GOD is a Mind, and TRUTH is conſequently an *Attribute* of MIND.

To the SUN "declaring at his riſing a "marvelous inſtrument," [p] he, "by whom "all things were made," [q] hath delegated the power of enlightening the *material* ſyſtem; whilſt he hath reſerved to HIMSELF the office, which is more ſuitable to his nature, of giving light and knowledge by his eternal TRUTH to the *mind* of man. But, whether he act through the *inſtrumentality* of his creatures, or more *immediately* from himſelf, he is uniform and conſiſtent in his operations: ſo that one part of his divine œconomy is always illuſtrative of another—As the SUN ſheds his *Light* over the material creation to be apprehended by the eye, TRUTH is the *Light* ſhed down from heaven to be apprehended by the intellect, given to illumine every ſubject natu-

[p] Ecclus xliii. 2. [q] John i. 3.

ral

ral and moral, corporeal and ſpiritual, ſo far as they are qualified by their different natures to convey it to the human mind; or rather, perhaps, ſo far as the human mind is qualified to receive it from them: For the difficulty of truth does not exiſt ſo much in the *ſubjects* as in *ourſelves*, and Truths, which are the ſtrongeſt, may ſometimes ſhine upon our minds with the weakeſt force.[r]

[r] Ισως δὲ καὶ τῆς χαλεπότητος ἔσης κατὰ δύο τόπους, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῆς. ὡς γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. Ariſt. M. lib.ii. c.1.

De cauſa difficultatis in Veritatis cognitione diſcrepantes ſunt ſententiæ: alii enim res ipſas hujus difficultatis cauſam eſſe; alii nos ipſos eſſe cenſent. Heraclitus et Academici omnes res fluxas et caducas nullamque omnino ſtabilem et immutabilem eſſe putarunt, et in rebus ipſis difficultatem poſſuerunt. Alii omnem veritatis difficultatem in imbecillitate noſtri intellectus habuerunt, hiſce niſi argumentis. "Siqua res eſſet cognitu difficilis, ea eſſet talis "reſpectu cujuſcunque intellectus; ſed ratione divini In-"tellectus nulla res ſit cognitu difficilis." Et "Quicquid "per ſe tale eſt, id ea re non eſt difficile tale." Sed intermedia Sententia recipienda eſt Quod difficultas cognoſcendæ veritatis partim ad nos, partim ad res ipſas referenda ſit. Joan. Ludov. Hayer. Com. in Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. 2, cap. 1.

THUS

Thus from the *Divine* Mind TRUTH becomes an *Attribute* of the *Human*, and muſt be in proportion to the MIND in which it is: and, from a comparative view of theſe different minds, ſo far as we can judge of them, however imperfectly that may be, aſſiſted by this illuſtrative ſimilitude of LIGHT, we may hope to arrive at a general conception of TRUTH as it relates to man.

In the DIVINE Mind, which pervades and comprehends all things, it is *Univerſal*, (allowing for the inadequate comprehenſion of our ideas and words when applied to the Deity): in the HUMAN, which, though it be capable of enlargement from the body, and can reach to diſtant times and places, is not of all times and places, it is *Partial*; as the *Light* of the Sun, by the rotation of the earth, is to the human eye: For, whereas our Minds are only in particular places at particular times, it is the ſole prerogative of the Divine to be in all places and at all times — In the DIVINE Mind, which is ſeparate and diſtinct from Body, it

is

is *Immediate* and *Intuitive:* in the HUMAN, which is joined by a myſterious union with the Body, it is *Mediate* and *Progreſſive*, advancing through the information of the Senſes to the operations of the Intellect; like the gradual dawn of *Light* — In the DIVINE Mind which is ſimple and uncompounded, it is of *Equal* force: in the HUMAN, which is compoſed of different Faculties adapted to different ſubjects, it is of *different Degrees* and *Kinds* according to the difference of its Faculties and the ſubjects preſented to them; as the *Light* is varied into many degrees of ſhade and colour, according to the different media through which it paſſes — In the DIVINE Mind, which is pure, it is *Unerring* and *Infallible:* in the HUMAN, which is corrupt, it is *ſubject to Error*; as the pure *Light* of the Sun is darkened and obſcured by the groſſer exhalations of the earth — But, as the DIVINE Mind is incapable of change, ſo alſo is the HUMAN: and whatever may be the imperfections of TRUTH as it relates to man, it is *Immutable*, that

is,

is, abſolute and oppoſite to falſhood; as "*Darkneſs* is to *Light*, and *Light* to *Dark-*"*neſs.*"

Thus of TRUTH, which in its omniſcient Fountain, is UNIVERSAL, IMMEDIATE, EQUAL, and INFALLIBLE, from the infirmity and inferiority of their nature, men are only bleſt with a PARTIAL, PROGRESSIVE, VARIOUS though IMMUTABLE, ray; and that obſtructed by paſſions, prejudices, habits and vices, the cauſes of ERROR, as clouds and vapours obſcure the SUN: and, however deſtined to be the guide of men, this TRUTH, imperfect as it is, is not beſtowed with an unconditional profuſion; but is HIDDEN in darkneſs, and involved in difficulties, intended, like all the other gifts of heaven, to be ſought and cultivated by all the different powers and exertions of human REASON.

The LOVE OF TRUTH is one of the ſtrongeſt paſſions of the Mind, a ſtimulus[a]

[a] Ορεξις διανοητικη, ης το εῦ και κακῶς τ'αληθὲς και ψεύδος. Ariſtot. Eth. Nic. lib. v. cap. 2.

which

which prompts it to its ſublimeſt exerciſe: and the INVESTIGATION of its various kinds, whether they reſt in *Contemplation*,[t] are applied to *Action*,[u] or operate in *Effect*,[w] is the moſt honourable employment of human life. This honour, to which all who have leiſure and opportunity ſhould ambitiouſly aſpire, is enhanced three ways — by the *utility* of the Truth in queſtion — by the *aſſiduity* and *ability* employed to overcome the difficulty of the ſearch — and by the *willingneſs* with which, when found, it is received and adopted; forming together an exalted union of Intellectual and Moral Virtue: and One, who was the moſt highly honoured of earthly potentates, could withdraw from the ſplendour of his riches and the glories of his crown, as a candidate for the higher honour of cultivating this Wiſdom, and of miniſtering in all her provinces. "The glory of God," ſays Solomon, "is to conceal a thing; and the ho-"nour of the King to ſearch it out."[x]

[t] Ἐπιστήμη. [u] Πρᾶξις. [w] Ποίησις. See Ariſt. Eth. Nic. lib. vi. cap. 3, 4.

[x] Proverbs xxv. 2.

Conſcious,

Ariſtotle raiſes the philoſophy of MIND above all other parts of learning. He aſſigns it the inveſtigation of the PRINCIPLES and CAUSES[a] of things in general, and ranks it not only as ſuperior, but alſo as *prior*, in the order of nature, to the whole tribe of Arts and Sciences. . . . .

But, 'what is firſt to nature is not firſt to man.' Nature begins with *Cauſes* which produce *Effects*. Man begins with *Effects* and by them aſcends to *Cauſes*. Thus all human ſtudy and inveſtigation proceed of neceſſity in the reverſe of the natural order of things, from *Senſible* to *Intelligible*, from *Body* the Effect to *Mind* which is both the firſt and final Cauſe. Now PHYSIC being the name given by the Peripatetic to the philoſophy of Body, from this neceſſary courſe of human ſtudies ſome of his interpreters[b] called that of Mind METAPHYSIC,[c]

[a] Δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικήν. Ariſt. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2.

[b] Alexander and Philoponus.

[c] ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ. Cujus inſcriptionis hæc ratio eſt, quod in hoc opere ea tractentur quorum theorea poſterior eſt doctrina naturali ſaltem quoad nos, qui a corporum cognitione rerumque caducarum, in ſubſtantiarum

implying alſo by that term, that, its ſubject being more ſublime and difficult than any other as it relates to *Univerſals*,[d] the ſtudy of it would come moſt properly and ſucceſsfully AFTER THAT OF PHYSICS.

Taking it, however, in its natural order as furniſhing the general Principles[e] of all other parts of learning, which deſcend from thence to the cultivation of particular ſubjects,[f] Ariſtotle himſelf called this the FIRST PHILOSOPHY: But, as its ſubject is *Univerſal Being*,[g] particularly MIND which is the higheſt and moſt univerſal, he gave it alſo the appellation of the UNIVERSAL SCIENCE, common to all the reſt:[h]

tiarum immaterialium atque immortalium contemplationem provehimur. Du Val. Synopſ. Doctr. Peripat.

[d] Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου· πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2.

[e] Ὑπολαμβάνομεν δὴ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι μάλιστα πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὡς ἐνδέχεται, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2.

[f] See Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. ii. cap. 1, 2.

[g] Ὂν ᾗ ὄν See Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. iv. cap. 1.

[h] Ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία καθόλου—πασῶν κοινή. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1.

And, laſtly, to finiſh his encomium of this firſt and univerſal philoſophy, he honoured it with the excluſive name of WISDOM.[1]

And though, in his celebrated Partition of the Sciences, Lord Bacon has made the diſtribution of METAPHYSICS ſomewhat differently from that of the old philoſophers, he treats this FIRST PHILOSOPHY with the greateſt reſpect and attention, calling it the general root or ſtem out of which the other

Ut Phyſica tractat res naturales et corporeas quæ materia conſtant et forma; ſic Metaphyſica res incorporeas et materiæ expertes, quæ divinæ dicuntur. — Agit, primo, de Ente generatim ejuſque principiis, eſſentia ſcilicet et exiſtentia et partibus, ſive de ſummis generibus Entis et Categoriis, ut res ſint ſive partes Entis; deinde, de Subſtantia Spirituali ſive Spiritu, et, ultimatim, de Deo. — Eſt Scientiarum Univerſaliſſima. Diſſerit generatim per ſupremas cauſas et univerſales, primaque principia; unde nominata SAPIENTIA et PRIMA PHILOSOPHIA. Du Val. Synopſ. Doct. Peripat.

[1] Primus Philoſophus res ſpeculatur quatenus abſtractæ ſunt, ab omnique nexu liberæ. Philoſophia autem Prima ea eſt quæ etiam Sapientia dicitur, cujus ambitu omnes diſciplinæ cinguntur. ἡ πολυθρύλητος σοφία, ἣν καὶ αὐτὴν ἁπλῶς ἐπιστήμην καλητέον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην, ut inquit Themiſt. in 1 Poſter. Ipſa enim tenet et ſpeculatur primarias rerum cauſas. Budæi Comment. in Ling. Gr.

Ἡ σοφία περὶ τίνας αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη.

Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 1.

general

parts of learning ſhoot into ſeparate branches, viewing it in hopeful proſpect, when more maturely cultivated, as ſupplying a collection of *Axioms* and *Univerſal Propoſitions* appropriated to no particular ſcience but of more general application, conſidering it as the *Parent* of them all, declaring it *tranſcendent*, and calling it with Plato THE SCIENCE OF THINGS DIVINE AND HUMAN.[k]

Mr. Locke has taken the moſt uſeful part of this fruitful field of ancient erudition, which forms the moſt difficult as well as the ſublimeſt ſubject of inveſtigation, and has deſcended, with peculiar genius and ability and a native ſtrength of mind, to the analyſis of the *Human Underſtanding*. And, if this great philoſopher had followed the example of the learned Cudworth in his *Intellectual Syſtem*, and built his work upon the foundation of the ancient metaphyſicians, he would have added much to its merit and perfection, and have greatly enhanced that fame, which it has already made immortal.

[k] De Augm. Sc. lib. iii. cap. 1. See Plato in Theæt. and Cic. 2. Tuſc. Queſt.

The object of this Universal Science or Philosophy of MIND, the seat of all learning and the storehouse of all TRUTH, is both the first in dignity and the largest in comprehension. It is a study both deep and difficult; a study which has been too much conducted on false principles founded only in imagination, too long perverted and obscured by the subtleties of logic, and too often terminated in something more injurious to Truth than mere refinement and speculation. When founded, however, on just observation and sound reflection, and conducted by rational investigation, it is a study which paves the way to a more scientific and successful cultivation of all the other parts of knowledge.[1]

Waving, for the present, the further pursuit of this fundamental Science, in its use or in its abuse, through the volumes of ancient and modern metaphysicians, and without descending to a more minute parti-

[1] Τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι, τῷ μάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. οὗτος γὰρ οἶδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα. Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2.

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cular of the HUMAN MIND, that imperfect emanation of the Divine, it will be ſufficient for the purpoſe of theſe Lectures that its general functions have been diſtributed into three different provinces—The THEORETIC, the PRACTIC, and the POETIC, Mind,[m] which I ſhall otherwiſe expreſs by the INTELLECT, the WILL, and the IMAGINATION.

[m] Πασα διάνοια, ἢ ΠΡΑΤΙΚΗ, ἢ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ, ἢ ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΗ. See Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1. for the philoſophical diſtinction between them.

Philoſophia Theoretica eſt, cujus finis eſt Veritatis nuda ſolaque contemplatio.

Philoſophia Practica, cujus finis eſt Praxis, id eſt Actio interna, libera, ex electione profecta, et ad Bonum directa.

Philoſophia Poetica, cujus finis eſt Poeſis, id eſt Effectio, ſeu Actio externa. Du Val. Synop. Doctrin. Peripat.

Plato divided the Mind into four Faculties or Affections ΝΟΗΣΙΣ, ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ, ΠΙΣΤΙΣ, ΕΙΚΑΣΙΑ: Intelligentia, Cogitatio, Fides, Simulatio—correſpondent to the different *Degrees* of Truth. Νοήσις ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτατῳ, Διάνοια ἐπὶ τῷ δευτερῳ, τῷ τριτῳ Πιστις, καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ Εἰκασια. (De Repub. ſub fine.) This Diſtribution is not however ſo well calculated to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral *Kinds*, as ΠΙΣΤΙΣ is common relating to all the kinds.

Lord Bacon makes his general Partition of Learning as it relates to the MEMORY, the IMAGINATION, and REASON. "Partitio Doctrinæ humanæ ea eſt veriſſima quæ ſumitur

ex

To each of theſe Faculties, in their operation upon their reſpective objects external or internal, TRUTH IN GENERAL divides into *ſpecial* relations; and the diſtribution of its ſeveral PARTS, forming the whole circle of Learning divine and human, will be moſt naturally and philoſophically made, according as they range under one or other of theſe general provinces.

"ex triplici facultate animi rationalis quæ Doctrinæ ſedes "eſt. Hiſtoria ad Memoriam refertur, Poeſis ad Phan- "taſiam, Philoſophia ad Rationem.—Neque aliâ cenſe- "mus ad Theologica partitione opus eſſe." De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. c. 1.

And in the 7th Book he refers Morality to the WILL under the conduct of *Reaſon*.

This diſtribution of our great Philoſopher and Reformer of Learning ſeems, alſo, to be imperfect; for REASON is the general Inſtrument of the mind common to all its faculties, (and his words are *ex triplici facultate* ANIMI RATIONALIS,) and common alike to all the kinds of Truth or Learning.

I have, therefore, preferred the diſtribution of the Peripatetic to thoſe both of the Academic and Engliſh Philoſopher as being more *proper* and *diſtinct*, and alſo as *comprehenſive*; for under his diviſion Διάνοια θεωρητικὴ he claſſes all thoſe parts of learning which do not belong to the other two. Τρεῖς φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαὶ, μαθεματικὴ, φυσικὴ, θεολογική. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1.

And for the ſame reaſons I deem it much more juſt and philoſophical than Mr. Locke's *Diviſion of the Sciences* in the Concluſion of his Eſſay.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of PRINCIPLES in general.

THAT all TRUTH of which the MIND is capable, to whatever *Faculty* it may relate, is derived from certain PRINCIPLES[a] or firſt and fundamental

[a] Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ, ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως. Φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπισημῶν· διὰ γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου παραγίνονται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη τέχνων. Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i. cap. 1.

Οὐκ ἴσμεν δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας. ἔκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον. οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμότατον. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦτο τῆς θερμότητος. ὥστε καὶ ἀληθέστατον τὸ τοῖς ὑστέροις αἴτιον τοῦ ἀληθεύειν εἶναι. διὸ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἀρχὰς, ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀληθεστάτας. οὐ γάρ ποτε ἀληθεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐκείνας αἴτιόν τι ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ-

truths, which are the cauſes why other things are true, is a maxim older than the days of Ariſtotle, in which all ſound philoſophers have neceſſarily concurred; ſince, by the contrary ſuppoſition, there could be no ſuch thing as Truth at all: [b] For, as all the productions of the *material* creation owe their exiſtence to Seeds of one kind or other; ſo every true production in the *intellectual* ſyſtem owes its exiſtence to ſome ſort of PRINCIPLES analogous to SEEDS.

But though all philoſophers, who are in any reſpect entitled to that name, are unanimouſly agreed in the exiſtence of ſuch PRINCIPLES, as the only foundation of ſound learning; it is amazing to reflect how widely they differ from each other in determining what they are. Almoſt every one, who has embarked in the ſearch of knowledge, has exhibited a ſtring of his own as the grounds of his future reaſoning; and

ναι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ὥσθ' ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τῷ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. ii. cap. 1.

[b] See the 4th Chapter of the 4th Book of Ariſtotle's Metaph.

others

others refuſing to admit them, have, upon equal authority, ſubſtituted different ones in their room.[c] Ariſtotle himſelf, after refuting thoſe of all his predeceſſors[d] was the prolific father of various Principles; and, collected from one or other, their number, their variety, and their inconſiſtency are almoſt infinite.

PRINCIPLES as well as Seeds are, doubtleſs, of many and various kinds, and to canvaſs and examine them, to reduce them to ſimplicity and order, to arrange them into claſſes, and to determine them with preciſion, is the firſt and moſt eſſential office of ſound logic.

As they are indiſpenſible to all Truth,[e] What are PRINCIPLES? is a previous queſ-

[c] See Ariſtot. Metaph. B. ii. chap. 3, 4, 5, 6. in which the Peripatetic delivers the different opinions of the ancient philoſophers, Heſiod, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Xenophon, Meliſſus and Plato.

[d] See Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 7.

[e] Μάλιϛα δὲ ἐπιϛητὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια. διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων τἄλλα γνωρίζεται, ἀλλ' ὐ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2.

See Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. ii. cap. 2.

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tion more important to the inquirer than "What is Truth?"

Are they ſuch AXIOMS or UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS[f] as thoſe upon which Ariſtotle and the ſages of antiquity erected *Sciences* and *Syſtems*, and ſuch as our Newton eſtabliſhed as his *Principia?* If this queſtion be affirmed, (and it will not be denied,) it will bring after it another of equal moment. Are theſe Axioms ſuch PRINCIPLES as are properly FIRST; ſuch as have the *ſeed* abſolutely in themſelves, that is, ſuch as are derived from no others of any kind whatever by any act or proceſs of Reaſon; ſuch as, in the words of a living writer 'are *intuitively* certain, or *intuitely* probable, and are known by a power of the 'mind which perceives truth not by progreſſive argumentation, but by an inſtantaneous and inſtinctive impulſe; derived 'neither from education nor from habit, but 'from nature; acting independently upon

[f] Καθόλυ γὰρ μάλιϛα, καὶ πάντων ἄρχαι τὰ ΑΞΙΩΜΑΤΑ ϵἰσίν.

Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. iii. cap. 2.

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'our will, whenever the object is preſented, 'according to an eſtabliſhed law, and there- 'fore not improperly called *Senſe*, and act- 'ing in *the ſame* manner upon all mankind, 'and therefore properly called *Common Senſe*, 'the ultimate judge of Truth?'[z] Or, are they the reſult of the laborious inveſtigations, reaſonings and deductions of a few philoſophers? —— If the latter part of this alternative be true (and the *Categories* from which Ariſtotle formed his Axioms, whether philoſophically or not is here no queſtion, as well as the *Principia* of Newton, have immortalized the fame of their inventors as ſplendid monuments of human Reaſon;) there muſt be OTHER *Grounds* or *Evidences* productive of *intuitive* certainty or *intuitive* probability, obvious, inſtantaneous and incapable of being deduced by Reaſon, which are as the FIRST PRINCIPLES from which theſe SECONDARY ONES are, by a proceſs of Reaſon, formed.'

Theſe Primary Principles, (and they have ſurely the firſt title to the name of Prin-

[z] Beattie's Eſſay on Truth, p. 36 and 42.

ciples,)

ciples,) are mentioned by the ſame living author to be — the EVIDENCE OF EXTERNAL SENSE; the EVIDENCE OF INTERNAL SENSE or CONSCIOUSNESS; the EVIDENCE OF MEMORY, and ſome more. [h]

This general diviſion of PRINCIPLES into PRIMARY and SECONDARY, ORIGINAL and DERIVED, EVIDENCES and AXIOMS, let the diſtinction be made in what terms you will, however novel it may ſound, is, I hope, philoſophically made [i] and, if ſo, it will be found of great importance in the ſearch of Truth in general, as it will divide our REASONING, which ſhould always be governed by the Principles, into two direct kinds or methods.

[h] Beattie's Eſſay on Truth, p. 43.

[i] Theſe original *Evidences* are acknowledged by Ariſtotle in b. ii. chap. 19. of the Poſt. Analyt. as the genuine foundation from which all *Axioms* are derived: and though he chooſes to reſerve an equal *honour* to the latter, he allows the former to be *neceſſary* to their exiſtence. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μὲν τίνα δύναμιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δ' ἔχειν, ἢ ἐϛι τέτων τιμιωτέρα κάτ' ἀκρίβειαν—δυνάμιν σύμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἣν καλῶσιν ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of REASONING in general.

ALL TRUTH, to whatever *Province* or department of MIND it bears a reference, is deduced from PRINCIPLES, by an act of REASON, the faculty which is common to them all, and which is diſtinguiſhing prerogative of human nature.

It is obſerved by the excellent Lord Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning*, that ſoundneſs of Direction in the application of the means takes away error and confuſion, and is the principal of thoſe general expedients, by which every work is to be ſucceſsfully conducted. [a]

[a] Merito primas tenet, *Conſilii prudentia et ſanitas*; hoc eſt, monſtratio et delineatio viæ rectæ et proclivis ad rem

To execute a work in the line of his profeſſion with competent ability, the Artiſt not only underſtands the *power* and *compaſs* of his Inſtrument; but the particular *manner* in which, according to the nature of his materials and the progreſs of the work, it is to be employed. And it is of equal moment to the Philoſopher to know the general *power* and *compaſs* of REASON, the Inſtrument of Truth; and alſo the particular *method* in which it is to be applied on different ſubjects, and in different ſtages of the inveſtigation: becauſe the want of a juſt attention to theſe fundamentals of ſound LOGIC has often miſled the Reaſoner, increaſed his labour, and diſgraced his learning.

A falſe eſtimate of REASON heightened, as it has often been, into a wild conceit of

eam quæ propoſitur, peragendam. Claudus enim (quod dici ſolet) *in via, antevertit curſorem extra viam:* Et Solomon perappoſite ad hanc rem: *Ferrum ſi retuſum fuerit, viribus utendum majoribus: quod vero ſuper omnia prævalet, eſt ſapientia.* Quibus verbis innuit, medii prudentem electionem efficacius conducere ad rem, quam virium aut intentionem aut accumulationem. De Augm. Sc. lib. ii.

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its all-ſufficiency, and that it is itſelf the Cauſe and the Standard of all Truth, is a fatal rock by which many adventurers in philoſophy have either ſuffered ſhipwreck before they were well embarked, or elſe have been thrown out of the direct road, and left to the mercy of the waves to be toſſed upon a tempeſtuous ſea, by every blaſt of doctrine, into all the harbours round the world except the right one. Suppoſing that from its own underived reſources, by acting and reacting upon itſelf, REASON can diſcover all truth of conſequence to man, they totally miſtake both its Nature and Office; as it is neither the original *Cauſe*, nor the *Standard*, of Truth.

So far from being the Cauſe of Truth, it cannot penetrate into, or even apprehend, the Eſſence or Subſtances of things corporeal or mental.[b] It can only paſs over their ſurface to take account of their Qualities, Powers, Properties, Operations and Af-

[b] Internas ſubſtantias nullo ſenſu, nulla actione reflexa cognoſcimus. Newtoni Sch. Gen. ſub fine Princip.

ſections, which are the *Cauſes:* and that not directly and of itſelf, but by the help of ſuch Evidence as nature has ſupplied, which is the *Standard* of Truth.

REASON *conſiſts* of *Perception* and *Judgment*, and operates by *Compariſon:* and its *Office* is to judge of EVIDENCES, to form and to apply AXIOMS, and to trace SIMILITUDES; ſo that it is properly the INSTRUMENT of Truth. And, in the execution of its office, it acts liberally and impartially, when not perverted and abuſed, accommodating its METHOD and operation to the *Principles* and to the nature of the Subject, whatever they may be, upon which it is employed.

SECT I.

Of the INDUCTIVE Method. *

EVERY thing in the univerſe, whether of Mind or Body, preſents itſelf to our obſervation, however mixed with others, in its *individual* ſtate: ſo that PERCEPTION

* Sir Reid on the Mind. Ch. 6. ſect. 24. and

and JUDGMENT employed in the inveſtigation of all Truth have, in the firſt place, to encounter with PARTICULARS. With theſe Reaſon begins, or ſhould begin, its operations. It obſerves, tries, canvaſſes, examines, and compares them together, and judges of them by ſome of thoſe native *Evidences* and original lights, which, as they are the firſt and indiſpenſable inlets of knowledge to the mind, have been called the PRIMARY PRINCIPLES of Truth.[c]

By ſuch acts of Obſervation and Judgment diligently practiſed and frequently repeated, exerciſed on many *particular* or *individual* ſubjects of the ſame claſs and of a ſimilar nature, noting their agreements and marking the differences however minute, and re-

[c] Homo naturæ miniſter et interpres tantum facit et intelligit, quantum de ordine naturæ opere vel mente obſervaverit; nec amplius ſcit, aut poteſt. Bacon De Interp. Naturæ, et Nov. Orig. lib. i. aph. 1.

Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ, ὅτι, εἴ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν· — ἐταχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν, ἀδύνατον. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ αἴσθησις.

Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i.

jecting all inſtances which, however ſimilar in appearance, are not in effect the ſame, REASON, with much labour and attention, extracts ſome *general Laws*[d] reſpecting the Powers, Properties, Qualities, Actions, Paſſions, Virtues and Relations of things, which are the Cauſes of Truth.

This is no haſty, premature, notional abſtraction of the mind, by which images and ideas are formed that in nature have no exiſtence. It is a rational, operative, experimental proceſs,* inſtituted and executed upon the real nature and conſtitution of things. By this proceſs REASON advances from *Particulars* to *Generals*, from *leſs General* to *more General*, till, by a ſeries of ſlow progreſſion, and by regular degrees, it arrive at the *moſt General*, ideas, called

[d] Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ. Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. ii. cap. 19. See lib. ii. c. 13.

* Manus hominis nuda, quantumvis robuſta et conſtans, ad opera pauca et facile ſequentia ſufficit: eadem ope inſtrumentorum multa et reluctantia vincit. Similis eſt et mentis ratio. Baconi Nov. Org.

FORMS

FORMS or FORMAL CAUSES.[f] And, by *affirming* or *denying* a Genus of a Species or an Accident of a Subſtance or of a claſs of Subſtances through all the ſtages of the gradation, we form *Concluſions*, which, if logically drawn, are AXIOMS,[g]

[f] Qui FORMAS novit, is, quæ adhuc non facta ſunt, qualia nec naturæ viciſitudines, nec experimentales induſtriæ unquam in actum produxiſſent, nec cogitationem humanam ſubituræ fuiſſent, detegit et educit. Ibid.

[g] AXIOMS are the reſult of the moſt laborious and recondite learning, and that they ſhould be firmly eſtabliſhed is an object of the firſt importance to the ſucceſs of every branch of ſcience. Lord Bacon, therefore, ſtrenuouſly contends that they ſhould never be taken upon conjecture, or even upon the authority of the learned, but that, as they are the general Principles and grounds of all learning, they are to be canvaſſed and examined with the moſt ſcrupulous attention, 'ut Axiomatum corriga-'tur iniquitas, quæ plerumque in exemplis vulgatis fun-'damentum habent." De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. cap. 2. 'Atque illa ipſa putativa Principia ad rationes reddendas 'compellere decrevimus, quouſque plane conſtent.' Diſtrib. Operis.

That all Axioms are *intuitive* and *ſelf-evident* truths, is a fundamental miſtake, into which Mr. Locke [Eſſay, B. iv. C. 7. §. 1.] and others [ſee Ancient Metaphyſics, Vol. I. B. v. C. 3. p. 389. and Vol. II. p. 335.] have been betrayed, to the great injury of ſcience. This error has, I apprehend, been engrafted upon another equally prevalent, That mathematics is a ſyſtem, or however a ſpecimen, of univerſal reaſoning: And, as mathema-

derful, expedients by which REASON puſhes on its enquiries in the particular purſuit of Truth, in every branch of knowledge: and the METHOD of Reaſoning, by which they are formed, is that of true and legitimate INDUCTION,[k] which is therefore called, by the beſt and ſoundeſt of logicians, the *Key of Interpretation*.[l]

Inſtead of taking his Axioms out of the great families of the Catagories by an immediate and indolent extraction, and erecting them by his own ſophiſtical invention into the Principles upon which his diſputation was to be employed,[m] had the analytical

[k] Inductionem cenſemus eam eſſe demonſtrandi formam quæ ſenſum tuetur et naturam premit, et operibus immi-net ac fere immiſcetur. Baconi Diſtrib. Operis.

[l] Ibid. Nov. Org. Lib. ii. Aph. 10.

[m] Ex experientia arripiunt varia et vulgaria, eaque neque certo comperta, nec diligenter examinata et penſitata; reliqua in meditatione atque ingenii agitatione ponunt.—Hujus generis exemplum in Ariſtotele maxime conſpicuum eſt, qui philoſophiam dialecticâ ſuâ corrupit, quum mundum ex *Categoriis* effecerit, et inumera pro arbitrio ſuo naturæ rerum impoſuerit, magis ubique ſolicitus quomodo quis reſpondendo ſe explicet, et aliquid reddatur in *verbis* poſitivum, quam de interna *rerum* veritate.—Ille enim prius decreverat; neque experientiam ad conſtituendą axiomata

genius of Ariſtotle preſented us with the Laws of the true INDUCTIVE LOGIC by which Axioms are philoſophically formed, and given us an example of it in a ſingle branch of ſcience with his uſual ſagacity,[a]

axiomata rite conſuluit; ſed, poſtquam pro arbitrio ſuo decreviſſet, experientiam ad ſua placita tortam circumducit et captivam. Ibid. Lib. i. Aph. 62 & 63.

[a] Though in different parts of his works he gives a general idea of INDUCTION; [Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς λόγης, οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν, καὶ οἱ δι' ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗΣ· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν· εἱ μὲν, λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων· οἱ δὲ, δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλε, διὰ τὸ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθέκαςον. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i. cap. i. Ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία. Ἡ μὲν δι' ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗΣ, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. Ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐςι καὶ τὸ καθόλε. Ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλε. Εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ, ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν ἄκ ἔςι συλλογισμός. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 3.] from the whole of them, *Analytical*, *Topical* and *Phyſical*, it is clear he was very imperfectly acquainted with the particular philoſophy of the Inductive Organon: and it is apparent from a paſſage in his Ethics [μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς, ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι, καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἤτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐςιν ἡ ὁδός. Ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ςαδίῳ, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέμπε, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΓΝΩΡΙΜΩΝ. Τοῦτα δὲ διττῶς. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν, τὰ δ' ἁπλῶς. Ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν πατρακτέον ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΗΜΙΝ ΓΝΩΡΙΜΩΝ.—ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ

he would have brought an offering more valuable and acceptable to the temple of Truth than he has done by the aggregate of all his logical and philoſophical productions.

It is, after the *Inductive* proceſs has been induſtriouſly purſued and ſucceſsfully performed, that DEFINITION,* ſo pompouſly but prematurely, ſo formally but gratuitouſly, affected by the old logicians and their diſciples of the Schools, may be logically and uſefully introduced, by beginning with the *Genus*, paſſing through all the graduate and ſubordinate ſtages, and marking the *Specific difference* as it deſcends, till it arrive at the *Individual* which is the ſubject of the queſtion: And, by adding an *Affirmation* or *Negation* of the attribute of the *Genus* on the *Species* or *Individual*, or of that of a

τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρχέντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Eth. Nicom. lib. i. cap. 4.] that he never put it in practice in the formation of his Axioms and Principles, which he choſe rather to aſſume gratuitouſly, or to fabricate out of his own invention. See Analyt. Poſt. l. i. c. 24.

* Δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ ὧν ὁ ὁρισμὸς, προειδέναι καὶ εἶναι γνώριμα. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 7.

general

general *Accident* on the particular *Subſtance* ſo defined, making the Definition a Propoſition, the truth of the queſtion will be logically ſolved, without any farther proceſs.[p] So that, inſtead of being the *firſt*, as employed by the logic in common uſe, *Definition* may be the *laſt*, act of Reaſon in the ſearch of Truth in general.[q]

But I am now anticipating the ſubject of the following ſection.

SECT. II.

Of the SYLLOGISTIC Method.

THESE AXIOMS or GENERAL PROPOSITIONS thus *Inductively* eſtabliſhed, become another ſpecies of PRINCIPLES which may be properly called SECONDARY, and which lay the foundation of another and different METHOD of Reaſoning.

[p] See Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i. cap. 10.

[q] I only except Mathematical truth.

When

When theſe are formed, but not before, we may ſafely admit the maxim with which logicians ſet out in the exerciſe of their art, as the great hinge on which their reaſoning and diſputation turn. *From truths that are already known,*[1] *to derive others which are not known.* Or, to ſtate it more comprehenſively, ſo as to apply to *probable* as well as to *ſcientific* Reaſoning — *From truths which are better known,*[2] *to derive others which are leſs known.*

Theſe KNOWN and BETTER KNOWN truths are thoſe of AXIOMS or General Propoſitions, the exiſtence of which this other METHOD of Reaſoning not only ſuppoſes, but alſo that there is a ſubordination and gradation of them, upon which as PRINCIPLES, all its operations are founded, and on the truth and ſoundneſs of which its ſucceſs muſt ultimately depend.

[1] Ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμοτέρων καὶ πρότερων καὶ αἰτιῶν τῆ συμπεράσματος. Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i.

[2] Ex præcognitis et præconceſſis.

Philo-

Philoſophically ſpeaking, this Reaſoning is, Under *general Propoſitions* to reduce others which are *leſs general* or which are *particular*,[t] where the *proof* is out of higher and more general Propoſitions; for the *inferior* ones are only known to be true, as we trace their connection with the *ſuperior*. Logically ſpeaking, it is, To predicate a *Genus* of a *Species* or *Individual* contained and comprehended under it,[u] or an *Accident* of the *Subſtance* in which it is inherent:[w] For whatever as a whole or Genus contains

[t] Manifeſtum eſt artem judicandi per Syllogiſmum nihil aliud eſſe, quam reductionem Propoſitionum ad Principia. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4.

[u] ΚΑΘ' ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΥ——Τῶν ὄντων, τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν· οἷον, ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινος ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν. Ariſtot. Categ. cap. ii.

[w] ΕΝ ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΩ——τὰ δὲ, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται· (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω, ὃ ἐν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον, ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν·) οἷον ἡ τὶς γραμματικὴ, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται· καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκὸν, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῷ σώματι, (ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα, ἐν σώματι,) καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται· Ibid.

another

another as a part or Species, it communicates to it its nature and properties; and whatever common *Accident* is actually inherent in a claſs of *Subſtances*, it communicates itſelf, in a logical ſenſe, to every *particular* of the claſs: ſo that, when a queſtion ariſes upon any ſubject, the enquiry is, What is true of the Genus or Family under which it claſſes; for that will be always true of it whether a *ſpecies* or a *particular* and vice versâ, upon the great logical *Maxim*, that *What is true of the whole, is true of all its parts.*[*] And here we arrive at the true foundation of that *agreement* and *diſagreement*, which conſtitute *affirmative* and *negative* truth.

This Method of Reaſoning has obtained the name of SYLLOGISM or Collection,

[*] Quod verùm eſt de toto verum eſt de omni.

This is generally expreſſed by *Dictum de omni*, a Logical Axiom That what is affirmed of the *genus* or *whole* may be affirmed of all the *ſpecies* and *individuals* under it. And the oppoſite Axiom is *Dictum de nullo* That what is denied of the *genus* or *whole* may be denied of its *ſpecies* or *individuals*. By theſe Axioms all the *Moods* of the firſt *Figure* are governed, to which all the legitimate *Moods* of the other *Figures* are reducible.

which

which has been analyſed by Ariſtotle in a minute and laborious proceſs with a wonderful degree of ſubtlety and acumen, who has exhibited it to view in every poſſible ſhape, enacted the *Laws* by which it is to be governed, and invented all the *Moods* and *Figures* into which it may be caſt.

Thus INDUCTION and SYLLOGISM are the two METHODS of *direct Reaſoning* correſponding to the two kinds of Principles, *Primary* and *Secondary*, on which they are founded, and by which they are reſpectively conducted.[7] In both Methods, indeed, Reaſon proceeds by *judging* and *comparing*, but the proceſs is DIFFERENT throughout. In the exerciſe of INDUCTION, the firſt thing is, To perceive and to JUDGE of Particulars from their reſpective Evidence by *ſingle apprehenſion*, as the ſenſes do of objects; and

[7] Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λόγους, οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν· οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων· οἱ δὲ, δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλε, διὰ τὸ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθέκαστον. Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i. cap. 1.

the

the next, To COMPARE theſe judgments together, by *ſingle* and *ſimple* acts, and that *immediately*,[z] from the agreement of a number of which *collateral* judgments, General Ideas and Propoſitions are derived. In the exerciſe of SYLLOGISM, the firſt thing is to COMPARE, by *double* and *complex* compariſons, by the help of a third or *middle* term ſeverally applied to the two original terms of the queſtion,[a] making two propoſitions called the Premiſes: and the ſecond thing is to JUDGE of theſe *Premiſes* in order to col-

[z] Ἔστι δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος συλλογισμὸς τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀμέσου προτάσεως. Ariſtot. Analyt. Prior. cap. xxiii.

In arte judicandi, aut per inductionem aut per ſyllogiſmum concluditur. At, quatenus ad judicium quod fit per inductionem, *uno eodemque mentis opere* id quod quæritur invenitur et judicatur. *Neque* enim *per medium aliquod* res tranſigitur, ſed *immediate*, eodemque fere modo quo fit in *ſenſu*: quippe ſenſus in objectis ſuis primariis ſimul et objecti ſpeciem arripit et ejus veritate conſentit. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4.

[a] Ὧν μὲν γάρ ἐστι μέσον, διὰ τοῦ μέσου ὁ συλλογισμός· ὧν δὲ μή ἐστι, δι' ἐπαγωγῆς. Analyt. Prior. Cap. xxiii.

Aliter fit in Syllogiſmo, cujus probatio immediata non eſt, ſed per *medium* perficitur. De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. iv.

lect

leſt a third propoſition, or *Concluſion*, different from them both.[b] As, therefore, theſe Methods of reaſoning proceed on different Principles, ſo they are not only *different* but the *reverſe* of each other;[c] and, though it may have the ſanction of Ariſtotle, an *Inductive Syllogiſm*[d] is a ſoleciſm.

Till general truths are aſcertained by Induction theſe *third* or *middle terms* by which Syllogiſms are made, are no where ſafely to be found: for it is only by the middle terms and propoſitions taken from general truths, by which leſs general or particular truths can be evinced.[e] 'The invention 'of the *Middle Term* or Argument by Induc-'tion is, therefore, one and the firſt thing, 'and the judgment of the *Conſequence* from the

[b] Συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος, ἐν ᾧ, τεθέντων τινῶν, ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. Ariſtot. Analyt. Prior. lib. i. cap. 1.

[c] Καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀντίκεισθαι ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ τῷ συλλογισμῷ, are the words of Ariſtotle himſelf. Analyt. Prior. cap. xxiii.

[d] See Analyt. Prior. lib. ii. cap. 23.

[e] Let the truth in queſtion be Whether A contain C, and the general truth That A contains B. B the Subject of the general Propoſition is the Middle Term, by which a Middle

argument by Syllogiſm is another and the ſecond.'[f] So that another poſition of the Peripatetic, *That Syllogiſm is naturally* prior *in order to Induction*,[g] is equally unfounded: for *Induction* does not only naturally but neceſſarily PRECEED *Syllogiſm*, and is, in every reſpect indiſpenſable to its exiſtence; ſince till Generals are eſtabliſhed, there can neither be *Definition*, *Propoſition*, nor *Axiom*, and of courſe no Syllogiſm.

And, as Induction is the firſt, ſo it is the more ESSENTIAL and fundamental inſtrument of Reaſoning: for as Syllogiſm can never produce its own *Principles*,[h] it muſt have them from Induction; and, if the general Propoſitions or Secondary Principles be imperfectly or infirmly eſtabliſhed, and much

a Middle Propoſition is formed, That C contains B, from which the truth in queſtion is deduced. See Ariſtot. Prior. Analyt. on the Invention of Middle Terms.

[f] Itaque alia res eſt inventio medii, alia judicium de conſequentia argumenti. De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4.

[g] Φύσει μὲν ὂν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος, διὰ τὸ μέσα συλλογισμός· ἡμῖν δὲ ἐναργέστερος, ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. Analyt. Prior. cap. 23.

[h] Syllogiſmus ad principia Scientiarium non adhibetur. Nov. Org. Lib. i. Aph. 31.

more

more if they be taken at hazzard, upon authority, or by arbitrary aſſumption like thoſe of Ariſtotle, all the ſyllogiſing in the world is a vain and uſeleſs logomachy,[1] only inſtrumental to the multiplication of falſe learning, and to the invention and confirmation of error. The truth of Syllogiſms depends ultimately on the truth of Axioms, and the truth of Axioms on the ſoundneſs of Inductions.

Thus Induction is not only *different* from, but *prior* and *eſſential* to Syllogiſm, and in reſpect SUPERIOR.[k]

[1] Syllogiſmus ex propoſitionibus conſtat, propoſitiones ex verbis, verba notionum teſſeræ ſunt. Itaque ſi notiones ipſæ (id quod baſis rei eſt) confuſæ ſint et temere a rebus abſtractæ, nihil in iis quæ ſuperſtruuntur eſt firmitudinis: Itaque ſpes eſt una in Inductione vera. Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 14. Ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλε θεωρῆσαι, εἰ μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· (ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσαι δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα, ἐάν τις βάληται γνώριμα ποιειν ὅτι ὑπαρχει ἐκάσῳ γένει ἴνια)—ἔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλε ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, ἔτε διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i.

[k] 'In matters to which the theory of Syllogiſm extends, 'a man of good ſenſe, who can diſtinguiſh things that 'differ, can avoid the ſnares of ambiguous words, and is 'moderately practiſed in ſuch matters, ſees at once all

But, though Induction be more uſeful in the firſt *Invention* of Truth, Syllogiſm, it is ſaid, is more uſeful in *Teaching* it when found.

Truth is more eaſily *conveyed* than *found*. Induction is not only the ſole Method of *Invention*, but of *Initiation* too taken in its enlarged and claſſical meaning; for to it all parts of human learning, except the Mathematics, owe both their origin and advancement. Being, however, more difficult and laborious and leſs oſtentatious than the other, it has been too much neglected, and almoſt quite abandoned, to the great loſs of Truth in general. Syllogiſm affects, indeed, to be the Method of *Science*, and the Method of *Inſtruction*; though, perhaps, when duly eſtimated, with leſs title to thoſe diſtinctions than the former. It is, indeed, the Method of *Mathematics*, which have unfortunately been miſtaken by Logicians for the rule of

'that can be inferred from the premiſes; or finds that 'there is but a very ſhort ſtep to the concluſion.' Dr. Reid, in Appendix to vol. iii. of Lord Kaims's Sketches.

univerſal

univerſal Reaſoning:[1] and, as that word ſignifies *Teaching* or *by what men are taught*, by another miſtake of its meaning[a] they thought Syllogiſm was of courſe both the Method of *Science* and *Inſtruction* too. In all other parts of Science, however, whether we wiſh to add to their truths by farther inventions, or, indeed, to exemplify, illuſtrate, or teach what is already known, the *only* Method of *Science*, and the beſt Method of *Inſtruction*, is that of *Invention* and *Initiation*.[b]

Thus I have taken a general and comprehenſive, but compendious, view (and they who know how many volumes have been employed upon Syllogiſm alone cannot think that I have been prolix) of the whole exerciſe of

[1] See Duncan. p. 118. and almoſt every other book of Logic. Mr. Harris ſomewhere calls it *The praxis of univerſal Logic*: and Mr. Locke was perhaps as much miſled by this miſtaken notion as any other philoſopher.

[a] The true and original meaning of *μαθηματα* was, to *teach* men to aſcend from *material* to *immaterial* ſubjects, that is, from Phyſics to Metaphyſics.

[b] Scientia, quæ aliis tanquam tela pertexenda traditur, eadem methodo (ſi fieri poteſt) animo alterius eſt inſinuanda, qua primitus inventa. De Augm. Sc. lib. vi. c. 2.

REASON as it advances in the DIRECT inveſtigation of Truth, which is *aſcending* and *deſcending*; aſcending by INDUCTION from leſs to greater, from *particulars* to *generals*; and deſcending by SYLLOGISM from greater to leſs, from *general* to *leſs general*, and to *particulars*.

SECT. III.

Of the ANALOGIC Method.

TO theſe two kinds of Reaſoning which are *direct*, we add another of great importance and extent, which is INDIRECT and collateral.

The PRINCIPLE in which this branch of Logic has its foundation is a native bent and propenſity of the mind, ſtrengthened by experience and confirmed by habit, by which we are involuntary led to expect that Nature and Truth are uniform and *analogous* throughout the univerſe—that *ſimilar* Cauſes of whatever kind will, in *ſimilar* circumſtances, at all times produce *ſimilar* Effects: or,

or, if the Cauſes cannot be known, that *ſimilar* Effects[a] will explain, illuſtrate, and account for *ſimilar* Effects.

This Principle, then, reſolves itſelf into SIMILITUDE, and Reaſon acts upon it, as in all other caſes, by *comparing* and *judging*. Thus we argue *from* truths which have been proved by *direct* reaſoning, or which are *obvious* to ſimple apprehenſion, *to* others which are *ſimilar* in Cauſe or in Effect: and if, upon comparing and judging the Principle will bear us out, we conclude the *latter* to be alſo true; a concluſion which will ſupply us with a kind and degree of Truth ſufficient for moſt of the uſes and purpoſes of human life.

This METHOD of Reaſoning is ANALOGY, which according to Quintilian, is 'To refer a thing that is doubtful to ſome-'thing ſimilar and different, that uncertain-'ties may derive their proof from certainties.'[b]

[a] If the liberty of arguing from a ſimilarity of Effects be once denied us, all *experimental* philoſophy will be in a manner uſeleſs. Jones's Philoſophy, p. 119.

[b] Analogiæ hæc vis eſt, ut id quod dubium eſt ad aliquod ſimile de quo non quæritur referat, ut incerta certis probetur. Quintilian Inſt. Orat. lib. i. cap. 6.

This

This kind of Reaſoning has a more permanent and certain foundation than, perhaps, may appear to ſome upon a ſuperficial eſtimate of that SIMILITUDE on which it reſts. 'This is not,' ſays the excellent Butler, 'an *appearing* and *metaphorical* Si-'militude; it is the ſubſtituting the *idea* or '*conception* of one thing to *ſtand for* and *re-*'*preſent* another, on account of a *true re-*'*ſemblance and correſpondent reality* in the '*very nature* of the things compared. It is 'defined by Ariſtotle, An *equality* or *parity* '*of reaſoning*;[1] though, in ſtrictneſs of 'ſpeaking, the parity of reaſoning is rather 'built on the Similitude and Analogy, and 'conſequent to them, than the ſame with 'them.'[2]

The reſult of this Reaſoning is, however, not properly *Conviction*; it is only ſtrong *Preſumption* at beſt; and, from the view of the truths we know ariſes an Opinion concerning thoſe we do not know, which OPINION will, of courſe, vary in the de-

[1] Ἡ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων. Eth. Nicom. lib. v. cap. 3.

[2] Butler's Divine Analogy, p. 2.

grees

grees of its force almoſt from the point of *abſolute Certainty* through the whole ſcale of *Probabilities*, down to the confines of *Doubt* and *Conjecture*—according to the *nature* of the truths from which we reaſon—according to their *greater* or *leſs extent* and—according as the caſes and inſtances compared are more or leſs *ſimilar*.

ANALOGY is a ſort of Logic on which the Stagyrite has been as frugal of his philoſophy,[1] as he has upon *Induction*. It is, however, a Method of Reaſoning of moſt uſeful and important application, and almoſt of univerſal extent, in life.

It is the *firſt* Logic to convey truth and information to the mind, eaſy in its application, and obvious in its concluſion. And, beſides this advantage reſulting from its *plainneſs* and *familiarity* (an advantage which

[1] The ΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΓΜΑ, of which he ſpeaks in the 25th Chapter of the Prior Analytics in a very curſory way, is indeed ſomething like *Analogy*, τότε δὲ πίστις ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων — φανερὸν ἔν ὅτι τὸ παράδειγμά ἐστιν, ὅτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ᾖ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ, γνώριμον δὲ θάτερον. See also Rhetoric. Lib. 2. c. 20. § 3, 4.

the

the ableſt philoſophers and the divineſt teachers have been careful to improve,) it has other privileges. Many truths of the laſt importance to men divine and human are incapable both of *direct* proof[t] and *direct* communication,[u] and can only be *evinced* and *conveyed* to the underſtanding by this *indirect* and collateral channel. Many, which can be directly proved and directly conveyed, it illuſtrates with *clearer* and *fuller* light, and ſets them in a point of view *eaſier* to be ſeen and apprehended by us.

But it has alſo a *ſcientific* uſe which is conſpicuouſly diſplayed, when it acts as a neceſſary ſuppliment and auxiliary to *Inductive Reaſoning* without which this uſeful part of logic would remain very defective and confined: for, when the philoſopher has founded a *General Truth or Propoſition* upon a certain number of *particular compariſons*, it is by the help of ANALOGY that he gives it an extent over all *ſimilar* inſtances throughout the univerſe, till it may happen

[t] See Newton's Principia.

[u] See Butler's Analogy.

to

to be contradicted by one in which it is found to fail.

So that by ANALOGY the whole province of Truth is *facilitated*, *illuſtrated* and *enlarged*, and widened beyond the ſtrict and proper limits of Inductive and Syllogiſtic Reaſoning.

Thus, we ſee, this METHOD of Reaſoning is totally *different* from thoſe preceding. Though they all agree in two general points—That they argue *from Truths known before*[*] either particular or general, and—That they reaſon by *comparing* and *judging*; yet it is from DIFFERENT *Firſt truths* or *Principles*, and in a DIFFERENT *way*. And, whilſt the Student or Philoſopher is deriving advantage from them all, let him take care to keep them *ſeparate* and *diſtinct*, and in their *proper* exerciſe; elſe, by a promiſcuous application of them, he will be in danger of employing them where they will not uſefully

[*] Ἐκ τῶν προγινοσκομένων πᾶσα διδασκάλια. Ariſtot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 3.

Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γινέται γνώσεως. Ibid. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i. cap. 1.

apply,

apply, and, inſtead of leading him to Truth, where they will betray him into Error.

THESE three different METHODS conſtitute the proper, and, I think, the whole, buſineſs of LOGIC, that uſeful and univerſal Art, which for two thouſand years has been twiſted and tormented into ten thouſand ſhapes; which has been proudly and formally profeſſed by many, but philoſophically practiſed or underſtood by few.

This LOGIC is legitimate in its origin, and rational in its progreſs. Conſidering all TRUTH as the furniture of the MIND and differing with its Faculties, it takes account of theſe *Faculties* from the Firſt Philoſophy, with which univerſal ſcience it has a near connection,[x] diſtinguiſhing their ſeparate objects and operations. It then applies *Reaſon* to the EVIDENCES or FIRST PRINCIPLES of every *Kind*, and advances by a ſlow and

[x] Ἡ δὲ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΗ τὴν πρώτην μεμφομένη φιλοσοφίαν τὰ πάντα πειρᾶται δεικνύναι, ὥσπερ πάντων αὐτῇ ὑποκειμένων. Philoponus.

gradual

gradual motion to GENERAL TRUTHS or SECONDARY PRINCIPLES, which form the baſis of farther concluſions to be deduced in another but eaſier way. And it evinces and illuſtrates the whole by correſpondent and COLLATERAL PROOFS. Thus it fixes a juſt criterion for determining its ASSENT in all.

It does not begin with *Definitions* of its own invention ingeniouſly formed and verbally conſtructed, calculated only to anſwer its own views, and to ſerve its own intentions. It does not erect its own imaginary notions and premature aſſumptions into *Dogmas* and *Principles* which are gratuitous, and which it forbids to be examined. Inſtead of purſuing the quibbles and niceties of *Terms* divorced from things and arbitrarily defined, it deſcends to the minutiæ and ſubtlety of *Things* themſelves experimentally examined; making it the chief object to canvaſs and to eſtabliſh the *real Principles* of knowledge. From theſe Principles it does not ſpin the cobwebs of imaginary *Syſtems* without uſe or end,[7] but erects upon them the ſuperſtructure of uſeful and ſubſtantial *Sciences*.

[7] Hoc genus doctrinæ minus ſanæ et ſe ipſam corrumpentis invaluit, præcipue apud multos ex ſcholaſticis, qui ſummo

Inſtead of relying on mere *memory* for information, it prompts the mind to the exerciſe of *reflection*. Inſtead of building on the vague authority of *others*, where it can, it judges for *itſelf*. Thus prejudices begin to ſoften and prepoſſeſſions to vaniſh, and that weak opinion, which governs the multitude, to loſe its influence.

It is not preſumptive but inquiſitive, not indolent but active, not verboſe but operoſe. It does not waſte our time in *Wrangling* and *Diſputation*, which, however they may have been magnified in their uſe when viewed through the medium of that ignorance of which they are the patrons, or extolled by

ſummo otio abundantes, atque ingenio acres, lectione autem impares (quippe quorum mentes concluſæ eſſent in paucorum authorum, præcipue Ariſtotelis dictatoris ſui ſcriptis, non minus quam corpora ipſorum in cœnobiorum cellis) hiſtoriam vero et naturæ et temporis maxima ex parte ignorantes; ex non magno materiæ ſtamine, ſed maxima ſpiritus, quaſi radii, agitatione, operoſiſſimas illas telas, quæ in libris eorum extant, confecerunt. Etenim, mens humana ſi agat in materiam, naturam rerum et opera Dei contemplando, pro modo materiæ operatur, atque ab eadem determinatur; ſin ipſa in ſe vertatur (tanquam aranea texens telam) tum demum interminata eſt, et parit certe telas quaſdam doctrinæ, tenuitate fili operiſque admirabiles, ſed quoad uſum frivolas et inanes. De Aug. Sc. lib. i. p. 40.

the

the tongue of fooliſh adulation, had never any other purpoſe than to retard the progreſs of good Learning, and to check the growth of Truth,[a] and, in the pointed language of the Apoſtle, "to miniſter queſtions and to "gender ſtrifes." What it fairly acquires of whatever kind, it enjoys with gratitude, and communicates with ſimplicity. It diſcriminates between *Certainty* and *Probability*, *Knowledge* and *Conjecture*, and their ſeveral modes. It endeavours to aſcertain the juſt *limits* and *extent* of the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, and has courage to be ignorant of what lies beyond its reach.

Profeſſing to fill the great and general office of conducting men in the invention and communication of all it is poſſible they can know, it diſdains the narrow limits of all human ſyſtem, and refuſes to be pronounced as an Art which by that ſyſtem is made complete and perfect. Though ſubject to the rules which are preſcribed by the nature

[a] Logica quæ in uſu eſt ad errores ſtabiliendos et figendos valet, potius quam ad inquiſitionem veritatis; ut magis ſit damnoſa quam utilis. Nov. Org. lib. ii. aph. 12.

of

of the truth which is its object, it refuſes to be confined within the tramels of *Mood* and *Figure*, and to be cramped in its motion by the artificial forms of *Ariſtotle*, *Smiglecius*, *Burgerſdicius* and *Wallis*. It is always in a ſtate of free inveſtigation and progreſſive improvement, changing with the changes, and advancing with the advancement, of learning, till all Truth be found.

But, I fear, I have dwelt too long upon a dry unpopular ſubject, which, however important, is not calculated to meet the approbation, or to hit the taſte, of the preſent age more anxious for a few hours entertainment from what is thought *fine-reading*, than for the intereſts of TRUTH.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the KINDS of Truth, and the RULE of REASON.

FROM the view that has been taken of TRUTH IN GENERAL and the relation which it bears to the INTELLECT, the WILL and the IMAGINATION, the three great provinces of the human MIND, and of its GENERAL PRINCIPLES, PRIMARY and SECONDARY, from which ALL REASONING divides into two direct METHODS, the INDUCTIVE and the SYLLOGISTIC, assisted by a third which is the ANALOGIC, let us descend to the consideration of PARTICULAR PRINCIPLES, their correspondent METHOD OF REASONING, and the KINDS of Truth in which they terminate.

That TRUTH which we have been hitherto conſidering in the groſs, like every thing in the univerſe, will be found, upon a nearer inſpection, to *vary* its features, to aſſume a *particular* complexion, and to take a *ſpecial* form, according to the different nature of its MEANS, which are all thoſe various Subſtances and Subjects of the univerſe, both of Mind and Body, from which its *particular Principles* and grounds of judgment are ſupplied.[a]

And, as we have obſerved the *general Method of Reaſoning*, to differ with the *general diviſion of Principles*; ſo we may reaſonably expect to find all theſe PARTICULAR PRINCIPLES, as they ſhoot out from the common ſtock into all the Arts and Sciences, and give life to every branch of the tree of knowledge, demanding a different ſort of

[a] Αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητεῖται τῶν ὄντων· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ἢ ὄντα. Ἔστι γάρ τι αἴτιον ὑγιείας καὶ εὐεξίας. Καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα, καὶ αἴτια. Καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ, ἢ καὶ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας, περὶ αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστιν, ἢ ἀκριβεστέρας, ἢ ἁπλουστέρας· ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι αὗται περὶ ἕν τι, καὶ γένος τι περιγραψάμεναι, περὶ τοῦτο πραγματεύονται. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1.

PROOF

PROOF or EVIDENCE, and a METHOD OF REASONING appropriated to themſelves.[b]

And, what is of ſtill higher importance, we ſhall ſee all theſe different Principles ſo differently conducted terminating in different KINDS of Truth poſſeſſed of many DEGREES OF EVIDENCE AND CONVICTION: as we ſee the fruits of the harveſt or of the vintage differing from each other both in ſhape and quality, according to the different *Seeds* from which they ſpring, and to the different *mode of their Cultivation.*

And here we may contemplate with admiration and not without advantage, that amazing ſimilitude, that univerſal harmony, and exact proportion, which, in the midſt of wonderful variety, pervade the mental and material ſyſtems; by which a clear and reſplendent ray of light is reflected from the one part upon the other, however diſtant and

[b] Αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσει ποιήσασαι αὐτὸ δῆλον, αἱ δ' ὑπόθεσιν λαβεῖσαι τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἕτω τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ γένει περὶ ὃ εἰσιν, ἀποδεικνύεσιν ἢ ἀναλικαιότερον ἢ μαλακώτερον. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1.

diſtinct, and even independent of each other, they may ſeem to be.

"And God ſaid Let there be light, and "there was light.[c]"—"And God ſaid Let "the earth bring forth graſs, the herb yield- "ing ſeed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit, "whoſe ſeed is in itſelf, after its kind upon "the earth; and it was ſo.[d]" In all his works, however different they may be, he is uniform in operation and conſiſtent with himſelf; and this mandate of the Deity giving law to the various kinds or productions of his *Vegetable* kingdom may be conſidered, from the *analogy* of things, as extending to thoſe of his *Intellectual*. We may conſider the ſeveral KINDS of Truth with which the world is repleniſhed as ſpringing from ſeeds or Principles of their own and which they poſſeſs within themſelves, ripening, when matured by proper cultivation, into every ſpecies of knowledge, human and divine, producing that exact Certainty or Probability of which they are naturally capable, and terminating in thoſe ſe-

[c] Gen. i. 3. [d] Gen. i. 11.

veral

veral degrees of Conviction and Aſſent which are ſhaped and proportioned to themſelves.

This mode of illuſtrating mental operations and affections by the analogy of vegetable productions was employed by ONE, whoſe method, as it was on all occaſions the apteſt and moſt familiar, may be imitated with advantage, and whoſe example, as it was in all things the model of perfection, may be followed without reſerve. "Ye ſhall "know them by their fruits. Do men ga- "ther grapes of thorns or figs of thiſtles? "Even ſo every good tree bringeth forth "good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth "forth evil fruit.*" This mode of reaſoning is at once ſimple and energetic; and, by reverſing the analogy we may ſay, that, as to expect a produce of Wheat from the ſeed and cultivation of Barley, or the fruit of the Olive-tree from the plant and culture of the Vine, would, in common life, be marked as an abſurdity akin to madneſs: ſo to ſuppoſe that Truths from different Principles and deduced in a different way will reſult

* Matth. vii. 16, 17.

the ſame, will ſhine forth with an equal degree of brightneſs and be attended with the ſame meaſure of conviction, involves an abſurdity equally great though perhaps not quite ſo glaring. But, whilſt the former is an abſurdity of which the peaſant is utterly incapable; the latter has too often diſgraced the philoſopher and theologiſt, and involved them in error and confuſion.

From the vaſt number and variety of Subſtances and Subjects, both mental and material, with which the univerſe is ſo abundantly repleniſhed and ſo beautifully adorned, the PARTICULAR PRINCIPLES or ſeeds of Truth may be expected to be of many and various kinds: and to take them up purely and diſtinctly in their proper exiſtence, that is, as every Subſtance or Subject is calculated by nature to make its addreſs to the underſtanding and to afford it a juſt and ſolid ground of Judgment; and then to purſue them, each in its diſtinct and proper province, in the WAY which they lead themſelves, to the END which they are calculated

to

to fulfil and to no other, and in that end to repoſe with confidence, is the *particular* office of pure and genuine *Logic*, that univerſal Art, which, when fairly and philoſophically, not ſcholaſtically, exerciſed, ſcience and learning have been, and muſt ever be, indebted.

Here a wide and various field of ſtudy and ſpeculation lies open before the rational and ingenuous inquirer, full of irregularity and order, of variety and conſiſtency, of number and uniformity, for the exerciſe of his judgment, and the trial of his induſtry. By a proceſs of reaſoning philoſophically inſtituted and logically conducted, adapted with addreſs to the nature and genius of different Subjects, and varied with their Principles, he may hope to conduct his reſearches in the ſafe but ſilent, in the ſlow but ſure, inveſtigation of the CAUSES of TRUTH and ERROR. And if, after his moſt diligent and beſt directed labours, he ſhould fail of ſucceſs in many parts of this vaſt and various field, he will have learned the wiſdom and poſſeſs the fortitude to reſt in ignorance, thankful

thankful for what he is allowed to know, and without preſuming that providence intended he ſhould know the whole.

THUS, though TRUTH, with other excluſive perfections, be of EQUAL certainty in the *Divine* Mind (for all Truth is equally oppoſite to Falſehood, though that oppoſition be not equally obvious to us) that PARTIAL, PROGRESSIVE, VARIOUS and DECEITFUL, though IMMUTABLE, ray of it which illumines the *Human*, when logically and diſtinctly FOUND, does not ſhine out upon all ſubjects with the ſame force and brightneſs, but is varied into many KINDS and DEGREES, like the different ſhades of *Light* and *Colour*, according to the different ORIGIN and the different MEDIUM through which it comes; the darkeſt of which ſhades of Truth may, perhaps, be ordained by his omniſcient Will to be the "Light of Life:" And WISDOM will inſtruct her children of of whom in all virtue and knowledge ſhe is juſtified, to deſpiſe and to diſhonour none; but

but to cultivate all Truth with diligence and humility, with "meekneſs and fear,"[f] and, in their reſearches of every kind, to adopt ſome ſuch as the following

RULE.

"To take up the PRINCIPLES of each part "of Learning as they exiſt in nature, in "its diſtinct and proper Province; to "judge and to reaſon in the METHOD "which theſe Principles preſcribe; and, "when the TRUTH is found, whatever "it may be, to embrace and honour it as "the gift of heaven by a reaſonable and "virtuous aſſent, and to reſt ſatisfied in "it as the fitteſt and the beſt, and as all "that Providence in her wiſdom meant "to give us."

By the uſe of ſuch expedients and by the application of ſuch a Rule as ſound logic

[f] 1 Pet. iii. 15.

and

and philoſophy preſcribe, under the auſpice of virtue and religion, we may hope to ſearch into the nature, genius, and dependencies, of the different kinds of knowledge; to trace the ſeveral links of the golden chain which the poet ſo finely imagined to be let down from the throne of Jupiter; and to be enabled to ſee how Reaſon aſcends ſtep by ſtep, through all the regions of ſcience human and divine, up to the univerſal fountain of LIGHT and TRUTH.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The general PLAN.

THE RULE OF REASON, which I have attempted to eſtabliſh in the laſt chapter upon the preceding obſervations, is logical and philoſophical, ſubject, I hope, to no cavil or objection: And, to exemplify this *general Rule* by applying it *particularly* to ſome of thoſe important *Parts* of knowledge which are cultivated in this Lycæum of univerſal learning, or, in other words, to reduce the *particular Parts* under the *general Rule*, may to all who can peruſe it be an uſeful, and to ſome an intereſting, work.

The PLAN of theſe Lectures will, therefore, attempt — To trace the diſtinct and proper PRINCIPLES, to point out the right

right METHOD OF REASONING, and to mark that juſt ASSENT, all correſponding with each other, which appertain to the different KINDS of TRUTH, as they ſeverally relate to the *Intellect*, the *Will*, and the *Imagination*; and this for the expreſs and ſpecial purpoſe of aſcertaining the proper *Nature*, the particular *Method*, and the peculiar *Genius*, of THEOLOGIC TRUTH: which Deſign, if I may be able to execute it up to the idea which my hope, perhaps only my preſumption, may have encouraged me to form, promiſes to lay the deepeſt as well as the broadeſt bottom on which "TO GROUND AND ESTABLISH THE CHRISTIAN FAITH."*

This part, if ſucceſsfully executed, will be preparatory to my *ſecond* object, which will be—To ſhew how all the other Kinds of Truth miniſter and ſubſerve, in their proper *Uſe*, both to the Introduction and Support of THEOLOGICAL: which will contribute to the further CONFIRMATION and Illuſtration of that FAITH.

* See the Extract from the Will of Mr. Bampton prefixed to this volume.

And

And the ſecond part will pave the way to my *third* object, which will be—To diſcover, in the different modes of *Abuſe* of the ſeveral Kinds of Truth, as they paſs in review before us, many of the principal and moſt inveterate *Cauſes* of HERETICAL and SCHISMATICAL ERRORS: [b] which, by diving to their root and pointing out their origin, will prove the moſt logical and effectual method to eradicate and expoſe them.

THE FIRST part, which is the ground-plot of the two following, will take a logical Eſtimate of the different *Kinds* of Knowledge, and chalk out a general CHART of their diſtinct and ſeparate *Provinces*, exhibiting a PARALLEL or comparative view of the different LOGIC appropriated to each—a *Parallel* of their PRINCIPLES—a *Parallel* of their REASONING — and a *Parallel* of their TRUTHS.

Such a general Chart and Eſtimate, by diſtinguiſhing them from each other and by preſenting before the eye a full and comprehenſive proſpect of their order and diſpoſi-

[b] See the ſame Extract.

tion,

tion, their relations and connections, their bearings and dependencies, may prove friendly to the advancement of univerſal learning, may contribute to remove much of the *difficulty* of ſcience, and may aſſiſt Reaſon in piloting its way with facility and ſucceſs through *every part* of its literary voyage.

From GENERAL VIEWS the ſtudent derives ſtrength of mind, and clearneſs of comprehenſion. Like the enlightened traveller with a map of the roads and diſtricts in his hand, he can take the whole country before him at one view. He can mark clearly with his eye every confine, diviſion and ſubdiviſion of the whole, and can ſee diſtinctly every object and its ſituation, within the extent of the horizon. Inſtead of wandering about in a perpetual maze of error and confuſion from narrow and contracted views, as if led by the glimmerings of a torch through the darkneſs of the night; he moves from place to place with eaſe and certainty in the enlargement of his mind, as under the direction of the ſun at noon. 'Were it not 'better,' ſays the incomparable Bacon, 'for 'a man in a fair room to ſet up one great 'light

'light, or branching candle-ſtick of lights, 'whereby all may be ſeen at once, than to 'go up and down with a ſmall watch candle 'into every corner? For, when you carry 'the light into one corner, you darken all 'the reſt.'[c]

Delivered, by ſuch an enlarged and comprehenſive idea of things, from all attachments and averſions which are partial and confined, he is diſpoſeſſed of *Prejudice*, which is always an inveterate, and often an invincible, enemy of Truth; which warps and miſleads the judgment, and draws all the powers of the underſtanding within the confines of its own contracted priſon. And, beſide the yoke of prejudice, he can ſhake off thoſe embaraſſing *Difficulties* which have their origin only in partial views; but which, however inſignificant, puzzle and confound the reaſoner: 'For the Sciences, by their 'combined and confederated force,' according to the obſervation of the ſame philoſopher, 'ought to be the true and brief way of con-'futation and ſuppreſſion of all the ſmaller 'ſort of objections.'[d] And he can rid him-

[c] De Augm. Sc. lib. i. p. 40.
[d] Ibid.

ſelf

ſelf at once of thoſe little and minute *Enquiries*, which, whilſt they waſte his labour, contract his genius and perplex his judgment, are frivolous in themſelves, and unworthy his attention. By its reflection from ſcience to ſcience intellectual light is redoubled and concentrated; and, as it diſpenſes itſelf with impartiality and perſpicuity over the whole field of learning, it is like that of the ſun breaking through a cloud, which diſpels the miſts and vapours that ſurrounded the bewildered traveler, and enables him to overcome all the difficulties and obſtructions that beſet his journey.

And thus, enlarged in his views and cleared of his impediments, and raiſed by a general elevation above the level of the particular parts of ſcience, the ſtudent can deſcend to the cultivation of each with every fair and advantageous proſpect. Whilſt he draws his attention from the general ſcene to particular objects, he is mindful of the keeping and conſiſtency of the whole. He ſees them in their connection and dependence upon each other, and, without being in danger of mixing and confounding them together,

ther, he avails himſelf of the aſſiſtance which they mutually lend and mutually borrow. In their ſeparate cultivation he conſults the nature and genius of each, and, actuated by liberal and impartial views, he purſues it in its own way as it leads him by a clue of reaſoning to Truth and Happineſs; of which, though, like their Author, they cannot ſtoop to the level of man's ignorance and vice, he may, by a virtuous induſtry, reach the ſublimeſt heights, their abode near the footſtool of the Almighty.

BUT, amidſt ſcenes of knowledge ſo various and extenſive as thoſe which are diſplayed in the univerſal theatre of Truth, ſome objects may be clearly and diſtinctly viewed by the naked eye; whilſt others are not to be diſcovered without the help of inſtruments human or divine; and others, from their remoter diſtance or more refined tenuity, vaniſh entirely out of ſight. Whilſt many ſubjects of enquiry burſt fully upon the underſtanding by their native force and evidence; others, though diſcoverable, are

in themſelves more obſcure and intricate; and others, perhaps, more numerous than both, lie out of the verge of all mortal cognizance.

To diſtinguiſh, in this general ſcene of things, what is *light* and what is *darkneſs*,—what he CAN KNOW, and what he CANNOT KNOW: and then To mark the different *force* and *clearneſs* of the light, and the different *ſhades* in which it is diſpenſed — the MODES and DEGREES in which he knows, are objects of the laſt importance to the philoſophical enquirer, both for the apprehenſion of TRUTH, and for the detection of ERROR.

Theſe important objects will be moſt eaſily and effectually ſecured by the help of ſuch a general Chart; which, as it eſtimates and diſplays the *Principles* of all true learning, it will exclude every thing not poſſeſſed of ſuch Principles, thereby determining what is *knowable* from what is *not*, and deciding between what is *light* and what is *darkneſs*. And, as it places thoſe parts of Truth which are within the verge of human comprehenſion

ſion in juxtapoſition with each other, by affording him an eaſy opportunity of comparing them together in every relation, in their *Principles*, in their *Reaſoning*, and in their *Truths*, it will enable him from theſe *compariſons* to furniſh himſelf with a general SCALE or common meaſure, by which to aſcertain the particular nature and relative force of every kind of Truth, and to adjuſt them with preciſion.

By the help of this intellectual Scale he will be enabled to range Truths above each other, ſo far as relates to their conviction, according to their reſpective *Evidence*, and the *Aſſent* to which they are reſpectively entitled, and to mark, in its operation in each, the exact proportion and degree of the *ſtrength* or *weakneſs* of human Reaſon.

Though poſſeſſed neither of the *Inſtrument* nor of the *Means* of boundleſs knowledge, he will find that the Author of all Truth hath ſupplied him with what is ſufficient of both, for the purpoſes of human life, and for the pleaſures of intellectual enjoyment: and, the more he knows, the more he will reſt ſatis-

fied in that ſufficiency. By applying his Reaſon, which is the *Inſtrument*, fairly and logically to the different Subjects that preſent themſelves before him, which are the Means, he will find whether they can ſupply him with ſound Principles of judgment, and what thoſe Principles are; and thus ſecure the former of theſe important objects by diſcovering its *capacity* and *extent*, and what lies within and without its reach. And the Subjects, which are the *Means* conſtituting all the different kinds of Truth, on the application of the Inſtrument fairly and logically to them in their ſeparate provinces, and on a comparative eſtimate between them, will enſure him the latter by diſtinguiſhing the *modes* and *degrees* of knowledge.

Thus, by ſubmitting to the *nature* and *neceſſity* of things through the whole of its inſtrumental employment, the Logic he applies will neither lead him away from Truth into ſpeculative dreams by fancied objects which in truth have no foundation; nor into the endleſs maze of error and confuſion by ſending him

him in purſuit of truths which are above his comprehenſion. And, what is of ſtill more importance to the great cauſe of learning as involving an evil which is more generally incurred, it will not be in danger of miſleading his Judgment and betraying his Aſſent by inſtructing him to expect ſtronger or different conviction, than the nature of the Subjects and the Truths reſulting from them can afford; that is, by requiring more or leſs than they are calculated to give.

A Logic, ſo general in its views and accommodating in its method, will, on the contrary, both abridge his labour, and inſure his ſucceſs.

It will *abridge* his labour by cutting off all that is uſeleſs and ſuperfluous, which vainly attempts to ſearch after truths that have no exiſtence, or which as vainly ſtruggles after thoſe which it can never reach. And it will promiſe him *ſucceſs*, by directing his reſearches right, and confining them within the proper track in which the truth in queſtion can be found, as well as by aiding

ing and conducting him through every ſtage of the enquiry.

And, ſince both the *Means* which ſupply the Principles, however different from each other, are at all times and to all perſons in themſelves the *ſame*, and alſo the *Inſtrument* or Reaſon, however it may differ in degrees of ſtrength with times and perſons, is the *ſame* faculty in all; the *End*, which is all TRUTH, however *various in kind*, if faithfully ſought and ſucceſsfully found, will be unchangeably and individually the SAME to all.

Where then is ERROR that many-headed monſter which goes on triumphing and to triumph, though not conquering and to conquer, (for, that truth will be victorious at laſt is the faithful promiſe of ONE on whom we can ſteadfaſtly rely,) and leading thouſands captive in its train? — It lies hidden under the toils of a dark and partial Logic, by which the learned have ſuffered themſelves to be enſlaved, and which, by its various artifice and chicanery, gives to ſome of the worſt

worſt of falſehoods the privilege to wear the face of the beſt of truths.

THE ground which I have choſen for the ſubject of theſe Lectures, as it is the firſt in conſequence, was the firſt in the contemplation of their judicious Founder. The form in which I have divided and laid it out for cultivation, may not be that which has been uſually adopted: but, as it appeared in my own mind to be that by which I could beſt accompliſh the end I have in view, whilſt I ſollicit the patience and attention, I may hope for the indulgence, of my hearers.

In the purſuit of a plan which embraces ſo many different and diſtant objects, I ſhall have occaſion to viſit the ſources of the Arts and Sciences, and to run the circuit of general Learning. And, ſenſible of the high honour, to which I am elected, of reading lectures upon theſe ſubjects before ſo accompliſhed and learned an audience, and in a ſeat of literature which ſtands the firſt both in antiquity and in renown, it ſhall be my utmoſt

active and *inquiſitive*, in the ſpirit of philoſophy, to go along with it, in which he lays himſelf fairly and freely open, ſolely and honeſtly devoted to the intereſts of Truth.[c]

torum excitent. Ii igitur recta incedunt via, qui de conſiliis ſuis id prædicare poſſint, quod fecit Demoſthenes, atque hac clauſula ea concludere, *Quæ ſi feceritis, non oratorem duntaxat in præſentia laudabitis, ſed voſmet ipſos etiam, non ita multo poſt, ſtatu rerum veſtrarum meliore.* Ego certe, ut de me ipſo, quod res eſt, loquar, et in iis quæ nunc edo, et in iis quæ in poſterum meditor, dignitatem ingenii et nominis mei (ſi qua ſit) ſæpius ſciens et volens projicio, dum commodis humanis inſerviam. Ib. l.vii. c.1.

[c] When we ſet out in purſuit of TRUTH as of a Stranger; and not in Search of Arguments to ſupport our Acquaintance with preconceived Opinions; When we poſſeſs ourſelves in a perfect indifference for every thing but known and well-atteſted TRUTH; regardleſs of the place from whence it comes, or of that to which it ſeems to be going: When the Mind, I ſay, is in this State, no one, I think, can fairly ſuſpect the reality of its attachment, Warb. Div. Leg. b. iv. p. 12.

Nos æterno veritatis amore devicti, viarum incertis et arduis et ſolitudinibus nos commiſimus; et divino auxilio freti et innixi, mentem noſtram, et contra opinionum violentias et quaſi inſtructas acies, et contra proprias et internas hæſitationes et ſcrupulos, et contra rerum caligines et nubes, et undequaque volantes phantaſias, ſuſtinuimus; ut tandem magis fida et ſecura indicia viventibus et poſteris comparare poſſemus. De Aug. Sc. Præf. p. 10.

Poſtremo omnes in univerſum monitos volumus, ut ſcientiæ

'One of theſe methods,' ſays Lord Bacon, 'delivers popular ſubjects as to the illiterate; 'the other, ſciences as to the ſons of ſcience:' and the latter is that which alone can be worthy of the author, or of his audience. *Popularity* is an idol to which the ambitious may bend the knee: *Truth* is that divinity to which a philoſopher need not bluſh to bow.

And if, in purſuing an argument, which, from its vaſt and univerſal moment, has been often treated, I ſhould go wide of the common road (not from a principle of novelty which I diſclaim, but from that love of truth and utility which, in all temperance and humility, I avow,) as I ſollicit examination and am under juſt correction, I had rather commit errors in a new way, though more dangerous and difficult to be found, than walk more ſafely and indolently over ground which has been beaten a thouſand

ſcientiæ veros fines cogitent; nec eam aut animi cauſa petant, aut ad contentionem, aut ut alios deſpiciant, aut ad commodum, aut ad famam, aut ad potentiam, aut hujuſmodi inferiora, ſed ad meritum et uſus vitæ, eamque in *Charitate* perficiant et regant. Ibid. p. 11.

times

inveſtigation and eſtabliſhment of the Principles of each as they exiſt in nature and affect the mind, and then purſuing them, in a juſt and rational way, into all their different *effects*, is the *univerſal Art*: in which *Univerſality*, as well as in many other reſpects, they have a cloſe connection and affinity with each other.[a] All the other *Sciences* and *Arts*, as has been before obſerved, apply to *particular* Subjects,[b] which are of different kinds and various extent.

PHYSICS is the Science which treats more immediately of BODY, or matter organized, its properties and affections, its motions and operations, its qualities, and internal ſtructure.

Between theſe Sciences of *Mind* and *Body* lies one, which is intermediate and which partakes of both, taking its ſubject from the

[a] See Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. iv. cap. 2.

Μόνη δὲ ἡ ΠΡΩΤΗ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ καὶ ἡ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΗ ὑποκειμένου ἔχει πάντα τὰ ὄντα. Philoponus in 1 Poſt. Analyt.

[b] ΕΚΑΣΤΗ μὲν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ περὶ ἓν τι γένος καταγίνεται. Ibid.

ſenſible

ſenſible qualities of BODY, but having it perfectly ſeparated from it and made abſtract by an act of MIND.[c] This *intermediate*

[c] Ariſtotle diſtinguiſhes the *three* Sciences thus, ἡ μὲν ΦΥΣΙΚΗ περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα· τῆς δὲ ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ἔνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν, ἴσως δὲ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ ΠΡΩΤΗ καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα· Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. i. Which is thus explained by Duval—Phyſica quidem verſatur circa ſubſtantiam mobilem et materialem: Mathematicæ puræ agunt de rebus reipſa mobilibus, et a materia ſenſibili re inſeperabilibus, ſed tamen ea ratione qua ſunt immobiles, et cogitatione ſeparatæ; vel, quod idem eſt, prout in ſui conſideratione materiam ſenſibilem non includunt. Ut ergo Phyſica, mobilium et inſeperabilium; Mathematica vero, velut immobilium et ſeparabilium; ſic Metaphyſica eſt revera immobilium, æternorum, ſeparabilium, et divinorum contemplatrix. Doct. Peripat. Synop. p. 23. And again Ariſtotle diſtinguiſhes *Mathematics* from both *Phyſics* and *Metaphyſical Forms*, ἔτι δὴ παρὰ τὰ ΑΙΣΘΗΤΑ καὶ τὰ ΕΙΔΗ, τὰ ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΙΚΑ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναί φασι μεταξὺ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν, τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι· τῶν δ' εἰδῶν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πολλ' ἄτλα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ, ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον. Metaph. lib. i. cap. vi. which is thus explained by another commentator.—Indicat Ariſtoteles Platonem aliud adhuc genus rerum poſſuiſſe [principalium] a rebus ſenſibilibus et ab ipſis ideis diverſum. Nam, præter ſenſibilia et ſuas formas, res mathematicas conſtituit, quas *medias* eſſe dixit inter res ſenſiles et inter ideas; et differunt a ſenſibilibus, quod ſempiterna ſunt et immobilia entia mathematicæ, ſicut ideæ quoque ſunt; a formis autem et ideis diſtant, quod pleraque mathe-

Science is MATHEMATICS, which, as it is related to both, is the connecting link by which they are united in the grand ſyſtem of knowledge: and the tranſition from *Metaphyſics* and general *Logic*, to the particular *Logic* of *Phyſics* and the *other parts* of learning, will be aptly and advantageouſly made through Mathematics.

This Science is entirely confined to the predicament of QUANTITY, which being of two kinds *Magnitude* and *Multitude*, that is Quantity *continuous* and Quantity *diſcrete*, the firſt bounded and defined by *Figure*, the ſecond bounded and defined by *Number*, it accordingly divides with theſe different ſubjects into two collateral correſpondent branches—GEOMETRY and ARITHMETIC.[a] And, as they are the ſimpleſt in their *Prin-*

mathematicæ ſimilia ſunt inter ſe, hoc eſt, quod plura ſint ejuſdem ſpeciei individua, ut plures trianguli æquum laterum, plura quadrata, et ſic deinceps. Forma autem ipſa et idea unaquæque unum quoddam ſit tantum. Ita ut res mathematicæ ſint inter res ſenſiles et inter ideas, quia de utriſque aliquid commune habent, et tamen ab utriſque rurſus differunt. Joan. Ludov. Haver. Comment. in locum.

[a] See Ariſtot. Categ. cap. vi.

ciples,

ciples, the cleareſt in their *Reaſoning*, and the moſt convincing in their *Truth*, the LOGIC of them will be properly introductory to that of the other parts of Learning, which are more complicated in their nature, and more involved in their conſtruction.

SECT. I.

Of Mathematical PRINCIPLES.

EXTERNAL *Nature* is the archetype and original of all our ſenſations, and of many of our ideas: and the EVIDENCE of the EXTERNAL SENSES exerciſed upon the ſuperficial properties of innumerable bodies with which they are familiarly and perpetually converſant, as their *Length*, *Breadth* and *Depth*[*] and other exterior qualities, and

[*] Καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεὰ ἔχει τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, καὶ μήκη, καὶ γιγλὰς, περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖ ὁ μαθηματικός. —ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν φυσικῶν σώματος πέρας ἕκαστον· οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα θεωρεῖ ἢ φύσεως ἐστι συμβέβηκε· Διὸ καὶ χω-

again as familiarly and inceſſantly employed upon many different objects, which they cannot avoid diſtinguiſhing as *Individuals* or *Monades*, is undoubtedly the PRIMARY PRINCIPLE of Mathematical learning in both its branches.

This is every where the doctrine of Ariſtotle,[f] who, as well as Plato, has very philoſophically remarked, that, whereas many of the properties of Body are confined to particular ſenſes, thoſe few, which are the ſubject of Mathematics, are *common to all the ſenſes*.[g]

Theſe external and obvious properties of Natural Body conſtitute the qualities of what is called MATHEMATICAL BODY, if we may be allowed to give the name of *body* to that which is *ideal*: for, all the *other* qualities and attributes of Natural Body being

ρίζει· χωριστὰ γάρ τῇ νοήσει, κινήσεως ἐσι· καὶ ἐὰν διαφέρει, ἀδὲ γίνεται ψεῦδος χωριζόντων. Ariſtot. Nat. Auſc. lib. ii. cap. ii.

[f] See Metaph. lib. xi. cap. i, 2, 3.

[g] Κοιναὶ δὲ, κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμὸς, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀδεμιᾶς ἐσιν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις. Ariſtot. De Anima, lib. ii. cap. vi.

abſtracted

abſtracted and taken away by an act of the Mind, they are conceived to be left alone, and to exiſt *ſeparate* and independent of the bodies from which they are originally taken, conſtituting what are properly and logically termed *ideas*. Theſe ſeparate and abſtract ideas are *Units* or *Monades*, *Points*, *Lines*, *Angles*, *Circles*, *Superficies*, *Solids*, *Equality and Inequality* [h] and ſome more, which are otherwiſe denominated *Univerſal Forms*; and the Abſtraction, by which they are collected from the Senſes exerciſed upon many individual objects, is performed in a way ſo perfectly obvious and familiar, and with ſo much eaſe and perſpicuity, that they ſeem to preſent themſelves to the mind immediately,[i] and without the application of *Inductive Reaſoning*.[k]

[h] Τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν ἴσαι καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ γραμμὴ, καὶ σχῆμα ἄνευ κινήσεως. Ariſtot. Nat. Auſc. lib. ii. cap. 2.

[i] Λανθάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, καὶ οἱ τὰς ἰδέας λέγοντες. Τὰ γὰρ φυσικὰ ψωρίζουσιν ἥττον ὄντα χωριστὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. Ariſtot. Nat. Auſc. lib. ii. cap. 2.

[k] Ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὅτι, τῶν αἰσθητικῶν εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ διότι, τῶν μαθηματικῶν· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἔχουσι τῶν αἰτίων τὰς

So that Mathematical Science may be conſidered as beginning its career with *general ideas* or *abſtracted forms*;[1] in the farther view of which we ſhall find this branch of learning poſſeſſed of many other ſingular and excluſive advantages.

One advantage is that theſe general or rather univerſal ideas are immediately capable of being aſcertained with a logical preciſion, and conveyed by clear and adequate *Definitions* in a language which is the moſt direct

ἀποδείξεις, καὶ πολλάκις ἐκ ἴσασι τὸ ὅτι· καθάπερ οἱ τὸ καθόλε θεωρῶντες, πολλάκις ἕνια τῶν καθ' ἕκαςον ἐκ ἴσασι δι' ἀνεπισκεψίαν. Ἐςι δὲ ταῦτα, ὅσα ἕτερόν τι ὄντα τὴν ὑσίαν, κέχρηται τοῖς εἴδεσι. Τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα, περὶ εἴδη ἐςίν· ἢ γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένε τινὸς, εἰ γὰρ καὶ καθ' ὑποκειμένε τινὸς, τὰ γεωμετρικά ἐςιν· ἀλλ' ἐχ ἧ γεωμετρικὰ, καθ' ὑποκειμένε. Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i. cap. 13.

[1] Linearum rectarum et circulorum deſcriptiones, in quibus Geometria fundatur, ad *Mechanicam* pertinet. Has lineas deſcribere *Geometria* non docet. Poſtulat enim ut tiro eaſdem accurate deſcribere prius dediſcerit quam limen attingat *Geometriæ*; dein quomodo per has operationes problemata ſolvuntur, docet; rectas et circulos deſcribere problemata ſunt, ſed non *Geometrica*, ex *Mechanica* poſtulatur horum ſolutio, in *Geometria* docetur ſolutionum uſus: at gloriatur Geometria quod tam paucis principiis aliunde petitis tam multa præſtat. Newtoni Præf. in Princip.

and

and obvious. Geometry defines a Point, Line, Angle, Triangle, Circle, and any other mode of continuous Quantity, the leſs general by the more general, in terms which are appropriate, and poſſeſſed of all poſſible accuracy and preciſion; ſo that, if they be once underſtood, the ideas they repreſent cannot poſſibly be miſconceived. And, whatever number of Units or Monades conſtitute any idea of Quantity diſcrete (and theſe ideas are innumerable,) by the admirable dexterity and addreſs of the Arithmetician in the arrangement of Numbers into ſtated claſſes and collections, general and leſs general, formed out of each other and diſtinguiſhed by appropriate names as they riſe into higher and more complex orders, Tens, Hundreds, Thouſands, and ſo on, (an invention entitled to the gratitude of all ages and countries) its language is at once *definitive*, and its ideas, however complex and collective, when thus expreſſed, are equally incapable of miſapprehenſion. Thus, if of Thouſands we take *one*, of Hundreds *ſeven*, of Tens *eight*, and of Units *nine*, we have at once an adequate

Definition of the idea, or collective number, of the years of the chriſtian æra.

Another advantage ſimilar to this, and by which it is heightened and completed, is, that its ideas ſo adequately and eaſily defined, are capable of being *exhibited and preſented to the eye* in an obvious external ſhape. The *diagram* of a Square, Circle, or other Figure, though it cannot be a complete repreſentation of the idea, is ſufficient to convey the definition through the ſight directly into the underſtanding: And the ſigns of Number, which we call *figures*, with the *order* in which they are ſet down 1789, form a clear and exact repreſentation which puts the mind in immediate poſſeſſion of the full force of the definition — an invention which we owe to our more modern intercourſe with the eaſt, and which the ancient mathematicians, though they had formed ſome uſeful arrangements of Numbers, did not enjoy. This artifice or mechaniſm of expreſſion addreſſed to the ſight, which is the readieſt and moſt familiar interpreter to the mind, or even to the touch, (for the great

Sanderſon

Sanderſon is ſaid to have been born blind,) gives a ſuperior eaſe and perſpicuity to Mathematics through all the ſtages and progreſſions of that luminous ſcience.

So that MATHEMATICS poſſeſs an extraordinary clearneſs and preciſion both in their *ideas*, and in their *language*.

Into whatever extent or variety theſe ideas may run, whether through all the forms and conſtructions of Figure, or through all the claſſes and combinations of Number, and however complex and multiform they become, they are only different modifications of *one* and *the ſame kind*, or, as Mr. Locke chooſes to expreſs it, of the *ſame idea*, without the mixture or addition of any other; on which account he has diſtinguiſhed them by the name of *Simple Modes*, a diſtinction which, however expreſſed, is very philoſophically made. They are formed by adding *unit* to *unit* and *line* to *line* through all the modifications of Number and Figure, without the mixture of any thing elſe; from which circumſtance the ſcience

in

in-queſtion derives this great and excluſive privilege, that its ideas are *totally* ſeparate and *diſtinct* from thoſe of every other kind.

And, however numerous they may be, another advantage to the preciſion of the ſcience to which they belong, is, that every one is *abſolute* and *unchangeable* in itſelf, that is, it cannot be either greater or leſs,[m] or any way different from what it exactly is, by partaking or communicating with any other even of the ſame kind; for two numbers differing only by one unit, or two angles by one degree, are as abſolutely different from each other as thoſe that are the moſt diſtant.[n] So that Mathematical ideas are *individually* diſtinct from one another, as well as totally from thoſe of other kinds.

They have, therefore, only to do with themſelves, at the ſame time that they ſtand

[m] Quantitas non recipit majus aut minus. See Ariſtot. Categ. cap. vi.

[n] *Two* is as different and diſtinct from *one* as from a *thouſand*; but ideas of *good* and *evil*, *hot* and *cold*, *hard* and *ſoft*, and of the different *colours*, participate with each other, and are more or leſs akin, varying into ſhades compounded of their neighbours, and having their difference according to their diſtance.

perfectly

perfectly independent of each other: and a farther advantage, by which they contribute to the illumination of this ſcience, is, that all the *differences between themſelves* are moſt minutely and diſtinctly *marked* and aſcertained. It is the excluſive privilege of both the kinds of Quantity to ſupply a certain *meaſure* or ſtandard, not only to themſelves, but to every other ſubject in the univerſe capable of menſuration.* *Extention* or continuous Quantity is meaſured by any fixed part or diviſion of itſelf, as by an *Inch*, a *Foot*, and other ſtated lengths formed out of each other; and *Number*, which is diſcrete, is meaſured by ſtated portions or claſſes of Number, as by *Tens*, *Hundreds* and ſo on, as they riſe in due order above each other. So that any part, form, collection, or relation of ſuch ideas, can be eaſily compared with others, and pronounced to be exactly *equal* or *unequal*, *greater* or *leſs*, or in a certain *ratio*: where-

* Fundatur Geometria in praxi Mechanica, et eſt nihil aliud quam *Mechanicæ univerſalis* pars illa quæ artem menſurandi accurate proponit ac demonſtrat. Præf. Newtoni in Princip.

as

though the truth reſult *immediately* and be properly *ſelf-evident*, though not *intuitive*.

Theſe general Propoſitions ſo formed are the AXIOMS of Mathematical ſcience, which are the SECONDARY PRINCIPLES, from which Reaſon derives all its numerous and extenſive operations, and into which they are ultimately to be reſolved.

AND now that I am upon the ſubject of Mathematical Principles, I beg leave to make a DISTINCTION which, however new, may prove of great and general importance to the more eaſy diſcovery, and more ſucceſsful cultivation, of all the different kinds of Truth.

Intuitive and *Self-evident* are terms uſed promiſcuouſly by philoſophers and logicians as perfectly ſynonimous; which has, I apprehend, been the cauſe of introducing much error and obſtruction into general ſcience.

'certainly to diſcern the reſpect which one term bears to 'another, and from theſe to conclude the propoſition *ne-* '*ceſſarily* true, is an act of *Reaſon*, though performed 'quick, or perhaps all at once.' Wollaſton's Religion of Nature, §. iii. Note.

To

To *Mathematical Axioms* they have *both* been attributed with the fulleſt confidence, becauſe their truth is ſo direct and palpable that mathematicians think they cannot do them more than ſufficient honour by affording them too ſtrong an appellative. And, as theſe Axioms are ſo obvious in formation and ſo eaſy in apprehenſion, no injury has been derived to this ſcience from the miſtake. But, when philoſophers and logicians aſſert that *all other Axioms* are likewiſe both *intuitive* and *ſelf-evident*, great misfortunes ariſe from this falſe idea; as it precludes inquiry, and ſecures them by an invincible bar againſt all ſorts of examination and reaſoning, which they moſt faſtidiouſly reject and ſpurn.

So far, however, from being *Intuitive*, the Axioms of all other parts of knowledge are the conſequences and deductions of the moſt attentive reaſoning and laborious inveſtigation conſtituting the moſt uſeful and honourable part of human learning; whereas, if they were *intuitive*, they would fluſh direct conviction on the minds, as external objects do on the ſenſes, of all men.

All

All Axioms, though not intuitive, may, however, be properly ſaid to be *Self-evident*; becauſe, in their formation Reaſon judges by ſingle compariſons without the help of a third idea or Middle Term;[r] ſo that they [p]are not indebted to any *other* for their evidence, but have it *in themſelves*: and, though Inductively framed, they cannot be Syllogiſtically proved. Till they are either legitimately eſtabliſhed or preſumptively aſſumed, the Middle Term is, indeed, no where to be had;[q] and, ſo far from deriving their evidence from it, it derives itſelf from them: they are, therefore, properly ſaid to be *Immediate*.[t] It is in this ſenſe that all Axioms are pronounced and ſhould be underſtood, to be *Self-evident*, becauſe *Immediate* and incapable of proof.

INTUITION is, therefore, properly attributed, and ſhould be carefully reſtricted, to thoſe inſtinctive faculties and impulſes external and internal, which act inſtantaneouſly and

[r] See the 48th page of this volume.

[q] See the 49th page of this volume.

[t] Αἱ δ' ΑΜΕΣΟΙ προτάσεις ἀρχαί. Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i. cap. 29.

irreſiſt-

irreſiſtably,* which were given by nature as the firſt inlets of all knowledge, and which we have called the *Primary Principles*, whilſt SELF-EVIDENCE may be juſtly and properly attributed to Axioms or the *Secondary Principles*, of Truth.

This *Diſtinction* I am induced to make in the ſanguine hope, that, if juſtly conſidered and attended to, it will effectually contribute to the improvement of all learning in the act of conſtituting the *Principles*, that is of diſtinguiſhing the *Evidences* and eſtabliſhing the *Axioms*, of all the different parts of knowlege: a point which every philoſopher will acknowlege to be of the laſt importance. 'I apprehend,' ſays one in the concluſion of his remarks on the organon of Ariſtotle, 'it is a ſubject of 'ſuch conſequence, that if inquiſitive men 'can be brought to the ſame unanimity in 'the firſt Principles of the other ſciences, as 'in thoſe of mathematics and natural philo'ſophy (and why ſhould we deſpair of a ge'neral agreement in things that are ſelf-evi-

* See page 28 of this volume.

'dent?)

'dent?) this might be conſidered as the third 'grand æra in the progreſs of human rea-'ſon."

SECT. II.

Of Mathematical REASONING.

THIS ſpecies of REASONING is employed in inveſtigating the relations of ſuch abſtract and *general ideas*, poſſeſſed of ſuch other qualifications as have been noticed in the preceding pages, by reducing them to *Axioms* or *Secondary Principles* which are univerſal propoſitions; and the METHOD it purſues is, of courſe, the moſt perfectly and purely SYLLOGISTIC.[x]

[w] Dr. Reid in the Appendix to Lord Kaim's 3d vol. of Sketches.

[x] Ariſtotle ſays that all Mathematical Reaſoning is reducible to Syllogiſms in the *firſt of* the three *Figures* which is the moſt pure and perfect, and by which all other kinds of Syllogiſms that are ſound and legitimate are finally to be tried. See Analyt. Poſt. lib. i. cap. 14.

As

As Mathematic has a ſubject, ſo its Reaſoning has a language, peculiar and appropriated to itſelf; but, when analyſed, it is reducible to the following proceſs.

The Mathematician may be conſidered as taking his ideas from the beginning in their *general* form. Every *Propoſition* compoſed of ſuch ideas is, therefore, *general*; and thoſe which are theoretic are reducible to two parts or *Terms*, a *Predicate* and a *Subject*, with a *Copula* affirmative or negative, but generally the former. If the agreement or the relation between the two Terms be not immediate and ſelf-evident, he has recourſe to an Axiom which is ſtill *more general*, and which ſupplies him with a third or *Middle Term*.[1] This he compares firſt with the *Predicate* and then with the *Subject*, or vice verſa. Theſe two compariſons, when drawn out in form, make two Propoſitions which are called the *Premiſes*; and, if they happen to be *immediate* and *ſelf-evident*, the *Conclu-*

[1] The Middle Term is the *Subject* of a more general Propoſition than that of the Queſtion, and the *Predicate* the ſame in both. See page 49 of this volume.

ſion, conſiſting of the Terms of the queſtion propoſed, is ſaid to be *demonſtrated:* [z] Which Method of Reaſoning is conducted exactly in the Syllogiſtic form [a] delivered by Ariſtotle with ſo much labour and particularity in his Analytics.[b]

[z] Ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστημην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι, καὶ πρωτῶν, καὶ ἀμέσων, καὶ γνωριμότερων, καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τε συμπεράσματος. Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i.

[a] Συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐςι λόγος, ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν, ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει, τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. Ariſtot. Analyt. Prior. lib. i. cap. 2.

[b] Every kind of Syllogiſm is reducible to a *Categeric* and every categorical Syllogiſm to one of the *Firſt Figure*; and in the *Premiſes* of a Syllogiſm of the Firſt Figure this is done—In the Major Propoſition, or the Axiom, the *Predicate* of the Queſtion or Concluſion (which is the ſame thing) is univerſally affirmed or denied of ſome general idea, which is the Middle Term: In the Minor Propoſition the *Subject* of the Queſtion or Concluſion is always affirmed or aſſerted to be a PART of that MORE GENERAL idea or Middle term. And the ground of this reaſoning is this, *Whatever may be affirmed univerſally of any idea, may be affirmed of any ſpecies or number of particulars comprehended under it, and vice verſâ*; upon the great Logical maxim, *Dictum de omni, et Dictum de nullo.*

Fundamentum quo nititur *Modorum* omnium jam memoratorum vis, (unde probetur *Concluſiones* eſſe) eſt *Poſtulatum* illud quod dici ſolet *Dictum de Omni et de Nullo:* quod

Thus to Axioms he adds another claſs of Propoſitions called *Demonſtrations*, which, though leſs general, are of equal force, and which he applies, in the ſame way and by the ſame proceſs, to the proof of relations which lie more diſtant and concealed. And, as it is the peculiar privilege of his ſcience, that all its ideas are *general* and theſe general ideas *inexhauſtible*, in purſuing all their various and multiplex relations he can produce many Demonſtrations: which *Axioms* and *Demonſtrations* he can apply by the ſame Syllogiſtic proceſs, to the proof of theorem after theorem almoſt ad infini-

quod tam per ſe evidens præſumitur, ut probatione non indigeat. Nimirum, *Quicquid de Subjecto quopiam univerſaliter Affirmatur vel Negatur, id ſimiliter vel Affirmatur vil Negatur de omni eo de quo hoc ſubjectum dicitur.* Utputa, Quicquid univerſaliter affirmatur aut negatur de Animali; ſimiliter affirmatur vel negatur de *quopiam* Animali, ſeu de omni eo quod eſt Animal: puto de *Homine*, de *Bruto*, de *Alexandro*, de *Bucephalo*, alioque quopiam Animali. Wallis's Logic, B. iii. C. 5: And, if the reader would ſee at one ſhort view the whole jet and force of all Syllogiſtic reaſoning, he cannot do better than read this chapter *De fundamento Syllogiſmi*; *et*, *Modis Figuræ Primæ.*

tum: ' and which *Syllogiſtic* proceſs is, (to expreſs it in a few words) To reduce *general*

' The relations of quantity are ſo ſuſceptible of exact ' menſuration, that long trains of accurate reaſoning on ' that ſubject may be formed, and concluſions drawn very ' remote from the firſt principles. It is in this ſcience and ' thoſe which depend upon it, that the power of reaſoning ' triumphs; in other matters its trophies are inconſidera- ' ble. If any man doubts this, let him produce, in any ' ſubject unconnected with mathematics, a train of rea- ' ſoning of ſome length, leading to a concluſion, which ' without this train of reaſoning would never have been ' brought within human ſight. Every man acquainted ' with Mathematics can produce thouſands of ſuch trains ' of reaſoning. I do not ſay that none ſuch can be pro- ' duced in other ſciences.' Dr. Reid's Appendix to Lord Kaims's Sketches, p. 281.

I think Dr. Reid might have pronounced that no ſuch lengthened trains of Reaſoning can be produced in other Sciences. And hence it is that SYLLOGISM, which is *Mathematical* and conſtitutes the Ariſtotelian Logic, is of very little uſe in other parts of learning. Upon this ground the following obſervation of the ſame author is very juſt. ' The Ancients ſeem to have had too high no- ' tions, both of the force of the reaſoning power in man, ' and of the art of ſyllogiſm as its guide. Mere reaſoning ' [ſyllogiſtic] can carry us but a very little way in moſt ' ſubjects. By obſervation and experiments properly con- ' ducted, the ſtock of human knowledge may be enlarged ' without end; but the power of reaſoning alone, applied ' with vigour through a long life, would only carry a man ' round, like a horſe in a mill who labours hard, but ' makes no progreſs. Ibid. p. 381.

truths

truths under *more general*, till they terminate in Axioms, which are the *moſt general*.[d]

Such is the METHOD OF SCIENCE or DEMONSTRATION, (belonging, I think, to *Quantity* alone,[e]) which has been juſtly celebrated and admired through every age, in which Reaſon advances, by a ſublime intellectual motion, from the ſimpleſt Axioms to the moſt complicated ſpeculations, and exhibits truth ſpringing out of its firſt and pureſt elements, and riſing from ſtory to ſtory in a moſt elegant progreſſive way, into a luminous and extenſive fabric. The certainty of ſelf-evidence attends it through every ſtage, and every link of the Mathematical chain is of equal, that is, the utmoſt, ſtrength.

[d] See chap. iv. §. 2. of this volume.

[e] Here I am under the neceſſity of differing in opinion from Mr. Locke, who thinks that Demonſtration is not confined to Quantity. See Eſſay B. IV. C. ii. §. 9. and B. IV. C. iii. §. 18. I ſhall have occaſion to conſider this opinion of this great man in ſome future part of theſe Lectures.

From the ſingular elegance and preciſion of MATHEMATICAL REASONING, and the amazing feats which it has performed in its progreſſive career, and form its wonderful effects in its application to ſome parts of phyſical learning, philoſophers ancient and modern have not only held it in a juſt reſpect and veneration, but have been ſo enamoured of its beauty, as to embrace and adopt it as the praxis and exemplar of univerſal Logic.[f] This is a miſtake, which I ſhall re-

[f] 'THUS we have taken a ſhort View, of the ſo much 'celebrated Method of the Mathematicians; which to any 'one who conſiders it with proper Attention, muſt needs 'appear *univerſal*, and *equally applicable* in other Sciences. 'They begin with Definitions. From theſe they deduce 'their Axioms and Poſtulates, which ſerve as Principles of 'Reaſoning; and having thus laid a firm Foundation, ad-'vance to Theorems and Problems, eſtabliſhing all by the 'ſtricteſt Rules of Demonſtration. The Corollaries flow 'naturally and of themſelves. And if any Particulars are 'ſtill wanting, to illuſtrate a Subject, or compleat the 'Reader's Information; theſe, that the Series of Reaſoning 'may not be interrupted or broken, are generally thrown 'into Scholia. In a Syſtem of Knowledge ſo uniform and 'well connected, no wonder if we meet with Certainty; 'and if thoſe Clouds and Darkneſſes, that deface other parts 'of human Science, and bring Diſcredit even upon Reaſon 'itſelf, are here ſcattered and diſappear.' Duncan's Logic, p. 188. See alſo p. 224.

ſerve

ſerve myſelf to obſerve upon in ſome future ſtage of this work. For the preſent I ſhall only remark, that, in this Demonſtrative Reaſoning, not only the *Middle* Terms and Propoſitions are *general*, but that all other Terms and Propoſitions are *general* alſo: from which obſervation I beg leave to appeal to the judgment of Dr. Reid, who allows both the Ancient and Modern Logic to be defective as an univerſal Art, Whether 'The ancients, who attended only to categorical propoſitions, which have one ſubject and one predicate; and of theſe to ſuch only as have a *general term* for their *ſubject*,'[g] were not miſled in their Logic by the Mathematics: and alſo Whether 'the moderns, who have been led to attend only to *relative* propoſitions, which expreſs a relation between two ſubjects, and theſe ſubjects always *general ideas*,'[h] were not likewiſe miſled by the Mathematics, when they founded the new principle of their Logic

[g] Dr. Reid in the Appendix to Lord Kaim's 3d vol. of Sketches, p. 328.

[h] Ibid.

upon

upon the Axiom *Things that agree with one and the ſame, agree between themſelves*;[i] by which they confined their reaſoning to *general Relations*, and to the *Agreement* and *Diſagreement of Ideas*, meaſured by a *third*, as a Carpenter meaſures a piece of timber by the application of his rule.[k]

[i] Nonnulli autem Logici (noſtri ſeculi, aut ſuperioris) poſthabita veterum probatione per *Dictum de Omni et de Nullo*; aliud ſubſtituunt illius loco Poſtulatum; nimirum, *Quæ conveniunt in eodem tertio, conveniunt inter ſe.* Atque ad hanc regulam exigentes ſingulos ſyllogiſmorum Modos, inde concluſum eunt juſtam eorum conſecutionem. Quique ſic procedunt; negligere poſſunt eam diſtinctionem modorum *perfectorum et imperfectorum*; ut quæ ortum ducit ab ea methodo qua uſi ſi ſunt veteres, in probatione ſua ab illo *Dicto*. Wallis's Logic. B. iii. chap. 5.

[k] Mr. Locke is the great advocate for the Perception of the *agreement* and *diſagreement of ideas* being the criterion of all truth, and in exemplifying this great logical maxim he uſes the following words; 'When a Man has in his 'Mind the *Idea* of two Lines, *viz.* the *Side* and *Diagonal* 'of a Square, whereof the Diognal is an Inch long, he 'may have the *Idea* alſo of the Diviſion of that Line into a 'certain Number of equal Parts; *v. g.* into Five, Ten, an 'Hundred, a Thouſand, or any other Number; and may 'have the *Idea* of that Inch Line being diviſible or not divi-'ſible into ſuch equal Parts, as a certain Number of them 'will be equal to the Side-line. Now, whenever he per-'ceives, believes or ſuppoſes ſuch a kind of Diviſibility to 'agree or diſagree to his *Idea* of that Line, he, as it were, 'joins

Of theſe two Logics, both of which are partial and imperfect, the former is entitled to the preference; becauſe, when the general Principles are once eſtabliſhed, it is the guide to truth in all parts of knowledge; whereas, out of Mathematics, pure or mixed, the latter can uſefully apply to none.

SECT III.

Of Mathematical TRUTH.

WHEN ſuch abſtract and *general ideas* as are appropriated to Mathematics in both its branches, which, beſides

'*joins* or *ſeparates* thoſe two *Ideas*, *viz.* the *Idea* of that 'Line, and the *Idea* of that kind of Diviſibility, and ſo makes 'a mental Propoſition, which is true or falſe, according as 'ſuch a kind of Diviſibility, a Diviſibility into ſuch aliquot 'Parts, does really agree to that Line or no. When *Ideas* 'are ſo put together or ſeparated in the Mind, as they, or 'the Things they ſtand for, do agree or not, that is, as I 'may call it, *mental Truth*. But *Truth of Words* is ſome-'thing more, and that is the affirming or denying of Words 'one of another, as the *Ideas* they ſtand for agree or diſagree.' Eſſay, B. IV. C. v. §. 6.

the

the exclusive privileges that have been enumerated are permanent and eternal, are thus *Syllogistically* compared in their numerous relations, and ultimately brought to the test of a few simple *Axioms* or *Universal Propositions* which are palpably and self-evidently certain, the TRUTHS that result from such an operation of reason must be particularly clear and luminous, bearing down all possibility of doubt, and carrying the most ABSOLUTE and IRRESISTIBLE CONVICTION.

This part of learning is, therefore, distinguished by the name of SCIENCE, understood in its special and appropriated signification; and it is awarded by Aristotle to the province of the INTELLECT or THEORETIC MIND, as producing *abstract*, *unchangeable*[1] and *necessary* Truths,[m] which exclude from

[1] Περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχόμενων ἄλλως ἔχειν. Aristot.

[m] Αλλ' ἔστι καὶ ἡ ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΗ. Αλλ' εἰ ἀκινήτων καὶ χωριστῶν ἐστι, νῦν ἄδηλον. Οτι μὲν οὖν ἔνια μαθήματα ᾗ ἀκίνητα καὶ ᾗ χωριστὰ θεωρεῖ, δῆλον. Aristot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1.

the

the underſtanding all manner of uncertainty; and alſo as containing in themſelves the *End* for which they were contemplated.[a]

[a] Ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερὸν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησι· πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν. Τὰ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν, ἢ μή. Ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. Ἀΐδιον ἄρα. Τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς, ἀΐδια πάντα· Τὰ δ' ἀΐδια, ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. Ariſtot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 3.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Logic of PHYSICS.

THOUGH TRUTH does not appear in the other departments of learning with that bold and irreſiſtible conviction with which it preſides in Mathematical Science, it ſhines through them all, if not interrupted by prejudice or perverted by error, with a clear and uſeful, though inferior, ſtrength. And, as it is not neceſſary for his general ſafety or convenience, that the traveller ſhould always enjoy the heat and ſplendor of a mid-day ſun, whilſt he can purſue his journey with more pleaſure and accommodation under the weaker influence of a morning or evening ray; ſo it is not requiſite

requiſite, for the various concerns and purpoſes of life, that men ſhould be led by Truth of the moſt redundant brightneſs.

On the contrary, it is in every view more uſeful and expedient for us, ſituated and circumſtanced as we are, that Providence has left us in the confines of much darkneſs, to act and move under the ſhades of weaker, but ſufficient, evidence. Both reaſon and experience accordingly inform us, that the uſe and value of Truth in general, as it is appointed in all its different diviſions to attend us with its light through our tranſitory way, do not bear any proportion to its clearneſs and conviction.

Much of the moſt uſeful part of our knowledge is derived from a ſource different from that which has been juſt inveſtigated: not from a *few general ideas* of *two kinds of Quantity* abſtracted and *ſeparated from all matter*, but from the *innumerable Qualities* of *individual* and *particular things* as they are *inherent and exiſt in matter* — of all thoſe BODIES with which we are by nature every way

way ſurrounded, which are perpetually ſolliciting the external ſenſes, and with whoſe uſes we are immediately and neceſſarily concerned. To know their inherent Powers and Properties, their Qualities and Attributes, their Motions and Operations, their Cauſes and Effects, is to cultivate the various and extenſive field of PHYSICS or NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

This part of learning, however it may differ from pure Mathematics, is referred by the Peripatetic Philoſopher to the ſame province of the Mind, the ſpeculative or theoretic INTELLECT; becauſe it derives its Principles from thoſe external *ſubjects* which it contemplates, and not from the internal reſources of the *mind* contemplating and creating, as we ſhall find to be the caſe with MORALITY and POETRY.[a]

[a] Επεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιςήμη τυγχάνει ὖτα περὶ γένος τι τῶ ὄντος, (περὶ γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐςὶν ὐσίαν ἐν ᾗ, ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ ςάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ, δῆλον ὅτι ἔτε πρακτικὴ ἐςιν ἔτε ποιητική. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἢ νῦς ἐςιν, ἢ τέχνη, ἢ δύναμίς τις· τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν·

SECT. I.

Of Phyſical PRINCIPLES.

THE *Evidence of the External Senſes* is obviouſly the PRIMARY PRINCIPLE from which all Phyſical knowledge is derived.

But, whereas Nature begins with *Cauſes*, which, after a variety of changes, produce *Effects*, the Senſes open upon the *Effects*, and from them, through the ſlow and painful road of Experiment and Obſervation, aſcend to *Cauſes*.

Man appears upon the ſtage of this material ſyſtem as upon a viſionary theatre, in which he looks only upon the exterior of things, as the eye upon a flower that is full-blown, or upon an inſect in all the pride

τικῶν, ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις. Τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πρακτὸν καὶ προαιρετόν. Ὡστε εἰ ἡ ἅπασα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ, ἢ ποιητικὴ, τὶ θεωρητικὴ, ἡ ΦΥΣΙΚΗ ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΗ τις ἂν εἴη. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1.

and

and beauty of its colours; without obſerving immediately the different ſtages through which they have paſſed, the different forms they have aſſumed, the different changes they have undergone, and without deſcending to the ſeeds and principles from which they ſpring, and which, upon examination, will be found totally different both in form and colour. In like manner are the SENSES, the ultimate criteria of all phyſical knowledge, liable to be impoſed upon and deceived in regard to the Qualities and Cauſes, the Powers and Operations, of PHYSICAL BODY.[b]

The *Senſes* are, therefore, to be aſſiſted by various *Obſervations* taken with diligence and circumſpection, and to be undeceived by different *Analyſes*, which diveſt Nature of her external and compounded form, and lay open

[b] Ædificium autem hujus univerſi, ſtructura ſua, intellectui humano contemplanti, inſtar labyrinthi eſt; ubi tot ambigua viarum, tam fallaces rerum et ſignorum ſimilitudines, tam obliquæ et implexæ naturarum ſpiræ et nodi, undequaque ſe oſtendunt: Iter autem, ſub incerto ſenſus lumine, interdum affulgente interdum ſe condente, per experientiæ et rerum particularium ſylvas, perpetuo faciendum eſt. Baconus De Augm. Sc. Præf.

her

her internal mechaniſm and conſtruction. Their errors and miſconceptions are to be corrected by the uſe of *Experiments* of different kinds, which penetrate her inmoſt receſſes, and deſcend to her remoteſt cauſes. By the application of ſuch aſſiſtance they are enabled, not without difficulty,[c] to leave behind the fallacious exterior, to paſs from one appearance to another, and, as far as human ſearch can go, to judge of the realities of things.

'The information which the Senſes give 'us,' as the great friend and father of philoſophers has obſerved,[d] 'is to be examined 'and corrected by various methods; for 'though they deceive us on all occaſions,

[c] Quin etiam duces itineris (ut dictum eſt) qui ſe offerunt, et ipſi implicantur; atque errorum et errantium numerum augent. In rebus tam duris de judicio hominum ex vi propria, aut etiam de felicitate fortuita, deſperandum eſt: Neque enim ingeniorum quantacunque excellentia, neque experiendi alea ſæpius repetita, iſta vincere queat. Veſtigia filo regenda ſunt: omniſque via uſque a primis ipſis ſenſuum perceptionibus, certa ratione munienda. Ibid. in eodem loco.

[d] See Lord Bacon on the Advancement of Learning, Diſtrib. Op. p. 15.

'they themſelves diſcover the errors into 'which they lead. But whereas the errors 'lie immediately before us, the indications 'of them are to be ſought at a great diſ-'tance.'

'The Senſes are ſubject to a twofold de-'fect. They either *deſert*, or elſe *deceive*, us. 'Many ſubjects * elude their cognizance, 'however well they may be diſpoſed and 'free from impediment, either from the te-'nacity of the whole object, or the extreme

* Air and Fire are bodies of the moſt univerſal extent and operation in the material ſyſtem. And the great Boerhaave ſpeaking of the latter makes the following obſervation. 'So great is the power, ſo extenſive the action, 'and ſo wonderful the manner wherein *Fire* acts, that it 'was anciently held and adored as the ſupreme God by a 'nation reputed the wiſeſt of all others. Thus ſome of the 'chemiſts, having found its extraordinary force, took it for 'an uncreated being, and many of the moſt eminent among 'them attributing all the knowledge they had acquired to 'this Inſtrument, called themſelves *Philoſophers of Fire*, as 'thinking they could not be dignified by an higher title. 'There is however nothing more wonderful in the nature 'of Fire, than that whilſt it is the chief cauſe and principle 'of almoſt all the effects cognizable by our ſenſes, itſelf 'is IMPERCEPTIBLE by any ſenſe, being ſo incom-'prehenſible, by reaſon of its extreme minuteneſs, that it 'eludes our niceſt reſearch; ſo that with many it paſſes for 'a ſpirit rather than a body.' Boerhaave's Chemiſtry.

'minute-

'minuteneſs of its parts, from the diſtance 'of its ſituation, the ſlowneſs or the velo- 'city of its motion, its familiarity to the 'eye, and from many other cauſes. And 'again, where they fully apprehend their 'object, they are not to be ſecurely relied 'upon; for the teſtimony and information of 'the Senſes depend on the analogy and con- 'ſtitution of man, and not on thoſe of the 'univerſe: ſo that, to ſay that Senſe is the 'adequate meaſure or competent judge of 'things, is an aſſertion founded in miſ- 'take.

'To obviate the imperfections of Senſe phi- 'loſophers are under the neceſſity, by much 'labour and attention, of calling in aid and 'aſſiſtance from every quarter, in order to 'ſupply the deficiency, where the Senſes fail 'us; and alſo to regulate and rectify them, 'where they vary in themſelves. This is 'effected not ſo much by the uſe of Inſtru- 'ments, as by the help of Experiments. 'For Experiments are much more pene- 'trating and ſubtle than the Senſes even 'when aſſiſted by Inſtruments of the moſt

'exquiſite contrivance: I mean ſuch Experi-
'ments as are ingeniouſly invented, and ap-
'plied with ſkill and addreſs to the elucida-
'tion of the very thing which is the ſubject
'of enquiry. Philoſophers do not, there-
'fore, rely on the perception of the Senſes
'immediately applied, as in their proper and
'common exerciſe, but bring the matter of
'judging to this iſſue, that the Senſes
'judge of Experiments and Experiments of
'Things. Thus *Experiments* are, in fact,
'as the religious guardians of the Senſes,
'from which every thing in ſound philoſo-
'phy is originally derived, and the ſkilful in-
'terpreters of their oracles; ſo that, whilſt
'others only pretend, true philoſophers in
'reality cultivate and ſupport, the EVI-
'DENCE OF SENSE.'

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of Phyſical REASONING.

BY ſuch *Experiments* and *Obſervations* in aid of the External Senſes ſkilfully choſen, ~~artfully~~ conducted, and judiciouſly applied, the philoſopher advances from one ſtage of enquiry to another,[f] by a ſlow but ſteady pace, in the rational inveſtigation of the *general Cauſes* of Phyſical truth.

That one great and univerſal MIND who, made all things by his Power and preſerves them in his Goodneſs, is the *firſt* and only *Cauſe*, operating at all times and in all places,

[f] Nonnulli qui experientiæ undis ſe commiſere fere mechanici facti ſunt; tamen in ipſa experientia erraticam quandam inquiſitionem exercent, nec ei certa lege militant: Quin et plerique puſilla quædam penſa ſibi propoſuere, pro magno ducentes, ſi unum aliquod inventum eruere poſſint; inſtituto non minus tenui, quam imperito. Nemo enim rei alicujus naturam, in ipſa re, recte aut feliciter perſcrutatur; verum poſt laborioſam experimentorum variationem, non acquieſcit, ſed invenit quod ulterius quærat. Baconus De Augm. Sc. Præf.

and

and producing, by an exertion of his wil all the various phænomena of the materi ſyſtem. This firſt and univerſal Cauſe however, in the ordinary adminiſtration c his providence, hath condeſcended to em ploy *Second Cauſes* as the inſtruments of hi will by which he acts; which ſecond Cauſe he hath alſo appointed, in his Wiſdom, t operate, through every part of his creation by *general Laws:* And to trace the hand o the Almighty through all his works, to inveſtigate theſe *general Cauſes* and to erect them into the *Laws of Phyſics*, is the ſublime, the delectable, and honourable employment of the Natural Philoſopher.[s]

From different Experiments and Obſervations made on the ſame individual ſubject, and from the ſame Experiments and Obſervations made on different ſubjects of the ſame kind, by comparing and judging he diſcovers ſome *Qualities*, *Cauſes*, or *Phænomena*, which,

[s] Newtonus philoſophis præcepit, ut a *Phænominis* et *Experimentis* ad eorum *Cauſas* progrediatur; atque inde ad Cauſarum iſtarum *Cauſas*, et ſic deinceps, donec ad *Primam Cauſam* perveniatur. Hoffley in Edit. Newt. Op. p. 495.

after

after carefully diſtinguiſhing and rejecting all contradictory inſtances that occur, he finds *common* to many. And thus from many collateral compariſons and judgments formed upon *Particulars* he aſcends to *Generals*; and, by a repetition of the ſame induſtrious proceſs and laborious inveſtigation, he advances from *general* to *more general*, till at laſt he is enabled to form a few of the *moſt general*, with their attributes and operations, into AXIOMS[h] or SECONDARY PRINCIPLES, which are the well-founded *Laws* enacted and enforced by the God of Nature.[i]

This Method of REASONING, founded on Experiment and Obſervation, by which

[h] Secundum nos, axiomata continenter et gradatim excitantur, ut nonniſi poſtremo loco ad generaliſſima veniatur: Ea vero generaliſſima evadunt, non notionalia, ſed bene terminata; et talia quæ natura ut revera ſibi notiora agnoſcat, quæque rebus hæreant in medullis. Baconus de Augm. Sc. Præf.

[i] See Nov. Org. lib. i. p. 302.

Ad veram philoſophiam pertinet rerum naturas ex *Cauſis* vere exiſtentibus derivare: eas vero *Leges* quærere, quibus voluit ſummus Opifex hunc mundi pulcherrimum ordinem ſtabilire, non eas quibus potuit, ſi ita viſum fuiſſet. Coteſii Præf. in Newt. Princip.

the

the general ideas and *Forms*[k] of Natural Philoſophy are invented, is purely and excluſively INDUCTIVE. The Schools are not the theatre in which this philoſophical logic is diſplayed.[l] It does not delight in external appearance, and oſtentatious formality. It retires from the clamour of verbal diſputation into the retreat of the Laboratory and Obſervatory, where, in ſilent inveſtigation, it lays the foundation of ſubſtantial learning. And, as it mixes with Experiment and Obſerva-

[k] Inquiſitio formarum ſic procedit; ſuper naturam datum primo facienda eſt comparentia ad intellectum omnium inſtantiarum notarum, quæ in eadem natura conveniunt, per materias licet diſſimillimas. Atque hujuſmodi collectio facienda eſt hiſtorice, abſque contemplatione præfeſtina aut ſubtilitate aliqua majore. Bacon. Nov. Org. lib. ii. Aph. xi.

[l] Rejicimus igitur ſyllogiſmum; neque id ſolum quoad principia, (ad quæ nec adhibent) ſed etiam quoad propoſitiones medias: quas educit ſane atque parturit, utcunque ſyllogiſmus; ſed operum ſteriles et a practica remotas et plane quoad partem activam ſcientiarum incompetentes. Quamvis igitur relinquamus ſyllogiſmo et hujuſmodi demonſtrationibus famoſis et jactatis, juriſdictionem in artes populares et opinabiles, (nil enim in hac parte movemus;) tamen ad naturam rerum, inductione per omnia et tam ad minores propoſitiones, quam ad majores, utimur. De Augm. Sc. Præf.

tion,

tion, it is incapable of being adequately diſplayed by words, but is beſt ſeen and underſtood by attending it in the act, and purſuing it through every ſtage of the analytical progreſſion.

Such is the genuine Logic of Phyſical learning; not that which was employed by the ancient philoſophers the diſciples of Pythagoras and the Lycæum, who, (to ſpeak with all reverence of theſe exalted characters, and to think of them with all the gratitude due to their uſeful labours, without being a ſlave to their authority,[m]) in haſte to indulge in their national infirmity that vain and oſtentatious parade of terms divorced from things and invented by themſelves,[n] overlooked the true ground-work of all ſound philoſophy, Experience and Induc-

[m] Pro certo habeant homines non ſectæ nos alicujus aut placiti, ſed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanæ fundamenta moliri. Baconus De Augm. Sc. Præf.

[n] Cum toti ſint in rerum *nominibus*, non in ipſis *rebus*, Sermonem quendam Philoſophicum cenſendi ſunt adinveniſſe, Philoſophiam tradidiſſe non ſunt cenſendi. Cotesii Præf. in Newtoni Princip.

tion,

The Inductive Logic has, indeed, much humbler pretenſions, but more efficient operations, ſtooping from the high preſumption of the mind thus raiſed upon the wings of an imaginary perfection, to the manual and ocular examination of the meaneſt particulars in the univerſe, for the ground of its proceedings: and, ſo far from having advanced to a ſtate of perfection, it was in their day in its tendereſt infancy, and, from the obſtacles thrown in its way by its proud opponent, continues at the preſent in a ſtate of ſlow progreſſion. In the field of Natural Philoſophy it has before it ſuch a vaſt extent and variety of ground, as is ſufficient to employ the joint and confederated labours of philoſophers of different ages and countries, aſſiſted by the largeſt collections and beſt arrangements of Natural Hiſtory,[s] which is

poſſe confidit; hunc oportet vel ſtatuere Mundum ex neceſſitate fuiſſe, Legeſque propoſitas ex eadem neceſſitate ſequi; vel, ſi per voluntatem Dei conſtitus ſit ordo Naturæ, ſe tamen homuncionem miſellum, quid optimum factu ſit perſpectum habere. Coteſii Præf. in Newt. Princip.

[s] Phænomena Univerſi; hoc eſt, omnigena experientia, atque hiſtoria naturalis, ejus generis, quæ poſſit eſſe

the proper foundation of Natural Philoſophy. From this ground Experience takes its ſlow but ſteady courſe. It firſt 'lights the candle, 'and then by that candle ſhews the way, 'beginning with regular and well-conducted 'Experiments, not ſuch as are vague and pre-'poſterous, from which it derives Axioms, 'and then from Axioms well eſtabliſhed, 'deſcends to new Experiments.'[t]

The more numerous and extenſive the Experiments and Obſervations are from

eſſe ad condendam philoſophiam fundamentalis. Neque enim excellens aliqua demonſtrandi via, ſive naturam interpretandi forma; ut mentem ab errore et lapſu defendere ac ſuſtinere, ita ei materiam ad ſciendum præbere et ſubminiſtrare, poſſit. Verum iis, quibus non conjicere et hariolari, ſed invenire et ſcire propoſitum eſt; quique non ſimiolas et fabulas mundorum comminiſci, ſed hujus ipſius veri mundi naturam introſpicere et velut diffecare in animo habent; omnia a rebus ipſis petenda ſunt. Neque huic labori et inquiſitioni ac mundanæ perambulationi, ulla ingenii aut meditationis aut argumentationis ſubſtitutio, aut compenſatio ſufficere poteſt; non ſi omnia omnium ingenia coierint. Baconus De Augm. Sc. Præf.

[t] Verus experientiæ ordo primo lumen accendit, deinde per lumen iter demonſtrat, incipiendo ab Experientia ordinata et digeſta, et minime præpoſtera et erratica, atque ex ea educendo Axiomata; atque ex Axiomatis conſtitutis experimenta nova. Baconi Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 82.

which

which Inductive Reaſoning draws the general concluſion, the more certain will the Axiom be, as ſtanding upon a wider and firmer bottom; but, however numerous and extenſive, they muſt of neceſſity come ſhort of the number and extent of Nature, which, in ſome caſes, by its immenſity will defeat all poſſibility of their co-extenſion, and, in others, by its diſtance lies out of the reach of their immediate application. In order, therefore, to make his Law of general uſe, and to ſtretch it over the whole extent of Nature, the Philoſopher is obliged to have recourſe to ANALOGY, by which he can lengthen out his Inductions, which are properly confined to the number of Experiments and Obſervations actually made, to all other particulars of the *ſame kind*, concluding the Axiom to hold good of all,[a] and that not

[a] Regulæ Philoſophandi.

Reg. 2. Effectuum Naturalium ejuſdem generis eædem aſſignandæ ſunt Cauſæ, quatenus fieri poteſt.

Reg. 3. Qualitates Corporum quæ intendi et remitti nequeunt quæque omnibus corporibus competunt in quibus experimenta inſtituere licet, pro qualitatibus corporum univerſorum habendæ ſunt.

Nam Qualitates corporum non niſi per experimenta innoteſcunt; ideoque generalia ſtatuendæ ſunt quotquot cum

only for the preſent, but alſo for the future, till it either be farther confirmed and rectified, or elſe contradicted, by better Experiments and a more extenſive and complete Induction.[u]

This is that juſt and philoſophic METHOD OF REASONING which ſound Logic preſcribes in this, as well as in other parts of Learning, by which, through the ſlow but certain road of Experiment and Obſervation, the mind aſcends from Appearances to Qualities, from Effects to Cauſes, and, by a fair INDUCTION from many particular ſubjects extended by ANALOGY, forms GENERAL PROPOSITIONS concerning the powers and properties of Phyſical Body.

cum experimentis generaliter quadrant.—Non a Naturæ ANALOGIA recedendum eſt, cum ea ſimplex eſſe ſoleat et ſibi ſemper conſona.—Et hoc eſt fundamentum Philoſophiæ totius.

[u] Reg. 4. In Philoſophia Experimentali Propoſitiones ex phænomenis per *Inductionem* collectæ, non obſtantibus contrariis hypotheſibus, pro veris aut accurate, aut quam proxime haberi debent, donec alia occurrerint phænomena per quæ aut accurationes reddentur, aut exceptionibus obnoxiæ. Newtoni Princip. lib. iii.

When

WHEN the SECONDARY PRINCIPLES, which conſtitute the *Laws* of Phyſics, are thus Inductively and Analogically eſtabliſhed, the proper uſe of SYLLOGISM, in ſubjects of Natural Philoſophy, is very ſimple, and confined within a narrow circuit. This is only to reduce the *particular Phænomena* that occur under the *General Propoſitions*, for the truth of which they will account by communicating their own, and preſent us at once with new and uſeful inventions :[y] All which is, indeed, properly and effectually done by a mere *Superinduction* of the Principle, or by the application of the general Law to the particular inſtances to which it belongs; and that without the formality of a ſingle Syllogiſm, which in the opinion of the father of Philoſophers, is not only uſeleſs but injurious in ſubjects of philoſophical diſquiſition.[z]

[y] Axiomata recte inventa tota agmina operum ſecum trahunt; atque opera non ſparſim ſed confeſtim exhibent. Baconus De Augm. Sc.

[z] Nos demonſtrationem per ſyllogiſmum rejicimus, quod confuſius agat et naturam emittit e manibus. Tametſi enim nemini dubium eſſe poſſit, quin, quæ in medio termino

After the *General Propoſitions* are conſtructed, men who are born with *Definitions* in their mouths, and bred up in the formalities of *Mood* and *Figure*, may, indeed, entertain themſelves and others by playing at *Sophiſms* and *Syllogiſms*, as children do at *Hide* and *Seek*: but, as from the latter we do not expect much uſeful work, ſo from the former we may deſpair of receiving either additional Principles or new Inventions. This idle game has been uſeleſsly played for many ages.[y] Their maſter of the Lycæum ſyllogized before them to little purpoſe, beſides that of

termino conveniunt, ea et inter ſe conveniant; (quod eſt mathematicæ cujuſdam certitudinis:) nihilominus hoc ſubeſt fraudis, quod ſyllogiſmus ex propoſitionibus conſtet, propoſitiones ex verbis, verba autem notionem teſſeræ et ſigna ſint. Itaque, ſi notiones ipſæ mentis (quæ verborum quaſi anima ſunt et totius hujuſmodi ſtructuræ ac fabricæ baſis) male ac temere a rebus abſtractæ et vagæ, nec ſatis definitæ et circumſcriptæ, denique multis modis vitioſæ fuerint, omnia ruunt. Baconus De Augm. Sc. Præf.

[y] Si quis in omnem illam librorum varietatem, qua artes et ſcientiæ exultant, diligentius introſpiciat, ubiquo inveniet ejuſdem rei repetitiones infinitas, tractandi modis diverſas, inventione præoccupatas; ut omnia primo intuitu numeroſa, facto examine, pauca reperiantur. De Augm. Sc. Præf.

promoting perpetual diſputation,* and that of checking all uſeful and experimental enquiry, arrogating an implicit obedience to a falſe philoſophy by a ſpecies of tyranny hitherto unexampled in the annals of mankind. And, if it would not ſpoil their diverſion by ſhocking their devotion to the Logic of that gratuitous and hypothetical reaſoner, I would beg leave to lay before them what a true philoſopher and logician thought of their employment. 'Let men know this 'as a certain truth, that all ſubtlety of diſ- 'putation and diſcourſe of reaſon, if it be 'only applied after Axioms are invented, is 'too late and indeed prepoſterous; and that 'the true and proper time for ſubtlety, or 'at leaſt the principle time, is that which is 'employed in making Experiments, and from 'them in forming Axioms. For that other 'ſubtlety only mocks and catches at nature

* Et de utilitate aperte dicendum eſt; ſapientiam iſtam quam a Græcis potiſſimum hauſimus, pueritiam quandam ſcientiæ videri, atque habere quod proprium eſt puerorum ut ad garriendum prompta, ad generandum invalida et immatura ſit. Controverſiarum enim ferax, operum est fœta eſt. Ibid. in eodem loco.

'bu

'but can never ſeize or lay hold of it.[a]' When they diſpute however from principles which are better founded than the dreams and hypotheſes of Ariſtotle, logicians would do well to recollect that in Phyſical Syllogiſms the minor Propoſitions are not *general* but *particular*, a circumſtance which, philoſophically weighed, might put a ſhort period to their Diſputations, however tenacious men attached to forms and diſciplines may be of their ancient privileges, and however willing to wreſt every thing to them and them to every thing, and to conſider their uſe and application as univerſal.

BUT, though the common ſyllogiſtic Logic can lend no uſeful aſſiſtance to Phyſical learning, either in its advancement or com-

[a] Hoc vero ſciant homines pro certo, omnem ſubtilitatem diſputationum et diſcurſuum mentis, ſi adhibeatur tantum poſt axiomata inventa, ſeram eſſe et præpoſteram; et ſubtilitatis tempus verum ac proprium, aut ſaltem præcipuum, verſari in penſitanda experientia, et inde conſtituendis axiomatibus: Nam illa altera ſubtilitas naturam prenſat et captat, ſed nunquam apprehendit, aut capit. Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 121.

munication; as there is, perhaps, nothing in Nature without rule and meaſure, if philoſophers can find them out, MATHEMATIC is its moſt uſeful friend and handmaid.

The ſubject of *pure* Mathematics are the *ideal Forms* of Quantity ſeparated from body by an act of mind. The ſubject of Phyſics are the *Qualities*, *Cauſes* and *Affections* of things as they exiſt in body, and produce, by that exiſtence, various *Phænomena* and *Effects*. To account for theſe Phænomena and Effects, as a ſcience, by reducing them under the general Laws of Nature, Phyſics from Experiments by Induction derives its general *Forms*, and from them erects philoſophical *Axioms*: and it is in the application of the *Forms* of Quantity to the *Forms* of Quality, wherever they are capable of accurate menſuration, that Mathematical ſc advantageouſly applies to the elucidation and promotion of Phyſical learning. In all theſe caſes it is of moſt eſſential uſe both in the act of deriving the general *Laws* and *Principles* of Phyſics from Experiments and Phæ-

nomena

nomena; and alſo, after they are eſtabliſhed, it is equally uſeful in calculating all their particular *Operations* and *Effects*, which are the other Phænomena, and in adopting them, with the utmoſt addreſs and ingenuity, to the uſe as well as elegance of civil, ſocial, and domeſtic life.

MOTION is a general *Form* of great influence and extent in the wonderful mechaniſm and œconomy of nature, to which the *Forms* of Number and Figure apply, as an affection of various ſubjects, and capable of various menſuration. They begin with the moving power conſidered as a *ſecond Cauſe* (for with the Firſt ſtupendous Cauſe natural Philoſophy has no direct concern;) or, if the phyſical Cauſe cannot be properly aſcertained from experiment and obſervation, which too often happens, they take a general Phænomenon [b] eſtabliſhed on their authority, which will ſufficiently ſupply its place.

[b] Naturæ vires legeſque virium ſimpliciores ex ſelectis quibuſdam *phænomenis* per Analyſin deducunt, ex quibus deinde per Syntheſin reliquorum conſtitutionem tradunt. Coteſii Præf. in Newtonii Princip.

Upon this experimental foundation, they calculate the *force*, or the *quantity of motion* produced ;[c] they account for the different *kinds* of that motion ; they ſhew how their are *mixed* and *compounded*, what *direction* and *velocity* they will conſequently have ; and they demonſtrate the *times* and *periods* in which they are reſpectively performed.

From this application of Geometry and Numbers to the Motion of bodies on the ſurface of the earth, we derive the philoſophy of *Mechanics:* By their application to the Motion of the heavenly bodies, we riſe to the philoſophy of *Aſtronomy:* And to their application to the Motion of various ſounds, we are indebted for the fundamental part of the philoſophy of *Muſic*[d]—All which uſeful and liberal departments of learning, with ſome

[c] *Mechanica rationalis* erit ſcientia Motuum quæ ex Viribus quibuſcumque reſultant, et Virium quæ ad motus quoſcunque requiruntur, accurate propoſita, et demonſtrata. Newtoni Præf. in Princip.

[d] Τὰ ὀπτικὰ πρὸς γεωμετρίαν, καὶ τὰ μηχανικὰ πρὸς στερεωμετρίαν, καὶ τὰ ἁρμονικὰ πρὸς ἀριθμητικὴν, καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πρὸς ἀστρολογικήν. Ariſtot. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i, cap. 13.

others,

others, ſo far as the *Forms* of Quantity are concerned, may be allowed to partake of the nature and preciſion of Mathematical ſcience.[e]

Thus we ſee with pleaſure and advantage theſe two kindred ſciences, both of which are originally derived from *Body*, meeting together in a kind of connubial union,[f] and producing a *Philoſophy* which conſtitutes the richeſt and brighteſt gem in the crown of human learning.

[e] Mixta habet pro ſubjecto axiomata et portiones phyſicas: Quantitatem autem conſiderat, quatenus eſt ad ea elucidanda, et demonſtranda, et actuanda, auxiliaris. Multæ ſiquidem naturæ partes, nec ſatis ſubtiliter comprehendi, nec ſatis perſpicue demonſtrari, nec ſatis dextere et certo ad uſum accommodari poſſint, ſine ope et interventu mathematicæ. Cujus generis ſunt perſpectiva, muſica, aſtronomia, coſmographia, architectura, machinaria et nonnullæ aliæ. Baconus de Augm. Sc. lib. iii. cap. 6.

[f] Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ φυσικώτερα τῆν μαθεματικὴν, οἱον ἁρμονικὴ, καὶ ἀρμονικὴ, καὶ ἀςρολογία· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ ἔχουσι τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ· ἀλλὰ ἡ μὲν γεωμετρία περὶ γραμμῆς φυσικῆς σκοπεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐχ ᾗ φυσική· ἡ δὲ ὀπτικὴ, μαθηματικὴν μὴν γραμμὴν, ἀλλ' ἐχ ᾗ μαθηματικὴ, ἀλλ' ᾗ φυσική. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό, τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὡς ἂν εἰ περὶ σιμότητος τί ἐςι σκοποῖμεν, ἕτω θεωρητέον. ὥςτ' ἔτ' ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔτε κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ περὶ τούτου διχῶς ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ἐπεὶ δύο

αἱ

This friendly mixture and alliance of *Phyſics and Mathematics*, from which ſo much honour and advantage are derived to the cauſe of phyſical truth, is a piece of fine philoſophy, which, whether it was ſpeculately underſtood by the great *Newton*, whoſe labours, founded on the connection, produced ſo many ſplendid diſcoveries, is well explained by *Ariſtotle*,[5] whoſe Phyſics are little better than a heap of vain hypotheſes — an illuſtrious proof, that the perfection of ſcience is never to be raiſed from its foundation by the exertions of a ſingle genius, however powerful and extenſive; but muſt advance, through ſeveral ſtages of improvement, on the labours of many: at the ſame time that it is a pointed admonition to every later philoſopher, to avail himſelf of the diſcoveries of his predeceſſors.

αἱ φύσεις, περὶ ποτέρας τὲ φυσικοῦ, ἢ περὶ τὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἀλλ' εἰ περὶ τὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, δὲ περὶ ἑκατέρας. Πότερον οὖν τῆς αὐτῆς, ἢ ἄλλης, ἐκλέραν γνωρίζειν. Ariſtot. Auſcult. Natural. lib. ii. cap. 2.

[5] See Nat. Auſcult. lib. ii. cap. 2.

It

It is, however, a truth to be acknowledged and lamented, that the genius of one philoſopher being either inſenſibly warped or voluntarily enſlaved by the authority of another, is a circumſtance which has often thwarted the advancement of knowledge, and always proved an inſurmountable obſtacle to the progreſs and ſucceſs of learning: and one of the moſt difficult and important taſks under which every improver of ſcience has to labour, however independent in his ſpirit and ingenuous in his views, is to know, what of the works of his predeceſſors to adopt, and what to reject. This is a field which it is neceſſary to cultivate, but which is of moſt critical and important determination; in which judgment is often embarraſſed, and genius perplexed; and in which memory and prejudice too often uſurp their place: and, ſince he put in execution the precepts, and followed the directions of the organum of an abler logician, we may have cauſe to rejoice upon the whole, that our great Engliſh philoſopher was no more converſant in the works of the Peripatetic.

It

It was neither from the Principles nor Reaſoning, neither from the Logick or Practice of Ariſtotle, (which two laſt ſeldom, if ever, coincided in effect,) that Newton aſtoniſhed the world with ſuch a brilliant train of Aſtronomical diſcoveries and calculations; which, in addition to the other philoſophical inventions and improvements of that extraordinary genius, whilſt they reflect the higheſt honour on the country which gave him birth and education, have immortalized his name and memory. The Logic, which directed his phyſical reſearches, pointed out to him a more humble and laborious, but a more honourable and ſucceſsful, road to truth. From the ingenious fictions and plauſible inventions of the Stagyrite, and from the formal but feeble diſputations of his weaker followers, it brought him down to the labour of experiment and actual obſervation. Out of the wilds of imagination, it led him to cultivate the field of nature: and from mental ſpeculations, it drew down his attention to manual operations.

By

By *Experiments*, ingeniouſly made and accurately obſerved, he took the true phænomena of *Motion* as generated by the powers of *Gravity*, *Elaſticity*, the *Reſiſtence of fluids* and the like; and analyſed the *Forces* by which it is produced, and of which it is compounded.[h] To theſe *Forces* be applied his ſublime *Geometry*, which ſcience he advanced much beyond the fartheſt reach of all former mathematicians, and by which he demonſtrated the phænomena of all the *Curves* deſcribed, and *Motions* performed by Projectiles, in every hypotheſes that could be framed.

From the aſtronomical *Obſervations* of Copernicus and the *Rules* and conjectures of Kepler, two of the ableſt aſtronomers before him, he found the Planets revolving round their reſpective centres in *Curves* and *Motions*

[h] All improvement in learning is *progreſſive*; and philoſophers are never diſhonoured by availing themſelves of the inventions of their predeceſſors or contemporaries. *Galileo* obſerved the *velocity of falling bodies to increaſe in the duplicate ratio of the time*; and that Projectiles move in a *Parabola*: and Sir *Chriſtopher Wren* found the *equability of motion* by experiments on pendulums. See the Scholium at the end of the ſixth Corollary of Newton's Principia.

exactly

exactly SIMILAR or the SAME; and by a bold and ſublime ANALOGY,[1] which made him the firſt aſtronomer in the world, from his theory of *Projectiles*, experimentally founded and geometrically confirmed, he raiſed his philoſophy to the *celeſtial Bodies*,[k]

[1] Non a Naturæ *Analogia* recedendum eſt, cum ea ſimplex eſſe ſoleat, et ſibi conſona,—et hoc eſt fundamentum Philoſophiæ totius. Newtoni Regula Philoſophandi, lib. iii. Princip.

Concluſiones precedentes huic innituntur Axiomati 'Effectuum ſcilicet ejuſdem generis, quorum nempe quæ 'cognoſcuntur proprietates *eædem* ſunt, *eaſdem* eſſe cauſas 'et *eaſdem* eſſe proprietates quæ nondum cognoſcuntur' &c.—In hac regula fundatur omnis philoſophia, quippe, 'qua ſublata, nihil affirmare poſſemus de *univerſis*. Coteſii Præf. in Newtoni Princip.

[k] Eadem ratione qua Projectile vi gravitatis in orbem flecti poſſet et terram totam circumire, poteſt et Luna vel vi gravitatis, ſi modo gravis ſit, vel alia quacunque vi qua in terram urgeatur, retrahi ſemper a curſu rectilineo terram verſus et in orbem ſuum flecti: et abſque tali vi Luna in orbe ſuo reteneri non poteſt. Hæc vis, ſi *juſto minor* eſſet, non ſatis flecteret Lunam a curſu rectilineo: ſi *juſto major*, plus ſatis flecteret, ac de orbe terram verſus deduceret. Requiritur quippe ut ſit *juſtæ magnitudinis*: et Mathematicorum eſt invenire Vim, qua corpus in dato quovis orbe data cum velocitate accurate retineri poſſit; et viciſſim invenire Viam curvilineam, in quam corpus e dato quovis loco data cum velocitate egreſſum data vi flectatur. Newtoni Principio Mathem. Def. v.

Without

applying to them the ſame *Forces* and Mathematical calculations, for the phænomena

Without detracting from the merit of Sir Iſaac Newton as an Aſtronomer, which is ſo great that nothing can diminiſh it, truth and juſtice require it ſhould be acknowledged, that the Application of *Projectile* to *Celeſtial* Motion, which he improved to ſuch wonderful and important purpoſes, was made by one before him.

'Certiſſimum hoc eſt et ab omnibus conceſſum, motum 'Planetarum verum nec eſſe perfecte circularem, neque 'perfecte æqualem. Teſtantur enim obſervationes, idque 'ultra omnem diſputationem, figuram orbitæ planetariæ 'eſſe Ellipticam ſive ovalem, et a circulo deficientem; 'motumque ejus in hoc Elliptico inæqualem eſſe, et pro 'diſtantia ſua a Sole intendi ac remitti.—Ultro ſe offerunt 'cauſæ Phyſicæ et naturales, quæ talem motum neceſſi-'tate Geometrica deſcribunt.—Per cauſas Phyſicas veritati 'ſatisfaciamus; ut enim Planeta legibus magneticis mo-'veatur, quid quæſo impedit, cum idem in aliis exemplis 'aperte videamus?—Projiciatur plumbum aliquod in al-'tum, ſurgit *primo velociter*, deinde *tardius*, dum tandem '*ſtationarium* in terram recidat *continuo velocitatis incre-'mento*, atque ita motum *librationis* deſcribit.—Oritur ea 'libratio in linea recta ex *pugna virtutis illius quam manus 'tua* illi infudit, una cum *virtute telluris magnetica*, qua 'omnia gravia ad ſe attrahit, ut magnes ferrum. Nihil 'hic opus eſt, ut circulos neſcio quos in ære ſomniemus, 'ubi cauſam naturalem ante oculos habemus. Et quæſo 'quid eſt quod in motu Planetarum, ubi eadem commo-'ditas non deeſt, cauſam veram a Natura ipſa tot exemplis 'confirmatum, fictitio circulorum ſomnio commutare-'mus.' Jeremiæ Horroccii Liverpolienſis Opera Poſthuma Diſp. vi. cap. 1.

When

of which they moſt exactly and wonderfully accounted.

When we compare this extract with that above, and indeed with the whole plan of his *Principia*, we cannot help concluding that Sir Iſaac Newton made theſe broad and pointed hints of Mr. *Horrockes*, the baſis of his Aſtronomy. He acknowledges this philoſopher, who died about the year that he was born, to have been the firſt who diſcovered the Moon's motion to be in an *ellipſe* about the Earth in the lower focus; and that this invention was improved by Halley, who put the center of the Ellipſe in an *Epicyle* with its center revolving uniformly about the Earth, from whence the inequality of the progreſs and regreſs of the apogee, and in the quantity of eccentricity is deduced. [See Princip. lib. iii. prop. 35 Schol.] The philoſophical tract alluded to by Sir Iſaac is entitled *Nova theorea Lunæ* publiſhed after the author's death by Dr. Wallis; and in the ſame publication is that other tract *De Motu Siderum*, from which the extract above is taken, and which our great Aſtronomer muſt undoubtedly have ſeen, as he was particularly converſant with every thing that came from or through the hands of Dr. Wallis.

This philoſopher was the firſt who, in 1639, after detecting the fallacies of the Lambergian tables and correcting them, by the uſe of Kepler's which he improved, calculated and took the obſervation of that rare and deciſive Phænomenon the *Tranſit of Venus*, in which Kepler had failed. This important obſervation, by which the Sun's parallax and diſtance from the Earth are more juſtly aſcertained, he publiſhed in a work entitled *De Venere in Sole viſa*, a few weeks before his death; and he had a much greater work in hand in which he had made conſiderable progreſs. The ſubject of this was, in the *firſt part*, to refute

By this theory founded and eſtabliſhed in *Projectile* Motion, and thence, by a vaſt ex-

refute the *hypotheſes of Lamberg* by which he had been miſled; which is the work collected and publiſhed by Dr. Wallis: And the *ſecond part* was much more important intending to found a NEW PHILOSOPHY upon the baſis of ſound *Experiment* and accurate *Obſervation*, in which he adopted the Keplerian hypotheſes corrected and improved. But, though he had made ſuch advances in this New Philoſophy as from it to calculate and conſtruct an Ephemeris, he had not ſo adjuſted his materials and committed them to paper, that they could be collected and arranged for publication. An idea of his general ſcope may, however, be collected from what is incidentally ſaid in the tract *De motu Siderum* inſerted in the publication mentioned above. 'Cauſa vera eſt phyſica, Sol nempe converſione ſui cor-'poris reliquos planetas legibus magneticis ſecum rapit in 'gyrum, non aliter quam Terra Lunam, nubes, et reliqua 'in altum projecta, magnetica hac virtute ſecum circum-'vehit, ut doctiſſime probat *Keplerus*. Cauſam autem Ex-'centricitatis male (ut mihi videtur) tradit. Illam ego 'fibris magneticis quas ille in corpore Planetarum fingit 'tribuendam non cenſeo, ſed *inertiæ* eorum *corporali*, qua 'locum ſuum tueri conantur adverſus fortiorem Solis vir-'tutem. Philoſopham hanc alio tempore fuſius exponam, 'ejuſque ope ſperare auſim, ipſum Creationis momentum 'ex motibus cœleſtibus (ſaltem probabiliſſime) demon-'ſtrare. In preſens hoc ago ut ſtudioſiorum animos a vanis 'illis et fictitiis circulorum ſomniis ad naturalem et phy-'ſicam magis cauſarum diſquiſitionem revocarem.— Ex-'empla multa dari poſſunt eorum quæ per leges naturales 'et magneticas in circuitum rapiuntur.—Videmus Ter-'ram magnetica ſua vi nubes et reliqua ſurſum projecta

'abripere

ertion of mind, tranſlated to *Celeſtial*, he confirmed the obſervations of theſe philoſo-

'abripere in gyrum.—Docet igitur hic nos experientia fi-
'guram circularem per leges magneticas generari poſſe,
'cur illud de ſtellis dubitemus, quod in aliis verum cerni-
'mus?—Oſtendimus nos Philoſophiæ noſtræ familiare
'exemplum.—Philoſophiam noſtram ab ipſa Natura ultro
'oblatam nos grati accepimus: fruſtra illi ad cauſas fic-
'titias, et pro lubitu commentas confugiunt.'

That every philoſopher has an abſolute right to avail himſelf of the labours and diſcoveries of his predeceſſors, as a legacy freely given him, is a privilege which philoſophy always claims. It is, however, a tribute juſtly due to the memory of this extraordinary genius, whilſt we regret the loſs of his more valuable works, to acknowledge from what has been ſaved; that he was principally inſtrumental in calling Philoſophy out of the regions of fictitious invention, and putting her on the inveſtigation of the *phyſical Cauſes* of things from *Experiments* and *Obſervations*; that he not only made the application of *Projectile Motion* to the analogical illuſtration of *Celeſtial*, but alſo aſſigned the *Forces* both *Projective* and *Attractive* on which all geometrical calculations are founded; and that, without injuring the immortal fame of his great ſucceſſor, he may be fairly conſidered as the *Forerunner* of Newton. He mentions the *Vis Inertiæ* of matter in totidem verbis: and as to the *attractive force* whether it be that of *Magnetiſm* or *Gravitation*, is immaterial; and, indeed Sir Iſaac himſelf, in the beginning of his Principia, is quite indifferent both as to its name and nature (vel Vi Gravitatis, ſi modo *gravis* ſit Luna, vel *alia quacumque* Vi, quâ in Terram urgeatur.)

That every body reſpecting the Earth as its center, and that every body reſpecting the Sun as its center and moving

phers; demonſtrated their hypotheſes and conjectures;[1] and enacted, on a ſound found-

moving in a ſphere, are acted upon and varied in their motions and ſpheres, according to their reſpective diſtance, by ſome phyſical cauſe or cauſes from which their phænomena could be geometrically demonſtrated, was the general doctrine of *Horrockes*. *Halley*, obſerving the ſurfaces of the planetary ſpheres to be as the ſquares of their radii, found the force at ſeveral diſtances to act reciprocally as the ſquares. And *Newton* demonſtrated that a planet muſt revolve in an ellipſis about the center of force in the lower focus acting reciprocally as the ſquare of the diſtance, and that, with a radius drawn to that center, it muſt deſcribe areas proportionable to the times; particularizing and completing the *Mathematical Calculation*, and carrying it through all the celeſtial phænomena. All which might, probably, have been done by Horrockes, had he lived to execute his work: but this excellent young man, of illuſtrious genius but of humble birth, died in the year 1641 at the age of twenty three!!

[1] Kepler's *firſt Rule* is 'That the ſame Planets deſcribe 'equal areas in *equal times*:' and Sir Iſaac Newton demonſtrated from thence 'That the Planets are *attracted* 'towards the Sun as their *center*.' Kepler's *ſecond Rule* is 'That the *ſquares of the periodical times* are as the *cubes of* 'the *tranſverſe axis of their orbits*:' and Sir Iſaac demonſtrated 'That the *force* is *reciprocally* as the *ſquares* of the 'diſtance; from which duplicate ratio he demonſtrated 'the rule.' Kepler's *third Rule* is 'That the *Orbits* of the 'Planets are *oval* and probably *elliptical*, having the *Sun* in 'the *focus*:' and Sir Iſaac demonſtrated that the *Orbits* are really *elliptical* 'And that the *Sun* is in the *lower focus*.

L ation,

ation, the LAWS of the whole planetary ſyſtem, which, on finding their truth confirmed by repeated facts and continued experience, he called the MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF ASTRONOMY.[m]

From theſe Principles or general Laws of Motion, by the ſame geometrical calculations, he deduced the ſtupendous theory of the elliptical orbits of the planets both primary and ſecondary, of the ſpaces through which they paſs, of the different velocity with which they move, both in reſpect of each other and of themſelves in the different ſtages of their ethereal journey, of their relative times, and reſpective ſituations; and crowned this amazing ſyſtem of the heavens by his new philoſophy of the motion of the comets, of the moon, and of the ſea.

For the mathematical foundation of his Aſtronomy, as the effects were the ſame, he aſſigned the ſame or ſimilar *Forces* exiſting in nature, as the efficient cauſes both of

[m] Principia tradidi a *Mathematicis* recepta et *Experientia* multiplici confirmata. Newtoni Præf. in Princip.

Mecha-

Mechanical and Celeſtial motion.[a] And, indeed, both in the act of deriving his *Principles* from the projectile phænomena, and afterwards for the purpoſe of applying them to the planetary, it was neceſſary to analyze the elliptical motion of the heavenly bodies into a compound of two ſimple motions in right lines[*] produced by the action of theſe dif-

[a] See his *Regulæ Philoſophandi* prefixed to the third book of his Principia.

Having founded his Aſtronomy on the *Analogy* between the phænomena of Projectile and Planetary motion, from the *phænomena* he puſhed the Analogy to the *forces* as the efficient *cauſes* of both. 'Deſpiciamus,' ſays Mr. Cotes in his preface, 'qualis ſit in terreſtribus natura *Gravitatis*, ut 'deinde tutius progrediamur ubi ad corpora coeleſtia longiſſime a ſedibus noſtris remota perventum fuerit;' which is more fully explained in the following words; 'Videamus 'jam comparatione inſtituta inter Planetarum *Vires Centri*'*petas* et *Vim Gravitatis*, annon *ejuſdem* forte ſint generis. 'Ejuſdem vero generis erunt, ſi deprehendantur hinc et inde 'leges eædem, eædemque affectiones.'

[*] The *projective impulſe* given to a ſtone being the cauſe of its aſſent in the air, and its own *weight* that of its deſcent to the earth, he adopted *Projection* and *Gravitation* or the *Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces*, in their compound operation both on the Projectile and Planet, as the *cauſes* of their ſimilar motions: and theſe *Forces* he made the Mechanical foundation of his Principia. 'Mechanica rationalis 'erit ſcientia motuum qui a *Viribus* quibuſcunque reſultant, 'accurate propoſita ac demonſtrata.' And, after his Princi-

ferent *Forces:* and this might alſo be uſeful for the purpoſes of teaching and demonſtration; juſt as we find it neceſſary, in all parts of ſcience, to ſeparate what in nature is inſeparable, for the convenience and aſſiſtance of the underſtanding. The planetary motions may, however, be *ſimple* and *uncompound*, as they moſt probably are, (for no experiments can be tried in theſe diſtant regions;) and the Aſtronomy of Newton, which is only

pia were formed, theſe and ſimilar Forces are the ſubjects upon which they were to operate in the demonſtration of other phænomena. 'Nos ea tractamus quæ ad *Gravitatem*, '*Levitatem*, *Vim Elaſticam*, *Reſiſtentiam fluidorum* et ejuſ-'modi *Vires*, ſeu *attractivas* ſeu *propulſivas*, ſpectant; et ea 'propter hæc noſtra tanquam Philoſophiæ Principia Mathe-'matica propoſuimus. Omnis enim Philoſophiæ difficultas 'in eo verſari videtur, ut a Phænomenis motuum inveſtige-'mus *Vires* Naturæ, deinde ab his viribus demonſtremus 'phænomena reliqua.' This is profeſſedly the deſign and conduct of his great aſtronomical work. 'Et huc ſpectant '*Propoſitiones generales* quas libro primo et ſecundo pertrac-'tavimus. In libro autem tertio *exemplum* hujus rei propo-'ſiumus per explicationem ſyſtematis mundani. Ibi enim 'ex phænomenis cœleſtibus, per Propoſitiones in libris pri-'oribus mathematice demonſtratas, derivantur *Vires Gravi-'tatis* quibus corpora ad Solem et Planetas ſingulas tendunt: 'deinde ex his *Viribus*, per Propoſitiones etiam Mathemati-'cas, deducuntur *Motus Planetarum*, *Cometarum*, *Lunæ* et '*Maris*.' Newtoni Præf. in Princip.

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the application of his Mathematical Principles to their menſuration from their *Analogy* to projectile motions, did not at all require that the Forces of *Projection* and *Gravitation*, however uſeful their ſuppoſition might be, ſhould be aſſigned as their *real* exiſtent *Cauſes*.[1] It is ſufficient for the *Analogy*, on

[1] Sir Iſaac Newton is, doubtleſs, the firſt Aſtronomer in the world; and his great merit conſiſts in the application of *Geometry* to the phænomena of *Motion*, which he reſolved into two general *powers* or *cauſes*, for the purpoſe of applying his Mathematical calculations with effect to diſcover the *Principles* of Motion in general, and by them to demonſtrate the *Phænomena* of the Solar ſyſtem—A ſtupendous exertion of the human mind. But men who have gone far, have ſometimes, in the laudable zeal for knowledge and the perfection of their ſcience, been carried beyond the bounds of truth in attempting to go farther. It was ſufficient for the purpoſe of Aſtronomy, (which differs from Phyſics properly underſtood, inaſmuch as it conſiſts in the calculation of *Effects*, whatever the *Cauſes* may be,) to *ſuppoſe* the exiſtence of the Forces aſſigned: for, whether a combination of the two Forces be the *real cauſe* of the celeſtial motions, does not at all affect the truth and utility of the calculations founded upon them, which would demonſtrate the Phænomena equally as well upon the *hypotheſis*, and be equally convincing when confirmed by Experience, which would crown the ſcience.

Thus a Geometrician can work with imaginary Forces, as well as with real ones; and, as an *Aſtronomer*, in calculating the celeſtial motions, he had nothing to do with

which the whole philoſophy is founded, that the *Phænomena* of motion are known, from

inveſtigating the celeſtial cauſe: for he himſelf declares that his *Principles* are *Mathematical*, not Phyſical (p. 356.) And Dr. Berkeley has well obſerved, that 'what is ſaid of '*Forces*, whether *attracting* or *repelling*, is to be regarded 'only as a *Mathematical hypotheſis*, and not any thing ex-'iſting in nature' [Siris]. Though Sir Iſaac may be totally wrong as to the *Cauſes*, he may be totally right as to the *Laws*, of celeſtial motion, aſcertained by *figures* and confirmed by *facts*.

To the *ſame* Phænomena as *Effects* his philoſophy attributes the *ſame* exiſtent *Cauſes*, by a Maxim founded more in the authority of antiquity than in the truth of things. To inveſtigate and aſſign the *true cauſes* of things is a much more hazardous taſk than philoſophers are willing to allow. Becauſe the *Curve* deſcribed by a Planet is of the *ſame ſpecies*, and the *motion ſimilar* to thoſe of a Projectile, to infer that therefore the *Cauſe* is actually the *ſame*, is a concluſion more than the ANALOGY, on which his Aſtronomy is founded, either requires or warrants: for the *curves* of both are the *ſame* with that produced by the ſimple act of cutting a piece of wood of a certain ſhape in a certain direction, and it cannot be therefore argued that the *cauſes* are the *ſame*.

That the Firſt Cauſe of all Motion, Projectile or Aſtronomical, inceſſantly acting in his providential care, according to general laws, is one and the ſame, is moſt true: But, whether he may not *move* the grander wheels of his material ſyſtem by a more *immediate act* of his omnipotent mind, whilſt he produces the *ſame apparent effects* or *ſimilar motions* on this earth by the operation of *ſecond cauſes*: Or, whether he does not produce the heavenly motions by ſe-

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experiments and obſervations, to be the *ſame* in *both* inſtances; that the *Principles* or *general Laws*, mathematically eſtabliſhed from the *Forces* of the *one*, are transferred to the *Phænomena* of the *other*; and that the proofs and operations deduced from theſe Principles, in the latter caſe, are confirmed by *Facts*, and *Experience*, the firſt and final teſt of truth. And it is enough for his immortal honour, that his Aſtronomy, thus founded on Mechanics, has anticipated and predicted all the ſtupendous revolutions of the hea-

cond cauſes either *different in themſelves*, or *compounded differently*, from thoſe which act upon Projectiles, as no experiments can be inſtituted in theſe diſtant regions, are points worthy the conſideration of a philoſopher.

But there are many motions upon the earth different from that of projectiles, which may probably lay the foundation of an *Analogy* to the celeſtial motions; as that of *Fire*, which is directly oppoſite to *Gravitation*. We have heard of a foreigner, who is projecting an Aſtronomy on the principle of *Repulſion*: and our own countryman, the ingenious Mr. Jones, has aſſigned a principle of Planetary motion grounded on Experiment totally different from the Newtonian Forces; and which, if the *real cauſes* are to be given, is much more *ſimple*, and, in many reſpects, leſs objectionable. [See his Eſſay on the Principles of Natural Philoſophy.]

vens; that it has ſurmounted innumerable difficulties, and demonſtrated what was before out of the reach of human obſervation; and that it has erected, upon a mathematical conviction, all thoſe celeſtial facts and obſervations into a ſyſtem at once ſublime and luminous.

Had this great and good man been content to reſt his Aſtronomy on the baſis of this ANALOGY confirmed by repeated Facts and uniform Experience;[p] and left the *Cauſes* of the celeſtial motion to HIM, many of whoſe ways are above all human inveſtigation, his philoſophy would have maintained the ſame dignity and value, equally uſeful

[p] The ANALOGY, on which Aſtronomy is founded, concerns properly the *Phænomena* and apparent *Effects*, and *need not*, perhaps *cannot*, ever extend to the real *Cauſes*. And Dr. Clarke, the learned advocate and defender of Newton, in his conteſt with Leibnitz, after many a ſtruggle, was obliged to bring the matter at laſt to this ſame iſſue; where he ſays, That '*Attraction* is not a *Cauſe*, but 'a *Phænomenon* or *Effect* diſcovered by experience, what-'ever be the *Cauſe* of it, to which mathematical calcu-'lations are uſefully applied.' p. 355 and 356.

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to all the purpoſes of civil and ſocial life, and equally acceptable to the contemplative ſtudent; without being involved in thoſe abſurdities and incumbered with thoſe difficulties, which even the genius of a Newton was unable to ſurmount;[q] and which his followers have laboured in vain to evade or palliate;[r] without being ſo liable to be abuſed

[q] To eſtabliſh his *Projection* or *Centrifugal Force*, according to his firſt Axiom, he was obliged to invent a perfect *Vacuum*: But then, for his *Gravitation* or *Centripetal Force* a Vacuum would not do; and he was brought to great difficulties, [See his letter to Dr. Bentley] and at laſt to the neceſſity of conjecturing a *ſubtle ethereal fluid*, as a medium, to pervade the univerſe: [See Opt. Quæſt. 18, 19, 20, 21.] And thus, ſays Mr. Jones, 'he ſolved the 'government of the created world by a *Noſtrum*, which 'hath never yet been underſtood.'

[r] In juſtice to the Newtonian Philoſophy I cannot avoid tranſcribing the Apology, made in the Recenſion of the Controverſy with Leibnitz, from its laſt and ableſt Edition; as it contains the ſubſtance of the defence adopted by the followers of Newton.

Philoſophia porro, quam in Principiis ſuis atque Opticis Newtonus excoluit, eſt experimentalis: illa ſcilicet, quæ cauſas rerum non fidentius docet, quam per experimenta confirmari queant; neque implenda eſt opinationibus, quæ per phænomena nequeunt probari. Et idcirco in

that Religion, of which he lived in the be-

quod cauſas gravitatis aliarumque attractionum non per hypotheſes explicet? quaſi criminis loco eſſet, certis eſſe contentum, incerta vero dimittere. Newtoni Opera Edit. Horſeley, vol. iv. pag. 492, 493, 494.

The cauſe of Newton is here pleaded with all the candour and ability becoming the very learned and ingenious Editor of his works. Of *Cauſes*, in the great chain of nature, there are many kinds ſubordinate to each other: and, allowing that Sir Iſaac never intended to aſſign the *phyſical Cauſe* of his Forces; as he made theſe *Forces* the baſis of his Aſtronomy, the queſtion ſeems to be, whether he conſidered them as *exiſtent* in the heavens and founded on experiment and phænomena? or whether he only *ſuppoſed* them, for the purpoſe of applying his geometrical calculations? If he thought them *really exiſtent*, he aſſigned them as the *phyſical cauſes* of the celeſtial motions. And that he did ſo is, I think, clear both from himſelf and from his Editors. Mr. Cotes ſays in his Preface 'Conſtat Planetas 'in orbitibus ſuis retineri per Vim aliquam in ipſos, per-'petuo agentem, conſtat Vim illam dirigi ſemper verſus 'orbitarum centra &c.—Ideone Gravitatis occulta cauſa 'dicetur, eoque nomine rejicietur a philoſophia, quod 'cauſa ipſius Gravitatis occulta eſt et nondum inventa.—'Etenim Cauſæ continuo nexu procedere ſolent a compo-'ſitis ad ſimpliciora.—Cauſæ ſimpliſſimæ nulla dari poteſt 'mechanica explicatio.'

Sir Iſaac Newton was, certainly, much perplexed about his Forces. They were indiſpenſible to his Aſtronomy either as *real* or *ſuppoſed*; and if he had reſted the whole ſimply upon the *Analogy* between *Projectile* and *Celeſtial* Motion, according to the few plain words in his fifth Definition 'Eadem ratione qua Projectile vi gravitatis in

'orbem

lief and practice, and in which he repoſed his dying hope.'

'orbem flecti poſſet, et totam terram circumire, poſſet et 'Luna, ſi modo *gravis* ſit, vel *alia quacunque vi*,' without ſaying any more, he would have ſaved himſelf and followers much difficulty and trouble, and have fixed his Aſtronomy upon a foundation ſufficiently ſtrong, againſt which no fair objection could have been brought.

'Upon this part of the Newtonian Philoſophy ſome *Materialiſts* have hinged, or endeavoured to hinge, their abſurd and prepoſterous ſyſtem: and it is a misfortune ever to be lamented, in this dark and imperfect ſtate of things, that the *Errors* of great and good men, however *innocent* or even *laudable* in themſelves, (and this is one of the worſt plagues of Error,) lead weaker and leſs virtuous minds into a labyrinth beſet with fatal miſchief.

Two living authors, with a view of ſubverting this foundation of Materialiſm and all the abſurdity and impiety which it generates, have oppoſed this infirm part of the Philoſophy of Newton with arguments, which on both ſides are, I think, full and incontrovertible: but, after ſubverting the *Forces* of *Attraction* and *Repulſion*, in aſſigning what each ſuppoſes to be the *true Cauſe* of celeſtial motion, they draw two ways diametrically oppoſite to each other; which may probably be an omen that the true and proper Cauſe is not to be known.

The *Author of Ancient Metaphyſics* aſſigns a *metaphyſical*, *Mr. Jones' Philoſophy* a *phyſical*, cauſe: and, equally zealous for the intereſts of religion, they are both the avowed enemies of Atheiſm. The former attempts to revive and to ſupport the ancient doctrine of *Mind* or the *Deity* himſelf, as the *Firſt Cauſe*, animating and moving every part of his material creation by an immediate influence, and 'perpetu-

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BUT whilſt, from this mixture and connection of Phyſic and Mathematics, philoſo-

'ally operating upon it by inceſſant impulſes.' The latter 'attributes all motion to the action of *Matter upon Matter*, 'maintaining the agency of *Second Cauſes*, under the direc- 'tion of God the moral Governour of the world, and the 'Primary Cauſe of all things.'

They perfectly agree in allowing God, or the Univerſal Mind, to be the *Firſt* and Univerſal Cauſe of all things; ſo that, upon either ſuppoſition, the cauſe of *Theiſm* is ſafe: but the one repreſents him, in the exerciſe of his providential government according to fixed and general laws of his own enacting, as operating through every part of the natural material ſyſtem *mediately* and by the *inſtrumentality* of his creatures; that is *naturally*: whilſt the other exhibits him as acting upon all particular material ſubjects, in different ways, *immediately* and by the *direct operation* of his divine power, according to general laws; which, if not *miraculouſly*, muſt be *ſupernaturally*. Which of the two hypotheſes redounds more to the honour of God and the intereſts of his Religion, as their ſupporters appear to be actuated by the pureſt and moſt benevolent motives, is a queſtion I do not undertake particularly to decide.

I muſt however obſerve, ſo great is the perverſeneſs and obliquity of the human mind, that both, however oppoſite, have, at different periods, been twiſted to the ſupport of *Atheiſm*. The *immediate* operation of the Univerſal Mind animating and actuating all matter with every kind of life and motion, was, by the Chaldaic and ſome old philoſophers, converted into the doctrine of *Materializm*; in the entertainment of which they taught whole nations

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phers are deriving a train of ſublime and ſplendid truths, by which the heavens are

to worſhip the element of *Fire*, as the ſubtleſt and ſublimeſt part of the *Soul of the world*: And, under a ſimilar perſuaſion, a Roman Philoſopher of great moral reputation has the following queſtion 'Quid eſt aliud *Natura*, quam '*Deus*, et *divina ratio* toti *Mundo* et partibus ejus inſita?' [Seneca de Benef. lib. iv.] On the other hand, ſome more modern *Materialiſts* have founded their doctrines on the *agency of Second Cauſes*, on *Matter acting upon Matter*, by virtue, as they ſuppoſe, of its organization or other inherent power, making the *material world* into an *automaton* moving itſelf independently of any other cauſe. And, either the reaſon of men or the reaſon of things is ſo totally changed, that, to defeat this impious and modern doctrine, the other and ancient is revived as the only antidote, making God himſelf the ſole agent, by whoſe immediate power, excluſive of the operations and inſtrumentality of all material agents, the meaneſt effects are every hour produced. By theſe arms, we are taught, we can only obtain a complete triumph over *Atheiſm*. But, whether this triumph will be well founded in the event, may, I think, be left to be decided by the judgment of Lord Bacon ſupported by the verdict of Plato.—'Eos, qui autumant nimiam ſcientiam 'inclinare mentem in atheiſmum, ignorantiamque ſecunda-'rum cauſarum pietati erga primam obſtetricari, libenter 'compellarem Jobi quæſtione: *An oporteat mentiri pro Deo*, '*et ejus gratia dolum loqui conveniat, ut ipſi gratificemur?* 'Liquet enim, Deum nihil operari ordinario in natura, niſi 'per *ſecundas cauſas*, cujus diverſum credi ſi vellent, im-'poſtura mera eſſet, quaſi in gratiam Dei, et nihil aliud 'quam authori veritatis immundam mendacii hoſtiam im-'molare. Quin potius certiſſimum eſt, atque experientia

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enlightened from pole to pole, they ſhould never, in the pride of ſcience, loſe ſight of

'comprobatum, leves guſtus in philoſophia movere fortaſſe 'ad atheiſmum, ſed pleniores hauſtus ad religionem redu-'cere. Namque in limine philoſophiæ, cum ſecundæ cau-'ſæ, tanquam ſenſibus proximæ, ingerant ſe menti huma-'næ, menſque ipſa in illis hæreat atque commoretur, obli-'vio primæ cauſæ obrepere poſſit. Sin quis ulterius pergat, 'cauſarumque dependentiam ſeriem et concatenationem, 'atque opera providentiæ intueatur, tunc ſecundum poeta-'rum mythologiam facile credet, ſummum naturalis catenæ 'annulum pedi ſolii Jovis affigi.' De Augm. Sc. lib. i.

Ταυτ' ἔν πανν' ἐστιν τῶν συναιτίων, οἷς ὁ Θεὸς τὴν τε ἀρίστ τάξιν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀποτελεῖ. Plato.

Between theſe two rocks of Atheiſm is the middle way, in which ſound Theiſm is always to be found, which was pointed to both by Plato and Bacon, and in which Newton, however miſtaken in his Forces, ſecurely trod, in the exerciſe of philoſophy and religion.

In this middle way the very learned Author of *Ancient Metaphyſics* might reſt ſecure of his *Theiſm*; and, for the improvement of ſound learning, he may ſafely join the ingenious Mr. Jones in the following ſublime and truly philoſophical idea, that 'With *him* who is taught that the '*true God* is diſtant from, and above the world of matter, 'though virtually preſent in it by a providential inſpection 'and ſuperintendence, the *Mechaniſm* of the natural world 'will only ſerve to enlarge his ideas, by ſetting before him 'the viſible evidence of that divine Wiſdom, which, with 'ſo exquiſite a contrivance and ſuch a ſimplicity of deſign, 'hath adopted *phyſical Cauſes* to the production of their 'reſpective effects.' Jones's Philoſophy, p. 8.

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the nature and extent of that mixture and connection. Whilſt they join them in ope-

By overlooking the intermediate links in the great chain of Cauſes, and by reſolving every effect into the *immediate* and *perſonal* act of Deity, this learned writer ſhould reflect, that he not only injures the beauty and contrivance, the connection and dependence ſo admirable in the œconomy of Nature, but puts a check upon the progreſs of Natural Philoſophy, which conſiſts entirely of an enquiry into *ſecond cauſes*; and alſo, that, by introducing a ſort of '*miraculous interpoſition*, he is confounding the eſtabliſhed 'order of natural things, and introducing a method of 'philoſophizing, which would give a ſanction to every ri-'diculous hypotheſis that doth not quite come up to an 'impoſſibility'. Ibid. p. 115.

In allowing the Deity to act *mediately* by the inſtrumentality of his own creation, we can be in no danger of ſuppoſing that *Matter* is poſſeſſed of thought and motion in itſelf, or that it is able to make and to ſupport the world: and 'the Wiſdom of God will be infinitely magnified' in our conception 'if he be found to bring about thoſe things 'by the mechaniſm of *ſecond Cauſes*, to which philoſo-'phers have determined the divine power itſelf to be abſo-'lutely neceſſary. And we may hence derive the only ra-'tional encouragement to a chearful and diligent ſtudy of 'Nature. The Cauſes employed are few and ſimple be-'yond expreſſion: their Effects are infinitely various and 'wonderful; and to thoſe who begin upon a right found-'ation they will unfold themſelves every day more and 'more; nor will the labour of man be loſt in the purſuit, 'till he has acquired as much knowledge of this ſort, as 'will do him good in his preſent ſtate.' Ibid. p. 225.

ration, they ſhould be careful not to confound them in contemplation, ſo as to miſtake the Principles of the one for the Principles of the other; which will finally and inevitably lead to error.

That every particular ſcience has Principles of its own, which are totally independ-

Upon the whole, both theſe Authors agree with our great philoſopher as to the WHO, and the WHERE, and the WHEN. It is *God, in all places*, and *at all times*. But they all differ as to the *Manner* HOW. And though both may have ſupplanted the Newtonian Forces, their hypotheſes are oppoſite to each other, and each may ſerve to prove that the other is in the wrong. And, however honourable the ſearch, if conducted with humility and prudence, the *phyſical Cauſes* of things may often be among thoſe of "his ways which are paſt finding out." Whether he diſpenſe his bleſſings through the world more *immediately* with his own hand, or through the *mediation of* ſecond Cauſes, the real government of the whole will terminate equally in HIMSELF. If "in his *Wiſdom* he made "the worlds," HE upholds them by his *Power*. If his Sun repleniſh us with its light, and invigorate us with its heat, it is HE "who maketh it to riſe on the evil and on "the good." If the Air yield nouriſhment and reſpiration to the vegetable and animal creations, it is He "who gi-"veth life and breath and all things." If the clouds pour down water to fertilize the earth; it is HE "who ſendeth "his rain on the juſt and on the unjuſt;" HE is both "alpha and omega," the beginning and the end, "in whom "we live and move, and have our being."

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eat of others, is that ſound and wholeſome doctrine received from Ariſtotle, to exemplify and illuſtrate which is a main object of theſe Lectures; as it leads to the due diſtinction, and facilitates the juſt apprehenſion, of all the kinds of truth. Phyſical Principles, whether general *Cauſes* if they are to be found, or *Phænomena* which are generalized, are collected from Experiments which are *particular matters of fact*, and cannot poſſibly originate in Geometry, which conſiſts in the *ſpeculation of general ideas*; however uſeful Geomery may ſometimes be in the art of deducing them in the firſt place, and of applying them in the ſecond[1]: and it is, accordingly, obſerved by a very able and

[1] Young Mathematicians, who are ſmatterers in philoſophy, are apt to form very high and prepoſterous ideas of the nature and perfection of Phyſical Science, betrayed probably into a miſtake, in regard to its Principles, by Sir Iſaac Newton having called his 'Philoſophiæ Principia 'Mathematica:' and again by the following and ſimilar expreſſions 'Hactenus Principia tradidi a *Mathematicis* 'recepta, et Experientia multiplici confirmata.' Præf. ad Princip. From which it ſeems as if he conſidered *Mathematics* as the *ſubject matter* and *Experiments* only as the *inſtrument*; juſt contrary to the truth.

ingenious philoſopher, that 'Geometry can 'be of little uſe till *data* are collected to 'build upon[u].' Theſe data are furniſhed by Experiments and Inductions, and lay the foundation of the philoſophical ſuperſtructure, which Mathematics ſometimes lend moſt uſeful aſſiſtance in building up. If the foundation be well and firmly laid, the ſuperſtructure will be ſound and ſtrong; if otherwiſe, it will be infirm and weak: for, however ſure and invincible Mathematical reaſoning may be, either conſidered in the abſtract, or in its operation on true materials; when employed upon falſe and miſtaken principles, it is as falſe and erroneous as any other that is alſo miſapplied.[x]

[u] Maclaurin, p. 35.

[x] *Geometriam* atque *Arithmeticam*, velut *Alas* duas Aſtronomiæ datas eſſe, ſcite quidem ac vere dixit *Plato*: Sumque adjecit calculum *Lanſbergius*. Atqui non ſolum Alas habent volucres quibus in cœlum ſubvehantur, ſed additur præterea *Cauda*, quæ Temonis inſtar, volatus earum regere poſſit. Simili omnino ratione, quamvis Geometria et Arithmetica Aſtronomo ſummopere ſint neceſſariæ, adeo ut illis nequaquam carere poſſit; per ſe tamen non ſufficiunt ad laborem hunc *Herculeum* perficiendum, niſi inſuper accedat *ratio Phyſica*, quæ tanquam Nauclerus puppi

In their application to portions of Natural Philoſophy, Mathematics are, therefore, not to be conſidered as *fundamental*, but as *inſtrumental* only: and the judicious philoſopher will diſtinguiſh the Phyſical Principles, whatever they may be, or wherever found, from the Mathematics operating upon them. The Motion of bodies on the ſurface of the earth is the phænomenon, which from experiment ſupplies the Phyſical Principle;

puppi inſidens, totius ſpeculationis clavum teneat. Si quis igitur Palladem hanc, difficilis licet vultus, comitem et ducem nolit; nil mirum ſi, latentibus alicubi ſcopulis impingens, in erroris pelago naufragium fecerit. Atque hanc ego rationem exiſtimo, quod tam diu formoſiſſima illa divarum Urania tam difficilem petentibus præbuit aurem, quod ſcilicet hanc Philoſophiæ partem Phyſicam a rebus Aſtronomicis excludentes, mediatricem illam noluerunt. Exoranda eſt itaque ſummoque ſtudio excolenda intima hæc Aſtronomiæ famula, illis qui ſuaviſſimo Uraniæ gremio, votis tandem potiti, conquieſcere deſiderant. Quæ quidem ut mihi ſit propitia, ſummis ſtudiorum præmiis ac meritis contendam, ut mediante illius opera ſuaviſſimos Dominæ ſuæ vultus perſpiciam. Meos amores enim celare non poſſum, nec tamen æmulos metuo. Sponſam habeat illibatam illam virginem (Aſtrorum Scientiam) quicunque erit cui palmam ipſa conceſſerit, mihi ſat erit ſi vel tædam martialem nuptiis ſuis præferre me dignabatur. Horrocii Opera Poſthuma, Diſp. 1. cap. 2.

and Geometry, by applying its menſurations to that motion, erects this part of natural philoſophy into the ſcience of *Mechanics:* the ſimilar Motion of bodies in the heavens is the phœnomenon eſtabliſhed by Obſervation, which, whether the cauſe of that motion can be known or not, is the Phyſical Principle; and Geometry, by the application of *ſimilar* menſurations, produces the ſcience of *Aſtronomy:* and the ſame might be obſerved of *Muſic*—All which departments of Philoſophy, by this application of Mathematics, enjoy advantages, indeed, different and ſuperior to other parts of Phyſics.

If he would, therefore, hope for ſucceſs in his philoſophical reſearches, he will not adapt *Phyſics* to *Mathematics*, but *Mathematics* to *Phyſics*, in obedience to the directions of the guide and patron of philoſophy, who hath obſerved that 'all Natural enquiries ſucceed 'the beſt, when a Phyſical Principle is made 'to terminate in a Mathematical operation'.[y]

[y] Optime cedit inquiſitio naturalis, quando phyſicum terminatur in mathematico. Baconi Nov. Org. lib. iii.

AND

AND thus we have obſerved, according to the Rule preſcribed by LORD BACON, the friend and father of philoſophers, and according to the Practice of SIR ISAAC NEWTON, who put in execution the precepts of his great maſter, that all REASONING in Natural Philoſophy, is *aſcendent* and *deſcendent*—from Experiments up to Axioms, and from Axioms down to new Inventions.[s]

SECT. III.

Of Phyſical TRUTH.

BUT, as the beſt and moſt accurate *Experiments* that are inſtituted and conducted by human ſkill, which are the baſis and ſupport of all ſound Philoſophy, cannot pene-

[s] Neque enim in plano via ſita eſt, ſed *aſcendendo* et *deſcendendo*; aſcendendo primo ad axiomata, deſcendendo ad opera. Baconi Nov. Org. lib. 1. Aph. 104.
See De Augm. Sc. lib. III. cap. 3.

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trate into the *real* eſſences of things; as they can only inform the *Senſes* of ſome of their *apparent qualities*, and of ſecondary, which we call *phyſical*, *cauſes*, and ſometimes only of the *phænomena* or *effects* themſelves; ſince the *Induction*, by which the general truths are collected from particular Experiments, is only *partial* and *confined*, and extended by *Analogy*, which is an *indirect* ſpecies of reaſoning, never abſolutely concluſive; ſince theſe general truths, which become the Laws and Principles of Philoſophy, do not poſſeſs the *evidence* of Mathematical Axioms; and, laſtly, ſince from theſe Principles *particular*, not general, *concluſions* are deduced, PHYSICAL TRUTH muſt conſequently partake of the nature and inferiority of their Principles and Mode of Reaſoning.[a] And though Mathematics, by a friendly mixture and communication, often facilitate their production and elucidate their force, imparting

[a] Διόπερ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας, οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀλλά τις ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς δηλώσεως. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. i.

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to them, in all ſubjects capable of menſuration and where Quantity can apply, the uſe and ſimilarity of ſcientific demonſtration; however CERTAIN, they are NOT to be pronounced abſolutely NECESSARY: and, philoſophically conſidered, they are in nature and evidence greatly inferior to Mathematical concluſions.[b]

STILL, the Philoſophy of Nature is the field of utility and glory. It miniſters to the wants, and ſupplies many of the ornaments, of life. It opens one of the univerſal books of God, in which his infinite Power, his ſtupendous Wiſdom, and unbounded Goodneſs are written with his own finger in

[b] 'Zealous for the honour and perfection of their favourite ſtudy, ſome of our modern philoſophers ſtrenuouſly contend that almoſt every thing in *Phyſics* is *demonſtrable*. 'The ground and reaſon of which,' obſerves one of better information, 'I apprehend to be, that many of our geo-'metricians, ambitious of dictating to us about the *cauſes* 'and *firſt ſprings* of Nature, while they can reach only to 'the meaſure of ſome of its *effects*, have not been careful 'to diſtinguiſh how far a Mathematical concluſion will 'extend, and how far not.' Jones's Philoſophy, p. 91.

moſt

moſt fair and convincing characters: and thus the material world is made the counterpart of the immaterial mind, in which the latter contemplates, as in a glaſs, the image of its Author. And, after all the improvements which have honoured the labours of a *Boyle*, a *Newton*, a *Halley* and others, whoſe ſtudies, ſince the great *Bacon* founded the true, that is the Inductive, Logic, have conferred upon this nation the laurel of philoſophy; ſo great is its variety and extent, that our beſt knowledge of Nature is ſtill partial and imperfect. The more we know, the more we ſhall acknowledge to remain unknown, and the more readily ſubſcribe to the verdict of that illuſtrious child of Wiſdom who hath ſublimely obſerved, that "God "hath planted the world in man's heart; yet "cannot man find out the work which he "worketh from the beginning unto the end."[e]

Though not in the ſenſe in which the word was uſed by the old philoſophers, many Qualities and Cauſes are yet *occult*, which may be brought to light by future Experiments

[e] Eccleſ. iii. 11.

and

and Analyſes. New Inductions may be inſtituted, new Axioms eſtabliſhed, and new Inventions found: and thus the great volume of Nature is calculated, by the omniſcience of its Author, to afford ſcope to the virtuous and honourable employment of ſages and philoſophers, till its whole ſyſtem ſhall diſſolve and vaniſh, and be ſucceeded by one of a ſuperior order; when there will be "a new heaven and a new earth," in which the FIRST will himſelf take place of *ſecond* Cauſes; when the film which is ſpread over the carnal eye will be removed, new objects preſented, and new ſcenes diſcloſed, under the aſpect and illumination of a brighter SUN.[d]

[d] See Iſaiah lx. 19, 20; and Luke xvii. 2.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Logic of FACTS.

FROM Phyſics, the plan chalked out for the arrangement and execution of this general Chart of Truth leads me to that extenſive department comprehending all thoſe tranſactions, occurrences, and events, which are known by the name of FACTS, as belonging to the ſame *Theoretic*[a] province of the Mind, and entitled to the ſame diſtinction from ſubjects both of *Practical*[b] and *Poetical* intention.

[a] Τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας, καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς, μηδὲ ποιήτικῆς, τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς, ΤΑΛΗΘΕΣ ἐςι καὶ ΨΕΤΔΟΣ. Ariſtot. Eth. Nicom. Lib. vi. cap. 1.

[b] Οὐκ ἔςι δὲ προαιρετὸν ἀΘὲν γεγονός· οἷον ἀΘὲις προαιρεῖται Ἰλιον πεπορΘηκέναι. ἀΘὲ γὰρ βυλεύεται περὶ τᾶ γεγονότος,

THIS is a kind of truth, which is ſo direct and obvious in its nature, ſo open to the apprehenſion, and ſo familiar to the mind, of all men; that it ſeems to have eſcaped philoſophical enquiry and critical examination. As it is, however, a ſpecies of truth of more univerſal extent than any other, and of more immediate importance in every ſtage and ſphere of life; and, particularly, ſince by the decree of providence it has been made a principal foundation of thoſe ſuperior and ſublimer truths, which are the main object of this analyſis, it demands, in its place, a logical conſideration.

ντες, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶ ἰσομένω, καὶ ἐνδεχομένω. τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς
ἐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι. διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων,

Μόνα γὰρ αὐτῆ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
Ἀργένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσ' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα.

Ibid.

SECT.

SECT. I.

Of the PRINCIPLE of Facts.

FACTS have, indeed, a moſt intimate and inſeparable connection with Phyſics. As truths they derive their exiſtence from the ſame FIRST PRINCIPLE, from the notices and indications of the EXTERNAL SENSES; and, had it not been for their cloſe connection with the ſubject of the ſucceeding chapter, they would have been entitled to the precedence in this logical arrangement, as they ſupply the foundation of all phyſical deductions: for without *Experiments*, which are a ſpecies of *Facts*, there can be no ſound philoſophy of nature.

But, whereas Phyſics leave the firſt impreſſions made upon the SENSES by *individual* objects, and, from *Appearances* and *Effects*, by the help of experiments, deſcend to the inveſtigation of *Qualities* and *Cauſes*, in order

order to form general laws for the proof of particular truths,[c] which are *permanent*, and will extend to all *times* and *places* ſo long as nature remains the ſame; Facts, as truths, reſult immediately from the *individual* objects preſented to the SENSES, from the *Appearances* and *Effects* themſelves, and, however certain, are *tranſient*, and confined within the limits of *time* and *place*.

They are all *particular* independent truths, not deriving their proof from generals, as thoſe of Phyſics do; but requiring to their confirmation, that a particular event, or ſeries of events occurred to the ocular obſervation of a certain perſon or perſons, at a certain time and place; that a particular phænomenon appeared; or that a particular thing, was heard or ſeen to be ſaid or done. So that, for the proof of Facts, the coincidence of a particular *tranſaction*, *perſon*, *time*,

[c] Philoſophia individua dimittit; neque impreſſiones primas individuorum, ſed notiones ab illis abſtractas complectitur; atque in iis componendis et dividendis, ex lege naturæ et rerum ipſarum evidentia, verſatur. Atque hoc prorſus officium eſt atque opificium rationis. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. II. cap. 1.

and

and *place*, is abſolutely required; and th evidence of the EXTERNAL SENSES of thoſe who were the immediate witneſſes, is th firſt and laſt credential.

THAT, on *friday* the 13th day of the la month,[a] the Univerſity and City of Oxfor expreſſed their loyalty and affection to moſt amiable and illuſtrious SOVEREIGN the *FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY* and the *FRIEND OF ALL MEN* and teſtified an univeral and unbounded jo for his recovery from a long and dangerou ſickneſs, and his reſumption of the throne c theſe kingdoms, by a general *Illumination*, i a Fact of which *we* who were *preſent* wer rejoiced to be convinced: and of which con viction the evidence of one of the moſt fa miliar of the Senſes was the adequate an ſufficient cauſe. Here was a full coincidenc of all the particulars which are requiſite t evince and eſtabliſh the truth of Facts.

[a] March 1789.

SECT

SECT. II.

Of REASONING in regard to Facts.

SO far from being the conſequences and concluſions of any proceſs of Reaſon, FACTS reſult immediately from the Senſes, and convince the mind, without its conſidering or attending to their phyſical or other cauſes, and become themſelves as *Firſt Principles* of Reaſoning.

As truths, each of them ſtands on its ſeparate and independent bottom, terminating and concluding in itſelf: ſo that all direct compariſons and judgments between one Fact and another, or between a Fact and any thing elſe, is irrelevant to their truth, and all *Inductive* Reaſoning of courſe excluded. For *moral* and *political* purpoſes they are often, indeed, generalized and ranged into claſſes; but as *truths* they want no *General Propoſitions*

from which they are to be deduced as conſequences: And, if they admit of no *Secondary Principles*, all Reaſoning by *Syllogiſm* or *Superinduction* is of courſe totally ſuperceded.

But though Reason has no proper or direct concern *with* Facts, under the high privilege of *Firſt Principles*, it is never better or more eſſentially employed, than when it examines, and enquires *about*, them. The *Method* which it purſues may, indeed, be very different from thoſe we have been tracing both in Mathematics and in Phyſics, (for, give it fair play, and Reaſon will, ſome way or other, adapt itſelf to every thing;) it is not, however, to be rejected or diſcarded here. This uſeful office it performs, by examining whether the *External Senſes*, the firſt and final evidence of Facts, are in a ſound and healthy ſtate; whether they are well and ſufficiently informed; and whether they are ſubject to no impediment from nature, no impoſition from art, nor fallacy from accident. In this exerciſe, it does not preſume to change

or

or to correct the verdict of the *Senſes*, by any preconceived notion, or factitious determination, of its own. Senſible of the ſuperior dignity and excluſive privilege of *Firſt Principles*, it forbears to compare them with any thing elſe, and to judge of them by any medium but themſelves. All that it preſumes to do, is, by indirect and collateral compariſons, to rectify and aſcertain the evidence of Senſe by the evidence of Senſe; that is, to judge of it by itſelf.

Thus, if, on viewing any object with care and circumſpection, what appears to one eye, appears the ſame to others which ſee it at the ſame time and place; or, if what appears to one eye at a certain time and place, has uniformly appeared the ſame at all other times and places; we conclude, from theſe compariſons and judgments, which is an *indirect* mode of REASONING and a ſpecies of ANALOGY, that the Senſe is ſufficiently perfect and well-informed. And, what contributes both to facilitate and to enſure the concluſion, is, that *Facts* are truths in which we are bred and converſant

from infancy; ſo that hourly experience of them in ourſelves, confirmed by the expreſs, and perhaps more by the tacit, acknowledgement of the ſame in others, would immediately detect and expoſe any impediment, deception, or fallacy in the *Senſes*, and thus effectually ſecure the judgment from miſtake and error.

Sect III.

Of the Truth of Facts.

THOUGH derived from the ſame Firſt Principle of knowledge with Mathematical and Phyſical truth, logically viewed that of Facts is eſſentially different both from the demonſtrations of the one, and from the deductions of the other; as it differs from them, both in its nature and conſtitution, and in the mode of reaſoning employed about it.

This ſpecies of Truth enjoys the peculiar

liar and excluſive privilege of being both INTUITIVE and SELF-EVIDENT. As ſoon as preſented, it is palpably and irreſiſtibly *felt* at once: and it is ſo *immediate*, that it flaſhes conviction upon the mind through the medium of the Senſes, when ſound and well-informed, without an act of direct compariſon. It is ſo ſtrong and invincible in operation, that it defeats the powers of judgment. Thus *Fact* and *Truth*, in common and vernacular language, are ſynonimous words: and the ſtrength of its evidence cannot be more forcibly and pointedly expreſſed, than by the vulgar phraſe 'Seeing 'is believing.'

As theſe truths are not only the moſt numerous and the commoneſt of all others, but of the moſt intereſting and perſonal concern to men, in condeſcenſion to their feelings and neceſſities, Providence hath made them the moſt *obvious*, *eaſy*, and *familiar* to the apprehenſion of all: and, by their frequency and inceſſant occurrence in the rotine of human things, however various and multiplex they may be,

they are equally obvious and familiar in their *proximate* and *efficient cauſes*.

From theſe ſingular and ſuperior advantages by which FACTS are diſtinguiſhed, in the general Scale of Truth, above every other kind, they have been ſingularly honoured in their uſe and application by the Author and Finiſher of all Truth.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of the Logic of HISTORY.

THOSE important and intereſting truths comprehended under the general name of *Facts*, which determine the fortune of individuals, involve the felicity of ſocieties, and on which depends the fate of nations, and which fill all the buſy and variegated ſcenes of life, are inceſſantly and unexpectedly turning up in the tide of things, and again as inceſſantly and irrecoverably buried in its vortex. They are by nature tranſient and irrevocable, confined and circumſcribed within the ſtricteſt limits both of time and place: and ſo, from the condition of humanity, are the *Perſons* of men. In all caſes, therefore,

therefore, in which theſe do not happen to concur with them both in *time* and *place*, this ſpecies of truth, taken in its wideſt comprehenſion as including characters and events as well as acts, cannot be perſonally and directly known.

This great chaſm and defect, by which our perſonal intercourſe is cut off from the greateſt and moſt valuable part of this uſeful and intereſting knowledge, are filled and ſupplied by HISTORY, that elegant retroſpective mirrour, which, by its reflection, opens to us a view into ages never to return, which gives Facts an enlargement and extention to all times and places, and which becomes the guide and inſtructor of human life.

SECT. I.

Of the Hiſtorical PRINCIPLE.

ALL tranſactions, characters, and events that have exiſted or do exiſt in times and places, when and where we either did not,

not, or could not, witneſs them ourſelves, if we ever know them at all, (and theſe form the greateſt proportion of our knowledge) it muſt be from the Narration or Teſtimony, that is upon the *Authority*, of others. *Narration* I uſe to expreſs the communication of Facts with which we are coincident in point of time, but *not* of place: *Teſtimony* I apply to the communication of thoſe with which we are coincident, *neither* in time *nor* place. Theſe two are the neceſſary and indiſpenſable vehicles of Hiſtorical truth.

That on *friday*, the 10th day of the laſt month, the cities of London and Weſtminſter exhibited ſimilar tokens of their love and loyalty to their King, by a general *Illumination* on the ſame joyful occaſion abovementioned, is a Fact of which *we* who were *not there* rejoiced to hear; of the truth of which we are as fully and certainly, though not ſo directly, convinced, on the NARRATION of others public and private, as we were of that other which on the 13th we witneſſed ourſelves at Oxford: In the caſe of which Fact, there

there was a coincidence of *perſon* and *tranſaction* in point of *time*, but not of *place*.

And, both of theſe Facts will be tranſmitted, as they deſerve, to future ages, and embraced by them with almoſt the ſame degree of certainty, on the authority of ſound and well authenticated TESTIMONY: in which caſe all coincidence of *perſon* and *tranſaction*, *time* and *place*, may be removed.

All Hiſtorical Facts derive their exiſtence as truths from *Narration* and *Teſtimony*, which are, therefore, to be regarded as their *Principles*, agreeing in one, which is the main, point of conſideration—that they are both founded on the information and authority of *others*: And, as the ſhort ſpace of man's life, to which Narration has a reference, bears ſo ſmall a proportion to the extent of time within the reach of human tradition and record, TESTIMONY may be uſed, as it often is, to expreſs the whole, as the GENERAL PRINCIPLE of all Hiſtorical truth,

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of Hiſtorical REASONING.

AS in all parts of knowledge in which General Principles are concerned, Hiſtorical REASONING is, firſt *to* the Principle, and then *from* the Principle.

How, then, is the credit and authority of TESTIMONY, on which all Hiſtory depends, eſtabliſhed and confirmed?

Hiſtorical Facts are all *particular* and *individual* in their exiſtence; and, by their nature, removed from the Evidence of the *External Senſes:* And, as all general Principles are formed by an Induction of particulars, there muſt be ſome other native *Evidence* as a firſt Principle, by which a number of theſe *particular Facts* are eſtimated and their truth confirmed, ſufficient to enſure the authority, and to warrant the general truth, of the *Secondary Principle* of Teſtimony.

The

The Senſes are, indeed, the firſt informers, but MEMORY is the regiſter and ſtorehouſe, of the mind; in which all the facts which they have witneſſed, and all the truths which are otherwiſe obtained, are lodged and recorded with as much fidelity, as is conſiſtent with the condition of imperfect creatures: and, ſo far as relates to its retention, communication and tradition, it is recognized and acknowledged as a *Firſt Principle* of truth.

The *Memory* of fallible men is not, indeed, infallible. It is ſubject to ſimilar infirmities and defects with thoſe of the External Senſes; and capable of being regulated and adjuſted, by an act of Reaſon, in a ſimilar manner. After comparing it with itſelf exerted at different times and in different inſtances, and after examining whether, in the inſtance under conſideration, it is uniform and conſiſtent with its other acts, Reaſon confirms its fidelity ſo far eſtabliſhed, and enſures it ſtill farther, by comparing it with other Memories acting collaterally with it in the ſame inſtance.

But

But MEMORY, however faithful it may be found, is not ſufficient of itſelf to eſtabliſh and erect *Teſtimony* into a general Principle of reaſoning, ſince what it records is liable to be betrayed, diſguiſed, or falſified in the act of utterance; was it not ſufficiently guarded and ſecured by another native and powerful dictate of the mind *The Love of truth*, which, as a collateral *Principle*, comes in to the aid and ſupport of Memory.

Convinced of the exiſtence of both theſe *Principles* from our own conſciouſneſs and internal feeling, preſuming that all men are formed of the ſame materials caſt in the ſame mould, and obſerving them to operate in the minds of all, to whom that obſervation can extend, we conclude, by a ſtrong Analogy and Induction, that they are *Univerſal*. And we are convinced from an experience that does honour to human nature, that whenever intereſt, or any other evil and ſiniſter motive, influences an individual or combination of men to counteract theſe native dictates, to reject the truth and to eſpouſe and propagate

propagate a lye, the lye is deteſted and contradicted as ſoon as found, and the truth is juſtified, vindicated and avenged, by the public voice: which truth, in oppoſition to the lye, ſtrengthened and ſupported by a ſelf-approbation and native ſenſe of right in its aſſerter, will be ſure to prevail at laſt.

Upon the ground of theſe two Firſt Principles, the one a native faculty, and the other a ſublime affection, of the mind, operating in conjunction, the credit of all Hiſtory is originally founded. From the *particular* inſtances which are innumerable, and inceſſantly occur, in which they are obſerved to act together in ſtrict and faithful union, we derive, by a familiar and almoſt inſenſible INDUCTION, the authority and truth of TESTIMONY; which, as it is not only the *general* vehicle or channel of all Hiſtorical facts of whatever kind, but the *univerſal* fountain from which they flow, has a right to be claſſed among the SECONDARY PRINCIPLES of truth. Teſtimony is, indeed, of ſuch great variety and extent, and of ſuch frequent occurrence and vaſt importance in all

all the buſineſs and affairs of life, that (as is common in the uſe of many words,) from the frequency of its application, it has appropriated to itſelf the name of *Evidence*, which is a general term, equally applicable to the principles of other kinds of truth beſides Hiſtorical.

THIS *General Principle* is, however, very different in its nature and conſtitution from Mathematical, Phyſical, and other Axioms, as it is of much larger operation and extent; and, accordingly, the Method of REASONING *from* it, in all *particular* inſtances, is very different.

Axioms, logically ſpeaking, are the *Cauſes* of truth producing it in the minds of all who can apply them in reaſoning; without reſpect to *perſons*, *times*, and *places*. They are, therefore, general *Laws* poſſeſſed of a *certain* ſtandard, which is fixed and determined in itſelf, by which they impart the *ſame* degree of certainty and conviction in all the caſes to which they are applied, namely that which they poſſeſs themſelves. *Teſti-*

mony

mony, on the other hand, is not properly the *Cauſe* of truth: it is only the *Medium*, however indiſpenſable, through which truths already deduced from other Cauſes are conveyed from one mind to another: it is only the *Inſtrument* by which actual truths are converted into hiſtorical; which Medium or Inſtrument has an immediate connection with, and dependency upon, particular *perſons*, *times* and *places*, by which their power and operation are perpetually varied, become ſtronger or weaker, more contracted or more enlarged. It is not, therefore, a general *Law* poſſeſſing *one* common rule or ſtandard, by which it imparts, in all caſes, the *ſame* degree of certainty and conviction.

Hiſtorical learning is, therefore, the reverſe of philoſophical. Philoſophy conſiſts in tracing Generals, Hiſtory in purſuing Individuals: And the *Teſtimony* on which it is founded varies with the *Circumſtances*, in every particular inſtance to which it is applied.[a] Hiſtorical REASONING does not

[a] Hiſtoria proprie *individuorum* eſt, quæ bircumſcribuntur *loco* et *tempore*. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. cap. 1.

conclude

conclude by reducing particulars under general propoſitions by Syllogiſm or Superinduction. It has a more tedious and laborious proceſs; deſcending to the inveſtigation of every *particular* hiſtorical fact through all the windings of Teſtimony, either by tracing it up to its proper *time*, *place*, and the *perſons* of its primitive witneſſes, or by bringing it down from thence; and conſiſting in a minute examination of particular *witneſſes*, in a candid eſtimate of *collateral proofs*, and in a concluſion formed upon a full induction and fair valuation of the *whole*.[b]

The knowledge, which we derive through the channel of Hiſtory, is more various and extenſive, more intereſting and important, than, perhaps, the whole ſtock of our other

[b] Probability wanting that intuitive Evidence which infallibly determines the Underſtanding, and produces certain Knowledge, the *Mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the Grounds of Probability*, and ſee how they make more or leſs *for or againſt* any Propoſition, before it aſſents to, or diſſents from it, and, upon a due Balancing the Whole, reject or receive it, with a more or leſs firm Aſſent, proportionably to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability on one Side or the other. Locke Hum. Und. B. iv. c. xv. §. 5.

information: and the inveſtigation of hiſtorical facts, which muſt be conducted by a particular and ſeparate proceſs, conſtitutes a very large proportion of the moſt uſeful labours, and valuable collections, of learned men. Hiſtory involves in its compoſition many different and diſtinct objects, and has many different ends in view. In the execution, it receives from the pen of the hiſtorian many graces and embelliſhments, and, from the intereſt which man always takes in the concerns of man, it becomes a ſpecies of writing the moſt entertaining to the mind, and the moſt pleaſing to the imagination. Diveſted, however, of theſe adventitious conſiderations, and logically viewed, it is the inveſtigation of Facts through the channel of Teſtimony. And the general Rule by which this inveſtigation is conducted, in bringing them down from the time of their actual exiſtence, is, firſt, To enquire whether the *Senſes* of the primitive witneſſes were *duly informed* of the facts related, and they themſelves *competent* to judge of them: ſecondly, To examine whether theſe witneſſes

neſſes were *honeſt and faithful relators* of theſe facts to others: thirdly, as teſtimony, from the nature and neceſſity of things, is often committed to written record, To trace the *purity* and *authenticity* of that record through all the perſons, times, and places, through which it has deſcended: laſtly, To ſtrengthen and corroborate the whole concluſion, by the examination and adduction of *collateral teſtimonies*.[c] In which work of various learning, extenſive enquiry, and attentive inveſtigation, Reaſon will, I fear, derive little help from Mood and Figure.[d]

[c] In the Teſtimony of others, is to be conſidered, 1. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The Skill of the Witneſſes. 4. The Deſign of the Author, where it is a Teſtimony out of a Book cited. 5. The Conſiſtency of the Parts and Circumſtances of the Relation. 6. Contrary Teſtimonies. Locke Hum. Und. B. iv. c. xv. §. 4.

[d] But, however it be in Knowledge, I think I may truly ſay, it is of *far* leſs, *or no Uſe* at all *in Probabilities*. For the Aſſent there being to be determined by the Preponderancy, after a due Weighing of all the Proofs, with all Circumſtances on both Sides, nothing is ſo unfit to aſſiſt the Mind in that, as Syllogiſm; which running away with one aſſumed Probability, or one topical Argument, purſues that till it has led the Mind quite out of

SECT. III.

Of Hiſtorical TRUTH.

HISTORICAL TRUTH derived from the Principle of Teſtimony, ſo different in its nature from all others, and by a method of Reaſoning which is peculiar to itſelf, differs from thoſe, which have been the ſubject of our previous diſcuſſion, in its operation and *effect* upon the underſtanding.

However certain and convincing it may be, when poſſeſſed of its greateſt ſtrength, it is only *indirect* and *ſecondary*, amounting to the higheſt ſummit of PROBABILITY. And, as the Teſtimony, on which it depends, is in all caſes particularly circumſtanced and to be ſeparately inveſtigated, though all

Sight of the Thing under Conſideration; and forcing it upon ſome remote Difficulty, holds it faſt there, intangled, perhaps, and as it were manacled in the Chain of Syllogiſms, without allowing it the Liberty, much leſs affording it the Helps, requiſite to ſhew on which Side, all Things conſidered, is the greater Probability. Ibid. B. iv c. 17. §. 5.

TORICAL

HISTORICAL TRUTH be of the ſame ſpecies, it will vary with theſe circumſtances, with the fidelity and ſucceſs of the inveſtigation, and with the clearneſs or obſcurity of the media through which it comes, almoſt from the verge of abſolute Certainty, through all the *degrees* of Probability, down to the fainteſt ſhades of Uncertainty and Doubt. The *Aſſent* with which the mind embraces it, in all the degrees and ſhades which it aſſumes, is called BELIEF, which is ſtronger or weaker in its impreſſion, in propoſition to itſelf.

As it is only an enlargement of Facts, and thoſe other Truths that have been previouſly conſidered, lengthened out and conveyed to us by Teſtimony, it may be ranked under the *ſame* common province. Being, however, more general in its operation, more frequent and familiar in its uſe, though inferior in force, it has, in common language, appropriated to itſelf the name of *Truth* as oppoſed to *Falſehood*; as the Teſtimony, on which it is founded, has that of Evidence.

BUT, however different and INFERIOR it may be, HISTORICAL TRUTH, is that on which the mind of man with a peculiar ſatisfaction delights to dwell: and it hath pleaſed that gracious Providence, which benignly conſults the deareſt feelings of humanity in the promotion of our good, to make it of moſt intereſting and important concern to us, and to hold out ſome of the principal lights, by which we are obliged, from the condition of our nature, to find our way through the preſent dark and myſterious ſcene of things, in which we are only allowed to walk as by the glimmering of a diſtant twylight, and only "to ſee and to know in part."

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Logic of ETHICS.

LEAVING the *Theoretic* Diviſion of this general Chart, we now enter upon the PRACTIC, which is under the government and direction of the WILL, or Mind employed in *Moral Action.*[a]

Ariſtotle has divided the whole field of knowledge into three grand provinces; and the line of diſtinction which he has drawn as the general confine between that of the *rational Theoretic* Mind, and thoſe both of the *Practic* and *Poetic*, is, that the firſt is

[a] Διάνοια ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗ. See the 23d page of this volume. Οὐ γνῶσις, ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις Eth. Nicom. lib. 1. c. 3

productive

proſpect a moral end beyond itſelf: In the *Poetic*, it originates in the more inventive *Mind*[h] of the artiſt, and, through the inſtrumentality of different means, intends and accompliſhes a ſtill farther end,[i] which is properly termed *Effect*.

This diſtinction of the Peripatetic, however philoſophical, may be in ſome reſpects too metaphyſical and refined: and, as all the parts of knowledge, which do not belong to the Practic and Poetic Provinces, muſt be included in the Theoretic, (for there are only three,) he has made the outline of that not ſufficiently comprehenſive. The object of Theoretical learning is not confined to mere *ſpeculative* truth, which terminates in itſelf alone: it extends, as we have ſeen, to the *nature* and *properties* of external things,

[h] Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦνται ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἢ νοῦς ἐστιν, ἢ τέχνη, ἢ δύναμίς τις. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1.

[i] Αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀρχή. ἕνεκα γάρ τε ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν· καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πρός τι, καὶ τινὸς τὸ ποιητὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πρακτὸν, ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία, τέλος· ἡ δ' ὄρεξις, τούτου. Ariſtot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 2.

and

and takes account of what is *done* and *doing* in the world, as truths adapted to all the *uſes* and *purpoſes* of life. As the object of Practical Learning is the knowledge of *good* and *evil*, with a view to the right and reſponſible *conduct* of life. The end of the former is *Utility*: as the end of the latter is *Happineſs*.

But, before we advance in the Practical department, as the ſubject of rational inveſtigation, and productive of Truth iſſuing in moral Action, another diſtinction or ſubdiviſion muſt be drawn: for no part of learning has been more involved and complicated, in conſequence of the vague and indefinite mode in which it has been treated, than Morality in general; whence much obſcurity and confuſion have been brought into that moſt intereſting and extenſive ſcience.

Before men can *act* in a moral capacity, they muſt firſt *know* how to act. So that the Ethical province, taken in its full extent, conſiſts of two parts,—the Knowledge—

and

and the Action; which, however inſeparable they may be in the production of moral virtue, are diſtinct conſiderations in the eye of ſcience and philoſophy. It is with this *Knowledge*, as a ſpecies of *Truth* deducible from principles and propoſitions by an act of *Reaſon*, or what moraliſts have been pleaſed to call *Practical Intellect*, independently of the Action, that LOGIC is concerned:[k] and it is this part of ETHICS to which the preſent chapter will be confined. But this Truth, reſulting from right reaſon, and forming the baſis of morality, is, like all other ſpeculative truth, a dead inactive thing; till it be invigorated and enlivened into ACTION by the motions and affections of the WILL,[l] from which it is denominated *Practical Truth*, and arranged under that department of the mind. And here the

[k] Nulla *poteſtas* aut *imperium* in Voluntatem tribui debet *Intellectui*; cujus quippe munus ſolum, eſt bonum atque verum *cernere*, deque eo *judicare*.

[l] *Velle* autem, *eligere*, aut *imperare* ſolius *Voluntatis* eſt. Laugb. Eth. p. 13.

other

other field of Ethical cultivation opens to our view, which conſiſts in influencing that *Will*; in exciting and ſtimulating it to virtuous actions on the one hand, and in ſoothing and reſtraining it from vicious actions on the other. This part of Morality conſiſts more in *perſuaſion*, than in conviction; and is properly the *Rhetoric of Ethics*. It muſt, however, be acknowledged to be the crown and glory of the ſcience; as a philoſophy which confers the higheſt honour on human nature. It deſcends to the firſt ſprings and movements of the heart. It penetrates the inmoſt receſſes of the mind. It both ſubdues and animates the paſſions, and regulates all the motions and affections of the Will, by holding out to it the incentives of *Hope* and *Fear*. Its labour is various and extenſive. It attends to every character and diſpoſition. It conſults the particular inclinations, and ſeconds the natural propenſities, of men. And, by the application of every expedient that reaſon and prudence can ſuggeſt, it nouriſhes the ſeeds of virtue into habits,

habits, and ſubdues and extirpates th vice. Its office is, however, as diffi it is honourable; and has been mc perficially attempted, than ſucceſsfull formed.

Thus Moral Virtue is a compound ingredients—*Right Reaſon* and *Well-c Appetite*, which mix and incorporate ther :[n] and when Ethical *Truth* is, by tuous determination of the Will, redu its juſt and proper *Action*; when it ployed to regulate the *practice*, to for *habits*, to influence the *morals*, and to the *lives*, of men, it flows in all the nels of Love to God and Good-will t each other, and ſhines out in all the portraits of active virtue, conſtitutin

[n] Εστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασι ἐν ὀρέξει διωξις καὶ φυγή, ὡς' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρ προαιρετικὴ, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις, ὄρεξις βελευτικὴ; ταῦτα, τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία· καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ, τὸν μὲν φάνα διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν ἕν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀληθεια τ Ariſtot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 2.

illu

illuſtrious branch of WISDOM, which has been diſtinguiſhed by the name of CHARITY.*

Having endeavoured, by theſe preliminary obſervations, to aſcertain and define the proper boundaries of this branch of learning, which is of vaſt extent and comprehenſion, and which has been treated in general in a deſultory and promiſcuous way, by poets and orators, by moraliſts and divines, we ſhall deſcend with the greater preciſion to what is properly the *Logic* of ETHICS.

* See the 4th page of this volume.

SECT.

SECT. I.

Of the Ethical PRINCIPLE.

THAT native and original *Evidence*, which is the FIRST PRINCIPLE of all morality, is an *inſtinct* of our common nature, implanted in the human breaſt by the hand that formed it, interwoven in the very ſtamina of our conſtitution, and given, as all inſtincts are, to direct us to our *good*. This is another firſt and univerſal inlet of knowledge to the mind; and philoſophers have very properly given it the name of INTERNAL or MORAL SENSE in contradiſtinction to Internal Senſe, the other great and univerſal inlet of natural light;[p] which

[p] Notandum tamen lumen naturæ duplici ſignificatione accipi. Primo quatenus oritur ex ſenſu, inductione, ratione, argumentis, ſecundum leges cœli ac terræ: Secundo, quatenus animæ humanæ interno effulget *inſtinctu*, ſecundum legem *conſcientiæ*; quæ ſcintilla quædam eſt, et tanquam

different Evidences or Firſt Principles of knowledge, in their ſeveral operations upon things, form, indeed, the cleareſt and moſt philoſophical diſtinction between *Theoretical* and *Practical* truth. This Evidence of Internal Senſe is the dictate of *Conſcience* or *Conſciouſneſs*, which reigns predominant in the human breaſt, as a remaining ſpark of its native light, and as an indelible witneſs of that conſummate purity and perfection, in which it was originally deſigned.

This native and internal Senſe is the immediate and involuntary criterion of a few general truths, which, in their joint operation upon the mind, lay the foundation of *Moral Obligation*, which is the ſource and ſpring of Moral Action.

One truth diſcovered by this Internal Senſe, is an eſſential Difference in the quality of all moral thoughts and actions,

tanquam reliquiæ priſtinæ et primitivæ puritatis. In quo poſteriore ſenſu præcipue particeps eſt anima lucis nonnullæ, ad perfectionem intuendam et diſcernendam legis moralis. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. IX. cap. I.

and a general diſtinction of them into GOOD and EVIL. And, in doing this, it is perfectly analogous to the External Senſes; for the diſcovery is made by the ſame immediate and intuitive diſcernment, by which they diſtinguiſh their reſpective objects: which analogy is ſtrongly and pointedly expreſſed in the language of holy writ. As the carnal eye diſtinguiſhes "darkneſs from light, and "light from darkneſs," and the taſte "bit-"ter from ſweet, and ſweet from bitter;" ſo does this mental eye diſtinguiſh "evil from "good, and good from evil," by a native faculty as inherent and familiar, as thoſe of ſeeing colours, hearing ſounds, and diſtinguiſhing taſtes are to their proper and reſpective organs.

By the ſame inſtinctive impulſe of its own, the mind is informed of another univerſal truth, the Exiſtence of the WILL, that ſublime and diſtinguiſhing prerogative of men, by which they are enabled to chooſe the *good*, and to avoid the *evil*. Long and ſubtle are the diſquiſitions which have ſpun by the refinement of modern metaphyſicians on that favourite

favourite topic, the *Freedom of the Will*, both pro and con. They might, however, in compaſſion to their readers, and in mercy to themſelves, have ſaved much uſeleſs labour, only by changing the queſtion, and diſputing (for they are ready to diſpute every thing) the *Exiſtence of the Will* at once; for, *That the Will is free*, is an identical and convertible propoſition. Where there is *Will*, there is *Freedom*; and where there is *Freedom*, there is *Will*: and, however dearly the old philoſophers loved diſputation, they had more regard for the honour of their logic, than to waſte their ſyllogiſms on ſo abſurd a queſtion.

And it is the ſame conſcious and internal feeling, which, on the voluntary commiſſion of *evil*, wounds the breaſt with a pungent involuntary *pain*; and which, on the voluntary performance of *good*, expands the heart with a pure and involuntary *pleaſure*: From theſe native ſentiments ſpringing out of our very frame, another truth reſults, by immediate implication, That all *Good* will be ſucceeded by REWARD, and all *Evil*

by PUNISHMENT: for "wickedneſs," in the elegant and pointed language of Solomon, condemneth by her "own witneſs, and, be-"ing preſſed by conſciouſneſs, forecaſteth "grievous things.[q]"

Theſe great and univerſal truths operating upon the mind of man, that ſuperior and diviner part of his exiſtence, by a neceſſary and inceſſant impulſe, imply, with the help of a little reaſon, the exiſtence of a ſuperior LAW to which we are neceſſarily *obliged*, and, of courſe, the exiſtence of a MORAL GOVERNOUR, the author of that Law; who is the *Rewarder* of all voluntary Good, as conſiſtent with his Nature, and conformable to his Will, the unchangeable ſtandards of all *Moral Truth*; and who is the *Puniſher* of Evil, as contrary to both. Thus we arrive at the ultimate foundation of all *Moral Government* and *Obligation*, immoveably fixed in the ATTRIBUTES AND WILL OF GOD,[r] erected in his *Goodneſs*, eſtabliſhed in his *Juſtice*, and ſanctioned by his *Power*.

[q] Wiſdom, xvi. 10, 11.

[r] As it is of the nature of the *independent* firſt Cauſe of all

From this foundation all *Religion* ſprings. Hence we ſee that of *Nature* taking its origin, as a part of the Law uncreated and eternal, and, as a glympſe of the divine and immaculate light, ſhining in the breaſts of men. Hence we ſee that every man has the law of God written in his heart, and is made amenable to a tribunal which is ſpiritual and inviſible. And hence the Apoſtle argues, that they, who, deprived of the advantage of a fuller and clearer light, by the dictates of Conſcience and the guide of Reaſon, conform their actions to the Will of God, "are "a law unto themſelves.[1]"

all things to be obliged by his own *Wiſdom*; ſo it ſeems to be of the nature of all *dependent* intelligent beings to be obliged only by the *Will* of the firſt cauſe.

'All things therefore' (ſays Hooker, the great maſter of reaſon, Eccl. Pol. B. 1. §. 2.) 'do work, after a ſort, 'according to a LAW, whereof ſome SUPERIOR, to whom 'they are ſubject, is Author; only the works and opera-'tions of God have him both for the worker, and for the 'Law, whereby they are wrought. The Being of God is 'a kind of Law to his workings; for that perfection 'which God is, giveth perfection to what he *doth*.' Warb. Div. Leg. B. 1. §. 4.

[1] Rom. ii. 14, 15.

ALL Truth is, therefore, born of God: that which is *Natural* ſpringing every where from his *Works:* and that which is *Moral* reſulting every where from his *Will*, reflected upon us by the medium of CONSCIENCE or INTERNAL SENSE, which is God within us, that clear and invincible evidence of his Being ſhining in the human mind, as a ray of the divine, and diſcovering to men in part his Will, and by the performance of that Will, through the merits of ANOTHER, their way to Happineſs: ſo that, upon the authority of this Natural Religion, they may exclaim, in the words of the royal preacher, "Verily there "is a reward for the righteous; doubtleſs "there is a God that judgeth the earth.[t]"

As the *External Senſes* are the ultimate criteria of all material objects, this *Internal Senſe* is the ultimate criterion of all moral actions: and, though, in its acts and opera-

[t] Pſal. lviii. 10.

tions

tions as a guide to truth, it may be ſubſequent to them, it is prior both in uſe and dignity. In the analogy, which ſubſiſts between theſe two great inlets of all human knowledge in their exerciſe and effects, we cannot but obſerve with admiration that uniformity of deſign, which marks all the works of HIM who is unchangeable and the ſame, and that conſiſtency of operation which pervades his univerſe: And, as we know, from too frequent obſervation, that the one is liable, through ill-habit or diſtemper, to be vitiated and even loſt; ſo the other, from ſimilar cauſes, is ſubject to ſimilar effects. But, though this ſublimer PRINCIPLE of morality, which is the ſubject of our preſent conſideration, may ſometimes have been ſo far weakened in its evidence, or perverted in its uſe, as even to perſwade a great philoſopher of its non-exiſtence;[*] it is an ingredient

[*] See Mr. Locke's firſt book on Innate Practical Principles, Chap. iii. §. 8. 'If Conſcience be a proof of Innate Principles, Contraries may be Innate,' &c.

The Principles, however, both ſpeculative and practical, which Mr. Locke is in this book proving not to be *innate*, are *Maxims* and *General Propoſitions*; not *Evidences*, but *Axioms*;

ſo mixed and infuſed in the compoſition of the human mind, and ſo properly *innate*, that the one can never be entirely baniſhed or diſcharged, till the other be totally changed or annihilated.

Sect. II.

Of Ethical Reasoning.

UPON theſe congenial and collateral truths, *The Diſtinction between Good and Evil, The Exiſtence of the Will, Reward and Puniſhment*, implicitly reſulting from the ſame Firſt Principle, and acting, as they always do, in perfect conjunction and uniſon

Axioms; not *Primary* but *Secondary* Principles: which, indeed, ſo far from being *innate*, are generally the concluſions of much reaſoning and inveſtigation. But, that many of theſe maxims are implanted in the mind by nature, as the foundations and principles of all its knowledge, never to be queſtioned, but always to be aſſumed and granted, was a fundamental and moſt inveterate error, which this great man combated with ſucceſs.

with

with each other, all moral REASONING is ultimately founded.

Convinced by ſelf-experience of their uniform operation upon us, in particular inſtances that are perpetually occurring, and ſeeing that uniform operation ſtill more confirmed by the experience and obſervation of all others, in every ſtage and ſphere of life, we are obliged, by a kind of tacit INDUCTION, to admit the truth of two *moral Propoſitions* correſpondent to each other, and which are *univerſal* in their operation and extent.

" All *Voluntary Good* will have *Reward*"

" All *Voluntary Evil* will have *Puniſhment.*"

Theſe are the two cardinal Axioms, or SECONDARY PRINCIPLES, from which the authority of all Ethical deductions is derived, and on which they ultimately depend.

But all morality conſiſts of particular Actions, deriving their ſpecific character and complexion from different Relations: which moral Actions, as they are varied and multiplied by the triple Relation in which men are placed—To *God* their moral Governor, and his Attributes—To *Men* their fellow-ſubjects

ſubjects in their different ſtations and connections—and to the purity and propriety of their *own perſonal characters*, ſwell into ſuch a number and complexity, that Reaſon can neither diſtinguiſh the preciſe nature of their *good* or *evil*, nor apportion with ſufficient diſcrimination their *reward* or *puniſhment*, by reducing them under one or the other of theſe univerſal Axioms directly, and at a ſingle effort; ſo as to define and aſcertain their moral truth.

From a view of theſe *Relations*, therefore, moraliſts are under the neceſſity of ranging Actions into different kinds and claſſes, of aſcertaining in each its ſpecific *good* or *evil*, and of apportioning to every claſs its juſt degree of *reward* or *puniſhment*. Under each Relation they form Propoſitions *leſs general* than thoſe above, as MEDIATE PRINCIPLES or middle Axioms ſubordinate to them; to which all particular actions, as they occur in the different departments of moral government, are referred, in order to receive from them their ſpecific truth.

It is in the formation of theſe Axioms or Secondary Principles, in every branch of moral ſcience, that the ſtreſs of ETHICAL REASONING is principally exerted: and the Method which it employs is of courſe INDUCTIVE. Morality, in all its parts, conſiſts of individual or particular caſes[x]; and it is upon the obſervation of a number of theſe *individuals* or *particulars* poſſeſſing the ſame qualities and determinations, adduced and collected, that General Propoſitions are eſtabliſhed.

On the foundation of theſe inductive aggregates, are erected all the ſyſtems of moral ſcience, differing from each other, according to the Relations. From the Relation in which men ſtand to the Deity and to his different Attributes exerciſed towards them, reſults a train of numerous correſpondent obligations, which, conſidered as general laws, form the ſyſtem of *Divinity*. As the great ſociety of mankind is divided into Commu-

[x] Ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά. Ariſtot. Ethic. Nicom. cap. II.

nities

nities and States; from the Relation ſubſiſting between them ſpring thoſe reciprocal duties, which form the ſyſtem of the *Law of Nations*. As theſe Communities and States ſplit and divide into ſmaller bodies, collective and individual, more numerous and complex Relations riſe productive of more numerous offices, forming the ſyſtem of *Civil Law*; many parts of which, for publick utility, are enacted and ſanctioned by public authority. As theſe larger bodies are again broken into Families, the duties ariſing from which domeſtic Relation become more perſonal and confined, and form the ſyſtem of *Oeconomical prudence*. And as each Individual, in every ſtation and ſituation of life, owes an obligation to himſelf and to the dignity of his character as a free and moral agent poſſeſſed of many privileges and diſtinctions, in the diſcharge of this obligation many perſonal and moſt important duties ſpring, which conſtitute the ſyſtem of *Ethics* in its appropriated ſenſe.

From this ſhort view of man in his ſeveral Relations, how different, how various, and how

how numerous are the ſpecies of moral action in which he is capable of being employed? And it is no mean honour which is due to the Science in contemplation, and to the Logic which it employs, that, when they are well adjuſted and arranged into general and leſs general claſſes, with their appropriated names and characters, as thoſe of particular *Duties* and *Sins*, *Virtues* and *Vices*, the nature of each particular action, with the correſpondent proportion of praiſe or blame, reward or puniſhment, may be determined with a philoſophical exactneſs and preciſion.

After the Axioms are once founded, it only remains to apply particular Actions to them as to *general Rules*, the truth of which they will, in general, eaſily determine. This is, however, ſometimes an act of nice judgment and acute diſcrimination. The difficulty ariſes, partly in ſelecting the right *Rule* to which the action belongs, out of many others ſimilar and nearly akin; but chiefly in accurately diſtinguiſhing the *Action*, which varies its moral feature with the circumſtances attending it, inſomuch

inſomuch that caſes ſometimes occur ſo ſingular and ſpecial, that no rule has yet been formed to which they can be applied.

And, when the General Propoſitions happen to lie at a conſiderable diſtance from the particular caſes to be proved by them, ſo that the reaſoner has to aſcend through a range of mediate Propoſitions, SYLLOGISTIC REASONING may have its uſe: but, if the invention of the truth be his only object, he will find it in the courſe of a very few ſyllogiſms, and without the parade of a long-winded diſputation. For their private amuſement, indeed, men may ſyllogize as much as they pleaſe, if they do not annoy the public: but they will do Inductive Reaſoning the juſtice to allow, that, till *general ideas* are formed, there can be no *Definition*,[7] and, of courſe no *Syllogiſm*; and, when they are formed, whether their Definitions are good, and their Syllogiſms concluſive, does not at all depend upon themſelves, but upon the

[7] Ὁρίσμος ἐκ γένες καὶ διαφερών ἐςιν. Ariſtot. Top. lib. i. cap. 8.

ſoundneſs

ſoundneſs of the Induction by which they are generalized.

OF *Inductive* and *Syllogiſtic* Reaſoning, therefore, in Ethical as well as in Phyſical, and indeed in all other ſubjects,* excepting Mathematical, of how much more true and logical uſe is the former found? *Induction*, proceeding on experience and practice, how-

* Etiam dubitabit quiſpiam potius quam objiciet; utrum nos de naturali tantum philoſophia, an etiam de ſcientiis reliquis, logicis, politicis, ſecundum viam noſtram perficiendis, loquamur. At nos certe de univerſis hæc, quæ dicta ſunt intelligimus: Atque quemadmodum vulgaris logica, quæ regit res per ſyllogiſmum, non tantum ad naturales, ſed ad omnes ſcientias pertinet; ita et noſtra, quæ procedit per inductionem, omnia complectitur. Tam enim hiſtoriam et tabulas inveniendi conficimus de ira, metu et verecundia, et ſimilibus; ac etiam de exemplis rerum civilium: nec minus de motibus mentalibus memoriæ, compoſitionis et diviſionis, judicii, et reliquorum; quam de calido et frigido, aut luce, aut vegetatione, aut ſimilibus. Sed tamen cum noſtra ratio interpretandi, poſt hiſtoriam præparatam et ordinatam, non mentis tantum motus et diſcurſus, (ut logica vulgaris) ſed et rerum naturam intueatur; ita mentem regimus, ut ad rerum naturam ſe, aptis per omnia modis, applicare poſſit. Atque propterea multa et diverſa in doctrina interpretationis præcipimus, quæ ad ſubjecti, de quo inquirimus, qualitatem et conditionem, modum inveniendi nonnulla ex parte applicent. Baconi Nov. Org. lib. 1.

ever

ever ſlow in operation, is ſure in its effect. *Syllogiſm*, proceeding, in its common uſe, on ſpeculative, vague, and ill-founded axioms, however ready, is fallacious; and has produced no other effect, than that of filling many an uſeleſs and unwieldy volume with loads of egregious lumber. 'The moral treatiſes,' ſays our great reformer, 'which are not ſea-'ſoned with experience, but are drawn only 'from a general and ſcholaſtic notion of 'things are, as touching ſuch matters, for 'moſt part, idle and fruitleſs diſcourſes.*'—

* Eximie hoc atque veriſſime Afranius poëta de gignenda comparandaque ſapientia opinatus eſt, quod eam filiam eſſe Uſus et Memoriæ dixit. Eo namque argumento demonſtrat, qui ſapiens eſſe rerum humanarum velit, non libris ſolis, neque diſciplinis rhetoricis dialecticiſque opus eſſe; ſed oportere eum verſari quoque exercerique in rebus communibus noſcendis periclitandiſque: eaque omnia acta et eventa firmiter meminiſſe; et proinde ſapere ac conſulere ex his, quæ pericula ipſa rerum docuerint, non quæ libri tantum aut magiſtri per quaſdam inanitates verborum et imaginum, tanquam in mimo aut ſomnio delectaverint. Verſus Afranii ſunt in Togata, cui Sellæ nomen eſt:

Uſus me genuit, mater peperit Memoria
Σοφίαν vocant me Graii, vos Sapientiam.

Item verſus eſt in eandem ferme ſententiam Pacuvii, quem Macedo Philoſophus, vir bonus, familiaris meus, ſcribi debere cenſebat pro foribus omnium templorum. A. Gellius, lib. xiii. cap. 8.

Ego

'For the labours of ſpeculative men, in act-
'ive matters, do ſeem to men of experience
'little better than the diſcourſes of Phormio
'appeared to Hannibal, who eſteemed them
'but as dreams and dotage.[b]'

Ego odi homines ignava opera et philoſopha ſententia. Nihil enim fieri poſſe indignius neque intolerantius dicebat, quam quod homines ignavi ac deſides, operti barba et pallio, mores et emolumenta philoſophiæ in linguæ verborumque artes converterent; et vitia facundiſſime accuſarent intercutibus ipſi vitiis madentes. A. Gellius, lib. xiii. cap. 8.

[b] Tractatus autem, qui experientiam non ſapiunt, ſed ex notitia rerum generali et ſcholaſtica tantummodo deprompti ſunt, de rebus hujuſmodi inanes plerumque evadunt et inutiles. Quamvis enim aliquando contingat, ſpectatorem ea animadvertere, quæ luſorem fugiant; atque jactetur proverbium quoddam magis audaculum, quam ſanum, de cenſura vulgi circa actiones principum, *ſtantem in valle optime perluſtrare montem*; optandum tamen imprimis eſſet, ut non niſi expertiſſimus et verſatiſſimus quiſque ſe hujuſmodi argumentis immiſceret. Hominum enim ſpeculativorum, in materiis activis, lucubrationes, iis, qui in agendo fuerint exercitati, nihilo meliores videntur, quam diſſertationes Phormionis de bellis æſtimatæ ſunt ab Hannibale, qui eas habuit pro ſomniis et deliriis. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. vii. cap. 2.

I have here attempted a compendious ſketch of the general office of REASON in the province of Morality. From the intereſt which the human mind muſt naturally and neceſſarily take in the conſequence of moral action as the criterion of its happineſs, this has been a ſubject of more general inveſtigation, in every age, than any other. The old philoſophers honoured it with a particular regard. Socrates, the father of the ancient moraliſts, was ſaid, on that account, to have brought Philoſophy down from heaven, and to have introduced her into the ſociety of men.[c] And he enhanced his worth and dignity as a philoſopher, in the eſtimation of the Roman orator, by relinquiſhing Phyſical ſtudies, of which the ancients, from a wrong method of purſuit, were mainly ignorant, in order to devote his attention to morality alone.[d] Xe-

[c] Primus Philoſophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit. Cic. Tuſc. Quæſt. lib. v.

[d] Socrates mihi videtur primus a *rebus occultis* et *ab ipſa natura involutis*, in quibus omnes ante eum philoſophi occupati fuerant, evoluiſſe Philoſophiam, et ad vitam communem

nophon and Plato have delivered the precepts of their divine maſter in a familiar and inſtructive manner, characteriſtic of the dignity and ſimplicity of his exalted mind. And Ariſtotle, the diſciple of the laſt, collected the Ethics of antiquity, and arranged them into a clear and lucid ſyſtem. He has drawn all the Virtues with great exactneſs of truth, and nicety of diſtinction; and has treated the whole ſubject of Ethics in a conciſe, elegant, didactic ſtyle. When we conſider the extent and variety of his ſtudies, the relative diſadvantages under which he laboured, and the age in which he lived; when we view this great moraliſt as unacquainted with that evangelical Virtue, by whoſe diviner maxims future moraliſts have advantaged, but which did not appear upon this terreſtrial ſtage till two centuries after his departure; we cannot look up to his ſyſtem of morality, both as to the purity of its maxims, the value of its collection, and the juſtneſs of

munem advexiſſe, ut de *virtutibus* et *vitiis* omninoque de *bonis* rebus et *malis* quæreret. Ibid. Acad. lib. i.

its arrangement, without a mixture of the profoundeſt love and admiration.

Many and valuable are the precepts of theſe *ſages of antiquity*, and, though ſometimes defective as to their *matter*, on account of the falſe or partial principle of Moral Obligation from which they ſprung, both the *method*[e] and the *ſtyle*[f] in which they are delivered, form admirable models of all future imitation. Their defects were owing to the ſeparation which they made of the THREE great and fundamental truths, on the inviolable

[e] Would our moraliſts and divines imitate, in their writings, the *method* of the Peripatetic in his moral works, inſtead of eternally retailing the ſame partial moralizings and inſignificant obſervations, and too often ſpoiling the little merit they poſſeſs by a pitiful attempt to amuſe weak and ſhallow minds with a contemptible mixture of falſe pathos and enthuſiaſtic cant; our pulpits and our preſſes would not be inceſſantly labouring with things called *Sermons* and *Moral Eſſays*, full of nothing but ſtale indigeſted fragments, inſignificant obſervation, and incoherent traſh.

[f] And, had the celebrated Author of the Rambler ſtudied Plato and the Nicomachean Ethics with the attention and admiration they deſerve, and imitated, in his excellent didactic eſſays, the pure ſimplicity of their *ſtyle*; that of the *Engliſh language* would have been at this day more chaſte and elegant, in proportion as it would, probably, have been leſs ſonorous and redundant.

union

union of which all moral reaſoning ſhould be grounded, *Plato* having been excluſively the patron of one, *Ariſtotle* of another, and *Zeno* of the third; and in not paying a juſt attention to the true origin and end of all moral action, the Will and Attributes of God. ×

Some of our *modern philoſopers* have not only neglected their virtues, but have imitated and outraged their faults, and that after a more perfect exemplar of morality had been received from heaven; 'who, in their eternal ſquabbles about the true foundation of 'morality, and the obligation to its practice, 'have ſacrilegiouſly untwiſted this THREEFOLD CORD; and each running away with 'the part he eſteemed ſtrongeſt, hath affixed 'that to the throne of God, as the golden 'chain that is to unite and draw all to it— 'Thus a ſpirit of diſpute and refinement hath 'ſo entangled and confounded all our concluſions on a ſubject, in itſelf very clear and 'intelligible, that, were MORALITY herſelf, 'of which the *ancients* made a Goddeſs, to 'appear in perſon among men, and be queſtioned concerning her birth, ſhe would be tempted

× For a

'tempted to anſwer as Homer does in Lu-
'cian, that her commentators had ſo learnedly
'embarraſſed the diſpute, that ſhe was now
'as much at a loſs as they to account for her
'original.'[s] And thus have men, borne away
'by a fondneſs to their own idle ſyſtems,
'preſumptuouſly broken in upon that TRI-
'PLE BARRIER, with which God has been
'graciouſly pleaſed to cover and ſecure
'Virtue, and given advantage to the cavils
'of libertines, and infidels; who on each
'of theſe Principles, thus advanced on the
'ruins of the other two, have reciprocally
'forged a ſcheme of Religion independent
'of Morality; and a ſcheme of Morality
'independent of Religion; who, how dif-
'erent ſoever their employments may appear,
'are indeed but twiſting the ſame cord at dif-
'ferent ends: the plain deſign of both being
'to overthrow RELIGION.'

[s] See Warburton's Divine Legation of Moſes, Book 1, Sect. 4.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Of Ethical TRUTH.

STILL, in ſpite of all the difficulties thrown in the way of Ethical Science by the enemies of virtue, and of all the darkneſs which hath been drawn over the ſcene of Moral Action by many of its miſtaken friends; their TRUTH is able, by its native force, to break its way through all the obſtruction and obſcurity, in which it has been involved by art or ignorance.

'The divine Author,' ſays an able moraliſt and theologian, 'hath ſo wonderfully contrived 'human nature, that there needs little more 'in moral matters, than plainly and clearly 'to repreſent any inſtruction to the mind, in 'order to procure its aſſent to it. Whatever 'the inſtruction be, whether it affirm this 'conduct to be virtuous or that vicious, if 'the

'the mind be in a natural ſtate, it more than 'ſees, it feels the truth or falſehood of it. 'The appeal is directly made to certain cor-'reſpondent ſentiments of *right* and *wrong* 'inſtantly excited by the moral propoſi-'tion.'[h]

However it may be vitiated and corrupted, *Moral Senſe* will never be extinguiſhed: and, though the middle Axioms and ſubordinate Propoſitions, which are the means of Ethical Reaſoning, may be multiplied by Relations and varied by Circumſtances, and carried to a conſiderable extent, as they are all ultimately founded on one or other of the univerſal principles of *Good* and *Evil* evinced by this predominant criterion, which carries its light down the whole of the moral ſcale, Ethical concluſions will always be accompanied with a CLEAR and STRONG conviction.

Mr. *Locke* has, indeed, thrown out a conjecture, in different parts of his celebrated

[h] Bp Hurd, Serm. Vol. II. xi.

eſſay

ſſay; that, as *Ethical ideas* are what he is pleaſed to call *real eſſences*, and *archetypes of the mind's own making*, *complete* and *adequate* in themſelves, as well as *Mathematical*; and, as *Demonſtration*, in his mind, being nothing but the perception of the *Agreement* or *Diſagreement of ſuch ideas* by the proof or *intervention of other ideas or mediums*, MORALITY IS CAPABLE OF DEMONSTRATION, *as well as Mathematics:* or in words to this effect.[1]

As parents are often too fond of their *children*, ſo as ſometimes to ſuffer them to embarraſs and bring them into difficulties; ſo has this philoſopher been more than once led wrong by his favourite *ideas*.

Had he conſidered the different origin and nature of theſe two ſciences, he would have been delivered at once of this conjecture, with which he ſeems ſo much to have laboured. *Mathematical ideas* are purely *ſpeculative* in their origin, and totally abſtracted in their nature from every thing in the

[1] See B. III. C. xi. §. 16; and B. IV. C. iii. §. 18; and B. IV. C. iv. §. 7; and B. IV. C. xii. §. 8.

world;

world? *Morality* originates in *practice*, and has its exiſtence grounded in the real nature of things, as they exiſt in the moral government of the univerſe. A circle or a triangle is profeſſedly a creature of the mind, and whether either of them are actually to be found in nature (and there are few if any mathematical ones,) would make no difference in the truths of that ſpeculative ſcience: But whatever number of *Ethical ideas* may be formed of the *mind's own making*, unleſs they have a real and actual exiſtence or correſpondence in the moral actions of men, they would be *archetypes* indeed; but, inſtead of affording any kind or degree of Ethical certainty, all they could produce, in his moſt ſanguine expectation, would be a train of demonſtrations, which, however they might ſuit the ethical conſtitution of imaginary agents or the inhabitants of the moon, could never be adapted to the moral *practice* of the preſent inhabitants of this earth.

But this wild and romantic expectation, by which he has outdone the arbitrary inventions and fantaſtical notions of Ariſtotle and the

the ſages of antiquity, is not only inconſiſtent with the origin and nature of Morality; but it is defeated by the whole proceſs of Reaſon in both the ſciences: For, however ſtrong and clear Ethical conviction may be in general, it is totally different from Mathematical, both in the *Principle* from which it ſprings, in the *Method of proof* by which it is evinced, and conſequently in the nature of its TRUTH.

The Mathematician has his ideas at firſt from the *External Senſes*; and he takes them up at once in their *general form*, with little, if any, labour of Inductive reaſoning. The Moraliſt, on the other hand, has his materials, (for they are not properly *ideas* till generalized) from the evidence of *Internal Senſe*, which is the direct counterpart of the other; and he meets all moral actions in their *particular ſtate*.

Mathematical ideas, however numerous and extenſive, are what this philoſopher himſelf calls *Simple Modes of Quantity*: Moral Actions, on the contrary, are all *Complex Modes of Quality*. In conſequence of this diſtinction, which is quite philoſophical, the

the former are capable of being *univocally* and *mechanically expreſſed*, of being *preciſely diſtinguiſhed from each other*, and *from thoſe of other kinds*, and of being *exactly meaſured*; and they are ready, at firſt, to be *defined*, and SYLLOGISTICALLY *compared*: whereas the latter can never be ſo *univocally* and *artfully expreſſed*; *nor diſtinguiſhed with ſuch preciſion*, (defects which no expedients can remedy[k]) nor *exactly meaſured*; neither can they be logically *defined* at all or *compared* ſyllogiſtically, till their general ideas are formed by INDUCTION and general Propoſitions made.

So that, in Mathematics the *Method* of Reaſoning begins where it ends in Ethics, and is contrary throughout. In the one, it begins with Definitions and general Propoſitions, and advances from Syllogiſm to Syllogiſm, in which the *minor* as well as the *major* Propoſitions are always *general* truths; which *generality* is indiſpenſable to Demonſtration. In the other, the chief labour of Reaſoning, by which many perſonal obſerva-

[k] See Mr. Locke's Attempt, B. IV. C. iii. §. 26.

tions

tions are taken, accurate inveſtigations purſued, and fine diſtinctions drawn, and by which many particular compariſons are formed, neceſſarily precedes the logical Definition. And, when the general Office or Duty with its correſpondent quality, has been *Inductively* eſtabliſhed into a general propoſition, Definition, by reducing particular actions under their general head, will itſelf terminate the logical proceſs: Or, if Syllogiſms muſt be uſed, the *minor* propoſitions will be *particular*; ſo that there can be no Demonſtration: and, to the mortification of diſputants, one, or however a very few ſyllogiſms, will, be ſufficient.

ETHICAL TRUTH is, therefore, totally *different* from Mathematical; and, logically conſidered, and put in a comparative point of view, it bears a nearer reſemblance to *Phyſical*, and *Phyſical to Mathematical*.[1]

[1] PHYSICS and MATHEMATICS have the ſame Firſt Principle, the *External Senſes*; and, when Phyſical Forms are generalized, Mathematic can lend its *Reaſoning*; and they both terminate in *ſpeculative*, not practical, uſe. ETHICS differ from BOTH in its Firſt Principle the *Internal Senſe*, and from MATHEMATICS in the *Method of Reaſoning*,

LOCKE was that bold and adventurous philoſopher, who, led on by a candid impartiality and a reverence for truth, with a ſtrong and liberal mind, left the beaten track of ſcience, and took a new and untrodden path, in which he walked with great honour to himſelf, and great advantage to the learned. To ſubvert doctrines of philoſophy ſanctioned by authority, to break through ſyſtems of education made venerable by time, and to remove habits and prejudices by which the mind has been long enſlaved, is a taſk which has ever been reſerved for thoſe few champions of philoſophy, who are bleſt with ſuperior talents. His Eſſay produced an uſeful revolution in the republic of learning; and he may fairly be conſidered as the ſecond to Bacon in improving the purſuit, and in promoting the intereſts, of general knowledge. When the navigator of an unknown ſea, for

ſoning, but in this they agree with PHYSICS, the ſubject of both being *individuals:* and they differ from BOTH in their *End* which is *practical*, not ſpeculative, uſe: So that ETHICS and MATHEMATICS *differ* in toto.

the

the purpoſe of new diſcoveries, involves himſelf in difficulty, and perplexes himſelf in error, it is what we readily pardon, becauſe it is what we naturally expect: and both he and the philoſopher, who embark in the ſpirit of improvement, in order to correct what was before erroneouſly adopted or imperfectly known, will not only commend but honour the ſame ſpirit in others, by which they themſelves are corrected or improved.

The opinion, however, which he entertained in his Eſſay, of the demonſtrability of Ethics, he himſelf doubted of afterwards, and in part retracted in his Familiar Letters.* Philoſophers as well as navigators derive great advantages from being well informed of the works and obſervations of thoſe who have gone before them: and he would have neither entertained the opinion in the firſt inſtance, nor have doubted about it in the ſecond, had he not been unacquainted with

* Though by the view of moral ideas, whilſt I was conſidering that ſubject, I thought I ſaw that Morality might be demonſtrably made out; yet whether I am able to make it out is another queſtion. Locke's Fam. Let. p. 10.

the

the philoſophy of Demonſtrative and Syllogiſtic reaſoning, for want of having ſtudied with attention the *Analytics* of Ariſtotle, in which that deep philoſophy is ſo particularly inveſtigated; and had he not likewiſe been miſtaken in regard both to the Principles and Reaſoning of Morality, of which the book of *Topics*, however defective that part of the Organon may be, would have ſufficiently informed him, by diſtinguiſhing thoſe ſubjects which are capable of Probability from thoſe which admit of Demonſtration.[a] Above all, the *Metaphyſics* of Ariſtotle, which ſhould be moſt attentively ſtudied by every future metaphyſician, would have taught him, that

[a] The attempt which Mr. Locke has ſhewn, in different parts of his Eſſay, to make Morality demonſtrable like Mathematics, is a ſufficient proof that he was unacquainted with the *old Logic* derived originally from Ariſtotle: And the method by which he hoped to make the attempt ſucceed, viz. by proving the *agreement* or *diſagreement* of ethical *ideas* by the application and menſuration of a *third* or *medium*, is an additional proof that the *Logic* he eſpouſed was the *new* one, founded on the firſt Axiom of Euclid, which is more partial and imperfect than the old. And this is, indeed, ſtrongly apparent in every part of his Eſſay.

not

not to know what is demonſtrable, and what is not, is a prominent mark of ignorance.[o]

UPON the whole, Mr. Locke, with many other philoſophers, has been more at a loſs upon *moral* ſubjects, than in any other part of learning. Too anxious for the ſimplicity and uniformity of his new analyſis of the Human Underſtanding, he derives all its knowledge originally from one and the ſame ſource, that of *External Senſe*, to the excluſion of *Internal Senſe*, the firſt inlet of all moral truth, which is of equal authority, and as extenſive and eſſential in its uſe:[p] And

[o] Ἀξιῶσι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν, ἴσι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία, τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τίνων ὲ δεῖ. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. iv. c. 4.

[p] To make way for his new philoſophy, he employed the firſt book of his Eſſay to prove that there are no *Innate Principles*, either *Speculative* or *Practical:* and, as by Principles he means *General Propoſitions*, moſt of which are neither known nor aſſented to without the exerciſe of many previous judgments, nor often without a great maturity and progreſs of reaſoning, he had no great difficulty in overturning an abſurd doctrine, though it had obtained for many ages. In the ſecond book he proceeds to trace all *ideas*, by which he means *whatever is the object of thinking*,

thus, having loſt one of the eyes of Truth in the outſet of his journey, which ſhould have been his guide through ſome of the moſt abſtruſe and difficult paſſages, we cannot ſo much wonder that his ~~moral~~ philoſophy ſhould form a glaring defect of his incomparable Eſſay.

to their original in the EXTERNAL SENSES alone, as the inlet of all knowledge, both *ſpeculative* and *practical:* ſo that neither are they *innate*. Still this word is not to be excluded from the philoſophy of mind. That the *Eye* diſtinguiſhes *black*, *white*, *red*, *yellow*, is a faculty *innate* in that organ, elſe whence is it derived? But to apprehend *love* and *hatred*, *good* and *evil*, is not at all in the power of that external organ. No: we feel that it belongs to a faculty within the breaſt, which is likewiſe *innate*; and which we, therefore, call *Conſciouſneſs*. Theſe *innate* Faculties are, therefore, *different*, and independent of each other; from which we, accordingly, receive the *different* materials of all our knowledge, *ſpeculative* from the one, and *practical* from the other: they are, therefore, *Firſt Principles* of knowledge. And, as the one is properly called *natural* or *external* SENSE; the other, by its correſpondent analogy, is as properly called *moral* or *internal Senſe*.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of the PERFECTION of Moral Virtue.

HOWEVER thoſe inferior but more uſeful parts of ethical wiſdom, which are neceſſary to enſure the peace and exiſtence of ſocieties, to direct the conduct of individuals to their neceſſary well-being, and to enforce the ordinary duties of common life, may be impreſſed on the minds of all men with a *clear* and *obvious* conviction; when we reflect, that the whole *Moral Law* is a tranſcript of the unſearchable *Will* of the great Governour of the univerſe, we may eaſily ſuſpect, that but a ſmall and partial glympſe of this celeſtial light illumines the human intellect. Though, from juſt obſervations on the conduct of his providence, and by a due exerciſe of their reaſon, men may hope to develope ſome of his leſs obvious diſpenſations; yet we may ſuſpend our wonder, if philoſophers ancient and modern, who have attempted (and the attempt conducted by

humility and diſcretion does honour to human nature) to look with a more philoſophic eye into the deeper counſels of the Almighty, to ſcan the ways of his moral providence, and to reduce them to the formalities of ſyſtem, have been diſappointed in their object, and that, in ſubjects of morality, error has frequently aſſumed the face of truth.

Though the Deity has never been wanting in the diſcovery of himſelf to the meaneſt of his rational creatures; the ſublimeſt parts of his divine œconomy are reſerved as myſteries too exalted for the natural faculties of the higheſt to inveſtigate, and ſometimes for their largeſt capacities to comprehend:[a] however they may be enabled to embrace ſome parts, when diſcovered, and to acquieſce in others.[b] Our great philoſopher and reformer of all learning human and divine, has, therefore,

[a] Nec illud dubitandum eſt magnam partem legis moralis ſublimorem eſſe, quam quo lumen naturæ aſcendere poſſit. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ix.

[b] Particeps eſt anima lucis nonnullæ ad perfectionem intuendam et diſcernendam Legis Moralis; quæ tamen lux non prorſus clara ſit, ſed ejuſmodi ut potius vitia quodatenus redarguat, quam de officiis plane informet. Ibid.

referred

referred Reaſon in regard to the whole of the divine LAW, *moral* as well as *poſitive*, to *Revelation*, as affording that clear and certain light, on which it can firmly and ſecurely rely.[c]

Beſides the ſtupendous *Myſteries* it unveils, which are poſitive and doctrinal, it delivers a new and more perfect ſyſtem of moral duties, grounded on their true and proper principle, as the directory of our lives and actions: a divine philoſophy, unconſcious of all error, and free from imperfection, and which is carried to that height of purity and ſublimity, of which Reaſon is loſt in admiration. No code of Ethics, ancient or modern, is ſo full or ſo preciſe, none ſo clear, none ſo conſiſtent, none ſo practical, and none ſo practicable, and, above all, none ſo authoritative, as the MORALITY of the eternal GOSPEL.

To this code of evangelical Ethics the philoſopher muſt look up as to a polar ſtar, both to direct his ſtudies and to regulate his conduct. And here he will receive an in-

[c] Quare Religio, ſive *Myſteria* ſive *Mores* ſpectes pendet de *Revelatione* divina, Ibid.

ſtruction

ſtruction from the mouth of ONE who was *wiſer* than philoſophers — "If ye KNOW "theſe things, happy are ye if ye DO them:[d] an inſtruction which, with a clear and elegant preciſion, divides moral ſcience into its two diſtinct and general parts — the *Knowledge* and the *Practice*.[e]

The *former* part, under the luminous precepts of the Goſpel, being a work of more obvious and eaſy execution, and admiting of a more florid and popular diſplay, has been cultivated by moraliſts and divines with competent ſucceſs[f]. while the latter, which

[d] John xiii. 17.

[e] Partiemur igitur ethicam in doctrinas principales duas; alteram de exemplari ſive imagine boni; alteram de regimine & cultura animi, quam etiam partem georgica animi appellare conſuevimus: Illa naturam boni deſcribit, hæc regulas de animo ad illam conformando præſcribit.

Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. vii. cap. 1.

Hanc igitur partem (quando præſtantiam ejus in animo recolo) in corpus doctrinæ nondum redactam, non poſſum non vehementer mirari. Eam igitur, ex more noſtro, cum inter deſiderata collocemus, aliqua ex parte adumbrabimus. Ibid. Lib. VII. Cap. 3.

See this part of morality opened by Lord Bacon.

[f] Propoſuerunt nobis exemplaria bella et luculenta atque deſcriptiones ſive imagines accuratas, boni, virtutis, officiorum, felicitatis, tanquam vera objecta, et ſcopos voluntatis

is to give it operation and effect, and which conſtitutes the life of all morality, requiring a deeper inveſtigation into particulars and a more philoſophical reſearch, has been at all times too much neglected.[g] The neceſſity of this part was ſeen and acknowledged by the Peripatetic, whoſe large and comprehenſive mind embraced the confines and marked the dependencies of all learning, and who gave a promiſe to deſcend to the execution of the intereſting work ;[h] which, however, does not

voluntatis et appetitus humani : Verum quomodo quis poſſit optime ad hos ſcopos (excellentes ſane et bene ab illis poſitos) collimare ; hoc eſt, quibus rationibus et inſtitutis animus ad illa aſſequenda ſubigi et componi poſſit, aut nihil præcipiunt, aut perfunctorie et minus utiliter. Ibid. lib. vii. cap. 1.

[g] Delegerunt ſibi philoſophi in ethica maſſam quandam materiæ ſplendidam et nitentem, in qua potiſſimum vel ingenii acumen, vel eloquentiæ vigorem venditare poſſint : Quæ vero practicam maxime inſtruunt, quandoquidem tam belle ornari non poſſint, maxima ex parte omiſerunt. Ibid.

[h] Δεῖ ἆρα ὡς ἔοικε πρῶτον ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, τί τέ ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίνεται. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἴσως ὄφελος εἰδέναι μὲν τὴν ἀρετὴν, πῶς δὲ ἂν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων, μὴ ἐπαΐειν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὅπως εἰδήσομεν τί ἐστι, σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι. ἅμα γὰρ εἰδῆναι βουλόμεθα, καὶ αὐτοὶ εἶναι τοιοῦτοι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ δυνησόμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ εἰδῶμεν καὶ ἐκ τίνων, καὶ πῶς ἄν. ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν εἰδῆναι τί ἐστιν ἀρετή. ἔ γὰρ

appear to have been performed, unleſs very incidentally in his book of Rhetoric, in any of thoſe works which have come down to us.[1]

This is the philoſophy of the human heart, which, by a nice and judicious ſearch, enquires into its ſecret ſprings and motions, and diſcovers the latent ſeeds of all thoſe paſſions and affections, which are the iſſues and elements of moral life. This philoſophy does

ἐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον εἰδέναι τὸ ἐκ τίνων ἂν, καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἀγνοοῦντα τὸ τί ἐϛι, ὥϛπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιϛημῶν. Ariſtot Mag. Mor. lib. 1. cap. i.

[1] We have ſome good ground to believe that he reſerved this important topic of moral inveſtigation to form the crown and concluſion of his poetics. 'Tres de Poeticâ libros conſcripſiſſe Ariſtotelem memorat Laërtius — tertium (cujus interitum delemus maxime) περὶ καθάρσεως, ſive κατορθώσεως diſceptaſſe crederem, h. e. de *Animorum Purgatione* a Pravis Affectibus, deque *Emendatione Morum*. Quem quidem apud veteres, Poeticæ Imitationis probe conſtitutæ præcipuum ac proprium fuiſſe finem, nil dubium eſt. Sed quia, propter multiplices vitiorum formas, complura καθάρσεως illius capita fuſiorem tractatum deſiderarint; obiter illam ſane nec niſi verbo tetigit Philoſophus in Poeticis (cap. 8. in fine) ejuſque rationem ad hoc opus, tanquam ad latiorem campum fuſius ac ſigillatim explicandam retulit.' Goulſt. in Synop. Ariſtot. Poet.

See pp. 220, 221 of this volume.

not reſt in general ſpeculation; but deſcends to particular experiment and obſervation. It conſults the native bent of every diſpoſition, marks the different tempers and characters of men, whether caſt by nature or formed by art, and deſcends to all the propenſities of ſex, age, country, and condition of life. Thus every diſorder of the mind can be traced to its diſtinct and proper cauſe; and a remedy can be applied, if any remedy can prevail: and thus, by a due correction and proper culture of the mind, ſome affections can be promoted whilſt others are ſuppreſſed, which will gradually extirpate the ſeeds of vice and cheriſh thoſe of virtue; as the phyſician conſults both the conſtitution of his patient and the cauſe of the diſeaſe, in order to correct the habit, and to apply a ſucceſsful cure.

Still, however clear the conviction, and captivating the charms, of moral truth may be, men will both reſiſt its evidence and diſgrace its beauty. However they may embrace and honour Virtue in idea as leading to the greateſt good, they will reject and diſhonour it in practice; for Paſſion, which is of a con-

a contrary intereſt, will prove an overmatch for Reaſon, and [redacted] prevail upon the WILL to cultivate apparent Happineſs at the ſhrine of Pleaſure. And 'this is the true cauſe of 'all that diſorder and inconſiſtency in the life 'of man, which the *Philoſopher* affects to ad- 'mire, which the *Divine* laments, and for 'which the *Moraliſt*, could never find a 'cure.'[1]

THE power of DOING, as well as the opportunity of KNOWING, we owe ſolely to HIM who not only gave the *Inſtruction*, but ſeconded and illuſtrated that Inſtruction by his own *Example*.

MORAL VIRTUE never appeared on earth with that native brightneſs, or with thoſe powerful charms, by which ſhe is enabled both to convince the *Underſtanding* and to captivate the *Heart*, till brought down from heaven by ONE who "knew what is man;" who in HIMSELF preſented her in all *Perfection*, and can inveſt her with all *Power*; who "opened his mouth in Parables" and Simili-

[1] Warb. Divine Legation.

tudes

tudes, and introduced her with authority and effect into this lower world. Till that halcyon æra came, Human Nature had lain buried in "the works of darkneſs" and in "the ſhadow of death;" when it was invited into "light and life" by the call of a prophetic and evangelic voice — "Awake thou "that ſleepeſt and ariſe from the dead, "and CHRIST ſhall give thee light."

[a] Iſaiah lxii. 1. and Eph. v. 14.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Logic of POETRY.

FROM the *Ethical*, we are led by the general plan to the POETICAL province, which is ſubject to the IMAGINATION, or Mind employed in producing ſome *Effect*.[a]

After diſtinguiſhing the *Theoretical* diviſion from both the *Practical* and *Poetical*, by obſerving, that the truth of the firſt originates in its proper *ſubject* and terminates in *itſelf*, and that that of the other two originates in the *mind* of the agent moral or poetical, and reſpects ſome *farther end*;[b] Ariſtotle has drawn the line between *Morality* and *Poetry*,

[a] Διανοια ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ. See 23d page of this volume.
[b] See p. 227 and 228 of this volume.

according

according to the *different ends* they have in view — *Actions* and *Arts*.[c]

To put this general diſtinction in a ſtill fuller point of light, we may obſerve, that, as the object of *Ethics* is the Knowledge of the different *ſpecies* of moral *good* and *evil* with a view to the *right conduct* of life; ſo the object of POETRY, taken in its greateſt latitude of meaning, are the *elegant Arts*, and their proper end is *Pleaſure* with *uſeful Inſtruc-*

[c] Τῶ δὲ ἐνδεχομένε ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἔστί τι καὶ ποιητὸν, καὶ πρακτόν. ἕτερον δὲ ἐστὶ ποίησις, καὶ πρᾶξις· ὥςε καὶ ἡ μετα λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ, ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγε ποιητικῆς ἕξεως. καὶ οὐδὲ περιέχεἰαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις, ποίησις· οὔτε ἡ ποίησις, πρᾶξίς ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ, τέχνη τίς ἐστι, καὶ ὅπερ ἕξίς τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ, καὶ οὐθμία ἅτε τέχνη ἐστὶν, ἥτις ἐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξίς ἐστιν, ἅτε τοιαύτη, ἡ ἐ τέχνη, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγε ἀληθὲς ποιητική. ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι, καὶ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιεμένῳ. ἅτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, ἢ γινομένων, ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν, ἅτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχεσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχὴν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως, ἀλλ' ἐ πράξεως εἶναι. ἡ μὲν ἐ τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξίς τις μετὰ λόγε ἀληθὲς ποιητικὴ ἐστιν. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 4.

tion

tion [d] Prodeſſe Delectando;' [e] the excellence and perfection of which depend on their correſpondence to *Truth*, under the conduct of *Reaſon*.

In both the *Theoretical* and *Practical* departments, the mind, in the production of truth, acts and judges *within* itſelf: in the *Arts* it paſſes to ſome *external* operation by which it

[d] Hoc enim maxime videtur intereſſe inter Philoſophum et Poetam, quod cum utriuſque idem ſit conſilium, alia tamen alii id quod velit conſequendi ſit ratio. Uterque Docentis perſonam ſuſtinet; quam quidem alter ita optime tueri cenſetur, ſi clare doceat, ſi ſubtiliter, ſi enucleate; alter, ſi jucunde, ornate, ſuaviter, eleganter. Ille ab affectibus ad Rationem unce provocat; hic ita Rationem appellat, ut Affectus etiam in ſuas partes ſtudeat pertrahere. Ille ad Virtutem et Veritatem proxima et compendiaria ſemita utitur; hic per itinerum flexiones quaſdam et diverticula, ſed amœniore via, eodem ducit. Illius denique eſt utramque ita exponere et nudare, ut neceſſario eas agnoſcamus; hujus ita eaſdem ornare et veſtire, ut amemus ultro et amplectamur. Louth Poet. Præl. 1.

[e] *Ars* eſt ſecunda virtus intellectualis *practica*, quæ definitur *Habitus cum recta ratione effectivus.*

Objectum ejus ſunt omnia illa, ex quibus tanquam *materia* aliquid poteſt *effici.*

Artificis officium in tribus conſiſtit: primò, in *ſpeculando:* ſecundò, in *fabricando:* tertiò, in *perficiendo*, ut opus producat. Langb. Eth. p. 77.

produces

produces an effect, from which the truth reſults. The Arts are, therefore, *Energies* of the mind; but no energy of the human mind can actually *create*: it can only *imitate* the works of Nature material and mental, and, by variouſly joining and combining them together, *form new images* of things, which in nature have no real exiſtence. This is the proper office of POETIC ART in general, which conſiſts in *Imitations* formed by the *Imagination*, that prolific faculty of the mind, which gives a kind of ſecond creation to all the works of nature, generalizes and enlarges their comprehenſion, heightens their beauty, and improves their charms.[f]

[f] Πόλυ ἐν ταῖς τεχναῖς μιμεμέναις τὴν φυσιν, καὶ τὸ παραλειπομένον ὑπ' αὐτὴς ἀναπλήρυσαις. Simplius in Ariſtot. Præd.

Etenim nimium anguſtis finibus continetur Hiſtoria, nimum ſeveras habet operis ſui leges. Res geſtas tradit, eventorum veſtigiis inſiſtit; quod contigit, non quod contigiſſe potuit aut oportuit, narrandum; nec quo documenti opportunitas, vel probabilitatis ratio vocat, ſed quo facti neceſſitas cogit, eundum. Hiſtoria res et perſonas certas et conſtitutas tractat, infinitas et univerſales Poeſis: altera rerum cauſas incertis conjecturis conſectatur; altera evidenter certeque demonſtrat: altera fortuito elucentem Veritatis imaginem captat; altera ſimplicem ejus formam intuetur: illa præſcriptum iter certa via conficit; hæc liberis naturæ ſpatiis fruitur: illa demum argumento ſuo inſervit; hæc dominatur. Lowth Poet. Præl. 1.

All

All the *Elegant* Arts are IMITATIONS, by which they are principally diſtinguiſhed from the *Manual*, and which differ from each other, according to the *Means* or *Materials* which they reſpectively employ. *Marble* is generally the material of the *Statuary*, and his inſtrument the *chiſſel*: thoſe of the *Painter* are his *colours*, and his inſtrument the *pencil*: thoſe of the *Muſician* are the different *ſounds*, and his inſtruments of *various kinds*: thoſe of the *Poet* are *words*, and the *pen* his inſtrument.

SECT. I.

Of the Poetical PRINCIPLE.

THE Source from which the Imitative Arts originally derive their energy, is that *Internal Feeling or Senſibility*, which, by a ſpontaneous operation, recognizes a wonderful variety of different ſentiments, emotions, and affections, according to all the modes and diverſities

diverſities of *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, excited in the mind by the different objects, actions, and events which occur in all the various ſcenes of human life.

This native *Senſibility* is, therefore, the FIRST PRINCIPLE of Poetic Art, without which Genius would neither know what to imitate in order to produce the Effect deſigned, nor would the mind be enabled to recognize that Effect when produced.

However different from the *External* and *Moral Senſes*, we may obſerve a general analogy ſubſiſting between them. As the different kinds of *Good* and *Evil*, as they are diſtinguiſhed by the *Moral* Principle, form all the different claſſes and varieties of moral Action; ſo the different modes of *Pleaſure* and *Pain* as recognized by the *Poetical* Principle, give all their diſtinctive colours and varieties to the elegant Arts: and, ſuch is the general conſiſtency and uniformity of things, that, as we obſerve the *External Senſes* more perfect and the *Moral* more acute, from their natural formation, in ſome perſons than in others; ſo we remark this *other*

Principle to prevail in different minds with greater and leſs degrees of delicacy and refinement. And, as the two former are liable to be injured in their exerciſe, and perverted in their uſe by habit or accident, and capable of being corrected by an act of reaſon; ſo is this *Poetical Senſe* ~~ſubject~~ to be corrupted by habit, and to be corrected by reaſon.

The higher degrees of this Poetic ~~Feeling~~ are the rare and peculiar gift of nature; when accompanied with the imitative talent, the happy combination is diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Genius*; and, when conducted by ſound judgment, the reſult is called *Taſte*: which endowments are more partially and capriciouſly beſtowed than the other mental faculties, as it is neceſſary there ſhould be many Moraliſts and Philoſophers, whilſt a few Poets ~~will~~ ſuffice for all the purpoſes of life, provided they be the beſt.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of Poetical REASONING.

BUT, in the name of Apollo and the Muſes, what has REASONING, it may be ſaid, to do with *Genius* and *Taſte*? What has a dry and ſombrous LOGIC to do in the wild and luxuriant fields of *Imagination*? — An able philoſopher and philologiſt ſhall give the anſwer. 'Every thing really *elegant* or '*ſublime* in compoſition, is ultimately refer- 'able to the Principles of *ſound Logic*; thoſe 'Principles, when readers little think of them, 'have ſtill a *latent* force, and may be traced, 'if ſought after, even in the politeſt of 'Writers. By reaſoning of this kind an im- 'portant *Union* is eſtabliſhed; the Union 'between TASTE and TRUTH. 'Tis this is 'that ſplendid Union which produces the '*Claſſics* of pure *Antiquity*; which produced, 'in times leſs remote, the *Claſſics* of *modern* 'days; and which thoſe who *now* write, 'ought to cultivate with attention, if they

'wiſh to ſurvive in the eſtimation of poſterity.
'TASTE is in fact but a ſpecies of inferior
'TRUTH. 'Tis the *Truth of Elegance*, of
'*Decoration*, and of *Grace*; which, as all
'*Truth* is *ſimilar* and *congenial*, *coincides* as it
'were *ſpontaneouſly* with the more *ſevere* and
'*logical*; but which, whenever *deſtitute* of that
'more ſolid ſupport, reſembles ſome fair but
'languid Body; a Body, ſpecious in feature,
'but deficient in nerve; a Body, where we
'ſeek in vain for that natural and juſt per-
'fection, which ariſes from the pleaſing har-
'mony of Strength and Beauty aſſociated.[g]

Ariſtotle defines Poetic Art in general to be 'a Habit conducted by Reaſon to the pro-'duction of a *true* Effect:'[h] and wherever *Truth*

[g] Harris's Philoſophical Arrangements, p. 458.

[h] Ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι, καὶ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ. ἅτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, ἢ γινομένων, ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν, ἅτε τῶν καθὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιάσεως, ἀλλ' ἢ πράξεως εἶναι. ἡ μὲν δὴ τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου

is concerned, REASON is concerned; particularly where certain *Cauſes*, whatever they may be, are employed to produce certain *Effects*, and where certain *Means* are adapted to certain *Ends*. So that there is no part of learning in which Reaſon and Judgment have more various employment, or in which they perform a more delicate taſk, than in their application to the Imitative Arts.

When Effects are produced upon the *Internal Feeling* by objects or events as they occur in the ordinary courſe of things, which is the foundation of Poetical Imitation, we may, perhaps, be either too deeply intereſted in them, or too much involved in their contemplation, to think about their Cauſes: yet there are *Cauſes*, and theſe rational and intelligent, which are uniform and conſiſtent in their operation, ſo long as the preſent ſyſtem of nature and conſtitution of the human mind remain the ſame. In con-

λόγε ἀληθῆς ποιητικὴ ἐστιν· ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία, τἐναντίον μετὰ λόγε ψευδῆς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 4.

ſequence of this inattention to them, and other concurrent circumſtances, as their frequency, their variety, and complexity, and above all their familiarity, they are not, perhaps, ſo diſtinctly to be aſcertained, or ſo eaſily generalized, as thoſe which are productive of truth in the provinces of the Will and Intellect. They have, however, in nature a permanent exiſtence, and are more or leſs recognized and reſponded to by all, though in a higher degree by ſenſible minds. The Poet or Artiſt remarks theſe *Cauſes* as they affect his own feelings, and as he obſerves their operation on thoſe of others: and thus, from ſentiment and obſervation often repeated, he ſupplies himſelf with a large and various ſtock of *poetical ideas* generalized and remembered;[1] from which as from a genuine treaſure he draws all the reſources of his Art, to

[1] Γίγνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος, μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσι· καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη ὅμοιον εἶναι ἡ ἐμπειρία. ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία, τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὥς φησι Πῶλος, ὀρθῶς λέγων· ἡ δ' ἀπειρία, τύχην. γίνεται δὲ τέχνη, ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοη-

be employed in all the different acts of *Imitation*. All this, however logical, he does in fact, though it is generally performed by the silent and almost insensible operation of his mind, without the phlegmatic process of a formal logic.

But, however insensibly performed, the REASONING may be clearly analyzed; and from thence the truth produced may be critically ascertained.

The truth of both *Facts* and *History* results from the apprehension or investigation of *particulars*, independently of their causes; whereas that of *Poetry* springs from the application of *causes*, and these *general*[k] ones. The first act of Reasoning is, therefore, from a number of particulars, by collateral judgments of effects produced by them upon the internal Feeling, to collect these General Causes; and the second, to apply them, by the different modes of Imitation, in order to

μάτων, καθόλου μία γένηται περὶ τὸν τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 1.

[k] Ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθέκαστά ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου. Ibid. lib. i. cap. 1.

produce the poetical Effect. Hence Poetry is ſaid to be more philoſophical.[1] *Experience* is the foundation, *Induction* is the firſt, and a *judicous application of Generals*, is the ſecond, act. And if theſe generals are well formed in the firſt place, and well applied in the ſecond, the poetical truth will diſcover itſelf in the effect by a proportionable operation on the ſenſibility of all according to its powers.

Thus POETRY ſtands high in the eye of Philoſophy. It is founded in *Abſtraction* which is the ſublimeſt operation of the mind, by which its ideas are not only generalized, but corrected and improved by an act of intellect, and rendered more perfect and complete than the archetypes themſelves. Theſe are the materials with which the Imagination works, and which it moulds into forms of beauty ſuperior to any that appear in the face of nature. And hence it is, that the Imitative Arts derive that excellence and ſuperiority in which they glory. As by this

[1] Διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλε, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει. Ibid De Poet. cap. 9.

power

power of Abſtraction the Mathematician conceives the idea of a perfect circle or a perfect ſphere, which in nature has no exiſtence; and the Moraliſt that of a faultleſs character: ſo from archetypes that exiſt in nature, the Artiſt derives ideas ſo corrected and ſublimed, that they become *tranſcendent*, that is *above*, though *not contrary* to, nature.

Particulars and Individuals, with all their deformities and imperfections are, indeed, often applied by Imitation to the production of poetical effect: but, to arrive at the ſummit of his profeſſion, the Artiſt ſhould employ none but general ideas, with all the advantages which arrangement, diſpoſition, and ſituation can give them: as did the intelligent ſtatuary, to whoſe poetical genius the world has been indebted for the Venus de Medicis, or the Apollo Belvidere.

BUT the *Imitation*, by which theſe poetical ideas are employed in Art, according to good Taſte (which is only another word for Judgment,) is of different kinds, and the juſt diſtinction

diſtinction of them is an act of RATIONAL and judicious criticiſm.

All Imitation is *Reſemblance*, which differs according to the nature of the *Art*: and the nature of the Art, depends upon the *Materials* and *Inſtrument* employed. Imitation is either *direct* or *proper*, or *indirect* and *improper*: and to diſcriminate its nature and extent in each of the elegant Arts, as well as in the different provinces of the ſame, is a piece of the moſt refined philoſophy.

In *Sculpture* and in *Painting* the Imitation, from the nature of the means and materials they employ, is *direct* and *proper*, and the reſemblance between the ſtatue or picture and what they repreſent, is both immediate and obvious. *Words* are the means or materials of *Poetry*: But Words, though as *ſounds* they may ſometimes *directly* reſemble ſounds, are not the natural repreſentatives of *ideas*, in which poetry conſiſts; they are only their arbitrary ſigns, and do not, therefore, admit of any imitation ſo *proper* and *direct*. That part of poetry, in which the poet perſonates another, and employs his very words and ſpeeches,

ſpeeches, is, ſo far as that perſonification goes, *directly* imitative. But, with regard to the effects which it produces, poetical imitation is *indirect* in a greater or leſs degree. The ſimpleſt and *leaſt indirect* mode of this Imitation, is that repreſentation of *ſenſible* objects, which is called poetical *Deſcription*. From this Poetry advances to a ſublimer operation in the repreſentation of *mental* objects, of all the paſſions, emotions, movements and ſenſations of the mind;* which it performs

* Porro ut vehementioribus animæ Affectibus originem ſuam debet poeſis, ita in Affectibus exprimendis vim ſuam præcipue exerit, et Affectus concitando finem ſuum optime conſequitur.

Imitatione conſtare dicitur Poeſis: quicquid humana mens cogitatione complectitur, id omne imitatur; res, loca, imagines vel naturæ vel artis, actiones, mores, affectus: et cum omni imitatione magnopere delectatur mens humana, fieri vix poteſt, quin illam et delectet maxime et percellat ea imitatio, quæ ei ſuam ipſius imaginem exhibet, omneſque eos impulſus, flexiones, perturbationes, motuſque ſecretos exprimit, quos in ſe agnoſcit ſentitque. Commendat imprimis hanc imitationem ipſius rei ſubtilitas et difficultas: habet magnam admirationem, cum cernimus id effectum dari, quod omnino vix effici poſſe judicamus. Cæterarum rerum deſcriptiones accuratas eſſe et naturæ congruere, memoriæ ſubſidio ac veluti per medium quoddam, mens tardius intelligit: cum exprimitur Affectus aliquis,

two different ways—either by repreſenting theſe mental emotions as they are *internally* felt, and ſucceed each other in the mind—or by repreſenting them as they appear in their ſenſible and *external effects:* And theſe *leſs direct* modes conſtitute poetical *Expreſſion.* In all which mental imitations the effect is often extended and enlarged by *Aſſociation* of ideas; and wonderfully heightened by *Sympathy,* that lovely and ſublime affection, which gives poetry ſuch a powerful aſcendant over the heart of man.

Another mode of poetical imitation is that of *Fiction,* which repreſents facts, characters, actions, manners, and events, in feigned and

quis, rem ipſam quaſi nude intuetur; ipſa per ſe conſcia eſt et ſui et ſuorum motuum, nec rem perſpicit ſolum, ſed et vel idem vel ſimile quiddam ſtatim patitur. Hinc fit, quod ea Sublimitatis ſpecies, quæ ex vehementi Affectuum impulſu eorumque imitatione oritur, apud animum humanum multo maximam vim habet: quicquid ei extrinſecus exhibetur, utcunque grande et magnificum, minus eum ut par eſt commovet, quam quod intus percipit' cujus magnitudinem et impetum et vehementiam ipſe apud ſe perſentit.

Utque Imitatio Affectuum poeſeos perfectiſſimum eſt opus, ita per eorundum Concitationem maxime ad finem ſuum et effectum perducitur. Lowth Poet. Præl. xvii.

general

general ſtory, as Hiſtory does in real and particular narrative,[a] adding to the Fiction *Repreſentation:* Theſe *more indirect* Imitations conſtitute *Epic* and *Dramatic* poetry, into which every other ſpecies is introduced.

And to theſe is to be added another kind of Imitation ſtill *more indirect*, which conveys the thoughts and ideas of the mind through the external objects of ſenſe: This is *Parabolical* and *Alluſive* poetry.[*]

But, although the Imitations of *Poetry* be *leſs direct* and *proper* than thoſe of the other arts, they ſurpaſs them greatly in their extent and operation upon the mind. *Poetry*, which from this ſuperiority has appropriated the general name, is the mirrour of all Truth, by which every part of Nature,

[a] Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλυ, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει. Ἔστι δὲ καθόλυ μὲν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖ' ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν, ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς, ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ᾧ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις, ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη· τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον, τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν, ἢ τί ἔπαθεν. Ariſt. Poet. c. 9.

[*] At poeſis parabolica, inter reliquas eminet, et tanquam res ſacra videtur et auguſta; cum præſertim religio ipſa ejus opera plerunque utatur, et per eam commercia divinorum cum humanis exerceat.

corporeal

corporeal and mental, is reflected and improved. It is Phyſics, Facts, Actions and *Hiſtory* feigned at pleaſure;[p] and repreſented, by the different modes of its Imitation, in a *Language* raiſed above the common uſe, and which is peculiarly appropriated to itſelf.[q] And, whilſt it exhibits a beautiful picture of every ſpecies of truth, it ſoftens the labour which attends their acquiſition by affording the mind that refined and elegant recreation, which the moſt rigid philoſopher need not bluſh to take.[r]

[p] Cum nihil aliud ſit, quam hiſtoriæ imitatio ad placitum. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. cap. 13.

[q] Poeſis eſt genus doctrinæ *verbis* plerumque *adſtrictum*, rebus ſolutum et licentioſum. Ibid.

Ea eſt omnis Poeſeos indoles ut a vulgari ſermonis uſu maxime abhorreat, atque verborum non ſolum delectu, ſed et conſtructione proprium quoddam et exquiſitius dicendi genus affectet. Lowth Poet. Præl. iv.

[r] Equidem præclare nobis conſuluiſſe videtur natura, quæ cum nos ad veri cognitionem longe a nobis remotam, nec ſine magnis laboribus aſſequendam, vehementer impelleret, hæc nobis invenit et paravit oblectamenta, ut haberet mens noſtra, quo defatigata identidem confugeret; ubi conquieſcere, omnemque illum languorem et moleſtiam deponeret. Lowth Poet. Præl. i.

THUS

THUS Poetry, by its imitative and energetic powers, preſents us with a new world, every where repreſentative of the old one, ſpringing out of IMAGINATION, that ſublime inventive faculty which is a compound of *Will* and *Memory*, the former exerciſing a kind of plaſtic and creative power in the treaſures of the latter. Though Imagination can add nothing to the original ſtock of ideas with which the mind is furniſhed by the External and Internal Senſes, or change any of the materials of the old creation; it aſſumes an abſolute command and authority over them, to join, to combine, to mix, to vary, to compound, and to diſpoſe, them, in every different form and repreſentation of Deſcription, Fiction, Perſonification, Viſion, or Alluſion. And, if the wild and inventive genius of our own countryman was not inſtructed in the cold philoſophy of Poetry, his warm and ~~mimetic~~ fancy was ſuſceptible of its fineſt influence: and, from the following animated picture which he has given of his profeſſion, one would ſuppoſe, that he

was

was not entirely unacquainted with the rationale of the Art.

> The Poet's eye in a fine frenzy rolling
> Doth glance from heav'n to earth, from earth to heav'n;
> And, as IMAGINATION bodies forth
> The *forms* of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to ſhape, and gives to airy *nothings*
> A local habitation and a name. [s]

In the higher departments of the Muſe, Poetry feigns *Actions* and *Events* ſucceeding each other in due order, gives them the life and animation of *Perſons*, of the firſt diſtinction, with the conſiſtencies of *Time* and *Place*, and every other circumſtance of probable hiſtory, conſulting the gratification of the ſublimer ſentiments and affections of the mind, and finiſhing the whole plan into the *reſemblance* of a more complete, more beautiful, more engaging, and more inſtructive, truth. [t]

[s] Shakeſpeare's Midſum. Night's Dream, Act. i. Sc. 1.

[t] Ea a fundamento prorſus nobili excitata videtur, quod ad dignitatem humanæ naturæ imprimis ſpectat. Cum enim mundus ſenſibilis ſit animâ rationali dignitate inferior, videtur poeſis hæc humanæ naturæ largiri, quæ hiſtoria denegat; atque animo umbris rerum utcunque ſatisfacere, cum ſolida haberi non poſſint. Si quis enim rem acutius introſpiciat, firmum ex poeſi ſumitur argumentum, magnitudinem rerum magis illuſtrem, ordinem magis perfectum, et varietatem

In the choice and adoption of the *Means* requiſite to the accompliſhment of ſo complete an end, in their poetical execution, and in conducting the whole to the beſt effect, *Judgment* has a very delicate and difficult taſk. *Fancy* may be luxuriant, and *Genius* prolific; but REASON, however ſilently and imperceptibly it may work, has to prepare and to correct the natural fertility of the ſoil, and to aſſiſt in nouriſhing the production, till it ripen to its full maturity. It has to adjuſt the *propriety* of the inventions, to rectify the *falſities* of taſte, to arrange the *order* and *ſucceſſion* of the parts, and to unite them into one conſiſtent *whole:* a piece of philoſophy which forms a very deep and recondite branch

tatem magis pulchram, animæ humanæ complacere, quam in natura ipſa poſt lapſum, reperire ullo modo poſſit. Quapropter cum res geſtæ et eventus, qui veræ hiſtoriæ ſubjiciuntur, non ſint ejus amplitudinis, in qua anima humana ſibi ſatisfaciat, præſto eſt poeſis, quæ facta magis heroica confingat: Cum hiſtoria ſucceſſus rerum, minime pro meritis virtutum et ſcelerum, narret; corrigit eam poeſis, et exitus et fortunas, ſecundum merita et ex lege nemeſeos, exhibit: Cum hiſtoria vera, obvia rerum ſatietate et ſimilitudine, animæ humanæ faſtidio ſit; reficit eam poeſis inexpectata, et varia, et viciſſitudinum plena canens. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. c. 13.

of learning, eminently called *Criticiſm*, or the Philoſophy of Judgment.

This part of philoſophy did not eſcape the inquiſitive attention of Ariſtotle, whoſe ſtrong and comprehenſive mind was not only the repoſitory of all the learning of his age, but the author and improver of many parts. His penetrating eye could not view thoſe admirable models of poetic art, exhibited in the drama of Sophocles, and in the epos of Homer, and contemplate the *effects* which they produced on the mind and the different affections of pleaſure and pain, without inquiring into the *cauſes* which conſpired, in their exact and admirable combination, to that production. In this arduous inveſtigation he took to pieces the compoſitions, and reduced them to their ſimpleſt parts and principles. By this means he diſcovered their artifice and machinery, how every part was formed, how one operated upon another, and how they all co-operated together in the formation of a perfect whole. So that the inventive and poetical genius of Homer

Homer and Sophocles or Euripides produced the moſt admirable ſpecimens of the art; and the analytical and philoſophical genius of Ariſtotle diſcovered the logic or rationale of theſe ſpecimens.

In this philoſophical analyſis, all the parts and connections, all the beauties and propriеties, all the unities and conſiſtencies, which are aſſembled combined and executed by the exertion of the ſublimeſt and moſt judicious imagination, are explained in the cleareſt and moſt didactic manner, and with ſo much ſoundneſs and diſcrimination of judgment, that the criticiſm itſelf became a model on which to form the plan of the future poet, as well as the ſtandard to direct the deciſion of the future critic.

But, though many important advantages have been derived both to the works of the poet and to the judgment of the critic, from this incomparable production of Ariſtotle; yet, in many inſtances, the genius of the one has been checked in its native vigor, and the judgment of the other warped and con-

tracted, by too ſevere and unqualified an application of what can be only a partial rule.

Genius is the produce of every ſoil, and the growth of every age and country. In its application to poetry, it takes things, characters, and manners as they riſe; and, by a juſt and lively imitation, produces the effect upon the minds of thoſe who were witneſſes of the ſcenes, and which are beſt qualified to recognize and to reſpond to the poetical imitation. If theſe things, characters, and manners, which form the genuine reſources of the Muſe, are known to change with the change of times and places; if, from the temperature of climates, the influence of polities, the prevalence of civil and religious perſuaſions, and the dominion of faſhion; if, from ſome cauſes which we know, and more which we do not know, the ſcene of human life and manners is ſhifted with every age and country; the poetical model formed by Ariſtotle from the works of Sophocles and Homer, however perfect as far as it extends, is conſtructed upon too narrow and confined a ſcale to form an univerſal law of poetical compoſition

compoſition. However adapted to the manners and ſentiments of ancient Greece, however admirable in itſelf, as holding out a picture of the dignity and ſimplicity of the claſſic ages, and however incomparable as a ſpecimen of the moſt refined and poliſhed taſte, the *Poetics* of Ariſtotle, or the *Art of Poetry* of Horace, ſhould be conſidered only as a general and imperfect guide, to be applied with much caution and reſerve, and with a particular attention to the changes made in the circumſtances of time and place.

Poetical imitations are always the moſt perfect, the moſt proper, and the moſt effective, when they are made directly *from things that are*; when the poet's feelings are themſelves excited, his genius enlivened, and his imagination warmed, by preſent objects whatever they may be: and not when they are imitations of *things that were*, as preſented to the feelings, and repreſented by the imagination, of Sophocles and Homer, and copied from their works. This is an imitation of an imitation; and can at beſt be only as an excellent copy of a Titian or a Vandike.

However perfect the model, there is a coldneſs and languor inſeparable from this *ſecondary Imitation*, which muſt repreſs all the native fire of the poet, and ſink him into a diſgraceful inferiority.

True poetic genius in theſe later ages never glowed with ſuch force and brilliancy, as in the works of Spencer and Shakeſpear, Dante and Arioſto, who were unacquainted with the ancient rules, or as in that of Milton, whoſe immortal poem did not admit of their application. And did another Ariſtotle riſe up to analyze the works of theſe more modern bards, we ſhould receive a new code of poetical laws, ſuperior in ſome reſpects, however inferior in others.

Inſtead of improving the judgment and correcting the taſte, too implicit a devotion for the critique of Ariſtotle, and too partial a reverence for the ſpecimens of Antiquity, have tended to cramp the poet's genius, to pervert the judgment of the critic, and to abridge the privilege of the art.

From the ſame narrow prejudice and ſuperſtitious veneration of antiquity, *Architecture*

tecture has run the ſame or ſimilar fortune. The Grecian Orders are moſt inimitable in their proportions, unequalled in their ornaments, and unparalleled in the richneſs and beauty of their ſculpture; and the models of the ancient Temples are among the moſt ſplendid monuments of human genius. But theſe Orders, however excellent, are not adapted to all countries, to all climates, or to all materials; nor are theſe models accommodated to many of the uſes and purpoſes of modern life: and, whilſt we reverence theſe remains of claſſical antiquity, we ſhould not ſuffer ourſelves to be blinded by that reverence ſo far as to neglect and diſregard that other ſpecies of Architecture, of which we have many admirable ſpecimens; which, however inferior in its materials and in its ornaments, is more various and extenſive in its expreſſion, more adapted to the climate, and better calculated for many of the uſes of the country, in which we live."

" One loſs, out of many more which have been ſuſtained by the death of *Mr. Thomas Warton*, is that of his intended *Hiſtory of Gothic Architecture*, which is much to be regretted, as it is a great deſideratum.

THUS the field of *Imagination*, fertile and luxuriant in all its parts, requires the cultivation of REASON to improve its different ſoils and to manage them to the beſt advantage, that the fruits or effects, which they ſeverally produce, may neither be ſo exuberant in their growth as never to ripen to perfection, nor ſo haſty in their progreſs as to ripen before their time: but that, duly and regularly matured by the nature, ſtrength and vigor of the ſoil, and by a due proportion of ſun and rain judiciously applied, they may become nutritious to the moral conſtitution, as well as delicious to the taſte.

SECT. III.

Of Poetical TRUTH.

IF we compare the TRUTH that reſults from poetical Imitation with the ſeveral kinds, which have been the ſubject of the preceding pages, as they diſtinguiſh the other provinces of

of learning, and judge of it by that compariſon; many parts, and thoſe the moſt ſublime and perfect, as being the production of the trueſt genius under the conduct of the matureſt judgment, will be acknowledged to be downright falſehood. Poets enjoy the privilege, with the conſent of their father-critic, to be egregious falſifiers:[2] and their images are called, by one who was himſelf the firſt of poets, 'airy nothings.' But however falſe and unſubſtantial the art may be conſidered in its deſcriptions, fictions, and alluſions, it may be true in its imitations; and if the *Imitation* be *true* and the *Reſemblances* which it exhibits *juſt*, it will produce a CERTAIN and UNIFORM *Effect* (for it cannot be called Conviction) on the human mind.

When *deſcriptive* Poetry is a verbal expreſſion of external objects, or of internal emotions, either as they are immediately felt, or in their ſenſible effects, it is a repreſentation of things as they really are; and is but a very little remove from hiſtorical truth:

[2] Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, πολλὰ ΨΕΥΔΟΝΤΑΙ ἀοιδοὶ. Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. i, cap. 2.

and

and we know that hiſtorians frequently enliven the narrative of real facts with all the embelliſhments of poetical deſcription. But poetry as an art neglects, in its higher exerciſe, the reality of its repreſentations; conſidering the effect they are able to produce on the Imagination, and not the conviction they work on the Underſtanding. It, therefore, exhibits things as they *might be*, and not as they *really are*, and evermore delights in *Fiction*.[7] It feigns characters, circumſtances, ſituations, and actions, and ſometimes heightens the fiction by *Perſonification*; and it improves the whole picture by exhibiting it under the veil of a picturesque and *metaphorical Diction*. If the characters are ſuch as were ever capable of a real exiſtence; if the ſentiments would naturally riſe in the circumſtances deſcribed; if the actions are thoſe that might be expected in real life, and if the language attributed to the characters be ſuch as if they had really exiſted; the whole may

[7] Οὐ τὸ τὰ γινόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητὴ ἔργον ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς, ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Ariſtot. De Poet. cap. ix.

be

be a grand and intereſting lye, as it is, indeed, an impoſition upon the underſtanding, but ſuch an impoſition as the mind willingly indulges for the ſake of the effect; in which *effect* conſiſts that POETICAL TRUTH, which it delights to entertain.

POETRY is firſt, DESCRIPTIVE, or a picturesque repreſentation of *material and mental* objects; ſecondly, NARRATIVE or EPIC, which is a repreſentation of *Facts* and *Actions* in hiſtorical ſucceſſion: thirdly, DRAMATIC, which gives to portions of feigned *Hiſtory* the addition of *perſonal Repreſentation*: and, fourthly PARABOLICAL, which couches mental objects under *types*, *emblems*, and *actions*;[a] and, through the moſt elegant ve-

[a] Partitio poeſeos veriſſima, atque maxime ex proprietate, præter illas diviſiones, quæ ſunt ei cum hiſtoria communes, (ſunt enim ficta chronica, vitæ fictæ, fictæ etiam relationes) ea eſt, ut ſit aut narrativa; aut dramatica; aut parabolica. *Narrativa* prorſus hiſtoriam imitatur, ut fere fallat, niſi quod res extollat ſæpius ſupra fidem. *Dramatica* eſt veluti hiſtoria ſpectabilis; nam conſtituit imaginem rerum tanquam præſentium; hiſtoria autem tanquam præteritarum. *Parabolica* vero eſt hiſtoria cum typo, quæ intellectualia deducit ad ſenſum. Baconus De Aug. lib. ii, cap. 13.

hicle

hicle of inſtruction, conveys natural, moral, and religious, truths.[a]

MIND, the univerſal Cauſe of all things, exerted in the *creation* of the various and ſtupendous works material and mental, which repleniſh and adorn the univerſe, is the *energy* of God: and MIND operating in Poetic Art, and *imitating*, in its ſublimer acts, all thoſe material productions and mental operations, and giving them a more general, a more perfect, and inſtructive form, is the *energy* of man. Whilſt other parts of learning are uſefully and honourably employed in exploring the *Works*, and in ſearching into the *Will*, of God, it is the high previlege of POETRY to emulate his *Acts*, in order to raiſe and to ſublime the affections to the imitation of his Goodneſs, to the adoration of his Wiſdom, and to the admiration of his Power. The end is not merely to delight and to entertain the imagination, but to enlarge the under-

[a] Alter eſt uſus poeſeos parabolicæ, priori quaſi contrarius, qui facit (ut diximus) ad involucrum; earum nempe rerum, quarum dignitas tanquam velo quodam diſcreta eſſe mereatur: hoc eſt, cum occulta et myſteria religionis, politicæ, et philoſophiæ, fabulis et parabolis veſtiuntur. Ibid. lib. ii. cap. 13.

ſtanding,

ſtanding, to raiſe the genius, and to mend the heart. And it may be truly ſaid, as its votaries have often ſuppoſed, to partake in ſome meaſure of divinity; becauſe it raiſes the mind above its natural condition, by accommodating its images to its deſires; and, not like philoſophy and hiſtory, by ſubmitting the mind to the nature of things.[b]

IF I were to purſue this ſubject any farther, I might enlarge upon the various and intereſting EFFECTS of Poetry, and relieve the dryneſs, which is inſeparable from philoſophical diſcuſſion, by a more pleaſing and popular mode of writing. But the plan I have propoſed to execute calls my attention to other ſubjects. 'Let none, however, from the 'viciousand profane example of ſome who 'pervert the beſt of things to the worſt of uſes,

[b] Adeo ut poeſis, non ſolum ad delectionem, ſed etiam ad animi magnitudinem et ad mores conferat. Quare et merito etiam divinitatis cujuſpiam particeps videri poſſit; quia animum erigit et in ſublime rapit; rerum ſimulachra ad animi deſideria accommodando, non animum rebus (quod ratio facit et hiſtoria) ſubmittendo. Ibid. lib. ii. cap. 13.

'vilify

vilify and degrade this moſt honourable Art. Let none deſpiſe as futile, condemn as ſignificant, or impeach as impious, a Faculty beſtowed on man for the moſt ſublime and ſacred purpoſes, conſecrated to the moſt auguſt offices of Religion, and ſanctioned by the authority and example of God himſelf.

Definant itaque ex quorundam hominum vitio, qui rebus optimis peſſime abutuntur, honeſtiſſimæ facultati invidiam conflare: definant eam artem, ut in ſe levem futilemque contemnere, ut profanam atque etiam impiam criminari, quam in ſanctimos uſus Dei ipſus munere hominibus conceſſam fuiſſe videmus, Deique ipſus autoritate atque exemplo auguſtiſſimis miniſteriis conſecratam. Lowth Poet. Præl. ii.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of MUSIC in General.

MUCH criticiſm and philoſophy have been employed upon this moſt elegant and efficacious Art, ſince the days of Ariſtotle: yet the rationale of MUSIC ſeems to be more complicated and involved in myſtery, and more difficult to be analyzed,[a] than that of any other part of learning.

IT is certainly a compound of *Sound* and *Motion*; and ſo far as their menſuration and proportion are concerned in producing the

[a] Οὔτε γὰρ, τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν ῥᾴδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, ὅτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς. Ariſtot. De Repub. lib. viii. cap. 5.

effect,

effect, it is to be conſidered as a geometrical ſcience, akin to *Mechanics* and *Aſtronomy*.[b]

Terminating, however, neither in *Speculation* nor in *Action*, but in *Effect*, it is an *Art* akin to *Poetry* and the reſt, and derives its energy from the ſame general Principle of *Imitation*, which repreſent the different paſſions and emotions of the mind[c] by the means of its *rythms*, and of the *order* and *ſucceſſion* of its ſounds.

The *Effect* of Muſic on the human frame is truly wonderful: and, in its philoſophical analyſis, it ſhould, I think, be conſidered as

[b] Σχεδὸν δὲ συγγενεῖς εἰσι τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔνιαι· οἷον, ἀστρολογία, ἥτε μαθηματικὴ, καὶ ἡ ναυτικὴ· καὶ ἁρμονικὴ, ἥτε μαθηματικὴ, καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν. Ibid. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i. cap. 13.

See Cap. i. De Poet.

[c] Ἔστι δ' ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀνηθικὰς φύσεις ἔν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος· ἔτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσυνῆς, καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν. Ibid. de Repub. lib. viii. cap. 5.

See the latter end of the chapter—Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν, ὅτι δύναται ποιόν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν.

[d] Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ΡΥΘΜΟΙΣ, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν φθόγγων ΤΑΞΕΙ. Ibid. De Muſica § 19. Prob. 27.

a com-

a compound of Art and Science; which complex view might, probably, facilitate the knowledge of the rationale of its powers and mode of operation, and help to aſcertain with preciſion the ſpecific nature of its IMITATION, which varies in every Art, is more *immediate* or more *diſtant*, more *direct* or *indirect*, according to the different *Means* which they employ.

And with this ſhort hint to the Muſical philoſopher, if he may think it worth improving, I ſhall conclude this general remark on the Art of MUSIC. ✗

✗ See Avison on Musical Expression - Du Bos on Poetry Painting & Music &c.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the ARISTOTELIAN Logic.

I SHALL conclude this lecture on Poetry with an Obſervation ariſing out of the ſubject now before me, though it may not probably meet the conviction, nor perhaps the approbation, of many of my learned hearers: but as, in my humble conception, it may be of great importance to the cauſe of Truth in general and to the advancement of every part of Learning, it ſhall be fairly and freely made.

THE two higheſt ſpecies of Poetry, the *Dramatic* and the *Epic*, particularly the former, have been analyzed by Ariſtotle, as was obſerved,

obſerved, in his treatiſe of *Poetics*, in a minute and philoſophical inveſtigation of their parts and principles, and the cauſes of their effect on the imagination. This treatiſe and that of his *Rhetoric* are generally and juſtly allowed to be two of the ableſt works of that deep philoſopher; which, by their novelty and the critical acumen they diſcover, conferred upon him the honour of being ſtiled the Father of Critics, as Homer had been called the Father of Poets, and Demoſthenes of Orators.

They, who have beſt underſtood and moſt ardently admired the works of the Peripatetic, ſeem unanimouſly agreed, that theſe two admirable criticiſms did not originate properly with himſelf, that they did not ſpring from any effort of his own judgment and invention previouſly exerciſed, and independent on the productions of the Orator and Poet; but, on the contrary, that the one is the analyſis or diſſection of the drama of Sophocles or Euripides, and of that immortal and unparalleled work the Iliad of Homer; and that the other is the analyſis or diſſection of

the Orations of Demoſthenes and the moſt celebrated Grecian Orators: both of which conſiſt of a philoſophical inveſtigation of the cauſes which conſpire to the various and wonderful effects produced on the mind and feelings, by theſe ſplendid monuments of genius and invention.

To ſuppoſe that to have been originally and neceſſarily produced by art and philoſophy, about which, when produced, art and philoſophy have been ſucceſsfully employed, is an error in the hiſtory of learning which has been too commonly entertained. Theſe admirable productions firſt ſprang from the ſpontaneous operation of the genius, and from the native ſtrength of the jndgment, of the poet and the orator; and from them art and philoſophy extracted rules to direct the genius of future poets and orators, and to aſſiſt the judgment of future critics. 'Ariſtotle, we 'know,' ſays the author of Philoſophical Enquiries, 'did not form Homer, Sophocles, 'and Euripides; 'twas Homer, Sophocles, 'and Euripides that formed Ariſtotle.'* And

* Harris's Phil. Enq. p. 231.

this

this ſtrenuous admirer and interpreter of the Peripatetic who thus exhibited the mechaniſm and conſtruction of poetry and oratory, has with great ingenuity laid open the mechaniſm and conſtruction of theſe criticiſms themſelves. 'As the *great Events* of NATURE led mankind to *admiration*; ſo curioſity *to learn the cauſe* whence ſuch Events 'ſhould riſe, was that which, by due degrees, 'formed NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. What 'happened in the *Natural* world, happened 'alſo in the *Literary*. *Exquiſite Productions* 'both in PROSE and VERSE induced men '*here* likewiſe *to ſeek the Cauſe*; and *ſuch* '*Enquiries* often repeated gave birth to PHILOLOGY. Thoſe who can imagine that 'the Rules of writing were firſt eſtabliſhed, 'and that men wrote in conformity to them 'as they make conſerves and comfits by 'receipt books, know nothing of *Criticiſm*, 'either as to its origin or progreſs. The 'truth is, they were authors who made the 'firſt good Critics, and not Critics who 'made good Authors, however writers may 'have profited by critical precepts. — AN-

'CIENT GREECE, in its happier days, was the 'ſeat of Liberty, of Sciences, and of Arts. 'In this fair region fertile of wit, the *Epic* 'writers came firſt; then the *Lyric*, then the '*Tragic*; and laſtly the *Hiſtorians*, the *Comic* 'Writers, and the *Orators*, each in their 'turns delighting whole multitudes, and 'commanding the attention and admiration 'of all. Now when wiſe and thinking men, 'the ſubtle inveſtigators of principles and 'cauſes, obſerved the wonderful Effect of 'theſe works upon the human mind, they 'were prompted to enquire *whence this ſhould* '*proceed*: for that it ſhould happen *merely by* '*chance*, they could not well believe. Here, 'therefore, we have the RISE and ORIGIN 'of CRITICISM, which, in its begining was "A deep and philoſophical Search into the "primary Laws and Elements of good wri-"ting, as far as they could be collected from "the moſt approved performances."—— 'Much of this kind may be found in the 'different parts of PLATO: But ARISTOTLE 'his diſciple, who may be called the ſyſtem-'atizer of his Maſter's doctrines, has in his

'two

'two Treatiſes of *Poetry* and *Rhetorick* with 'ſuch wonderful penetration developed every 'part of the ſubject, that he may be juſtly 'called THE FATHER OF CRITICISM, both 'from the age when he lived, and from his 'truly tranſcendent genius. The Criticiſm 'which this capital writer taught, has ſo in-'timate a correſpondence with *Philoſophy*, 'that we can call it by no other name than 'that of Philoſophical Criticiſm." [b]

This acute reaſoning of our late Philologiſt, by which he very philoſophically accounts for the origin of the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* of the Stagyrite, I would extend to his books of INTERPRETATION and the ANALYTICS, and ſay that they contain 'a deep 'and philoſophical ſearch into the primary 'laws and elements of DEMONSTRATIVE 'REASONING, as far as they could be col-'lected from the moſt approved performan-'ces' in his time. And that this is in fact the caſe, no one who is ſufficiently acquainted with theſe works will, I think, deny. In

[b] Harris's Phil. Enq. p. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.

ſupport, however, of this poſition I ſhall avail myſelf of the opinion and authority of another of the Peripatetic's ardent admirers, who has informed us 'That the diſcovery of 'the *nature* of Truth does not ſeem to have 'been made, at leaſt by the philoſophers of 'Greece, till Ariſtotle wrote his book of '*Analytics*, the profeſſed deſign of which is 'to ſhew what SCIENCE and DEMONSTRA-'TIVE TRUTH is.'[c]

The Obſervation, then, which I have to make upon this comparative view of the works of Ariſtotle, is, that as the *Poetics* contain the philoſophy or rationale of two ſpecies of POETRY, and the *Rhetoric* the philoſophy or rationale of ORATORY, and deliver the *laws* and *rules* by which the moſt ſucceſsful productions in both theſe departments were conſtructed; ſo we may conclude by ſtrict analogy, that the *Analytics* of the ſame author is the philoſophy or rationale of DEMONSTRATION, inveſtigating its *principles*, and delivering the *laws* and *rules* by

[c] Ancient Metaphyſics, vol. 1. p. 374.

which

which it has been conducted, and may be advantageouſly continued. So that, if what is advanced in theſe lectures in regard to the KINDS OF TRUTH, their different *Principles*, *Reaſoning* and *Conſtitution*, be at all founded, this part of his ORGANON is no more calculated to ſupply the *Rule* or *Art* by which Reaſon can puſh on its enquiries in *Phyſics*, *Ethics*, and *all other parts* of learning from which Demonſtration is excluded, than his *Rhetoric* is the *Rule* or *Art* of writing a *Poem*, or his *Poetic* is the *Rule* or *Art* of compoſing an *Oration*; or than the *plan of a Bridge* exhibits the *Rule* or *Art* of *building a Church*, or any other *Means* in nature can be the *Rule* or *Art* of producing an effect, to which they do not properly belong.

SYLLOGISM forms profeſſedly the whole ſcope and burden of this celebrated work; which, as may be expected from this view of its origin, is peculiarly adapted, if not almoſt excluſively confined, to that ſpecies of Reaſoning which is properly *demonſtrative*.[4]

[4] See chap. iv. ſect. 2. and chap. vii. ſect. 2. of this volume.

In

Though the Prior Analytics affect to treat of *Probable* and *Sophiſtical*, as well as of *Neceſſary*

In his *Firſt Analytics*, where he delivers the doctrine of *Syllogiſm* in general, Ariſtotle divides it into three claſſes which he calls *Figures*, according to the *Predication* and *Subjection* of the *middle Term*: Each of which Figures he ſubdivides into a certain number of legitimate *Moods* according to the *Quantity* and *Quality* of the *Premiſes*. And this forms the whole plan of his Logic. The *firſt* of theſe Figures is, however, not only the leading one, but the moſt important, and involves all the merit of the other two; for all their legitimate Moods, as well as thoſe of a *fourth* invented afterwards by Galen, are *reducible* to ſome of the Moods of the *firſt Figure*, and derive their proof and authority from that reduction. See Analyt. Prior. cap. 23, 24. Now the reaſoning in the *Firſt Figure* is abſolutely *Demonſtrative*; and Ariſtotle obſerves, that all *Mathematical Reaſoning* is reducible to ſyllogiſms of the Firſt Figure. Τῶν δὲ σχημάτων ἐπιστημονικὸν μάλιστα τὸ πρῶτόν ἐστιν. Αἵ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τούτου φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις· οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ, καὶ γεωμετρία, καὶ ὀπτικὴ. καὶ σχεδὸν [ὡς εἰπεῖν] ὅσαι τῷ διότι ποιοῦνται τὴν σκέψιν. ἢ γὰρ ὅλως, ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσι, διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος ὁ τῷ διότι γινέται συλλογισμός.

Ὥστε κἂν διὰ τοῦτ' εἴη μάλιστα ἐπιστημονικόν. κυριώτατον γὰρ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ διότι θεωρεῖν. Εἶτα τὴν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμην, διὰ τούτου μόνου θηρεῦσαι δυνατόν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ μέσῳ σχήματι ὁ γένεται κατηγορικὸς συλλογισμὸς· ἡ δὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, καταφάσεως. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ γίνεται μὲν, ἀλλ' ὁ καθόλου· τὸ δὲ τί ἐστι, τῶν καθόλου ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ

ου

or *Demonſtrative*, ſyllogiſms; it is the laſt whoſe principles are ſo accurately and ſucceſsfully analyzed, and which are exhibited in the Poſterior, with ſo much force of genius and labour of inveſtigation, as ſpringing from an infallible foundation, raiſing an immenſe ſyſtem of abſtract and general truths all fortified by demonſtration, and riſing ſtory upon ſtory into a moſt luminous and extenſive fabric.

But although his *Poetics*, whatever might be the expectation of the Stagyrite, were never able to make a *Poet*, or his *Rhetoric* an *Orator*, however excellent theſe criticiſms may be, without that native force of genius and vigor of imagination, the firſt and indiſpenſable ingredients, which they may indeed correct and improve, but never can ſupply;

τῆ ἐςι ζῶον δίπουν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ἔτι τᾶτο μὲν ἐκείνων οὐδὲν προσδεῖται· ἐκεῖνα δὲ διὰ τᾶτα καταπυκνᾶται, καὶ αὔξεται, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὰ ἄμεσα ἔλθῃ. Φανερὸν οἷον, ὅτι κυριώτατον τῆ ἐπίςασθαι τὸ πρῶτόν ἐςι σχῆμα. Analyt. Poſt. lib. i.

So that we here plainly ſee the intimate and, indeed, neceſſary connection between *Syllogiſm* and *Demonſtration*; both of which he had extracted from *Mathematics*.

he

he reſolved, with a bold and enterprizing mind, though on weaker grounds of expectation, that his *Syllogiſm*, which he had conſtructed with ſo much labour on ſo firm a baſis, ſhould form an UNIVERSAL REASONER, and conduct him with facility and ſucceſs in the ſearch and illuſtration of probable Truth through all parts of learning.*

His ſagacity ſoon diſcovered that *Axioms* or *Maxims*, which are general Propoſitions, were, in the firſt place, to be formed, as they are in Mathematics, from which the *media* or arguments were to be drawn; before ſyllogiſtic Reaſoning could be applied, in any of the departments of *probable* learning, as the guide to truth. In his analyſis of *demonſtrative* reaſoning he had ſeen the wonderful and immediate effect, which the univerſal Form or Category of *Quantity* had in the production of *Axioms* or ſelf-evident truths, as the *Principles* of ſyllogiſtic argument; and he cheriſhed the hope (and, when great philoſo-

* Ἡμεν προθεσις της πραγματειας, μεθοδον ευρειν, ἀφ' ἧς δυνησομεθα συλλογιζεσθαι περι παντος του προτεθεντος προβληματος, ἐξ ἐνδοξων. Ariſtot. Top. lib. i. cap. 1.

phers

phers are too ſanguine, whilſt their labours are entitled to our gratitude, their miſtaken zeal beſpeaks our pardon,) that the other *Nine* would furniſh *Axioms* with almoſt equal eaſe, from which men might reaſon ſyllogiſtically upon every poſſible queſtion, and which they might apply in proof and elucidation of every kind of knowledge.[f]

He, therefore, took the TEN CATEGORIES or Univerſal Forms from the Pythagorean School, where they had been held almoſt in adoration as the grand umpires of all knowledge, and prefixed them to his Organon, that they might ſupply *Axioms* of every kind as the laws and principles of all Probable or Dialectic, as well as of Demonſtrative, Reaſoning. And, to complete his great deſign, at the end of his Analytics he added his book

[f] Ardua eſt et gravis doctrina Categoriarum, magnique uſus et momenti, non ad Logicam tantum, ſed et Metaphyſicam, omneſque Philoſophiæ partes, quæ de ente univerſim, vel de partibus entis differunt; ſunt enim Catagoriæ veluti quædam familiæ, claſſes et ordines entis, ſeu compendia rerum omnium, certa ratione diſpoſitarum, unde differendi ampliſſima materies petitur et ipſa ſcientiarum objecta tanquam è locupletiſſimo penu depromuntur. Du Valli Synop. in Ariſtot. p. 58.

of

of TOPICS, where he delivers the methods in which theſe general Propoſitions are to be formed at pleaſure from the Categories, enumerating and diſtributing them into certain heads according the *five Predicables*, and aſſigning them as the *general Principles* of argumentation upon every ſubject.[g] To theſe general Principles, ſo eaſily procured, he applied his *Dialectic Syllogiſm*, which included in his idea every ſpecies of reaſoning, according to all the *Moods* and *Figures* in which, in his Analytics, he had with ſo much labour and ingenuity diſplayed the *Demonſtrative*.

Thus by a lofty and magnanimous flight of genius, in an early period of the world, and in the infancy of ſcience, ARISTOTLE erected a fort of Univerſal Reaſoning; and, as its governour, enacted the *laws* of *Diſputation*,[h] according to which all its various artillery was to be levelled and diſcharged: And, by the ſuperaddition of his book of SOPHISMS, he rounded the whole into a Syſtem of

[g] See Ariſtot. Top. lib. i. cap. 9, 10.
[h] See Ibid. lib. viii.

LOGIC[1] or rather Diſputation, which ſtood for many ages the arbiter of all learning, and became the boaſt and idol of the SCHOOLS of which ancient and illuſtrious ſeminaries it ſtill continues to rule the *Diſcipline*.

[1] To attempt in ſo early a period a methodical delineation of the vaſt region of human knowledge, actual and poſſible; and to point out the limits of every diſtrict, was, indeed magnanimous in a high degree, and deſerves our admiration, while we lament that the human powers are unequal to ſo bold a flight. Dr. Reid App. to Ld. Kaim's 3d vol. of Sketches p. 330.

In the concluſion of his book of Sophiſtical Elenchs in which he winds up the whole Organon, which taken together muſt be allowed, notwithſtanding its defects, to form one of the greateſt monuments of human reaſon produced by one man, Ariſtotle apologizes for the errors of ſuch an undertaking which was entirely new and unattempted by any before himſelf: and 'although the art of categorical 'ſyllogiſm is better fitted for ſcholaſtic litigation, than for 'real improvement in knowledge, it is a venerable piece 'of antiquity, and a great effort of human genius. We ad-'mire the pyramids of Egypt, and the wall of China, 'though uſeleſs burdens upon the earth. We can bear 'the moſt minute deſcription of them, and travel hundreds 'of leagues to ſee them. If any perſon ſhould with ſacri-'legious hands deſtroy or deface them, his memory would 'be had in abhorrence. The predicaments and predica-'bles, the rules of ſyllogiſm, and the topics, have a like 'title to our veneration as antiquities; they are uncom-'mon efforts, not of human power, but of human genius; 'and they make a remarkable period in the progreſs of 'human reaſon.' Ibid. p. 420.

As

As in exploring the depths and receſſes of the earth for thoſe treaſures which are hidden under its ſurface, and in producing them to the uſe of men; ſo in diſcovering thoſe truths which are hidden in ſimilar obſcurity on every ſide, and in conveying them to their information, much depends upon the *Method* and *Direction* which we purſue.

It was unfortunate for the Diſcipline of the Schools, whoſe main object ſhould be the invention and communication of Truth in general, and which ſhould train up the mind in the right Method of Science, that the TOPICAL part of the organon of Ariſtotle, which affects to be of more importance and extent than the Analytical, as eſtabliſhing the *Principles* of all the parts of learning excepting the demonſtrative,[k] as enacting the *Laws* of all probable reaſoning,[l] and as

[k] Χρήσιμος πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν.—τοῦτο δ' ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν. ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα, πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει. Top. lib. i. cap. 2.

[l] See the 8th book of Topics.

guarding

guarding that reaſoning from all poſſible *error*,[a] is weak in its foundation and conſequently infirm in all its parts. Here we behold the great Peripatetic falling from the ſtrength and dignity of a philoſopher diſplayed in his Analytics, into all the weakneſs and credulity of a ſophiſt. Inſtead of analyzing the ſeveral ſubjects of enquiry as they preſent themſelves before him, and inveſtigating the ſecret cauſes of their truth, he reſts without examination on the bare authority of others, and erects the Principles of his reaſoning on their OPINIONS,[b] or on what was only ANALOGOUS[c] to their opinions.

[a] See the book on Sophiſtical Elenchs.

[b] Διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς, ὁ ἐξ ΕΝΔΟΧΩΝ συλλογιζόμενος.—Ἔνδοξα δὲ, τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοις σοφοῖς· καὶ τούτοις, ἢ τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις, καὶ ἐνδόξοις. Top. lib. i. cap. 1.

Ἔστι δὲ πρότασις μὲν διαλεκτικὴ, ἐρώτησις ἔνδοξος ἢ πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς· καὶ τούτοις, ἢ πασιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις, μὴ παράδοξος· θείη γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς σοφοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ ἐναντίον ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις ᾖ. Ibid. lib. i. cap. 10.

[c] Εἰσὶ δὲ πρόλασεις διαλεκτικαὶ, καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ΟΜΟΙΑ. Ibid.

See the 14th chap. of the firſt book De Propoſitionibus Sumendis.

On comparing this with the former part of the organon and ſome of his other works, were it not written in the manner and language of Ariſtotle and authenticated by the ſame proofs, one could hardly believe that this book came from the pen of that deep philoſopher. The *general Propoſitions* which form the baſis of a Logic which the Schools have ſo excluſively eſpouſed, are, by the method which it preſcribes, moſt ſuperficially and illogically formed;[p] and the *Syllogiſms* which are conſtructed from them, inſtead of advancing or even communicating truth, either conclude in falſehood, or only ſerve, as they have too long ſerved, to protract an uſeleſs *Diſputation* in noiſe and nonſenſe.

The *Cauſe* of this great defect in the organon of Ariſtotle may be traced to his blind and extravagant love of *Syllogiſm*, that favourite child which he begot in the Analytics, and which he was reſolved to enlarge in its poſſeſſions, and to qualify with every accompliſhment as the *Inſtrument* of all kinds of

[p] See the 9th and 10th books in which the method is delivered of forming dialectical propoſitions.

truth;

truth; and to his ignorance, or perhaps neglect, of *Induction*, that ſound and fundamental logic by which alone thoſe Principles and general Propoſitions, which are the only ſupport of uſeful Syllogiſm in probable Reaſoning, can be firmly and philoſophically eſtabliſhed.

He mentions *Induction*, indeed, in different parts of his works, and gives a juſt though general deſcription of its office;[q] and he acknowledges the immenſe importance of *Principles*, by which he always means general Propoſitions, in the invention of truth:[r] but to the inveſtigation of theſe Principles or general Laws, by which the maker of the world governs the world he has made, both

[q] ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ, ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος. Top. lib. i. cap. 12. See Analyt. Prior. lib. ii. cap. 23. et Poſt. lib. ii. cap. 19.

[r] Τῶν ἀρχῶν δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωρεῖνται, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσει, αἱ δὲ ἐθισμῷ τινὶ, καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλως. Μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασι, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὁρισθῶσι καλῶς. Μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα. Δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχὴ, καὶ πολλὰ ἐμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων. Eth. Nicom. lib. i. cap. 7.

in his natural and moral diſpenſations, it was by no means ſufficient to mention, in a general and incidental way, the only *Inſtrument* by which the latent ſeeds of truth of every kind, which lie ſcattered or diſperſed through all the individuals in nature, can be collected and arranged. Had ſo complete a maſter of the philoſophy of Demonſtration purſued the right method of forming by Induction the Principles of probable and contingent truths, according to the nature and genius of every ſubject which conſtitute the circle of human learning, he would have taken a more honourable and ſucceſsful road to the temple of knowledge; and his LOGIC, inſtead of bewildering and entangling Reaſon in the tramels of partial and imperfect rules, would have afforded her a fair and liberal, though more laborious, exerciſe, in the promotion and advancement of univerſal truth.

From this great imperfection of his *Dialectic*, as the inſtrument of knowledge, confirmed by the ill ſucceſs of many of his own philoſophical inveſtigations for want of ſound and legitimate *Inductions*, we may venture to conclude

conclude, if the maſter of the Lycæum knew their particular uſe and operation in forming the Principles of good reaſoning, that either his time was too much employed in collecting and arranging all the learning of his age, or that his enlarged and ſcientific mind was too deeply immerſed in mataphyſical and general ſpeculations, to cultivate a mode of reaſoning which is ſo active and experimental, and ſo converſant in particular operations.

Inſtead of deſcending to the canvaſs and examination of thoſe *Individuals* which conſtitute each branch of Science, and inſtead of riſing from them to *Generals* by ſucceſſive and labourious ſteps, he purſued and dictated a more eaſy but a more fallacious method of raiſing Topics or common Axioms, as the foundation of dialectic reaſoning. He applied immediately to the CATAGORIES,[s] thoſe great and illuſtrious families poſſeſſed of all prerogative, and inveſted with all power to decide upon the truth and falſehood of things.[t] From theſe he drew *Definitions* and

[s] See Top. 1ſt book and 9th chapter.

[t] Sunt Categoriæ quædam familiæ, claſſes, et ordines entis, ſeu compendia rerum omnium certa ratione diſpoſitarum

Propoſitions as from a mine unexhauſted and inexhauſtible; but which, being mere aſſumptions unfounded in the real nature and qualities of things, had their reſource only in imagination and the ingenuity of invention; which became prolific of a verboſe and artificial but inefficient Logic, and productive of a pompous and formal, but uſeleſs and phlegmatic, diſcipline: a diſcipline which, inſtead of the advancement, has proved the obſtacle and impediment, of all good learning.[a]

The *Categories* are certainly univerſal Forms: but between them and the individual and particular caſes which ſolicit our immediate attention, there exiſts a number and ſubordination of *Generals*, through every one

tarum, unde diſſerendi ampliſſima materies petitur, et ipſa ſcientiarum objecta tanquam e locupletiſſima penu depromuntur. Du Val. Synopſ. Doct. Peripat.

[a] Decem Prædicamenta principia ſunt et omnis Scientiæ et omnis Rationationis. Ibid.

[a] Ad principia ſcientiarum conſtituenda præpropere feſtinarunt, circa quæ omnis diſputationum varietas verteretur: neſcientes profectum eum, qui certa nimis propere captaverit, in dubiis finiturum: qui autem judicium tempeſtive cohibuerit, ad certa perventurum. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4.

of

of which the logician ſhould paſs with the utmoſt care. Legitimate *Induction* does not riſe, by a haſty abſtraction or ſuperficial enumeration only, to the higheſt generals. Before it preſumes to riſe, it deſcends by a practical and experimental examination; and from many particular obſervations made on the powers and properties, the actions and paſſions, the affections and qualities, the cauſes and effects, of things, after dividing, excluding and rejecting all ſpecial matter, it arrives at *general* truths, from thence to *more* general, till, perhaps, the *moſt* general may be known.[x]

[x] In conſtituendo autem axiomate, forma inductionis alia, quam adhuc in uſu fuit, excogitanda eſt; eaque non ad principia tantum (quæ vocant) probanda et invenienda, ſed etiam ad axiomata minora, et media denique omnia. Inductio enim, quæ procedit per enumerationem ſimplicem, res puerilis eſt, et precario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab inſtantia contradictoria, et plerumque ſecundum pauciora quam par eſt, et ex his tantummodo quæ præſto ſunt, pronunciat. At inductio, quæ ad inventionem et demonſtrationem ſcientiarum et artium erit utilis, naturam ſeparare debet, per rejectiones et excluſiones debitas; ac deinde poſt negativas tot quot ſufficiunt, ſuper affirmativas concludere; quod adhuc factum non eſt, nec tentatum certe, niſi tantum modo a Platone, qui ad excutiendas definitiones et ideas, hac certe forma inductionis aliquatenus utitur. Verum ad hujus inductionis ſive demonſtra-

The great defect of the Ariſtotelian Logic (a defect by which the uſe and value of the dialectical part are totally deſtroyed,) is the omiſſion of theſe neceſſary intermediate ſtages, and the deduction of its arguments too haſtily and ſuperficially from the higheſt Forms :[7] an error into which its author ſeems

tionis inſtructionem bonam et legitimam, quamplurima adhibenda ſunt, quæ adhuc nullius mortalium cogitationem ſubiere; adeo ut in ea major ſit conſumenda opera, quam adhuc conſumpta eſt in ſyllogiſmo, atque hujus inductionis auxilio, non ſolum ad axiomata invenienda, verum etiam ad notiones terminandas, utendum eſt. Atque in hac certe inductione ſpes maxima ſita eſt. Ibid. Nov. Org. lib. 1. Aph. 105.

De ſcientiis tum demum bene ſperandum eſt, quando per ſcalam veram et per gradus continuos, et non intermiſſos aut hiulcos, a particularibus aſcendetur ad axiomata minora, et deinde ad media, alia aliis ſuperiora, et poſtremo demum ad generaliſſima. Etenim axiomata infima non multum ab experientia nuda diſcrepant. Suprema vero illa et generaliſſima, (quæ habentur) notionalia ſunt et abſtracta et nil habent ſolidi. At media ſunt axiomata illa vera et ſolida et viva, in quibus humanæ res et fortunæ ſitæ ſunt; et ſupra hæc quoque tandem ipſa illa generaliſſima; talia ſcilicet quæ non abſtracta ſint, ſed per hæc media vere limitantur. Ibid. lib. i. Aph. 104.

[7] In notionibus nil ſani eſt, nec in logicis, nec in phyſicis; non Subſtantia, non Qualitas, Agere, Pati, Ipſum eſſe, bonæ notiones ſunt, ſed omnes phantaſticæ et male terminatæ. Ibid. lib. i. Aph. 15.

to

to have been drawn by his love of *Metaphyſics*, which is the ſcience of *univerſals*; and by forming his method of reaſoning in general from that of the *Mathematics* or demonſtrative ſcience, which is converſant only in *general* truths.

Thus the theory of SYLLOGISM delivered in the organon is a ſplendid monument of human invention, a ſuperb and ſtately fabric raiſed from the ableſt ſpecimens and examples of Mathematical and Demonſtrative Science by the analytical acumen and mental philoſophy of its author: but which, like the temples of the heathen divinites, on the ruins of which we may look with admiration, was never employed to any uſeful or honourable purpoſe. To invent another organum of of a different origin and conſtruction, was an honour reſerved for a future philoſopher of a diſtant age and country from thoſe of the Stagyrite; which, inſtead of puzzling all learning with artificial forms and perplexing all knowledge with diſputations, put truth and nature to the torture by a thouſand trials,

and

and forced them to confeſs thoſe ſecrets which, in ſpite of Syllogiſm, had hitherto lain concealed; and by which arts and ſciences have been improved, to the great honour of learning, and the advantage of ſociety. And, whereas *Ariſtotle* conſtructed or rather extracted the rules of his Poetics, his Rhetoric, and his Logic, after poets, orators, and philoſophers had brought their reſpective profeſſions to conſiderable perfection by their natural ſagacity and ſtrength of mind; it is a farther honour due to the name of BACON, that he delineated the rules of his Inductive logic with great amplitude and preciſion, before the world had ſeen any philoſophical example of it: which argues an effort and ſtrength of mind, which eclipſe the merit and fame of Ariſtotle.

On the appearance of this luminary in the field of ſcience, after they had laboured in the ſearch of truth for near two thouſand years with a dark and imperfect guide, the *Novum Organum* gave a new turn to the labours and ſtudies of men. They learned to hold all vain hypotheſes and mental fabrications in

juſt

juſt contempt, and to reſpect nothing but propoſitions eſtabliſhed upon facts ſufficiently tried and critically examined, and concluſions drawn from them by a fair and philoſophical interpretation. Sir Iſaac Newton was the firſt, or however the moſt conſiderable, philoſopher, who purſued and exemplified this better logic in different branches of natural philoſophy: and its value may be beſt appreciated from the wonderful *effects* it has produced in the hands of that exalted genius, both in his Principia and in his Optics; from whoſe immortal labours, as from the beſt examples, the organum of Lord Bacon, which was the produce of his great but unaſſiſted mind, might, by a kind of reflection, be improved and perfected.

FROM being the *Inſtrument* of all truth and learning, as he vainly hoped, the ORGANON of Ariſtotle has upon the whole been the *Inſtrument* of ignorance and error;[c] by which that

[c] Qui ſummas dialecticæ partes tibuerunt, atque inde ſidiſſima ſcientiis præſidia comparari putarunt, veriſſime et optime viderunt, intellectum humanum ſibi permiſſum, merito ſuſpectum eſſe debere. Verum infirmior omnino eſt malo

great philoſopher has proved in the event the greateſt tyrant in the univerſe. He not only ſubverted all the ſyſtems of the philoſophers who went before him with a bold and licentious hand, not ſparing that of his maſter Plato, as his pupil Alexander did all the empires of the eaſt; but, by that *Inſtrument*, has manacled the philoſophy of all future times; though the dominion of that great prince and conqueror has vaniſhed for many ages, and is now as though it never had exiſted, the chain of the philoſopher is felt at this day by learned bodies and ſocieties through ſome of the moſt diſtant and enlightened parts of Europe.[d] His LOGIC rendered

malo medicina; nec ipſa mali expers: Siquidem dialectica quæ recepta eſt, licet ad civilia et artes, quæ in ſermone et opinione poſitæ ſunt, rectiſſime adhibeatur; naturæ tamen ſubtilitatem longo intervallo non attingit; et prenſando quod non capit, ad errores potius ſtabilidendos et quaſi figendos, quam ad viam veritati aperiendam valuit. Ibid. Præf.

[d] Cæterum de viro tam eximio certe, et ob acumen ingenii mirabili, Ariſtotele, crediderim facile hanc ambitionem eum a diſcipulo ſuo accepiſſe, quem fortaſſe æmulatus eſt; ut ſi ille omnes nationes, hic omnes opiniones ſubigeret, et monarchiam quandam in contemplationibus ſibi conderet. Ibid. De Augm. Sc. lib. iii. cap. 4.

more

more imperfect than he had left it, held out as completely equipped to attend Reaſon in the ſearch and communication of all truth, infallible as a guide, and incapable of improvement,* ſuperſeded every other, and deprived it for many ages of its moſt uſeful and faithful attendant; keeping learning and ſcience in a dark and gloomy priſon, and drawing a cloud over the diſk of the literary ſun, by which it was for centuries eclipſed, and of which more than a ſingle limb is now obſcured.

Whilſt commentators, particularly the Latin and Arabian, were darkening this dark ſyſtem by their illuſtrations, and the ſchoolmen were contending with great ſubtlety and little ſenſe, and growing warm in Diſputation, Truth and Learning were left to ſtarve, cramped in their growth, and blaſted in their proſpects, in conſequence of being deprived of their natu-

* Primus mortalium Ariſtoteles certum Logicæ finem conſtituit, precepta in ordinem redegit, ſingulari artificio integræ artis *Methodum* contexuit. Quam invenit Logicam: tum feliciter perfecit, ut in hunc uſque diem, per annos circiter bis mille, perpetuis clariſſimorum virorum ſtudiis exculta, nihil prorſus acceperit incrementi. Aldrich.

ral

ral ſupport and ſuccour.[f] Inſtead of extracting the pure and genuine ore by an experimental and inductive proceſs, theſe champions of ſyllogiſm were employed in raking together heaps of ſophiſticated traſh, which they valued as the pureſt gold. Inſtead of purſuing Nature through her hidden ſtores, and connecting truth with truth, by a gradual operation, into an uſeful and well-compacted chain, they fabricated their boaſted ſyſtems of baſe materials, with all the ſubtlety of their art, into uſeleſs and factitious geer. Inſtead of connecting ſcience with ſcience, according to their natural order and relation, and erecting them into a great edifice of truth, they filled the Schools with heaps of indigeſted rubbiſh, which, however worthleſs and deſervedly deſpiſed by ſome, adds to its inutility this diſgrace, that it remains in a great meaſure unremoved -

[f] The ſlow progreſs of uſeful knowledge, during the many ages in which the ſylogiſtic art was moſt highly cultivated as the only guide to ſcience, and its quick progreſs ſince that art was diſuſed, ſuggeſt a preſumption againſt it; and the preſumption is ſtrengthened by the purility of the examples which have been always brought to illuſtrate its rules. Dr. Reid in the Appendix to vol. iii. Lord Kaim's Sketches.

How

How that ſublimeſt and moſt important part of Truth, the CHRISTIAN RELIGION, was enabled to emerge out of the midſt of thoſe errors and ſuperſtitions by which it was ſurrounded and involved for many ages, whilſt they were diſguiſed and patronized by the evaſive artifice and the fallacious ſubtleties of ſuch a Logic,[s] as a profound and

[s] What is more ſacred among Sciences than Divinity? You have prophaned it by bringing in of that which you term Scholaſtic, gathered out of *Lombard*, Maſter of the ſentences, which has engendered unto us the race of the Thomiſts, Scotiſts, Albertiſts, Ocamiſts, Realiſts, Nominaliſts, and ſuch others, whoſe foundation is laid upon the ſubtleties of *Ariſtotle*. Let any man remark the themes of your Sermons, the diſputations of your Schools, together with thoſe great and huge volumes of Commentaries upon the four books of the Sentences. Oracles are received every were from the *Tripus* of this Philoſopher, and the Univerſities that ought to be inſtituted after a Chriſtian manner, are changed into the Academies of that heatheniſh *Athens*. You ſpend more time in clearing that which ſeemeth ambiguous and doubtful in the doctrine of that ingrate diſciple toward *Plato*, than in teaching your flocks the law of the Goſpel. The oaths which the Univerſities do exact of their initiates and Batchelors, that they ſhall not controll him, are witneſſes of the truth of what I ſpeak. De Croy's Firſt Conformity, chap. 3.

ſolemn

ſolemn wonder, which can only be dispelled by referring the emancipation of this pure offspring of heaven to the ſpecial interpoſition of its Author, who became, in his good time, the vindicator of his own honour, and the aſſertor of its awful and ſtupendous truths.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

The APOLOGY.

AN attack levelled ſo openly and directly againſt a ſyſtem of *Univerſal Logic* ſanctioned by the authority of Ariſtotle and made venerable by its antiquity, and which has led the diſcipline of this ſeat of learning for many ages, which maintains a kind of perfection in the opinion of many, holds a doubtful ſway in the minds of ſome, and is totally diſcarded by very few, may, I ſuſpect, offend the ears of moſt of thoſe who hear me, and ſound from this place, as the voice of blaſphemy and rebellion: and it will be fairly expected, that a charge ſo ſolemn and unqualified ſhould either be ſubſtantiated by ſome evidence, or elſe relinquiſhed, or, at leaſt, that ſome apology ſhould be made.

My APOLOGY is (if the love of Truth need an apology — a love which, as it thinks, it fears, no ill,) that I could not purſue the plan of theſe Lectures, of which the *different Methods of Reaſoning* form the moſt eſſential part, without incurring the diſpleaſure of the ſchool-logic by noticing its defects. I am unwilling, I confeſs, to *relinquiſh* the charge, becauſe I am perſuaded in my own mind that it is juſt, till otherwiſe convinced, and I am open to fair conviction as far as that my Apology may be ſomething more than mere form and ceremony, at which my mind revolts as much as it loves the truth, I will endeavour to *ſubſtantiate* it, by bringing forward a proof or example of the falſehood and abſurdity of the Ariſtotelian Dialectic, on which the ſchool-diſcipline has been formed in every part of ſcientific learning.

THE criterion of all ſound logic is, that it lead to truth; and the great exception which I have taken to the Topical or Dialectic Reaſoning of the Stagyrite, is from the very haſty and unphiloſophical method he preſcribes

preſcribes of forming the *General Propoſitions*, *Axioms*, or *Maxims*, as the *Principles* from which all contingent and probable concluſions are to be drawn: for, if they be infirmly and illogically framed, all *Syllogiſm* of every kind will either conclude falſely, or unphiloſophically at beſt, owing it to accident, to conjecture, or to ſophiſtry, and not to ſound argument, if the concluſion ſhould happen to prove true.

One of the univerſal ſources, among a few others, from which Ariſtotle, out of his wonderful invention, directs theſe Dialectical Propoſitions to be formed into the Principles of probable reaſoning, and that one of the leaſt exceptionable, is the 'Rule 'of Contraries or Oppoſites,'[a] which he has

[a] Εὐδοξον δὲ καὶ ἐν παραβολῇ φανεῖται ΤΟ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΥ. Top. lib. i. cap. 10.

This Rule is triumphantly brought forward by his great modern champion to overſet a Principle of the Newtonian philoſophy. 'It was in this way the ancients ar-'gued concerning oppoſite things; and particularly that 'great maſter of the Reaſoning Art, Ariſtotle, who in his 'book of Topics, has taught us, that, if two things be 'oppoſite, oppoſite things will follow from them. —— 'Ariſtotle expreſſes the Rule of Reaſoning in his ſhort

" and *perſecute* you."[d] For the truth of this divine aphoriſm, our Lord does not appeal to any of the topics and factitious propoſitions of Ariſtotle, but to a more certain and infallible rule—the *Will* and *Example* of his heavenly Father, the final and immutable criterion of all moral truth—" That ye may be " the children of your Father which is in " heaven: for he maketh his ſun to riſe on " the evil and on the good, and ſendeth rain " on the juſt and on the unjuſt—that ye " may be perfect, even as your Father which " is in heaven is perfect."[e]

In the preceding pages I have paid a juſt reſpect to the moral philoſophy of the Stagyrite, and cannot help adverting in this place to its great, I had almoſt ſaid, its only, defect—the imperfect and inadequate Principle on which it is founded. Had he known the

[d] Ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη· Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου, καὶ μισήσεις τὸν ἐχθρόν σου. Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν· Ἀγαπᾶτε τὺς ἐχθρὺς ὑμῶν, εὐλογεῖτε τὺς καταρωμένυς ὑμας, καλῶς ποιεῖτε τὺς μισοῦντας ὑμᾶς, καὶ προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐπηρεαζόντων ὑμᾶς, καὶ διωκόντων ὑμᾶς. Matt. v. 43, 44.

Μηδενὶ κακὸν ἀντὶ κακοῦ, &c. See Rom. xii. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.

[e] Matt. v. 45, 48.

genuine

genuine foundation of moral Virtue, which nothing but Revelation could adequately diſcover, the Morality of Ariſtotle would have exhibited a monument of that perfection, to which it is ſeldom the lot of mortals to attain.

BUT to take an exception to the whole *Dialectic* from the failure of one Rule, though in a moſt important point, may be thought partial and unfair: let us, therefore, take a more general view of the *Deſign* and *Scope* of the whole, as they are propoſed in the book of Topics, and alſo of the *Effect* it has produced in other parts of his works.

The general *Deſign* is given in the firſt ſentence of the firſt book; and is ſo extenſive and enlarged, as to embrace every ſubject of probable and contingent reaſoning.[f]

In the ſecond chapter, the general *Scope* is divided into three ſpecific objects — *Exerciſe*, *Converſation*, and *Philoſophical Sciences*.[g] In

[f] Ἡμὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας, μέθοδον εὑρεῖν, ἀφ' ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος, ἐξ ἐνδόξων. Ariſtot. Top. lib. i. cap. 1.

[g] Ἐστὶ δὴ πρὸς τρία χρήσιμος, πρὸς ΓΥΜΝΑΣΙΑΝ, πρὸς τὰς ΕΝΤΕΥΞΕΙΣ, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΝ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΑΣ. Ariſtot. Top. lib. i. cap. 2.

regard to the firſt object, that of Exerciſe, it profeſſes to furniſh a method of *Diſputing* pro and con on every poſſible queſtion.[h] In regard to Converſation, it profeſſes to qualify men to weigh and to examine the *Opinions* of many, and to refute them, if they do not appear to be well founded.[i] And in regard to the third object, the Philoſophical Sciences, which is the moſt important, it profeſſes great things indeed; not only to enable men to *doubt* on both ſides of every queſtion, but to determine what is *true* and what is *falſe* with the greateſt *facility*.[k] And, In addition to all this, it makes it the proper and peculiar buſineſs of Dialectic Logic, to inveſti-

[h] Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς ΓΥΜΝΑΣΙΑΝ χρήσιμος, ἐξ αὐτῶν καταφανὲς ἐστι· μέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες, ῥᾴον περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐπιχειρεῖν δυνησόμεθα. Ibid.

[i] Πρὸς δὲ τὰς ΕΝΤΕΥΞΕΙΣ· διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατηριθμημένοι δόξας, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ὁμιλήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοῖς, μεταβιβάζοντες ὅ, τι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν ἡμῖν. Ibid.

[k] Πρὸς δὲ τὰς καθ' ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΝ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΑΣ, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι, ῥᾴον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. Ibid.

gate

gate and to eſtabliſh the *Principles* of all the *Sciences*.[l]

How far, with ſo fair and full a promiſe, it has anſwered the ſanguine hope and expectation of its inventor, facts and experience will beſt prove; and its utility and value will be the moſt infallibly aſcertained by the fruits and *Effects* which it has produced: for 'fruits and inventions are the proper 'ſponſors and ſureties for the truth of dif-'ferent philoſophies.'[m]

Of its operation and effect in the mouth of Ariſtotle himſelf either in *Diſputation* or *Converſation*, which exiſt in a viva voce practice ſeldom committed to writing, we cannot perhaps form any clear and deciſive judgment. It may, however, be here obſerved, once for all, that, in thoſe of his works which have

[l] Ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ ΠΡΩΤΑ ΤΩΝ περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην ΑΡΧΩΝ. Τοῦτο δ' ἴδιον, ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν. ἐξετάστικη γὰρ οὖσα, πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ΑΡΧΑΣ ὁδὸν ἔχει. Ibid.

[m] Inter ſigna nullum magis certum aut nobile eſt, quam quod ex fructibus. Fructus enim et opera inventa, pro veritate philoſophiarum velut ſponſores et fidejuſſores ſunt Baconi Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 73.

Syllogiſm

With ſimilar *ſucceſs* the labours of other philoſophers have been attended in their application of this Logic to the *Sciences*; and from one and the ſame *cauſe*, viz. 'that, 'according to its method of enquiry, the 'true *Forms* of things,' from which ſound Axioms are made, 'can never be obtained. 'And the root of the evil is this, that men 'draw their attention too ſoon and too far 'from Experience and Particulars, and give 'themſelves up to meditations and diſputations.'[a] The ſlow progreſs of ſcience and philoſophy, during the many ages in which the ſyllogiſtic method was employed in the cultivation of learning, is a proof founded in *Experience*, which evinces the falſity or futility of this Logic: although it has eſpouſed many an error and given birth to as many more, with regard to the invention and

[a] Quia illo inquirendi modo, qui hucuſque in uſum venit, nunquam in ſæculum comparebunt rerum formæ. Radix autem mali hujus, ut et omnium, ea eſt; quod homines et propere nimis et nimis longe, ab experientia et rebus particularibus, cogitationes ſuas divellere et abſtrahere conſueverunt, et ſuis meditationibus et argumentationibus ſe totos dedere. Ibid. De Aug. Sc. lib. iii. cap. 4.

propagation

propagation of truth, it will die at laſt a virgin, without bringing into the world one new diſcovery.

How far the Dialectic of the Stagyrite has contributed to the eaſe and advantage of *Converſation*, and to the clearneſs and elegance of that intercourſe which obtains in the higher and more literate departments of ſociety, is a point, which may be ſaid to be truly problematical.

But that his third expectation, that of *Exerciſe*, which, ſince he places it the firſt in order, ſeems to have been the chief in his intention, has been fully anſwered, is a truth confirmed by the fruitleſs experience of many ages; as the exerciſe of *Diſputation*, not the emolument of learning, was his great and leading object. This Logic is, indeed, admirably calculated for this favourite end. Its Principles and Axioms are all ſo looſely and indiſcriminately formed, and are in themſelves ſo vague and indiſtinct, that they will apply to one queſtion as well as to another; and, by its artful management of Terms and Propoſitions in the different forms of Syllogiſms,

giſms, they can often be adapted to one ſide of the queſtion as well as the other. By this Syllogiſtic dexterity and Sophiſtic art, ſo much darkneſs and confuſion can be introduced into every ſubject, that the *Diſputation*, after many a round, in which the combatants on both ſides are ſwelled with ideal conqueſt, terminates in an unedifying logomachy, or conteſt of artificial words. Inſtead of uſeful and ſober truth, in which both would equally rejoice and mutually partake, the reſult is furious contention, proud animoſity, and perſonal reſentment.° Inſtead of being determined and finally decided, by which they would be loſt, the ſame queſtions which were diſputed remained to be diſputed ſtill; and were preſerved with a jealous care, for the emolument of this favourite *Exerciſe*, to be the ſubjects of future conteſts, future

° St. Paul has given us an admirable picture drawn by his expreſſive pencil from his obſervation on a Diſputant in Theology. Τετύφωται, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, ἀλλὰ νοσῶν περὶ ζητήσεις καὶ λογομαχίας· ἐξ ὧν γίνεται φθόνος, ἔρις, βλασφημίαι, ὑπόνοιαι πονηραὶ, παραδιατριβαὶ διεφθαρμένων ἀνθρώπων τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ἀπεστερημένων τῆς ἀληθείας. 1 Tim. vi. 4, 5.

victories

victories, and future triumphs. And, to complete this *Exercise* with every neceſſary equipment for its honour and extention, its founder has delivered the precepts for the *Aſſailant* to make his attack ſo as to be ſure of victory, and for the *Reſpondent* to keep him at ſuch a diſtance, as never to be forced to yield: but—that each may deſcend from the well-fought field with the pride of an able warriour, and with ſomething like conqueſt on his brow.[p]

For the ſake of this *Exerciſe*, the Schoolmen embraced a Logic diſpoſſeſſed of every other uſe or qualification, which they erected into the ſtandard of their Diſcipline and the director of all their ſtudies, and which, together with the other works of Ariſtotle, they cheriſhed by a weak and ignorant, though unanimous, aſſent.[q] It indulged

[p] See the 2d book of the Firſt Analytics, and the laſt book of the Topics.

[q] Quod vero putant homines in philoſophia Ariſtotelis magnum utique *conſenſum* eſſe—illud de conſenſu fallit homines ſi acutius rem introſpiciant. Verus enim conſenſus is eſt, qui ex libertate judicii, re prius explorata, in idem conveniente conſiſtit. Baconi Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 77.

their

their indolence, and flattered their vanity. And whilſt they devoted their whole attention to his works, they idolized their author. Here all improvement in ſcience was checked at once, the progreſs of learning hindered, every attempt to advance in knowledge defeated and diſgraced; and the road to learning was ſtopped with Ariſtotle, who became both the umpire of Reaſoning and the ſtandard of Truth.'

' Si hujuſmodi ſcientiæ plane res mortua non eſſent, id minime videtur eventurum fuiſſe, quod per multa jam ſæcula uſu venit; ut illæ ſuis immotæ fere hæreant veſtigiis, nec incrementa generi humano digna ſumant; eo uſque ut ſæpe numero non ſolum aſſertio maneat aſſertio, ſed etiam quæſtio maneat quæſtio, et per diſputationes non ſolvatur, ſed figatur et alatur; omniſque traditio et ſucceſſio diſciplinarum recipræſentet et exhibeat perſonas magiſtri et auditoris, non inventoris et ejus qui inventis aliquid eximium adjicit. In artibus autem mechanicis, contrarium evenire videmus. Quæ ac ſi auræ cujuſdam vitalis forent participes, quotidie creſcunt et perficiuntur; et in primis authoribus rudia plerunque et fere oneroſæ et informes apparent, poſtea vero novas virtutes commoditatem quandam adipiſcuntur, eo uſque ut citius ſtudia hominum et cupiditates deficiant et mutentur, quam illæ ad culmen et perfectionem ſuam pervenerint. Philoſophia contra et ſcientiæ intellectuales ſtatuarum more, adorantur et celebrantur, ſed non promoventur: quin etiam in primo nonnunquam authore maximo vingent, et deinceps degenerant. Ibid. de Aug. S. Præf.

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And thus, after levelling the ſyſtems of all the philoſophers before him, and producing others of his own invention, and after leaving ſome vague and general hypotheſes as a legacy to his diſciples, with a fund to raiſe more at pleaſure, that they might do immortal honour to his Logic[s] by affording it perpetual exerciſe in the Schools of Athens and other places, Ariſtotle locked up the temple of Knowledge and threw away the key, which, in the abſurd and ſuperſtitious veneration of his authority, was loſt for many ages. It was found, at laſt, by a native of our own country, whoſe name as a philoſopher and particularly as a logician,[t] does

[s] Adamant homines ſcientias et contemplationes particulares; aut quia authores et inventores ſe earum credunt; aut quia plurimum in illis operæ poſuerunt, iiſque maxime affuerunt. Hujuſmodi vero homines ſi ad philoſophiam et contemplationes univerſales ſe contulerint, illas ex prioribus phantaſiis, detorquent et corrumpunt; id quod maxime conſpicuum cernitur in Ariſtotele, qui naturalem ſuam philoſophiam, logicæ ſuæ prorſus mancipavit, ut eam fere inutilem et contentioſam reddiderit. Ibid. Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 54.

[t] Illud vero monendum, nos in hoc noſtro organo tractare logicam, non philoſophiam. Nov. Org. lib. ii. Aph. 52.

more honour to England than his did to Stagyra; who threw open the priſon in which Science had been held captive, and once more ſet her free; and, who, with a bold and virtuous ſacrilege, tore the laurel from the brow of that dark and deified philoſopher, which he had ſo long and ſo injuriouſly worn.

That the Ariſtotelian Logic was introduced in the Univerſities of Europe, that it was admitted as the guide to truth and the vehicle of inſtruction, and that it was erected as the ſtandard of their general diſcipline, we cannot ſo much wonder at when we reflect, that, as the ſciences and arts were ſpread from Athens over the provinces of Europe, the merit of all learning conſiſted for many ages in ſtudying the languages, in reading the authors, and in retaining and retailing what they contained; and, that as the *matter* of various kinds collected by Ariſtotle from all the philoſophers of antiquity, and digeſted and improved by him, was embraced by an implicit confidence, ſo the ſyllogiſtic *method*, of which he claimed the ſole invention, was held

held in the higheſt veneration and eſteem, and adopted as the inſtrument of univerſal learning. The wonder is, that, after the authors of antiquity had been well read and underſtood, and their ſubjects of information ſufficiently exhauſted, and when philoſophers dared to advance in the detection of their errors as well as in the ſearch and invention of ſomething new, the Scholaſtic Diſcipline did not run the ſame fortune with the improvement of Philoſophy; that it was not canvaſſed and examined at the ſame time, exploded if falſe, or corrected if defective.

But the dialectic Logic, which, on the blind authority of Ariſtotle firſt took poſſeſſion of the Schools, had that poſſeſſion too ſtrongly fortified and ſecured by the warm prejudice and prepoſſeſſion of its votaries; ſupported on the one hand by the ignorance which it promoted, and cheriſhed on the other by the indolence which it allowed. The ſchoolmen embraced it with rapture and foſtered it with ambition, offering up to its inventor not merely the overflowings of their gratitude, but the firſt-fruits of their devo-

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tion,[a] for furniſhing them with a happy expedient, by which their pregnant fancy could raiſe notions and hypotheſes, fair ſtructures of their own, as the principles of argumentation, without any of the pains of perſonal experiment, or the labour of inductive inveſtigation;[z] and which ſupplied them, at the ſame time, with all its Moods and Figures, in which they could ſhew their

[a] The zeal of one of theſe devotees may probably entertain the Reader. 'Eſt ergo Ars ſive Scientia bene 'differendi ante alias omnes Philoſophiæ partes accerſenda: Sine cujus auſpiciis nihil certo ſciri recteque intel'ligi poſſit. Hinc enim Ars artium, Scientia ſcientiarum 'dicta eſt: non quaſi ſit ſcientiarum princeps, et præſtan'tiſſima, (Hic enim titulus uni Theologiæ, id eſt, Metaphy'ſicæ, debetur,) ſed quod ad omnes ſit neceſſaria, ideo ac'commodatius dicitur organum organorum, inſtrumentum 'inſtrumentorum, ancilla, clavis, janua, ſpes, teſta, murus 'Philoſophiæ, docendi vero diſcendique Magiſtra, veri falſi'que diſceptarix et judex; arbitra etiam Methodorum, defi'nitionum, diviſionum, ſyllogiſmorum, Pegaſi ungula, Si'lenus Alcibiadis, plus habens in receſſu, quam in forte, 'lima ingeniorum, cos veritatis, Ars diſputandi, Scientia 'rationis oratione concluſæ, denique Rationalis, ſive Lo'gica, diſſertatrix ſive Dialectica.' Du Val. Synopſ. Analyt. Doct. Peripat.

[z] De inductione vero dialectici vix ſerio cogitaſſe videntur; levi mentione eam tranſmittentes et ad diputandi formulas properantes. Baconus De Aug. Sc. Diſtr. Op.

ingenuity

ingenuity, by caſting the fruitful offspring of that fancy into various ſhapes, and diſplay their ſyllogiſms and ſophiſms before their ignorant admirers, in all the pride of formal Diſputation. And thus, in the darkneſs of the Schools, this weak and antiquated Diſcipline has continued to triumph from age to age over the improvement of ſcience; and, in theſe ſtrong holds, as in an enchanted caſtle, by brandiſhing its ruſty armour, it has held out againſt a much ſtronger and better claimant, maintaining its authority by keeping up an external but inſignificant formality, with no inconſiderable degree of parade and oſtentation.

And, as truth and knowledge are never at a ſtand, ſo neither are ignorance and error. The Syllogiſm of Ariſtotle, the chief defect of which ~~is owing to~~ the imperfection of the Principles it adopts, has, in theſe latter ages, been ſupplanted or rather mixed and confounded with a thing of modern invention,[b] more like the deciſion of a carpenter, than the concluſion of a philoſopher; inſomuch

[b] See page 120 of this volume.

that the preſent Scholaſtic Syllogiſm is ſo compounded and metamorphoſed, that the ſchoolmen are at length unable to determine either what it is, or of what it is compoſed.

"Verily thou art a God that hideſt thy-"ſelf"[y] is a character given by an ancient prophet to the Author of all Truth; and "to "ſearch him out"[z] in his myſterious diſpenſations both of Nature and of Grace, conſtitutes, in the judgment of another ſacred writer, "the honour of the firſt of men." That all human knowledge, at any time or in any period of the world however favoured by circumſtances, ſhould be ſubject to the law, or determined by the ſtandard, of one man or claſs of men, where inſpiration is not concerned, is an affront to the Human Underſtanding. It ſuppoſes that, ſince the days of Ariſtotle, its faculties are impared by time or injured by abuſe, and that, after the labours of near two thouſand years, no advancement has been made in the invention of truth; and it is at the ſame time an affront

[y] Iſaiah xlv. 15. [z] Proverbs xxv.

to

to the Omniſcience of the Deity, who is unſearchable in his counſels and inſcrutible in all his ways, as it preſumes that the depths of his Power and Wiſdom are completely fathomed. This was a prejudice, which, however weak and impious, took and kept poſſeſſion of the minds of men for many ages; and which, growing into a confirmed and inveterate bigotry, prohibited further reſearches under the pretence of avoiding hurtful innovations. The genuine love of truth, which ſhould burn with a free and ardent flame, was ſmothered by this prohibition, and the exerciſe of the underſtanding in its purſuit ſhakled and confined. The merit of the ſtudent was made to conſiſt not in advancing knowledge by adding to its ſtock, or in rectifying and correcting what was falſe and imperfect; but in remembering and preſerving what was already only ſuppoſed to be known, and confirmed by an implicit and ignorant conſent; and learned men, inſtead of roaming at large through the field of knowledge in the queſt and acquiſition of truth from every quarter, were like a flock of

ſheep running after each other in the ſame beaten track of ignorance and error.[a]

Under the cloud of this prejudice and intolerant bigotry, the Public Diſcipline of the Schools was erected upon the model of Ariſtotle, and ſanctioned by his authority which was made abſolute and unchangeable, in a dark and ſuperſtitious age, long before the birth of our Engliſh philoſopher and reformer of ſcience. And, though both our Univerſities were invited by that great legal, political, and literary character, in terms of the pureſt friendſhip and condeſcenſion, to change and to improve their Diſcipline, and to purſue a method of ſtudy leſs contracted and more liberal, leſs verboſe and contentious and more rational and philoſophical;[b]

[a] Numerus longe maximus eorum qui in Ariſtotelis philoſophiam conſenſerunt, ex præjudicio et auctoritate aliorum ſe illi mancipavit; ut ſequacitas ſit potius quam conſenſus. Ibid. Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 77.

[b] Almæ Matri Inclytæ Acad. Cantabrigienſi. S.

Debita Filii qualia poſſum perſolvo; quod vero facio, idem et vos hortor, ut AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM ſtrenue incumbatis; et in Animi modeſtia libertatem ingenii retineatis. Neque talentum a veteribus concreditum in ſudario reponatis. Affuerit proucl-dubio et affulſerit Divini

it is a truth we have at this day to lament, that this falſe and feeble plan of ſtudy and education has not been publickly expelled, and ſupplanted by a better: that Ariſtotle, who exploded all the philoſophers before him, is not made to ſubmit, in his turn, to the viciſſitude of times and things, and removed from the high ſeat of penal authority[c] which he has ſo long and ſo unjuſtly held in our Univerſities.

Abſurd and imperfect as it is, the ancient Diſcipline has ſtill its advocates. To remove

vini Luminis Gratia, ſi humiliata et ſubmiſſa RELIGIONI PHILOSOPHIA clavibus ſenſus legitime et dextre utamini: et amoto omni contradictionis ſtudio, Quiſque cum alio, ac ſi ipſe ſecum diſputet, *Valete.*

Inclytæ Acadimæ Oxonienſi. S.

Cum ALMÆ MATRI meæ inclytæ ACADEMIÆ CANTABRIGIENSI Scripſerim, deeſſem ſane officio, ſi ſimile Amoris pignus ſorori ejus non deferrem. Sicut autem eos hortatus ſum, ita et vos hortor ut SCIENTIARUM AUGMENTIS ſtrenue incumbatis, et veterum labores, neque nihil, neque omnia eſſe putetis; ſed vires etiam proprias modeſte perpendentes, ſubinde tamen experiamini, omnia cedent quam optime; ſi Arma non alii in alios vertatis ſed junctis copiis in Naturam rerum impreſſionem faciatis, ſufficit quippe illa Honori et Victoriæ, *Valete.* Fr. Baconus Verulam.

[c] Vide Stat. Univ. Oxon. Tit. vi. Sect. ii. § 9.

prejudices

prejudices which have been early imbibed, and to diſpoſſeſs inveterate prepoſſeſſions, has always been found a taſk of difficulty: and ſome think, that to change a conſtitution literary as well as civil, may be a work of danger. The greateſt impediment to a Reform is, however, that they, who are convinced of its propriety, are not willing to advance, and that, what ſhould be the work of all, is the buſineſs of none. Hence, in the midſt of an enlightened and improving age, this dark Diſcipline remains in uſe, revered by ſome, contemned by many, and neglected by all; and the uſeleſs and unwieldy fabric is left to ſtand an antiquated pile, diſhonoured and diſgraced; over which, as over a venerable ruin, it becomes us rather to lament than triumph, and to conceal its particular defects by removing it out of the way, rather than to expoſe them to public view.

The conſequence is, that the Univerſity Diſcipline, in every branch of learning, out of the *Public*, is forced into more *Private*, channels; in which every part of a learned and liberal education is cultivated with advantage, and inculcated with ſucceſs.

ceſs. Since the Schools were neglected, the Colleges have improved; and, however the main-ſpring of the great literary machine may be worn out by time, and never as yet replaced, there are other wheels in action of better mechaniſm, improving and to be improved, which move to the honour and emolument of general learning. Still truth obliges us to confeſs, that there is a great defect; for the Private Diſcipline can never be made to operate with that ſpirit and effect it ought, unleſs animated and ſupported by the Public; and all thoſe other wheels, however excellent in their conſtruction, cannot poſſibly act with that harmony and exactneſs they would do, if put in motion by one great and active ſpring.

TRUTH is the faireſt and beſt APOLOGY. And the account which I have given of the preſent ſtate of Academical Diſcipline, ſo far as my obſervation has extended, which has been made with accuracy, is ſtrictly juſt.

A living reformer of academical abuſes, who, though he may claim little attention for

for depth of learning, and leſs reſpect for candour of judgment, has gained a popularity by the flippancy of his ſtyle, hath thought proper to bring forward a number of what he calls *Facts*, and to hold them up to the public eye in the moſt ridiculous and diſadvantageous point of view. He has drawn the *Diſcipline* of our Univerſities, both literary and moral, in features the moſt diſtorted, and painted the whole academical ſcence in the blackeſt and moſt offenſive colours.

Whatever might be his deſign in preſenting the world with ſuch a diſplay, that *Truth* which he pretends, compels me to obſerve, that of the *Facts* which relate to the *literary* Diſcipline, ſome are exaggerated, others are ſuppreſſed, and many falſified.

We are conſcious that our's, like every other inſtitution, is ſubject to abuſe from relaxation, and to injury from time and the change of things: and we are ſorry that all abuſes cannot be at once corrected, and all injuries immediately repaired. But, to expoſe, by a particular exaggerated detail, thoſe

Facts

Facts which relate only to the forms of an antiquated diſcipline, which it is neceſſary to obſerve till it can be improved or changed, without either attempting to inveſtigate the cauſe of its defects in order to apply a cure, or being able to ſucceed if he had attempted, argues no extraordinary fund either of ſagacity or learning: to ſuppreſs what has been occaſionally and very uſefully ſubſtituted in its place, implies, in the relator, no extraordinary ſhare of ingenuity: and, to miſrepreſent many facts, no extraordinary degree of juſtice. He may laugh, indeed, at the ruins of a venerable though antiquated pile, whoſe ſtructure he never underſtood; or he may redicule the weakneſs and infirmities of old-age, the beauty of whoſe youth, in whatever it might exiſt, he is unable to recognize: but he will not, by theſe exploits, betray any conſpicuous marks of wit or wiſdom. *Facts* and the Commentaries of Judge Blackſtone, if he had poſſeſſed the merit to examine, and the candour to allow them, though not more modeſty, would have taught him at leaſt more diſcretion.

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In regard to the *moral* Diſcipline of that Univerſity of which he boaſts himſelf a ſon, his ſtrictures are not only a miſ-ſtatement of facts, but a ſcurrilous invective, as falſe as it is virulent.

Whilſt we may lament with the moraliſt that human nature is imperfect, we ſhould remember with the philoſopher that we are no more than men, and ſometimes recollect that we have been young ourſelves. Allowing for the imperfection of all human inſtitutions, as well as of all human conduct, the Order and Decorum of this ancient ſeat of learning are dignified and exemplary in a very high degree: and whilſt, for want of that Order and Decorum, other ſeminaries of public inſtitution throughout the kingdom are diſſolving every day, we ſee this and its ſiſter Univerſity exiſting and flouriſhing from age to age. So far from exhibiting a ſcene of that *Immorality*, *Habitual Drunkenneſs*, *Debauchery*, *Ignorance*, and *Vanity* ſo repeatedly and elaborately painted by this reformiſt; it

may

may be truly ſaid (and we could with pleaſure challenge him to the teſt,) that there does not exiſt a collection of men of high birth, ſpirit, fortune, and expectation, more liberal in their ſentiments, more ingenuous in their manners, more generous in their views, more honourable in their actions, and leſs reprehenſible in their conduct, than that illuſtrious aſſemblage of youth, which in this Univerſity does honour to the age and nation in which we live; and who would make a more conſpicuous figure in the ranks of literature, were it not owing to the ignorance and indolence of the ſchoolmaſters out of whoſe hands they come. So far from producing *a Race of Profligate and Unprincipled men*, we can with the utmoſt ſafety and aſſurance reſt the honour of our Univerſities on the beſt poſſible proof, that of an ample and illuſtrious experience to the contrary, both in church and ſtate. So far from being the ſource of *Vice and Infidelity*, a charge on which he dwells with a particular emphaſis, innumerable characters, who are paterns of virtue

virtue and religion both in public and private life, and the ableſt champions in defence of the Chriſtian Faith, will bear honourable teſtimony to the Univerſities of England. And, however ardently a new ſyſtem of Public Diſcipline is in ſome reſpects to be deſired, there is one virtue of the old, the loſs of which no reform could recompenſe; and which, whatever change take place, we hope will ſtill remain: I mean that amiable and reſpectful Modeſty of manners and demeanour, which ſhines with ſo much approbation in the eyes of all, and which (excepting, perhaps, a ſingle inſtance or ſo,) has always characterized and diſtinguiſhed the ſons of Oxford.

To ſuppreſs the effect of ſuch unmerited cenſure, the propereſt method would be, as the author apprehended with much dread, not to honour it in the notice: and with all who are ſufficiently acquainted with the Univerſities no other efforts need be employed. The main of my APOLOGY is therefore due to my reader for this digreſſion, into

into which, I confeſs, I have been inadvertently drawn contrary to my deſign, and for which I earneſtly beg his pardon, endeavouring, at the ſame time, to make him all the amends I can, by a promiſe to trouble him no more with ſuch impertinence. But there is a ſpecious and flimſy mode of writing, which gains a popularity in the preſent age, and by which many, for want of better information, are betrayed into falſe judgments; and it is for their ſakes alone that I embrace an opportunity of vindicating that *Truth*, which, under the pretence of aſſerting it, I ſee ſo infamouſly and egregiouſly diſhonoured.

What were the *motives* which could induce this reformer to dip his pen in ſo much calumny, he might not know himſelf, and it may not be eaſy for another to divine. He ſeems to write, if not the *dictates of ſpleen or perſonal animoſity*, the outrage of one, who, though *wanting reformation*, has been a libertine reformed. May he enjoy all the neglect he ſo much dreads, and ſo well deſerves;

for, however anxious to excite the public attention to his reform, he is almoſt equally incompetent in every part. A veteran in pedantry, but a child in ſcience, he is as weak in remedy[d] as wretched in deſign.

To reviſe and reform the Public Diſcipline of this ancient Univerſity, is an important taſk, as difficult in the execution, as deſirable if well performed; to be undertaken with earneſtneſs, to be conducted with ability, to be purſued with perſeverance, and That from the joint aſſiſtance of ſcholars and philoſophers, not ſcioliſts and pedants, men diveſted of prejudice on the one hand, and on the other inſpired with the love of learning, it may undergo a ſpeedy and effectual renovation; that under the conduct and direction of the Public, the Private Diſcipline of every College and Society may improve and flouriſh; and that all places of public inſtitution, both here and every where, devoted to narrow-minded and mercenary

[d] See a Letter to Lord North, price 6d.

views,

views, and which delight in ſloth and ignorance, may decay and periſh: as it is an event, which, in this enlightened age, may be reaſonably expected, it is a hope which every friend to church and ſtate may ſanguinely entertain.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

RECAPITULATION.

I HAVE attempted, in this volume, to draw a compendious analytical CHART or graphical delineation of *Mathematics*, *Phyſics*, *Facts*, *Hiſtory*, *Morality*, and *Poetry*, according to the relation which they reſpectively bear to the three general faculties of the human mind, the *Intellect*, the *Will*, and the *Imagination*: and, from the juxta-poſition to each other, and the ſynopſis of the whole, I have endeavoured to form a kind of general SCALE, by which the TRUTH of each may be compared and eſtimated.

As a ray of the Sun, that ſublime and ſignificant emblem of Truth, paſſing through a priſm, is divided into a beautiful variety of ſhades

ſhades and colours; ſo that ray of Truth which is ſhed down from heaven on the human mind, as it paſſes through theſe different mediums of knowledge, differs in ſtrength and in degree, and exhibits an illuſtrious ſpecimen of that beauty and variety of appearance and effect, which in every part of his creation diſtinguiſh the works of God.

Upon this philoſophical view of things, a queſtion may ariſe in the minds of ſome — Why does that TRUTH, which in the Divine Mind is equally clear in all its parts, and which is given by his omniſcient will for the guide and conduct of life, ſhine upon the Human with ſuch different degrees of force?

Aſk of thy mother earth why oaks are made,
Taller and ſtronger than the weeds they ſhade.
Or aſk of yonder argent fields above,
Why Jove's Satellities are leſs than Jove.

Pope's Eſſay on Man.

As all things were created in his pureſt Goodneſs, they are appointed in his profoundeſt

foundeſt Wiſdom: and though the ſize and majeſty of the oak may command our immediate notice and admiration, the humble vegetable under its ſhade, though difficult to be found and deſpicable to the eye, may poſſeſs thoſe ſuperior qualities which, both as food and medicine, contribute more eſſentially to the uſe and happineſs of man. It is enough, both for the benefit of the receiver and for honour of the giver, that Truth is diſpenſed in that exact proportion, and with thoſe particular qualifications, which are beſt adapted to that uſe and happineſs: and, though as he travels along his ſublunary way, man may be allowed to ſee ſome of its ſublimeſt parts only as "through a glaſs darkly;" yet, if he will labour with diligence and deſire to find it out, he may lift up his voice in praiſe —— "Thy TRUTH moſt mighty Lord is on every ſide."

I PROCEED next, in the execution of the plan propoſed, to the logical delineation of *Theologic Truth*; which will be the ſubject of the enſuing volume.

END OF VOL. I.

THE

CHART AND SCALE

OF

TRUTH,

BY WHICH TO FIND

THE CAUSE OF ERROR.

LECTURES

READ BEFORE THE

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,

AT THE LECTURE

FOUNDED BY

The Rev. JOHN BAMPTON, M. A.

By EDWARD TATHAM, D. D.

VOL. II.

Pro certo habeant homines non sectæ nos alicujus aut placiti, sed utilitatis & amplitudinis humanæ fundamenta moliri.

Baconus De Augm. Scient. Præf.

OXFORD:

SOLD BY J. FLETCHER, D. PRINCE AND J. COOKE, R. BLISS, J. F. AND C. RIVINGTON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD; BY T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND; AND RICHARDSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE, LONDON.

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THE CHART AND SCALE OF TRUTH, BY WHICH TO FIND THE CAUSE OF ERROR.

Of the Logic of THEOLOGY.

TO this general Chart of Truth, Speculative, Practical, and Poetical, I come now to add another and farther province; a province ſuperior in its origin, more univerſal in its comprehenſion, and more important in its uſe; in which the INTELLECT,

the WILL, and the IMAGINATION, have all the fulleſt and ſublimeſt exerciſe.

In this province, truth does not ſpring from any *Material ſubject* in the compaſs of the univerſe, or from the *Mind of man* in its operations and effects, as in thoſe which have been diſcuſſed; but from another and much higher ſource, the *Mind* or *Will of God*, more immediately and directly diſpenſed, than by the ordinary adminiſtration of his providence: And, as it is derived from the divineſt origin, it has in view the nobleſt end—the *immortal happineſs* of man [a].

This is a field of knowledge productive of a ſpecies of truth which, logically conſidered, is more different from the kinds that have been analyzed and arranged in the preceding volume, than any of them are from each other, conſtituting the ſcience of a THEOLOGY, with which Ariſtotle was entirely unacquainted: but, as Reaſon is more directly or indirectly concerned with all truth that relates to man, this ſpecies, however ſuperior

[a] See p. 126, 217, 268, of the firſt volume.

and

and divine, has a LOGIC appropriated to itſelf, as well as the other ſciences; which comes now to be analyzed and arranged, according to the *Rule* laid down in the fifth chapter of the former volume.

To give a philoſophical delineation of this other Logic, by diſtinguiſhing its *Principle*, by illuſtrating its proper *Method of Reaſoning*, and by aſcertaining the particular nature and genius of the *Truth* reſulting from the whole, is the main object of my preſent undertaking. For the ſake of diſplaying more clearly and adequately to view the province of Theology, this general Chart of the different kinds of learning was firſt projected, and the parallel drawn between the logic appropriated to each; in the humble but ſanguine hope, that, from ſuch an enlarged and comparative eſtimate, it may receive the ſtrongeſt and diſtincteſt light, that its ſtudy may be facilitated if not improved, that its truths, being weighed in an equal and impartial Scale, may have their full and proper value, and that its ſuperior excellence may be more evidently aſcertained: which plan, if executed with ſucceſs, pro-

miſes to lay the deepeſt and broadeſt bottom, on which *to ground and eſtabliſh the Chriſtian Faith* [b].

The departments of learning, which have been the ſubject of the preceding lectures, are properly *human*: this which comes now to be diſcuſſed and illuſtrated by a compariſon with them, is properly *divine*. From a logical and comprehenſive knowledge of the different branches of human learning, the ſtudent will bring a ſtrength and cultivation of mind, and a clearneſs of comprehenſion, to his theology, which will abridge his labour and enſure his ſucceſs, in every part of his ſublime profeſſion. Inſtead of being perplexed by a mixture and confuſion of different ſtudies, the bane of all proficiency in good learning; he will know how to adapt and improve them to his advantage. Inſtead of being embarraſſed by an intruſion of ſubjects from other parts of knowledge, which defeat his reaſoning or diſconcert his train of thinking; from a logical acquaintance with all, he will ſee

[b] See p. 76, of firſt volume.

where

where the diſtinction lies, and be able to apply each, in its proper uſe, to the great object of his enquiry. Inſtead of wandering from one difficulty to another, in the midſt of partial and indigeſted information, as in a maze of error which is increaſed by an indiſcriminate glare of light, he will move on with eaſe and ſafety, in the ſerenity of a clear and comprehenſive mind. Prejudice, which, in narrow conceptions, is always ſo inveterate and often ſo invincible, will give place to candour: whilſt all partial and minute objections will be loſt in enlarged and extenſive views. The theological ſtudent will found the principles of his ſcience on their juſt and philoſophical baſis, diſtinguiſhing them from thoſe of every other; and, after purſuing that method of inveſtigation which is naturally adapted to them, without deviating into any other, he will embrace, with a manly and reaſonable aſſent, the ſtupendous truths of a ſublime religion. Thoſe which he can comprehend, he will enjoy with gratitude; and thoſe, which are above his conception, he will adore in profounder admiration.

But, to derive this eaſe and advantage to his ſtudies from ſuch a comparative eſtimate of theology with the other parts of learning, he is to be apprized, that ſome labour and attention are to be previouſly employed. To read with care, to think with candour, to judge with impartiality, and to determine for himſelf, are the firſt and leading qualifications of the theological ſtudent. Many and various compariſons are to be formed between one ſcience and another, in all their correſpondent parts; and that of Theology is to be compared with every other. To make theſe compariſons with accuracy and ſucceſs, he will ſee the neceſſity of a competent acquaintance with the circle of the ſciences being previouſly formed. He will diſcover, that, to do juſtice to this exalted and extenſive field of knowledge, which is the object of his cultivation, it is not enough to read over, on the one hand, the bulky folios of ſchool-divinity with a droniſh and beſotted induſtry, embracing whatever is advanced with an implicit aſſent; nor, on the other, to run through the gilded volumes of our modern ſermonizers,

which

which are calculated to relieve him from the trouble of thinking, and the labour of attention, and to kill an idle hour in all the eaſe of an indolent ſtraight-forward reading. The ſtudy of Theology is both learned and laborious, and requires, more than any other, an independant and active mind. And whoever ſhall honour theſe volumes with a peruſal, their author preſumes to requeſt, that he will take nothing on the authority of the writer, or depend upon his judgment, but examine every thing and judge for himſelf; that he will do him the favour not to read them over in an indolent ſtraight-forward way, with a view to be entertained, (in which he will be miſerably diſappointed); but that he will look back to different parts of the parallel, and compare them together; that he will examine with freedom, and correct with candour: and, as a fellow-labourer in the commonwealth of learning, their author will engage, on his part, to accept of all improvements with gratitude, and to adopt them with ſimplicity.

With ſentiments of deepeſt awe and reverence, I enter upon the province of ſacred

truth, which, though protected, as it ought to be, from outrage and open violence, by the civil power, is always to maintain its authority over the minds of men, by its own inherent worth and native evidence. This exalted province is not the leſs perplexed in all its parts, nor rendered the leſs difficult in its arrangement and diſcuſſion, by the number and diverſity of champions, who, one after another, have taken this conſecrated ground. The ſociety of the learned, in this as well as in all other departments, may be divided into two claſſes: the one conſiſting of a *few*; the other of a *many*. The former are thoſe bold and enterpriſing geniuſes, who advance before their fellows in the road of ſcience, in the invention of truth, and in the formation of ſyſtem. The latter follow behind at a humble diſtance, content with the inferior praiſe of admiring and elucidating their ſteps, without attempting to advance beyond them; patronizing their inventions, eſpouſing their opinions, and adopting their errors[c]. The former,

[c] "Thoſe which give themſelves to follow and imitate "others, were in all things ſo obſervant ſectators of their "maſters, whom they admired and believed in, as they "thought

former, who are naturally capable, becoming too ſoon wedded to their own ſyſtems and inventions, from which they are unwilling to depart, are rendered by their ſucceſs, at length, unable to proceed in the advancement of knowledge: and a peaſant from the plough, with a ſtrong and active mind undebauched by ſyſtem, is a fairer candidate in the field of literature, than thoſe ſages of the ſecond claſs with all the parade of learning without any of the power.

Without affecting to dictate on the one hand, or implicitly to follow on the other, but ſoliciting to be examined and improved on all, as I have done in the departments of human learning, I muſt here alſo beg leave of ſyſtematical divines, without any diſreſpect or contempt for their labours, to claim the privilege of a free adventurer in the ſearch of truth, and to treat this great argument of Theology in my own way. Though truth may be moſt eaſily and frequently found

" thought it ſafer to condemn their own underſtandings, " than to examine them," is an obſervation of the great Raleigh on the learned men of his time.

Hiſt. of the World, Chap. iii. § 1.

in

in the broad and beaten path, and not the leſs to be valued becauſe overtaken in the common road; yet, by following each other in the ſame unvaried track of formal cultivation, with a ſacred care never to deviate from it, philoſophers, both divine and human, confirm many errors, without improving any truths: and though, in the other mode of proceeding, errors are perhaps more liable to be incurred, they will be ſoon detected; and, from the eaſe and liberality which it profeſſes, no ſooner detected than abandoned.

THEOLOGY is the queen of ſciences. To this all the other parts of learning ſhould miniſter and ſubſerve: "the virgins that be "her fellows ſhould bear her company," to cultivate the underſtanding, and to prepare the heart, for this ſublimer application. To train the mind in the gradual ſearch of knowledge; to raiſe it from one ſubject to another, as it gathers ſtrength; to direct its progreſſion from ſcience to ſcience; to facilitate and enlarge its comprehenſion, whilſt the exerciſe of its faculties is confined within the ſphere

ſphere of their diſtinct and proper action; to know its capacity and extent when ſtretched out to their utmoſt reach; and, above all, to reſt contented in the virtuous fruition of truth, whatever it may be, or however found, is that philoſophic diſcipline of their diviner part, in which mortals may repoſe their pride and honour. Whilſt it raiſes the intellect to the ſummit of all knowledge, it ſubdues the will to virtue, and engages the imagination in the ſupport and ornament of both; and, by an uſeful culture, prepares the mind, as a bridal chamber, for the reception and entertainment of thoſe diviner truths, which will exalt that honour into a more permanent and ſubſtantial glory.

CHAP.

CHAP. I.

Of the Theological PRINCIPLE, and *Effect* upon the Mind.

THE kinds of Truth, which form t ſeveral departments of human lear ing belonging to the different provinces of t Theoretic, the Practic, and the Poetic, min are the inferences and deductions of natu Reaſon from principles exiſting in the natt and conſtitution of ſubjects, material or me tal, to which they reſpectively relate[a].

And thus a *part* of that truth, which in t divine Mind is *univerſal*, and *intuitive*, is, the uſe of Senſe and Reaſon, conveyed *p greſſively* into the human; where it ex

[a] See p. 66 of the firſt vol.

accord

according to the nature of the ſubjects from which it is derived, and in *proportion* to the Mind in which it is [b].

But truth, as hath been obſerved, is originally of the nature and eſſence of God [c]; an attribute of his omniſcient mind [d]. Infinite regions and volumes of truth muſt, therefore, lie repoſed in that univerſal and unbounded intellect, which ſees all things without a medium, out of the reach of our ſenſes to apprehend, our reaſon to inveſtigate, or our beſt faculties to conceive; both for want of principles, and for want of mind.

If the *natural* operations of the Deity, which are the exertions of his Power, governing and diſpoſing the material ſyſtem of the univerſe by the inſtrumentality of ſecond cauſes, form a labyrinth of dark and difficult inveſtigation to human reaſon; if, after our ableſt and moſt ſucceſsful reſearches, many of the works of nature are only partially diſcovered, and ſome remain totally concealed [e]: the *moral* diſpenſa-

[b] See p. 12, 13, of the firſt vol. [c] Ibid. p. 6.
[d] Ibid. p. 10. [e] Ibid. p. 186.

tions

tions flowing from his Wiſdom, that more myſterious attribute, which are more immediately adminiſtered by an act of his omniſcient mind, and removed from the obſervation of external ſenſe, muſt form a ſyſtem of more dark and myſterious contrivance, unfathomable in its ſublimer parts as the profundity of his will. All the parts of this profounder diſpenſation, which lie out of the reach of the human faculties, if they are ever made the ſubject of our knowledge, muſt be derived into the mind from a principle or ground of evidence, different both from *External* and *Internal Senſe*, and communicated by an inſtrument different from that of Reaſon.

Our great philoſopher, whoſe clear and comprehenſive mind arranged the departments and marked the confines of all learning, has diſtinguiſhed this *Principle* of divine knowledge from thoſe of human by a general diviſion. All knowledge is allotted a twofold information; the one originating from *Senſe*, the other from *Inſpiration*[f].' And this diſ-

[f] Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. iii. cap. 1.

tinction,

tinction, ſo eſſential to the true foundation of Theology, is made by another, who excels him as much in divinity of thought, as in ſublimity of expreſſion. "Hardly do we "gueſs aright at the things that are upon "the earth, and with labour do we find the "things that are before us: but the things "that are in heaven who hath ſearched out, "or thy counſel who hath known; except "thou give Wiſdom, and ſend thy Holy "Spirit from above [s]?"

Some few individuals of the human ſpecies have been ſo dark in underſtanding, ſo preposterous in judgment, or ſo perverſe in reaſoning, as to call in queſtion the poſſibility of this divine communication: and they have been ſo impertinently abſurd, as to demand the formal demonſtration of an univerſal truth, which is one of thoſe that (if I may ſo ſpeak) demonſtrates itſelf by reſulting immediately from the exiſtence of God. To doubt of this important truth, is to inſult their maker by doubting of his power, and by denying that he, who gave men ſenſe and

[s] Wiſdom, chap. ix. 16, 17.

reaſon,

reaſon, the only means by which natural knowledge is acquired, cannot convey to them knowledge in another and different way. "He that planted the ear, ſhall he not "hear? He that formed the eye, ſhall he "not ſee[h]? He that made the mouth[i], "ſhall he not ſpeak? And he that framed "the mind, ſhall he not teach man know-"ledge[k]?"

Appointed the lords and ſovereigns of the whole viſible creation, and diſtinguiſhed with many divine and extraordinary gifts; admitted, by the information of the external and internal ſenſe, to the poſſeſſion of ſo much knowledge, ſpeculative and practical; and thought worthy of the ſtill higher favour, to be taken into a near connection with the ſupreme lord and governor of the univerſe, by being conſtituted his moral ſubjects accountable to him; He, who hath beſtowed upon men theſe ſuperemiment prerogatives, who has endowed their underſtanding with the power of drawing ſo much knowledge from principles in nature, and of communicating

[h] Pſalm xciv. 9. [i] Exodus iv. 11. [k] Pſ. xciv. 10.

it

it to each other by human intercourſe; He, who hath given them the ſtill diviner prerogative of the will, can, out of the treaſures of his wiſdom, impart to them other and ſublimer truths by his ſupernatural communication, for the employment of that underſtanding, and for the exerciſe of that will. Who may preſume to wonder, that He, who is the fountain of all truth, ſhould communicate to his moral agents ſuch portions of it, as their reaſon cannot deduce from thoſe material and mental ſubjects with which it is connected; particularly when he can enlighten the willing mind, and prepare it for their reception and improvement? His omniſcience knows the neceſſities of his moral agents created for happineſs and enjoyment, his goodneſs is always ready to ſupply them, and no one can doubt his power: "for the "greatneſs of his mercy reacheth unto the "heavens, and his truth unto the clouds[1]."

The poſſibility and probability of ſupernatural communication being ſo far eſtabliſhed,

[1] Pſalm xlvii. 11.

let us next enquire into the proper *nature* and *conſtitution* of this ſupernatural information, which forms the Principle of Theology.

When Mago arrived at the gates of Carthage, charged by the victorious general with the important embaſſy of the defeat of the Romans in the battle of Cannæ, though they did not themſelves witneſs the truth of that great event, the whole ſenate entertained the welcome news on the relation of the brother of Hannibal; and, on his pouring out the rings of the Roman knights, who fell in that bloody action, in the veſtibule of their houſe, they were fully confirmed of the truth of the intelligence, and abſolutely convinced of the important fact[m]. And, when Columbus, on his arrival in the weſtern hemiſphere, told the Indians that the ſhips in which he had ſailed over the Atlantic, were made by men, though they could have no conception how ſuch vaſt and complicated machines were built, they gave credit to this truth on the word of that celebrated navigator. Had theſe different facts not been credited by the in-

[m] Livy, lib. xxiii. cap. 11, 12.

formed,

formed, their miſtruſt or diſbelief could have made them no leſs true. They were, however, credited by both parties on the authority of their informants: in the firſt inſtance, by men who were capable of underſtanding clearly the nature of the victory of Hannibal, and how it was accompliſhed, from the narration of his brother: and, in the ſecond, by men, who were incapable of comprehending the complex and artful conſtruction of an European ſhip, or of conceiving how it could be erected by human means. And, whether the nature of the facts related were underſtood or not by the informed, was alſo a circumſtance, which did not in the leaſt affect their poſitive truth. They were entertained and credited alike on the teſtimony of others; and they were both equally true.

In ſimilar circumſtances are all men placed, from the condition of their nature, in regard to moſt of the truths which affect human life and action. Confined within narrow limits of time and place, poſſeſſed of different degrees of knowledge and information, and, indeed, of different capacity and reach of underſtanding for their acquiſition,

they are of neceſſity obliged, in every ſphere and ſcene of life, to rely on the credit and veracity of each other, and to receive the largeſt and the moſt uſeful proportion of truth, of many kinds, from information and tradition. Theſe are the moſt general and extenſive ſources or means of truth; and, whether they are capable of underſtanding it or not, men are obliged to found upon it the moſt important thought and the moſt eventful conduct. By this light they have been led from age to age; and never have had reaſon to complain that they have been led wrong. If ſuch be the credit and authority of men, ſo extenſive and infallible, as the experience of every one muſt convince him, in regard to many of the moſt intereſting and important truths; how properly, and how pointedly does the reaſoning of the inſpired Apoſtle, enforcing the authority of a divine communication, come home to our ſelf-conviction?—"If ye receive "the witneſs of men; the witneſs of God "is greater [n].

The nature of *Teſtimony*, as a principle of truth, has been ſtated and diſcuſſed in the

[n] 1 John v. 9.

firſt

firſt volume*, where it was found to operate with more univerſality and extent than any other, being a general vehicle by which truths of every kind were communicated and conveyed; and if we will make uſe of the clue held out to us by the Apoſtle, which leads us from earthly to heavenly things, reaſon will conduct us ſafely by a cloſe and obvious analogy, (the only logic by which divine truths can be conveyed to men), from this human principle to the divine: from this teſtimony of men, from which is derived the greateſt ſhare of natural or human truth, to the TESTIMONY OF GOD, which is the ſource and vehicle of thoſe truths which are ſupernatural or divine, and which, being communicated by the word of God, are *Theologic*.

All truth, whether natural or ſupernatural, proceeds alike from God, only in different ways, and by different diſpenſations. However various in appearance and multiplex in form, it is connected, like all his works, by a wonderful and conſiſtent chain, one main link of which, is this Principle of TESTIMONY which is common to

* Chap. x.

both; by which an eaſy and familiar tranſition is made from truths that are human to thoſe that are divine. Whether the Almighty act through the inſtrumentality of his creatures, or more immediately by himſelf; whether he convey truth to the minds of men through the natural organs of the ſenſes, or by a ſupernatural communication of his will, he is always uniform and conſiſtent with himſelf: and one part of his divine government is made introductory to another, and illuſtrative of its œconomy. Thus earthly things are the expreſſive types and reſemblances of heavenly, on which reſemblance a ſublime *Analogy* is founded, which is the great inſtrument of Theologic Truth; and it is upon reaſoning by this analogy from human Teſtimony to divine, that its Principle is conſtituted.

Such is the true nature and foundation of that *Logic*, which is peculiarly appropriated to ſubjects of Theology, and which has had the ſanction and approbation of Him, who is its origin, its inſtrument, and end. "Je- "ſus departed into the coaſts of Tyre and "Sidon: and behold a woman of Canaan "came

" came out of the ſame coaſts, and cried " unto him, ſaying, Have mercy on me, " O Lord, thou ſon of David, my daughter " is grievouſly vexed with a devil.—But he " anſwered and ſaid, it is not meet to take " the children's bread and to caſt it to " the dogs. And ſhe ſaid, Truth, Lord: " yet the dogs eat of the crumbs which fall " from their maſter's table." This anſwer made to his alluſive obſervation of the *children's bread*, poſſeſſed a quality ſo ſingularly excellent, as to extort from him an animated eulogium, accompanied with a grant of her requeſt; " O woman, great is thy faith! be " it unto thee even as thou wilt[p]." This anſwer, ſo highly applauded and honoured by our Lord, was the reſult of reaſoning by *Analogy*,—That as the dogs eat of the crumbs of the maſter's table, after the children are ſupplied and ſatisfied; ſo ſhe, though an alien from the houſe of Iſrael, and not entitled to the firſt overtures of his grace, might hope for ſome ſmall portion of his ſuperabundant favour, after the children of that houſe were ſerved: and, upon this rational ground, ſprung

[p] Matth. xv. 21. &c.

the excellency of her faith. And we have another very ſingular inſtance upon record of the ſame high approbation accorded to this mode of reaſoning, and to the effect which it produced. "And when Jeſus was entered "into Capernaum, there came unto him a "centurion beſeeching him, and ſaying, "Lord, my ſervant lieth at home ſick of the "palſy, grievouſly tormented. And Jeſus "ſaith unto him, I will come and heal him. "The centurion anſwered and ſaid, Lord, "I am not worthy that thou ſhouldeſt come "under my roof: but ſpeak the word only, "and my ſervant ſhall be healed[q]. For "I alſo am a man ſet under authority, "having under me ſoldiers, and I ſay unto "one, Go, and he goeth; and to another, "Come, and he cometh; and to my ſer-"vant, Do this, and he doeth it. When "Jeſus heard theſe things, he marvelled and "ſaid unto the people, I ſay unto you, I "have not found ſo great faith no not in Iſ-"rael[r]." This ſublime wonder of our Lord was, doubtleſs, excited by the centurion's arguing, from parity of reaſoning, that, as he

[q] Matth. viii. 5, &c. [r] Luke vii. 8, 9.

himſelf,

himſelf, whoſe power was infinitely inferior to Chriſt's, was veſted with an authority by which he could execute his intention without going in perſon; ſo our Lord's divine and ſupernatural power was ſo great, that he could heal diſeaſes at a diſtance, as well as at hand.

Theſe paſſages of ſacred ſtory are ſingular and important. From their conviction of the truth of his divine authority founded on *analogic reaſoning*, the author of our religion pronounced the faith of the parties to be more excellent than any other: and if to theſe inſtances of ſuch marked and decided approbation, we add the numerous parables, ſimilitudes, and analogies, which he employed on all occaſions to convey his ſupernatural truths to men, we may conclude that this method of reaſoning is ſpecially conſecrated to the ſervice of religion.

Upon this analogic reaſoning the great Principle of all Theology is founded: "If we "receive," ſaith the Apoſtle, "the witneſs "of men, the witneſs of God is greater." From the nature of divine Teſtimony it lays hold of the mind of man, only by its analogy to human. "This is the witneſs of God,

"which

" which he has teſtified of his Son :" and, accordingly, " he that believeth on the Son," as the Apoſtle argues, " hath the witneſs," the prototype and principle of the evidence, " within himſelf[s]."

In his kingdoms both of Nature and of Grace, the God of all truth is wonderfully conſiſtent in the mode of its diſpenſation; and *Analogy* is the inſtrument of reaſon, by which, in one as well as in the other, man is enabled to aſcend from earth to heaven. From the curves and motions of *projectiles*, we have ſeen the aſtronomer riſing, by a ſublime analogy, to thoſe of the *celeſtial bodies*[t]; juſt as we ſee the theologiſt riſing from the *teſtimony of men* to the *teſtimony of God:* and as thoſe ſtupendous orbs, rolling in ſilent majeſty through the vaſt regions of ſpace, are infinitely more exalted and ſublime than the projectiles by which they are illuſtrated and explained; ſo this divine Teſtimony, which is conveyed to the apprehenſion of men, and made a principle of reaſoning, by its analogy

[s] John iii. 10, 11. [t] See p. 155, 156 of the firſt volume.

to

to human, is infinitely ſuperior, more exalted, and ſublime, in proportion as God, in knowledge, fidelity, and all perfection, is ſuperior to man: for "the witneſs of "God is greater." The word of ſuch a witneſs muſt be invincible in power, and paramount to every thing which does not involve a palpable contradiction. ✗

The Theological Principle being thus founded and explained, let us next obſerve its *operation* and *effect* upon the mind. 2

That all reaſoning is from principles of one kind or another, and that the method which it purſues is governed by the principles, and is productive of a ſpecies of truth exactly correſpondent and proportioned to both *, is that logical doctrine, which this general Chart would illuſtrate and enforce in every part of learning. On comparing the Theological Principle with thoſe which have been ſeverally delineated in the preceding volume, in order to weigh the ſpecific operation and effect

* See page 30, and 66 of the first volume.

✗ See Reid on the Intellectual Powers, Ch. 6. Sect. 24. of

of each in the juſt Scale of truth, it will be found to differ more from them all, in its logical nature and *operation*, than any of them do from each other; conſtituting a new light or inlet of knowledge: and it may, conſequently, be expected to produce a different *effect* upon the mind, and that its truths will command a ſpecies of *aſſent* peculiar to themſelves.

All other parts of knowledge are derived into the underſtanding, primarily from the *Senſes external* or *internal*, or ſecondarily from the *Teſtimony of men*, and are called *natural*: theologic is derived from the immediate impreſſion, or communication, of the Deity, called *Inſpiration*; and, as diſtinguiſhed from them, is *ſupernatural*. In the former caſes, Reaſon begins its operation with particular truths, and riſes, by a laborious inductive proceſs, to general concluſions; which are the ſecondary principles, to be applied, by a different operation, to the proof of particular truths. In the latter caſe, Reaſon has no manner of concern with the truths at all, which ſpring immediately of themſelves from the divine in-

ſpiration [v]. If office conſiſts only in the *proof of that Inſpiration* from thoſe internal and external evidences which it abundantly contains; and which, though inſeparably interwoven with it, are to be conſidered as totally diſtinct and ſeparate from the truths themſelves. When the fact of Inſpiration is thus proved, the divine Teſtimony, which is the Principle of all Theology, reſults immediately from it: and as, on the one hand, in eſtabliſhing the Principle, reaſon has no direct concern; ſo, on the other, it has nothing to do in deducing them from it by any proceſs whatever [w]. They are ſaid to be *revealed*; and, as far as they are revealed, they flow from the Principle of themſelves, without the formality of deduction of any kind, and convince the mind, without any other authority, than the bare credit of the witneſs; being *implicitly*

[v] In rebus naturalibus ipſa principia examini ſubjiciuntur per inductionem, licet minime per ſyllogiſmum; atque eadem illa nullam habent cum natione repugnantiam, ut ab eadem fonte tum primæ propoſitiones tum mediæ deducantur. Aliter fit in religione, ubi & primæ propoſitiones authypoſtatæ ſunt, atque per ſe ſubſiſtentes.

Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ix. cap. 1.

[w] Et rurſus non reguntur ab ulla ratione, quæ propoſitiones conſequentes deducit. Ibid.

to

to be received, without any operation of the mind about them, upon the *Word* of God[1]. Whether they are revealed more fully or more partially, they are to be believed, as far as they are revealed, without our even attempting to throw any farther light upon them of our own: for "his thoughts are not as our "thoughts," and who may dare either to queſtion or to ſuper-add to the truths by him communicated; whether, like the Carthaginian ſenate, we may be able, or think ourſelves able, to comprehend them; or, with the benighted Indians, we be unable to form any conception of them at all; ſince He who hath revealed them, knew for what purpoſe they were deſigned, and in what proportion they were to be given; ſince he is totally free

[1] Prærogativa Dei totum hominem complectitur; nec minus ad rationem quam ad voluntatem humanam extenditur: ut homo in univerſum ſe abneget & accedat Deo. Quare ſicut legi divinæ obedire tenemur, licet reluctetur voluntas: ila & *verbo Dei* fidem habere, licet reluctetur ratio. Etenim ſi ea duntaxat credamus quæ ſunt rationi conſentanea, rebus aſſentimur non authori; quod etiam ſuſpectæ fidei teſtibus præſtare ſolemus.

Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. iii. cap. 1.

from

from error, and equally incapable of fraud or falſehood?

So that, contrary to its proceeding in the kinds of knowledge which are natural, in Theology, reaſon has nothing to do with the truths of revelation, either in the proper formation of their general Principle in the firſt place, or in judging of them as they are derived from it in the ſecond: for "*Faith*," or the conviction they produce, cometh not by reaſoning, but by "hearing, and hearing "by the word of God [y]." Their *Principle* ſubſiſts and terminates in itſelf: like its author, it is alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the firſt and the laſt.

This celeſtial Principle, the TESTIMONY OF GOD, is not only totally different from *mathematical*, *phyſical*, and all other *axioms*; but alſo from the principle of *human Teſtimony*, from its analogy to which it firſt takes poſſeſſion of the mind, in that, as was obſerved, it is infinitely more excellent and ſuperior in power. With an alluſion to Teſtimony in general, as founded on the authority of witneſſes, the Baptiſt, who, as the morn-

[y] Rom. x. 17.

ing-ſtar

ing-ſtar is the harbinger of natural, was appointed the immediate meſſenger of this ſupernatural, light, has diſplayed it in terms the moſt magnificent. "He that cometh from "above, is above all. He that is of the "earth is earthy, and ſpeaketh of the earth: "He that cometh from heaven, is above all; "and what he hath ſeen and heard, that he "teſtifieth." In the ſame inſpired and exalted ſtrain, he proceeds to urge the tranſcendent authority of this teſtimony. "He that "hath received his teſtimony, hath ſet to his "ſeal that God is true; for He that God "hath ſent ſpeaketh the words of God: for "God giveth not the ſpirit by meaſure to "him. The Father loveth the Son, and "hath given all things into his hands[s]." And this authority is enforced upon the minds of men by the beloved apoſtle, with a power which is invincible. "This is the witneſs "of God, which he teſtifieth of his Son. He "that believeth on the Son of God hath the "witneſs in himſelf: He that believeth not "God, hath made him a liar; becauſe he "believeth not the record which God gave

[s] John iii. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35.

"of

"of his Son[a]." He then proceeds to ſtate, in a few plain words, the ſtupendous ſubſtance of this Record or TESTIMONY, which is, "That God hath given us eternal life;" and "that this life is in his Son[b]"—The END and the MEANS of religion: the end worthy of HIM, by whom it was deſigned: and the means worthy of HIM, by whom they were executed.

Thus Theologic *Truth* will be different from every other kind; and its *effect* upon the mind will be proportioned to the divine authority, and tranſcendent ſuperiority, of its Principle.

Compared with the ſeveral kinds which have been analyzed in the preceding volume, how totally different will this be found, in its conſtitution and operation upon the mind? Though, in power and conviction, it be equal to mathematical concluſions, it is the very reverſe of them: for, whereas they are the deductions from general principles by a train of reaſoning the moſt ſyllogiſtic, elaborate, and extenſive of any other, this reſults from

[a] 1 John v. 9, 10. [b] 1 John v. 11.

its principle without a ſingle act of judgment. And, as all other kinds of truth which we call *natural*, claim an aſſent in proportion to the nature of their principles and mode of reaſoning; *ſupernatural* truths, when their principle is eſtabliſhed on the independent evidences, command an aſſent proportionable to itſelf, without any reaſoning at all: for "he that believeth," as the apoſtle affirms, "hath the witneſs in himſelf;" if his mind admit the witneſs, it muſt *immediately* admit the truth;—an aſſent diſtinguiſhed by the name of FAITH, which is abſolute and implicit, independent of all the powers of the Underſtanding, the Will, or the Imagination; and with which Reaſon has no direct concern, but to inſtruct them with all diligence and alacrity to embrace the truth, and in all virtue and humility to acquieſce.

The truths which are the objects of this faith, are, therefore, diſtinguiſhed from all other kinds by the name of *Myſteries*. But, as in advancing from truth to truth, we have obſerved the mind proceeding through a regularly aſcending ſcale, beginning with the loweſt and riſing higher and higher as it advances;

vances; ſo in condeſcenſion to their natural deſire, and to invite men to the enjoyment of the ſublimeſt truths, the diſpenſer of theſe myſteries hath made ſome of them to ſtoop, or to ſeem to ſtoop, to the level of their comprehenſions; whilſt others, by their ſublimity, reach up into the heaven from which they came, and are awfully loſt to all human ſight in the clouds and darkneſs, which ſurround his ſeat.

On thoſe myſteries which are revealed with ſo much clearneſs, as to be put within the comprehenſion of the human mind, (though to diſcover them at firſt was out of the province of reaſon, whatever fitneſs ſhe may find in them when once revealed,) and which ſeem to be the connecting link between the little we are allowed to know, and the much from which we are excluded, we may worthily employ our thoughts. Reaſon may explain them with ſimplicity, without prying into them with too preſumptive a curioſity, or giving them more light than the inſpirer hath given[s]. She may contemplate them with

[s] Humanæ rationis uſus, in rebus ad religionem ſpectantibus, duplex eſt: alter in explicatione myſterii; alter in illationibus,

with reverence, from a view of the Juſtice and Goodneſs of the Deity diſplayed in their diſpenſation, and illuſtrate them by inferences and illations, rather than dive into his ſecret counſel to decide upon their fitneſs with too determined a preciſion [4]. On thoſe which lie out of the ſphere of his moſt enlarged conception,

illationibus, quæ inde deducuntur. Quod ad myſteriorum explicationem attinet, videmus non dedignare Deum ad infirmitatem captus noſtri ſe demittere; myſteria ſua ita explicando, ut a nobis optime ea poſſint percipi; atque revelationes ſuas in rationis noſtræ ſyllepſes & notiones veluti inoculando; atque inſpirationes ad intellectum noſtrum aperiendum ſic accommodando, quemadmodum figura clavis figuræ ſervæ. Qua tamen in parte nobis ipſis deeſſe minime debemus: Cum enim Deus ipſe opera rationis noſtræ in illuminationibus ſuis utatur; etiam nos eandem in omnes partes verſare debemus, quo magis capaces ſimus ad myſteria & recipienda & bibenda; modo animus ad amplitudinem myſteriorum pro modulo ſuo dilatetur, non myſteria ad anguſtias animi conſtringantur.

Bacon's De Augm. Sc. lib. ix.

Scales by Division of Lines Book II. Prop. 2 and 3

Quantum vero ad illationes, noſſe debemus, relinqui nobis uſum rationis & ratiocinationis ſecundarium quendam & reſpectivum, non primitivum & abſolutum. Poſtquam enim articuli & principia religionis jam in ſedibus ſuis fuerint locata, ita ut a rationis examine eximantur;

tum

ception, man may think with reverence, and ſhould ſilently adore; not narrowing the myſtery to the contraction of his mind, but enlarging the mind, as much as poſſible, to the amplitude of the myſtery. He ſhould view them with all the pureſt affection of love and admiration, from a conſideration of their end; and, in humble condeſcenſion, allow them to partake of that incomprehenſible Wiſdom from which they flow [c]. Reaſon, by an indirect and ſecondary operation, may draw inferences and concluſions from theſe deeper myſteries according to the *analogy of Faith*, which will afford her an important and extenſive ſcope; taking care to diſtinguiſh between the authority of the inferences, and that of the principle. But the great duty of the Chriſtian is, to regulate both his faith and conduct by the doctrines and precepts of the

tum demum conceditur ab illis illationes derivare ac deducere ſecundùm analogiam ipſorum.

Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ix.

[c] "Why," ſaith St. Jerome, "do you pretend, "after ſo many ages are elapſed, to teach us what was never "taught before? Why attempt to explain what neither "Peter nor Paul thought it neceſſary to be known?"

Ad Pammach. & Ocean. de Erroribus Origenis.

Goſpel or word of God, whether enabled more or leſs, or not at all, to comprehend the grounds and reaſons on which they ſtand. Acknowledging the evidence, by which they are ſupported as the edicts of heaven, to be ſatisfactory and divine, he will beſt approve his wiſdom and gratitude to God by yielding an implicit obedience to his laws.

Amidſt her admiration of the ſtupendous myſteries of Religion, Reaſon may be reconciled to her own inſufficiency. They are *ſupernatural*; and nothing is to be found in the *compaſs of nature* to compare them to, in order to conclude. They are *divine*; and cannot be meaſured by what is human. They are as *firſt principles*; and with firſt principles reaſon has no concern. They who conſider Reaſon not as the handmaid, but as the miſtreſs, of Religion, totally miſtake both her office and her power; and plunge at once into the depth of error. They do not conſider that Reaſon is only *perception* and *judgment*; that perception is much limited in regard to many of the phænomena of nature; and that judgment in regard to many objects upon

upon earth, thus with difficulty perceived, is often defeated, and much embarraſſed in deciding upon the force of the different kinds and degrees of evidence: but "the things "which are in heaven who hath ſearched "out?"

They are, however, no leſs true, becauſe they are myſterious. This is owing to our own imperfection, which is no bar to our aſſent; for the truths of Revelation are not propoſed to us to *know* on the conviction of Reaſon, but to *believe* on the authority of "the Spirit which beareth witneſs," which he hath done, as St. John directly argues, "becauſe the Spirit is truth; and the things "of God knoweth no man but the Spirit "of God."

Derived from a divine original, and founded upon a principle which is moſt infallible, as on a rock which the power of men and angels cannot ſubvert or move, this ſupernatural Truth is THEOLOGIC; and the Faith, by which it is embraced and entertained, relating to the Son, who "brought life and "immortality to light by his goſpel," it is

the CHRISTIAN FAITH; inviſible in its object; tranſcendent in its power; and immortal in its end.

All other kinds of truth, ſpringing from the evidence of external and internal ſenſe, lie more immediately before our view, to direct our way through this material ſcene of things; in which we are fitly ſaid "to walk "by ſight." This kind, which is to conduct us from this viſible world into the world of ſpirits, is derived from "the evidence of "things not ſeen," and we are accordingly commanded "to walk by faith and not by "ſight."—But, however *inviſible* in its object, Faith is *tranſcendent* in its power, embracing immediately and at one graſp all the myſteries of religion, however dark and incomprehenſible, independent on the faculties of man, and devoted ſolely to the glory of God[f].—And this tranſcendent virtue is exalted to ſtill higher conſideration, in that it determines the prize of *immortality*. "He

[f] Quantum myſterium aliquod divinum fuerit magis abſonum & incredibile; tanto plus credendo exhibetur honoris Deo, ut ſit victoria fidei nobilior.

Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ix. cap. 1.

"that

" that believeth on the Son hath everlaſting " life; and he that believeth not the Son, " ſhall not ſee life; but the wrath of God " abideth on him[g]." In this grand cataſtrophe and conſummation of human nature, from being militant Faith will become triumphant. " Who is he," proceeds the beloved apoſtle, in terms of confidence and triumph, " that " overcometh the world, but he that believ- " eth that Jeſus is the Son of God[h]?"

Such is the nature and conſtitution of the *Chriſtian Faith*, which is the greateſt of virtues; and which, when " it worketh by " Love," or Chriſtian Charity, in the production of *good-works* or moral virtue, the condition of Natural Religion, as its genuine fruits, is the ſole and indiſpenſable condition of Revealed; on the performance of which *alone*, men, the moral agents, will be juſtified of God, their moral governor, redeemed, ranſomed, and rewarded, " having their " fruit unto holineſs, and the end everlaſt- " ing life[i]."

This

[g] John iii. 36. [h] 1 John v. 5, 6.

[i] " WORKS entitle us to a *reward* indefinitely, FAITH to " the reward of *eternal life*: therefore the firſt ſtep to the " *greater*

This ſupernatural PRINCIPLE, ſo different from all others; the TRUTHS reſulting from it, ſo different from thoſe of every other kind, and in ſo different a way; and this FAITH which tranſcends every other ſpecies of aſſent, unfortunately for the true intereſts of Theology the queen of ſciences, were unknown to Ariſtotle, whoſe Dialectic has been for ages the impregnable fort of all probable reaſoning, the umpire of all learning, and the high tribunal at which the pretenſions of all truth were to be tried. Thus to puniſh the vice and obſtinacy of mankind in different periods of the world, it hath pleaſed the high and lofty One who inhabiteth eternity, to ſuffer a cloud to be drawn acroſs the pure light of heaven, by which it has been obſtructed or obſcured.

Had that great philoſopher been bleſt with the privilege of being born after the glorious Goſpel had ſhed its rays over the Athenian provinces: or had he partaken with the righ-

" *greater* bleſſing muſt needs be a title to the *leſſer*." Warb. Div. Leg. Book ix. chap. 3. See the whole of this Chapter on the Doctrine of *ſalvation by Faith only*.

teous

teous Abraham the diſtinguiſhed favour of ſeeing, through type, viſion, or ſcenical repreſentation, that future day, in which its immaculate founder ſealed with his blood its immortal truths; doubtleſs, the patriarch and the philoſopher would have rejoiced together [k]. Inſtead of making that abſurd and unphiloſophical uſe of his works, which has been done by his blinder followers in almoſt every age, in the greater enlargement of his vigorous and comprehenſive mind, he would have diſcarded the definitions, the general propoſitions, and the formal ſyllogiſms, of his uſeleſs organon, to embrace immediately the Theologic Principle founded in the wiſdom, and eſtabliſhed by the power, of God [l]. Inſtead of diſputing about the ſtupendous myſteries reſulting from this principle, or ever calling them in queſtion, he would have placed them all upon the ſame divine inſcrutable level, and have exclaimed at once, "Lord, I believe; help thou "mine unbelief [m]!" Had this virtuous native of Stagyra been admitted with that of Tarſus to the further honour of foreſeeing all the various oppoſition, which his organon, in the

[k] John viii. 56. [l] 1 Cor. i. 24. [m] Mark ix. 24.

hands

hands of narrow and contracted geniuſes, enſlaved by terms and ſtupified by forms, would make, in its uſe and its abuſe, to the truths of Chriſtianity themſelves, or rather to their reception, (for againſt them the gates of hell cannot prevail,) and to the eſtabliſhment of their immortal principle; had he foreſeen the great injury it would do in future times to "that wiſdom which is from "above[n]; which is firſt *pure*," by prophane mixtures of 'philoſophy and vain deceit[o];' 'and then *peaceable*,' by 'miniſtering fooliſh 'queſtions[p],' and fomenting rancorous diſputations[q]: the philoſopher would have lamented with the apoſtle, and have laboured with him to guard mankind againſt them. Could he have beheld certain ſophiſts and ſyllogizers of the Athenian ſchools, diſputers of

[n] James iii. 17.

[o] Eodem etiam ſpectant eorum commentationes, qui veritatem Chriſtianæ religionis ex principiis & auctoritatibus philoſophorum confirmare haud veriti ſunt—divina humanis impari conditione permiſcentes. Baçoni Nov. Org. lib. i.

[p] 2 Tim. ii. 23.

[q] Qui cum theologiam in artis formam effinxerint, hoc inſuper effecerunt, ut pugnax & ſpinoſa Ariſtotelis philoſophia corpori religionis immiſceretur. Ibid.

this

this world, inſulting that great apoſtle with their ignorance and ſcorn, "What will this "babbler ſay[r]?" could he have beheld his learned commentator Simplicius, under the full light of Chriſtianity, confirming himſelf in infidelity, and exulting in oppoſition; could he have ſeen the unhappy Porphyry perplexed and entangled in the ſubtleties of his logic, and, in the act of compoſing the Iſagoge, abandoning his faith; could he have conjectured, that whilſt it was raiſing human Reaſon above itſelf by perſuading it of its all-ſufficient power, his hypothetical ſyſtem would lead it from the moſt ſolid truths into the endleſs maze of ſpeculative error, and that this wild infatuation might inflame the ſanguine and pregnant genius of a youthful emperor, and cauſe him to apoſtatize from his religion; could his eye have reached down to theſe diſtant times, and have obſerved the cloud of ignorance and ſuperſtition continuing to envelope the greater part of the Chriſtian church, which the evaſive verſatility of his Dialectic was calculated to thicken and con-

[r] Acts xvii. 8.

firm,

firm, rather than diſpel[a]; and, could he have ſeen that part which boaſts of reformation, ſtill ſhackled in the purſuit of theologic truth, by its ſophiſms and uſeleſs diſputations, and by keeping men blundering on from age to age in the thorny wilds of ſchool-divinity:—could he have foreſeen theſe hurtful conſequences, inſtead of committing this part of his works to the care of the too faithful Theophraſtus, the maſter and the ſcholar would have ſacrificed them together upon the altar of ſacred truth. And, could he have read in the book of light and life that heavenly precept "Love your "enemies," he would have expunged that contrary propoſition, by which his morality is diſgraced, as militating againſt every principle of humanity and ſound religion; and he would have improved, or elſe abandoned his ethical ſyſtem, as ſuperſeded by one infi-

[a] 'The court of Rome well knew the importance of 'the School logic in ſupporting their authority; they 'knew it could be employed more ſucceſsfully in diſguiſ-'ing error, than in vindicating truth: and Puffendorf '*De Monarchia Pontificis Romani* ſcruples not to inſinuate, 'that they patronized it for this very reaſon.' Beattie's Eſſay on Truth, p. 360.

nitely

nitely more perfect: whilſt his theology, in which he excelled all philoſophers before him, if Plato be excepted, would have ſoared on a ſublimer wing to the heaven at which it aimed [c].

[c] See the 8th book of his Metaphyſics, and the laſt Chapters of his Phyſics.

CHAP.

Reaſon may find its juſt and fair account; the truth of the holy Scriptures, which diſplay theſe facts, may receive light and confirmation from theſe concluſions. But though, in oppoſition to the fictions and hypotheſes of the patrons of natural religion, Reaſon may lend her modeſt aid in ſupport of this general argument: to judge of this *Neceſſity* reſts ſolely and properly with God, who, as in creating them at firſt, ſo in giving to men his revelation afterwards, acted from the pure motive of his *Wiſdom* prompted by his *Love*—attributes which tranſcend all human thought.

To judge of the *Fact*—whether ſuch a revelation containing ſuch a principle, with its myſteries and credentials, was actually ſent from God and received by men, by examining the *evidences* and *circumſtances* which accompanied it—the *time* when—the *place* where, the *manner* how, it was delivered—the *form* in which it deſcends to us—and in what it is *contained*—together with the particular *ſubſtance* and *burden* of it—and how every part is to be rightly *underſtood:* theſe are the various and extenſive ſubjects, which

conſtitute

conſtitute the ſublime office of THEOLOGIC REASONING, and the proper *Study* of *Divinity*.

This extenſive body of reaſoning is what a Faith which is rational, ſuch as that of our holy religion, not only admits, but actually requires. It forms the indiſpenſable duty of all, who have leiſure and ability for the ſearch, with all diligence and perſeverance to purſue this reaſoning. It is the proper and more particular buſineſs of thoſe, who, for the inſtruction of chriſtians, devote themſelves to the exalted and honourable profeſſion of divinity: and it ſhould be, in a certain degree, the employment of all, who "would give a "reaſon of the hope that is in them[b]."— And mortal man need not complain, that the uſe of his Reaſon, in the concerns of his Religion, is either precluded or ſuperſeded by the too high aſſumptions of Faith: for theſe various topics of enquiry and learning open fields of inveſtigation which will afford room for the ableſt exertions of his underſtanding to the longeſt period of human life.

A very general ſketch of the *Grounds* and *Method of Reaſoning* in Theology, or matters

[b] Peter iii. 15.

of Religion; and of the *Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, General*, and *Particular*; ſubjects, which conſtitute the STUDY OF DIVINITY in its various and important branches, is all that the general plan of theſe lectures permits me to attempt.

SECT. I.

Of the GROUNDS and METHOD of REASONING in Divinity.

THE principle of Theology itſelf, as well as the truths which it contains, lying out of the verge of human knowledge, and being totally different from all other principles, and kinds of truth; the REASONING, which is adapted to the province of Divinity, will be found, both in its GROUNDS and METHOD, different, in the aggregate, from every other kind.

Wherever general principles are concerned the reaſoning is, firſt *to* the Principle, and then

then *from* the Principle, excepting in the Mathematics, where it is chiefly, if not entirely, the latter. In Theology, it has been obſerved, there is no mediate proceſs of reaſon, by which the truths of religion can be deduced *from* the principle: it may, however, be properly ſaid that, in Divinity, we reaſon *to* the Principle; but from *Grounds* of a different nature, and in a *Method* totally different, from what we do in all the other ſciences.

This ſupernatural principle is not eſtabliſhed upon an Induction of particular truths, by which it is made *univerſal*, from which univerſality its doctrines are entitled to our Faith: but "Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing "by the word of God[c];" in which ſentence, the Apoſtle has propoſed the Principle itſelf, or *the Teſtimony of God*, the Means through which we receive it, which is *hearing*, and the end or effect which it is calculated to produce, or the conviction of *Faith*. The Principle is a divine fact, to be proved by the various *Means* by which it was confirmed and is conveyed to us, which are

[c] Rom. x. 17.

the juſt GROUNDS of reaſoning, and which alone warrant and ſupport a reaſonable Faith.

REASONING, therefore, in Divinity, reſpects theſe *Means* through which the light of Revelation, by which the divine Teſtimony was communicated, was eſtabliſhed in the world, and conveyed down to us in theſe diſtant ages: and the METHOD which it purſues, will be to take the Bible in our hand, which profeſſes to contain this word of God, and to trace its hiſtory through the intervening ages, and countries, and the perſons of its editors, up to the time, place, and perſons, in which, and by whom it was originally written; which will prove its *authenticity*. From the proof of its authenticity Reaſon will proceed to evince its divine *authority*, by examining all thoſe various teſts and marks of a ſupernatural commiſſion, which are every where inſeparably interwoven with its contents; and which are called the *External Evidences* of religion: which authority Reaſon will farther confirm, by examining the moral import of its immortal argument; or the *Internal Evidence* of its divinity. By theſe, which are the Means,

Reaſon

Reaſon will be conducted ſafely and logically to the infallible Principle, the *Word* or *Teſtimony of God*, in which Faith at once finds its repoſe and end; and Reaſon will have only to *interpret* the meaning of that myſterious book in which they are recorded——Or, Reaſon may perform this religious taſk, by purſuing the reverſe of this order, through the *Internal* and *External* Evidences of this *Authority*, to the *Authenticity* of the Holy Scriptures down to ourſelves, forming the conviction of our Faith on the ſame firm and ſolid grounds. ✕

In bringing Reaſon down the *deſcending* line, the different GROUNDS on which it argues, the different offices which it performs, or the METHOD it purſues, will be ſomething like the following.

All Truth is born of God; and, as every diſpenſation of it, whether *natural* or *revealed*, proceeds from him, all the *parts* of it, however different they may be in kind, are conſiſtent and correſpondent members of one perfect whole. Thus truth is evermore the way

✕ Bacon de Aug. Scient. Lib. to Ch. c. 3

to truth; the leſs leading to the greater, the inferior to the ſuperior, in a regular but ſublime gradation: and, that the knowledge and certainty of one part is the only right road to the knowledge and certainty of another, is the cardinal and fundamental maxim of ſound logic. As, from *firſt* and *intuitive principles* of external and internal ſenſe, *human truths* are derived of different kinds; ſo, by a ſublimer effort, from theſe *human truths*, as new *Grounds*, or *Principles*, reaſon aſcends to thoſe which are *divine*. And this is the great connecting link between natural and ſupernatural knowledge, annexed to the foot-ſtool of God, from which the golden chain depends, by which Reaſon aſcends from earth to heaven.

This method of conveying his divine truths into the minds of men, by connecting them with truths of which they were poſſeſſed before, and theſe the moſt natural and familiar, was univerſally adopted by our Lord, who never ſtooped to the formalities of an uſeleſs logic. Inſtead of defining and ſyllogizing, we find him perpetually illuſtrating and explaining ſpiritual and heavenly things, by the ana-

logy

logy and ſimilitude of thoſe which are temporal and earthly. Of this conduct of our divine maſter and inſtructor, I ſhall only bring one example out of a thouſand; and that, becauſe it lays thoſe very fundamental GROUNDS, from which we are enabled to reaſon in Divinity.——On aſſerting to the Phariſees and Scribes that he was "the light "of the world," in proof of this ſpiritual and important truth, he does not run into ſpeculative argument or metaphyſical diſcuſſion, which men could not poſſibly underſtand, however true; but he appeals to a public fact which experience and long uſage had rendered moſt familiar to their underſtanding; "It is written in your law, that the teſti-"mony of two men is true;" from which teſtimony of two, he directly argues to the ſimilar truth of his divine commiſſion, "I "am one that bear witneſs of myſelf, and "the Father that hath ſent me beareth wit-"neſs of me[d]."—But, in his anſwers and expreſſions, more was generally meant than met the ear: and we ſhall find theſe two heavenly witneſſes, in the different evidences

[d] John viii. 17, 18.

which

which they brought forward, in ſupport of this new light of the world, laying *two* different and important *Grounds* of Theologic Reaſoning.

I. In the ſame conference with the Jewiſh doctors, our Lord puts this pointed and deciſive queſtion, "Which of you convinceth "me of SIN, and, if I ſpeak the truth, why "do ye not believe me*?" He is in ſcripture eminently and expreſsly ſtyled the *Word*, which Word conſiſts of the *Doctrines* which he taught, and of which he was *himſelf* the ſubject; and of the *Precepts* which he delivered, and of which he was *himſelf* the pattern: and "Which of you," ſaid he in this important view of himſelf, "convinceth me "of ſin?" For the truth of what he ſaid, of his doctrines and of his precepts, he appealed, by this pointed queſtion, to that *moral truth*, which his hearers had acquired in a natural way, and were convinced of from the principle of internal ſenſe; drawing a proof of his own divinity from the eternal difference of *good* and *evil*, *virtue* and *vice*,

* John viii. 46.

written

written by the hand of nature on the hearts of men, to be, among other uſes, a familiar and ſtanding witneſs of himſelf; concluding, and teaching all men to conclude, that, if upon examining his Word, by this native unerring witneſs, it be found perfectly conſiſtent with their beſt ideas of the *Goodneſs* of God, and ſuperior to their beſt ideas, it muſt, in all reaſon, be alſo conſiſtent with the ſiſter attribute of his *Truth*.—"And if "I ſay the truth, why do ye not be- "lieve me?"

Thus, it is by the evidence of *Moral truth* deduced in a natural way from the internal principle of conſciouſneſs[f], that reaſon is enabled to form a deciſive judgment of the ſubject-matter of revelation; which is, therefore, if not properly to be called a principle, a ſufficient GROUND of ſolid reaſoning in matters of religion. Should any thing be found in Scripture as taught or enjoined of God, which, when fully underſtood, palpably contradicts his moral attributes, as they are diſcovered by the light of conſcience and natural reaſon, (which are our firſt, and as

[f] See Chap. IX. of the firſt volume.

far

far as they go, true, lights;) ſhould any thing be found which is *vicious*, *immoral*, and *ſinful*, oppoſite to his very being: we may and do ſafely conclude, that it could not proceed from Him, who is the author of good and not of evil. On the contrary, if the whole religious diſpenſation, both doctrinal and moral, betray that ſuperabundant mercy and goodneſs, and good-will to men, which exceed all human conception, and which muſt be divine, it affords a moſt ſtrong preſumption, almoſt amounting to a full and poſitive proof, that it aſſuredly came from him.

Founded, as they are, in the unſearchable *Wiſdom* of the Godhead, (to judge of which attribute of the divine nature, the whole order of intellectual beings and their *relations* are to be taken into the account,) many of the doctrines of our religion are tranſcendently ſublime, and ſome of them above the higheſt reach of our underſtanding to compaſs, or our imagination to conceive; but to determine of the great *Mercy* and *Goodneſs* which they accord to the human race, the only *relations* to be conſidered are thoſe between God

Sir Bacon's Advancement of Learning and towards the Conclusion, Sermons Sermons Evidences of Christianity &c. 2 Vols.

and man[g]: and theſe attributes, ſhining upon the face of the whole Chriſtian diſpenſation with the benigneſt influence, betray to natutural reaſon conſpicuous marks of its divine extraction; holding out "a bright and ſhin-"ing light," by which we ſee in its conſtitution the hand of an immaculate original. This is a ſpecies of evidence which is mixed and interwoven in the vitals of our religion, and inherent in its very ſubſtance—"And the "Word was made fleſh and dwelt among "us, and we beheld his glory as of the only "begotten of the Father, full of Grace and "Truth[h]."

Thus that MORAL VIRTUE, which is to form the crown and conſummation of a juſtifying Faith, is made its firſt credential and foundation: ſo much order, beauty, harmony, and conſiſtence, pervade the whole of God's moral government, and conſpire to the perfection of the heavenly ſyſtem.

By this INTERNAL EVIDENCE of his Word addreſſed to the hearts and conſciences of

[g] See Warb. Div. Leg. b. ix. p. 26.

[h] John i. 17.

men,

men, Chriſt was "one who bore witnes
"himſelf."

II. But, however neceſſary and fundam
tal this ſpecies of Evidence may be to a
gion which aſſumes to have come from G
it is not ſufficient of itſelf alone to ev
the authority of a divine commiſſion [i].

[i] 'In reverence to Truth, I hold myſelf obliged to
'that, in my opinion, the REASONABLENESS of a Do
'pretended to come immediately from God, is, of itſelf
'no PROOF, but a PRESUMPTION only, of ſuch its divin
'ginal: becauſe though the *excellence* of the Doctrine
'allowing it to ſurpaſs all other moral teaching whatſo
'may ſhew it to be worthy of God, yet, from tha
'*excellence*, we cannot certainly conclude that it cam
'mediately from him; ſince we know not to what h
'of moral knowledge the human underſtanding, una
'by inſpiration, may arrive. Not even our full expe
'that all the Wiſdom of Greece and Rome come
'tremely ſhort of the Wiſdom of the GOSPEL, can ſt
'us in concluding, with certainty, that this Goſpe
'ſent immediately from God. We can but doub
'gueſs, what excellence may be produced by a well-
'vated Mind, further bleſſed with a vigorous tempera
'and a happy organization, of Body. The amaz
'into which Sir Iſaac Newton's Diſcoveries, in N
'threw the learned world, as ſoon as men became a
'comprehend their Truth and Utility, ſufficiently
'

Lord, therefore, appeals to another, though not more eſſential, more obvious and convincing, teſt, which ſtamps an irrefragable ſeal on the heavenly embaſſy. "And the Fa-"ther that hath ſent me beareth witneſs "of me."

To call the attention of men to this other Evidence, as more obvious to their apprehenſion, and in itſelf more palpable and direct, he uſes this ſtrong and figurative language [k]. "If I bear witneſs of myſelf, my witneſs is "not true," (being only the "teſtimony "of one," and inſufficient of itſelf), pro-

'what little conception it had, that the human faculties 'could ever riſe ſo high, or ſpread ſo wide.

'On the whole, therefore, we conclude, that, ſtrictly 'ſpeaking, there is no ground of conviction ſolid and ſtrong 'enough to bear the weight of ſo great an intereſt, but 'that which riſes on MIRACLES, worked by the firſt Meſ-'ſengers of a new Religion, in ſupport and confirmation of 'their MISSION.

'That is MIRACLES and MIRACLES ONLY, demon-'ſtrate that the Doctrine, which is ſeen to be *worthy* of 'God, did, indeed, COME IMMEDIATELY from him.' Warb. Div. Leg. b. ix. c. 5.

[k] That he ſpeaks figuratively is obvious from another paſſage in St. John's Goſpel, where ſpeaking *directly* he contradicts theſe words—"Though I bear record of my-"ſelf, my record is true." viii. 14.

ceeding in the ſame ſublime and pointed ſtyle—, "There is another that beareth witneſs o—f "me, and I know that the witneſs whic—h "he witneſſeth of me is true: for the WORK—S "that the Father hath given me to finiſh ; "the ſame WORKS that I do bear witne—s "of me, that the Father hath ſent me ; "and the Father himſelf which hath ſen—t "me hath borne witneſs of me[l]."—"If [redacted] "do not the Works of my Father, believe "me not. But, if I do, though ye believe "not me, believe the WORKS: that ye may "know and believe that the Father is in me, "and I in him[m]."

This ſecond witneſs of his miſſion to which Chriſt appealed, which he calls Works, were the moſt plain and obvious *Facts*, intimately connected with his Doctrines and Precepts, as *collateral* vouchers of their divinity. After eſtimating the Internal or Moral Evidence, the next office of Reaſon is to canvaſs the pretenſions of Revelation upon the GROUND of theſe external concomitant facts.

The nature of *Facts*, as a ſpecies of truth, was analyzed in the firſt volume of this work,

[l] John v. 31, 32, 36. [m] John x. 37, 38.

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which I muſt now recall the attention of
reader; as they are thoſe human truths,
which the author of our religion leads men
mediately to the belief of its divine myſ-
ies. This ſpecies of truth was found to be
re direct and obvious than any other; open
the apprehenſion, and familiar to the mind,
all men; reſulting immediately from the
ividual objects preſented to the eye, the moſt
fect of the ſenſes; ſpringing from effects
mſelves, without attention to their re-
ter cauſes; and requiring nothing for their
of, but the coincidence of *tranſaction*, *per-*
, *time*, and *place*, or for their conviction,
that the *ſenſes* be ſound, competent, and
ll-informed. And, from their frequency
inceſſant occurrence, in the ordinary
rſe of human things, Facts are not only
ſt obvious and familiar in themſelves, but
in their proximate and efficient cauſes[n].
The *Facts* which our Saviour laid as an
portant GROUND, from which men were to
ſon to the truth of his religion, were as
pable to the ſenſes, and as eaſy to the ap-
henſions, of all men, as it is poſſible for

[n] See Chap. IX.

any facts to be; differing only from the moſt common and ordinary that occur in the natural courſe of things, in one particular, which difference was as clearly to be apprehended by the plaineſt conception, as they were themſelves. And it is to this important *difference*, to which they owe their evidence: for, whereas other facts are the effects of common and ordinary cauſes; theſe were ſtill more obviouſly the immediate effects of a moſt *uncommon and extraordinary Cauſe.*

From the operation of this uncommon and extraordinary Cauſe, not producing new phænomena in a natural way, but doing wonderful and particular acts, and producing wonderful and particular effects, in a ſupernatural one, theſe Facts, appointed as the concomitant proofs and evidences of the religious diſpenſation, were called *Powers* or *Miracles*; being, indeed, ſuch "Works as no man can "do except God be with him," whoſe allwiſe and perfect nature could not employ them to ſanction a lie, but to confirm and eſtabliſh the moſt important and beneficial truths.

Theſe

Theſe miracles, however new, and different from the ordinary and uniform experience of men, and the common effects of common cauſes, and, on that account, the leſs credible in themſelves; yet, being the only adequate credentials which could confirm to men the Teſtimony of God and the divine commiſſion of his Son, and abſolutely neceſſary to the ends of a diſpenſation ſo important as to involve the happineſs of the human race, they derive a credit both from their ſingular neceſſity, and the ſingular importance of their final cauſe; and, when ſupported by human teſtimony which is ſufficiently authentic, they are entitled to the belief of all future ages[o]. They were alſo pronounced and

[o] 'A MIRACLE, even when beſt ſupported by human 'teſtimony, needeth to be ſtill further qualified, ere it can 'deſerve credit of a rational Believer: namely, that it be 'ſo connected with the ſyſtem to which it claims relation, 'as that it ſeem to make part of it, or to be neceſſary to 'its completion.

'It is otherwiſe in Facts acknowledged to be within the 'verge of nature and human agency. Here all that is 'wanted to recommend them to our belief, is the teſtimony 'of knowing and honeſt Witneſſes.

and declared by their agent, the perſon who was inveſted with the ſupernatual power of working

'While in pretended Facts beyond the verge of nature 'and human agency, ſuch as thoſe we call MIRACULOUS, 'much more is required when offered to our belief. The 'controul and arreſt of the eſtabliſhed Laws of Nature, by 'the God and Author of Nature, either mediately or im- 'mediately, is a thing which COMMON EXPERIENCE hath 'rendered ſo extremely improbable, that it will at leaſt ba- 'lance the very beſt human teſtimony, ſtanding unſup- 'ported and alone. And why? Becauſe ordinary Facts 'carry their CAUSES openly and manifeſtly along with 'them: or if not ſo, yet none are required, as we are 'convinced their cauſes muſt be *intrinſically* there. But in 'Facts pretended to be *miraculous*, the immediate efficient 'cauſe is *extrinſical*; and therefore leaves room for doubt 'and uncertainty: or rather, when, in this caſe, men per- 'ceive *no cauſe*, they are apt to conclude there is none; 'or, in other words, that the report is falſe and groundleſs. 'So that when the *whole evidence* of the Fact, deemed *mi- 'raculous*, is ſolely compriſed in human teſtimony, and is, 'in its nature, contrary to UNIFORM EXPERIENCE, the 'Philoſopher will, at leaſt, ſuſpend his belief.

'But though in all MIRACLES, that is, in Facts deemed 'miraculous, the EFFICIENT CAUSE continues unknown; 'yet, in thoſe which our holy Religion ſeems to recom- 'mend to our belief, the FINAL CAUSE always ſtands ap- 'parent. And, if *that cauſe* be ſo important as to make 'the Miracle neceſſary to the ends of the DISPENSATION, 'this is all that can reaſonably be required to entitle it to

working them, to be expreſsly given as the ſtanding teſt, as the broad ſeal, of his divine

'our belief; when propoſed to us with the ſame fullneſs of 'human teſtimony which is ſufficient to eſtabliſh a com-'mon fact: ſince, in this caſe, we have the MORAL AT-'TRIBUTES OF THE DEITY to ſecure us from an error, 'ſo fatal to our welfare.

'And the confining our belief of *Miracles* within theſe 'bounds, wipes away (as I conceive) all the miſerable ſo-'phiſtry of our modern pretenders to Philoſophy, both at 'home and abroad, againſt MIRACLES, on pretence of 'their being contrary to GENERAL EXPERIENCE, in the 'ordinary courſe of things. At leaſt the TRUE PHILO-'SOPHER [Mr. Locke] ſo thought, when he made that 'ſtrict enquiry into Truth, towards the concluſion of his 'immortal Work—Though COMMON EXPERIENCE (ſays 'he) AND THE ORDINARY COURSE OF THINGS have 'juſtly a weighty influence on the minds of men to make 'them give or refuſe credit to any thing propoſed to their 'belief; yet there is ONE CASE wherein the STRANGE-'NESS of the facts LESSENS NOT THE ASSENT to a fair 'teſtimony given of it. For where SUPERNATURAL 'events are SUITABLE TO THE ENDS AIMED AT BY 'HIM who hath power to change the courſe of nature, '*then*, under ſuch circumſtances, they may be FITTER to 'procure belief by how much the more they are BEYOND 'OR CONTRARY TO ORDINARY OBSERVATION. This is 'the proper caſe of MIRACLES, which, well atteſted, do 'not only find credit themſelves, *but give it alſo to other 'truths, which need ſuch confirmation.*'

Warb. Div. Leg. b. ix. c. 5.

commiſſion, to which it was ſo requiſite; and, to complete their atteſting power, they were eſſentially and inſeparably connected with the moſt important part of the diſpenſation, and of the truths themſelves [p]. Thus, both from the expediency of the thing, the declaration of their agent, and their ſelf-importance, they derive the ſtrongeſt credibility.

[p] 'We come next to that ſecond Species of *Miracles* 'whoſe ſubject makes ſo eſſential a part in the Oeconomy 'of the GOSPEL, that, without it, the whole would be 'vain and fruitleſs. The firſt and principal of this ſpe- 'cies is the MIRACLE of Chriſt's Reſurrection from the 'Dead. *If Chriſt be not* RAISED (ſaith Saint Paul) *your 'faith is vain*; you are yet in your ſins. And St. Peter 'uſes the ſame argument to ſhew the NECESSITY of his 'Maſter's *reſurrection*—*God* (ſays he) raiſed him up, hav- 'ing looſed the pains of death; BECAUSE IT WAS NOT 'POSSIBLE THAT HE SHOULD BE HOLDEN OF IT.——If 'Chriſt himſelf was not ſeen to enjoy the fruits of that 'Redemption, which was of his own procuring, what 'hopes could be entertained for the reſt of mankind? Would 'it not have been too plauſibly concluded, that this expe- 'dient REDEMPTION had proved ineffectual by CHRIST's 'not *riſing*? So neceſſarily (connected in the Apoſtle's opi- 'nion) was the MIRACLE of our Saviour's viſible *reſur- 'rection* with the very eſſence of the Chriſtian Faith—

'Thus, we ſee, the MIRACLE of the *Reſurrection* 'made a neceſſary part of the integrity of the Goſpel.'

Warb. Div. Leg. b. ix. c. 5.

So

So plain and eaſy of apprehenſion, are both the nature and uſe of *Miracles*, that fundamental groundwork of the Chriſtian Faith. But ſome men, loſing themſelves in the mazes of philoſophy, poſſeſs the unhappy talent of puzzling the plaineſt things: and, what is a greater evil, they draw others into the toils in which they have been taken, who, in vainly ſtruggling to get free, entangle themſelves the more, till the whole ſcene becomes a maze of perplexity and error[q].

By this EXTERNAL EVIDENCE of Works, "the Father that ſent him bore witneſs "of him."

Founded in the plaineſt truths of the *internal* and *external* Senſes, ſo clear and convincing are theſe GROUNDS of Evidence, the one inherent in the very vitals of the religious diſpenſation, and the other eſſentially connected with it, to which our Lord appealed in proof of that "Truth" which he brought down from heaven to be the "Light of the world," in that conciſe and expreſſive declaration, "I am one that bear witneſs of myſelf; and "the Father which hath ſent me beareth

[q] Mr. Hume and his opponents.

"witneſs of me." And, when the blind obſtinacy of his prejudiced and perverted hearers ſhut their eyes againſt the full blaze of this twofold light, with that dignity and ſublimity of character which diſtinguiſhed all that he ſaid or did, he condemned their double blindneſs in this ſummary and deciſive ſentence—"And now have they both ſeen "and hated both ME and MY FATHER[r]."

Theſe two grounds of reaſoning, ſo totally different from each other, are jointly indiſpenſable to the eſtabliſhment of that Divine Teſtimony which is the infallible principle of all revealed religion, mutually ſupporting and ſupported by each other—The internal *purity of the Doctrine* proving that the *Miracle* which accompanied it was *wrought of God*: and the *divine power of the Miracle* proving, in its turn, the *divinity of the Doctrine*[s].

III. In

[r] John xv. 24.

[s] 'So little being known of the powers of created ſpi-'rits, ſuperior to ourſelves, (ſome of which we are taught 'to believe are beneficent to man, and ſome averſe) all 'that we can conclude of MIRACLES, conſidered only in 'themſelves, is, that they are the work of agents, able, 'in

III. In addition to this ſupernatural gift of Miracles exerciſed by Chriſt and his Apoſtles, for the rational foundation of his religion, in

'in ſome inſtances, to controul Nature, and divert her 'from her eſtabliſhed courſe.—But whether this controul 'be performed immediately by the God of Nature, or by 'Agents acting under his direction, or, on the contrary, 'by malignant agents, at enmity with Man, and, for a 'time, permitted to indulge their perverſe and hurtful 'purpoſes, cannot be known, but by the *nature of that 'Doctrine*, in ſupport of which, the pretended MIRACLES 'are performed. The concluſion from this is, that THE 'MIRACLES ARE TO BE VERIFIED BY THE DOCTRINE. 'But then, ſince we know ſo little of the extent of the 'human underſtanding, we cannot determine of the true 'original of the Doctrine propoſed to our belief, till it be 'ſupported by MIRACLES: now the concluſion from this 'is, that the DOCTRINE IS TO BE VERIFIED BY 'MIRACLES.

——'In this there is no fruitleſs return of an unprogreſ-'ſive argument; but a regular proceſſion of two diſtinct 'and different Truths, till the whole reaſoning becomes 'complete. In truth, they afford mutual aſſiſtance to 'one another; yet not by taking back what they had 'given; but by continuing to hold what each had im-'parted to the ſupport of the other.

'On the whole, we conclude, that if any Meſſengers 'ever wanted the CREDENTIALS OF MIRACLES, they 'were the firſt MESSENGERS OF GOD, in the revealed 'Myſtery of the GOSPEL.' Warb. Div. Leg. b. ix. c. 5.

the

tion will lead him into a labyrinth of error; but to ſtudy the language of prophecy, and to attend with a watchful eye to the hiſtory of things and changes as they happen in the world, and to claſs events with their predictions, as they are found clearly to correſpond. But to expatiate in this field of Prophecy would extend theſe lectures much beyond the limits of the plan preſcribed.

With one or other of theſe External Evidences the Chriſtian Church hath been ſupplied, according to its different circumſtances and occaſions, and as they were beſt ſuited to the purpoſes of religion. *Miracles*, ſtriking immediately upon the ſenſes, were beſt calculated for the firſt planting of a new religion: but they could not be continued through future ages; for, by being perpetually repeated, in time they would have loſt their very nature, and with that their evidence. When Miracles began to be withdrawn, *Prophecy* began to operate, which could not produce an immediate effect on the firſt witneſſes, requiring ſome time after its enunciation; and it was thus prepared to ſupply their place.

With

With us, therefore, it is a "ſurer," and more laſting evidence: for whilſt we have Miracles only on record, loſing, perhaps, ſomething of their force by time; we have Prophecy, in ſome part of its chain, in the act of completion, and growing more and more convincing, till, by the germinant luxuriancy of its branches gradually ripening their fruit, its force become irreſiſtible.

By this divine expedient 'the ſovereign 'Maſter, who no leſs manifeſts his conſtant 'preſence to the *moral*, than to the natural, 'government of the world, has been graci-'ouſly pleaſed to give to theſe *later* ages of 'the church more than an equivalent for 'what he had beſtowed upon the *earlier*, in 'beginning to ſhower down on his choſen 'ſervants of the new Covenant the riches of 'his *Prophecy*, as the power of working '*Miracles* abated—And hence the Wiſdom 'of the divine diſpenſer is ſtill further ſeen 'in making *Prophecy* not only the *ſtrongeſt*, but 'the *laſt*, and concluding, evidence of a reli-'gion, which, as it was the concluſion of the 'whole ſcheme of revelation; ſo, having (as 'it ſhould ſeem) the largeſt portion of its

'courſe

'course to run, that species of evidence, 'which does not lose, but gain, strength by 'time, was best fitted to accompany it to its 'utmost period [n].'

As Miracles formed a necessary supplement to the *Moral* evidence; so this vast chain of *Prophecy*, fulfilling and to be fulfilled, confirm the truth of *Miracles*, in which they originated and which they now supply; wonderfully co-operating with both, and uniting in one great design, forming together a magnificent and stately system, an extensive fabric, of Evidence, equally to be admired for the symmetry and support of all the parts, and the harmony and disposition of the whole.

These External Evidences, by which the divine Testimony is established, and which are the Grounds of a rational faith, are not only calculated for the purposes of different men, according to the times and circumstances under which they are placed; but require a different train and Method of Reasoning in their proper *Authentication*.

[n] Warb. Div. Leg. b. ix. c. 6.

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To the eye-witneſs of the facts called Miracles, which were performed by Chriſt himſelf, the evidence was ſo palpable and direct, that, where the mind was candid and well-diſpoſed, they produced an *immediate* and full conviction of the whole truth of his religion, as the Teſtimony of God.

To the primitive Chriſtians, who were not ſuch eye-witneſſes, the evidence was, indeed, one degree removed. Their conviction, however, flowed from the immediate report of the eye-witneſſes, or elſe from that report at ſecond hand; which report was, indeed, directly confirmed to them by the eye-witneſs of other miracles, "the Lord working with "his ſervants, and confirming the word with "ſigns following[r]." In this caſe reaſon had a very *ſhort* and eaſy operation.

In the ſucceeding age, when the canon of the New Teſtament was completing under the conduct of inſpiration, theſe evidences were confirmed by recent facts, performed in times not far remote, by perſons who were known, in places where the people lived; and publiſhed by theſe perſons, in theſe times

[r] Mark xiv. 20.

and

and places, as the original Miracles had been themselves, challenging all to contradict them if they could: and the conviction of Christians was founded in the sacred writings so recently attested, and in the inspired authority of their respective authors, who could be clearly proved. All which was directly confirmed by Prophecies, which were beginning to be fulfilled. In this case reason had a *longer* operation.

We, in these distant ages, are put under very different circumstances both of *time* and *place*. The times, in which the truths of theology were revealed, and their evidences exhibited to the world, and in which both were committed to written record, are many ages removed from ours; and the places are at the distance of many countries: so that they must necessarily come down to us through the lengthened channel of human tradition.

For the Testimony of God recorded in the holy scriptures, which is the governing principle of our faith, we are, therefore, indebted to the *Testimony of men*; which opens an *extensive* and *laborious* field of reasoning, and critical discussion.

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The METHOD which Reaſon is to follow, in this extenſive diviſion of theology, is, by a logical train of *hiſtorical inveſtigation*, to eſtabliſh a ſeries of important facts[w]. And the firſt queſtion that preſents itſelf to the theological enquirer, will be—Whether the *Senſes* of the immediate witneſſes of the ſupernatural facts and evidences of a divine commiſſion were *ſound* and *well-informed*, clear and competent judges of them, ſubject to no fraud or impoſition[x]? And to this another will ſucceed as its counter-part—Whether their credit is to be relied upon as *faithful* and *honeſt Relators*[y]?—Theſe two queſtions, in their joint affirmative, conſtitute the requiſite qualification of a true witneſs and faithful narrator, neither deceived himſelf, nor intending to deceive others: without which primary qualification, any hiſtory may be a fallacy or an impoſture.

Theſe immediate witneſſes or their immediate friends, the appointed inſtruments of the divine teſtimony in all its parts, were ſpecially

[w] See chap. x. ſect. 1, of the firſt volume.
[x] See p. 194, 195, 196, of ditto.
[y] See p. 210, 211. of ditto,

and divinely commiſſioned, and aided by a ſupernatural power, to commit the whole ſubſtance of its truths and evidences of every kind to *written record*, and authorized by divine aſſiſtance to add whatever was neceſſary, by way of explanation, prophecy, or exhortation, to complete the whole diſpenſation of Grace to man; that "the faith of future ages might "not ſtand in the wiſdom of men, but in "the power of God." The *originals* or *autographies* themſelves of this written record, forming the canon of the New Teſtament executed under this infallible guidance, it hath pleaſed divine providence to take away from us and out of the world, and only to leave *copies* of them to be tranſmitted down the channel of all future time by human means, ſuper-intending, no doubt, ſo ſacred a depoſit by the inviſible eye of its ſpecial care.

The queſtions, which ariſe upon theſe circumſtances, will, therefore, be—Whether the originals themſelves were the *genuine productions* of thoſe immediate witneſſes or their immediate friends, whoſe names they bear? and—Whether theſe productions had actually

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the ſeal of *divine inſpiration?* Then comes a moſt important and extenſive ſubject of theological inquiry and learned inveſtigation—Whether thoſe manuſcripts and books which contain the copies, with their ancient tranſlations, editions, and quotations in different languages, be the *faithful tranſcripts* of the originals?

And, to conclude this preliminary part of the extenſive ſtudy of Divinity, As theſe numerous manuſcripts, tranſlations, editions, and quotations are found, upon compariſon, to differ from each other, though in no very eſſential points, yet in many particulars of ſmaller account; another ſubject of nice examination and critical judgment opens itſelf to the theologiſt in an extenſive *collation* and compariſon of correſpondent texts in order to inveſtigate, as far as poſſible, the mutilations, additions, and alterations, which have been made through fraud, ignorance, or accident, and, by an able and impartial deciſion, to reſtore the true and genuine text.

So long and laborious is the way which leads fallible men, in theſe diſtant ages, to the

 infallible

infallible Principle of Theology. On theſe Grounds of judgment, which are the commoneſt truths of common life, derived from the internal and external Senſes, and from the documents of ſound and authentic Hiſtory, (which are as the *primary principles*, from which we reaſon to the divine Teſtimony as a *ſecondary* one,) the truth and certainty of the Chriſtian Religion are firmly built. Reaſon, we have more than once obſerved, can only judge of Evidences; and theſe Evidences are the beſt, they are indeed all, which the nature of that religion, being purely divine and ſpiritual, ſeparate from all human and earthly things, can poſſibly admit: and, whatever men may think of them, they were thought by Him, who gave us that religion, ſufficient in every age for our information and conviction. They are in all reſpects calculated to vindicate the *Goodneſs*, and to diſplay the *Mercy* of God, "whoſe ways are "not as our ways, nor thoughts as our "thoughts;" who, whether we may be able to diſcern them or not, knowing himſelf what cauſes will produce the deſigned effects, always employs the fitteſt means to accompliſh

the end he has in view; and who has taken eſpecial care, in every part, and under every circumſtance, of his religious diſpenſation, that "our Faith ſhould not ſtand in the wiſ- "dom of men, but in the power of God."

By ſuch a METHOD of extenſive and various REASONING philoſophically inſtituted and logically conducted, and upon theſe GROUNDS, is erected a rational and ſublime Theology; juſt as, in its different province, a ſyſtem of Natural philoſophy is erected upon phyſical and experimental principles:—a Theology, which, as a citadel founded upon a rock, challenges, in every age, the aſſaults of infidelity. After the moſt accurate and critical enquiry, the acuteſt diſcernment, and the profoundeſt learning, which have been repeatedly exerted on the one hand; after all that the keeneſt acumen, the ſubtleſt artifice, and the deepeſt ſophiſtry, could object on the other, which a ſubject of the greateſt and moſt univerſal concern to men could not fail to excite: upon theſe Grounds the Chriſtian Religion has been *eſtabliſhed* and *confirmed*, as much by the attacks of its bittereſt adverſaries, as by the defences of its ableſt advocates. Upon

theſe Grounds it has gone on conquering and to conquer, triumphing over intereſt and ambition, ignorance and learning, friends and enemies, the Pope and Ariſtotle. Reaſon and ſound Philoſophy are thoſe allies, on whoſe honeſt and faithful ſervice ſhe depends. In every age and country, where they have come, they have erected their ſtandard in her cauſe. They baniſh error and ſuperſtition, ſcepticiſm and infidelity, from her ſhrine; and rejoice to place that *Faith*, which is the pure offspring of heaven, in the immoveable ſeat of the *Underſtanding*.

SECT. II.

Of the Study of the HOLY SCRIPTURES.

WHEN, by eſtabliſhing the infallible Principle of Theology, the Teſtimony of God, that ſacred fountain from which the myſteries of religion ſpontaneouſly flow, Reaſon has cleared the way to the foundation of our moſt holy Faith; the *fruit*

of the heavenly vineyard remain to be gathered with diligence and preſerved with care, and to be ſo faithfully and plentifully diſtributed among men, that they may be enjoyed by all, who are willing to embrace and to improve them, in the eaſieſt and moſt advantageous way: which opens another field for the exerciſe of REASON in the province of Theology, in which the induſtrious huſbandman will find more and different employment.

The HOLY SCRIPTURES are the ſole repoſitory of all the myſteries of religion, doctrinal and moral, containing the whole form and ſubſtance of theologic truth. They are ſtyled "the oracles of God," ſpeaking and declaring his will to every age and country, in a language, which, though ſometimes plain and expreſs, is ſometimes as myſterious as the truths which they reveal. They are that ſole and univerſal ſpring, whoſe living waters are to flow pure and unadulterated "for the "healing of the nations," to the end of time: and the critical ſtudy and analyſis of every part preſent the ſublimeſt ſubject of rational inveſtigation to the mind of man.

In this part of theology, the act of Reaſoning becomes an act of *Interpretation*, in the conduct and execution of which, the deepeſt learning, the matureſt judgment, the ableſt criticiſm, the moſt extenſive information, and, I may ſay, the pureſt virtue, will find ample ſcope for the exerciſe of their powers. And as, in the proſecution of every ſubject, the firſt and the moſt important thing is to eſcape the wrong, and to get into the right, road; ſo, by adopting that method of interpretation, which is philoſophically and logically juſt, we ſhall ſave much fruitleſs toil, and be moſt ſucceſsful in the purſuit.

That, however infinite and various in his truth, "the Lord our God is *one* God," conſiſtent with himſelf and uniform in operation; ſo that one part of his truth is every where introductory to, and illuſtrative of, another, is the ſolid foundation of that logical *analogy*, from which the natural ſyſtem of the univerſe is a key to the moral, by the uſe of which the divine philoſopher is enabled to unlock the celeſtial manſions. A right knowledge of the diſpenſation of *Nature* will, therefore,

therefore, furniſh us with a clue which will lead us to the right knowledge of that *Grace*: and, by putting them ſide by ſide in a comparative eſtimation, we ſhall ſee that the true method of interpreting the one will introduce us to the true method of interpreting the other. 'Two books or volumes of ſtudy,' ſays our great philoſopher, 'are laid before 'us, if we would be ſecured from error: firſt, 'the *Scriptures* revealing the will of God: 'and then the *Creatures* expreſſing his power, 'whereof the latter is a key unto the for-'mer[a].' The diſplay of himſelf, in the great volume of his *Works*, will open to our underſtanding the diſplay of himſelf, in the ſmaller volume of his *Word*: and the œconomy of the one will illuſtrate and unfold the œconomy of the other.

Impreſſed upon every thing we obſerve in the natural ſyſtem of the univerſe, the Power, the Wiſdom, and the Goodneſs, of the Deity, meet the eye in ſuch bold and prominent features, as to force themſelves upon minds the moſt torpid and uninformed. A knowledge

[a] Baconus de Augm. Sc. lib. 1.

alſo

alſo of the general uſes of ſuch things, as are neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence and convenience of human life, is eaſily attained: and all the domeſtic and ſocial benefits, which are requiſite to the perſonal ſecurity and comfort of mankind, are extracted and derived with eaſe from the various materials with which they are ſurrounded. So obvious is the book of nature, in its moſt uſeful pages, to the plaineſt underſtandings. With equal clearneſs and ſimplicity the fundamental truths of Chriſtianity are revealed to all men. The great duties of Faith, Obedience, and Repentance, which are ſufficient to "make "men wiſe unto ſalvation," are moſt plainly and diſtinctly taught in almoſt every page of the ſacred volume; and every moral virtue or obligation is inculcated with a clearneſs and ſimplicity, to which all moraliſts muſt yield——So *openly* hath the univerſal Father dealt with all men in both his diſpenſations; leaving nothing concealed, which is neceſſary or ſufficient for the inſtruction of the ignorant and unlearned (who in all human ſociety muſt always form a great majority,) either in the uſe of things, which contribute

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to the comfort of this life, or in their religious dependence and moral duty, in which their future happineſs is involved.

But, however forcibly theſe divine attributes may impreſs themſelves upon the attention of all men; or however eaſily all the commoneſt uſes of common things may be diſcovered: it is only to the eye of the philoſopher penetrating, by accurate and experimental obſervation, into the deeper receſſes of nature, in the various parts of her extenſive volume, that that Power is diſplayed in all its wonder, that Wiſdom unfolded in all its glory, and that Goodneſs ſhines out in all its beauty;—that all thoſe latent cauſes are unfolded, which, in the mechaniſm of the material ſyſtem, produce ſuch various and aſtoniſhing effects. And, however clear and obvious both in its general truths and duties, the moral diſpenſation is replete with deeper and ſublimer myſteries than the natural. The volume of inſpiration is profeſſedly a myſterious book, challenging the deepeſt inveſtigation of the learned in every age, particularly of thoſe who are appointed by more than human authority to be the diſpenſers and interpreters

lations of their own invention. Hence, in their interpretation of nature, inſtead of finding a real world, the image of its author, they produced a number of imaginary ones, from the pregnant womb of fancy, as diverſe from each other, as almoſt equally unrelated to him. And, to keep pace with theſe interpreters of nature, their ingenious brethren the ſchool theologiſts, inſtead of ſearching the Scriptures by a grammatical, and truly critical, which is indeed a laborious, examination, for the truths which they every where contain, were as inventively but more miſchievouſly employed in erecting ſimilar ſchemes of faith and hypothetical ſyſtems of divinity, as different from each other as abhorrent from the dictates of the one inſpirer of one true religion.

Correſpondent to the genius of theſe air-built ſyſtems, was the logic employed about them. Logic, in theſe ingenious ages, diſdained to ſtoop to the office of finding truth. As imagination could more readily invent, than reaſon could inveſtigate, the taſk of finding truth was allotted to the former; and logic had only to forge artificial weapons for

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its attack and its defence. It furniſhed both the philoſophical and theological champion with a kind of magic armour of ſuch dexterous contrivance, that the patrons of different theories could attack and defend, with ſuch equal ſucceſs as never to injure or deſtroy, them, and eternally contend about them, with an equal ſhew of conqueſt on either ſide[a]. And it was only juſt, that ſuch eaſy and ingenious ſyſtems ſhould have ſuch an eaſy and ingenious logic. Conſiſting of *terms* of its own, to which, by an arbitrary, though formal, *definition*, it annexed what ideas it pleaſed, without regard to the truth of things; it could make every phænomenon of nature bend to every hypotheſis, and diſtort every text of ſcripture to the ſupport of every ſyſtem.

[a] Hæc inutilis ſubtilitas duplex eſt, & ſpectatur aut in materia ipſa, qualis eſt inanis ſpeculatio, cujus generis reperiuntur & in theologia & in philoſophia haud paucæ: aut in modo & methodo tractandi. Hæc apud ſcholaſticos ferè talis erat. Super unaquaque re propoſita formabant objectiones; deinde objectionum illarum ſolutiones, quæ ſolutiones ut plurimum diſtinctiones tantum erant. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. 1.

Upon

Upon ſuch a foundation, and by the help of ſuch an inſtrument, was erected the Babel of the ſchools in philoſophy and divinity, equally the peſt of ſcience and religion; which, for many ages, threw its dark ſhade over the moſt enlightened parts of Europe. Polemical divinity, conſiſting of a number of hypothetical and factitious queſtions agitated on both ſides with all the ſophiſtry of diſputation, and in a language as unintelligible to a rational underſtanding, as that of the ancient Babel after the confuſion of tongues, was the legitimate offspring of ſuch a theology and ſuch a logic. Univerſities adopted this as the main object of their ſtudy and cultivation; in the exerciſe of which, inſtead of opening the ſcriptures by a juſt and candid interpretation, by handling the word of God artfully and deceitfully, their theological diſputants ſcarcely found a text in ſcripture, which they did not pervert and miſapply, in defending their own dogmas and inventions, or in ſubverting thoſe of their opponents. Inſtead of employing their reaſon ſoberly and diſcreetly to the uſeful purpoſes of theology, they contaminated its moſt ſublime and ſacred myſteries by an impure mixture

mixture of metaphyſical ſpeculation. Theſe fabricated queſtions produced an exhauſtleſs fund of polemical contention (for of error there is no end), and, though held out by ſage divines as of the laſt importance to religion, they were "fooliſh and unprofitable" at beſt; and ſo exactly deſcriptive of thoſe "vain babblings, profane novelties of words, and oppoſitions of ſcience falſely ſo called [b]," againſt which St. Paul has cautioned his diſciples Timothy and Titus, as to warrant the aſſertion, that he foreſaw the folly, and foretold the conduct, of the learned in diſtant ages [c].

And, what was more than all inauſpicious to the ſtudy of theology and the pure interpretation of the word of God, from the prejudice of education and the prevalence of habit enflamed by the heat of party zeal, theſe

[b] 1 Tim. vi. 20.

[c] Qua in *litigioſa ſubtilitate* increpatio illa Paulina non magis ad ſuam ætatem referre, quam ad ſequentia tempora deduci, poteſt. *Devita profanas vocum novitates & oppoſitiones falſi nominis ſcientiæ.* His enim verbis duo ſigna ſcientiæ ſuſpectæ atque mentitæ proponit. Primum eſt, vocum novitas & inſolentia; alterum rigor dogmatum, qui neceſſario oppoſitionem, & dein altercationes quæſtioneſque inducit, &c. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. 1.

faſhionable ſyſtems and diſputations warped, by an inſenſible contagion, the underſtanding of men of ſuperior learning and ſounder judgment; inſomuch, that in their tranſlations, interpretations, and commentaries of the holy bible, inſtead of repreſenting the meaning of the original faithfully, critically, and candidly, they could not avoid giving it a colour of their own to favour the ſect or dogma to which addicted they were ~~inclined~~.

Thus the ſtudy of Phyſics and Divinity, inſtead of being the juſt interpretation of Nature and the Scriptures, which are the works of God, became the invention and ſupport of ſyſtems, which were the fabrications of men: and the honour of the philoſopher and divine conſiſted in a pertinacious and obſtinate adherence to the ſyſtems in which they had been bred, and in ſtanding forward, in the pride and formality of a contentious logic, invincible champions in their defence; as a mercenary ſoldier is bound to fight and to die under the banner, to which he has engaged.

From

From theſe cauſes, ſo inauſpicious to the progreſs of good learning, neither of theſe ſtudies made any material advances for many ages; till the ſuperior genius of Lord Bacon chalked out a new and different line, by the invention of a ſounder logic, for the ſtudy and interpretation of Nature, and gave ſuch clear and collateral intimations in regard to thoſe of the holy Scriptures, that a few philoſophers and divines magnanimouſly embarked in the cauſe of truth, and, in deſpite of the ſtatutable and formal diſcipline, have gone hand in hand in emancipating reaſon from the bonds of factitious ſyſtem, and, upon experimental and ſcriptural grounds, have been equally ſucceſsful in the interpretation both of the volume of Nature and of that of Grace.

The ſucceſs, which crowned the labours of the philoſopher in this new line of cultivation, gave encouragement to the theologiſt to purſue a ſimilar plan of ſtudy [d]: and the ableſt divines of the church of England have employed their learning and their labours after a more rational and ſucceſsful method, much

[d] See Introd. to Book ix. of Warb. Div. Leg.

to the honour of their profeſſion, and to the great emolument of the firſt of ſciences. What has been ſo ably and auſpiciouſly begun, in this theological reform, it is incumbent on the learned to purſue and finiſh. Avoiding the extremes of ſcepticiſm and ſuperſtition, of licentious ſpeculation and blind credulity, it is time to embrace and to ſecond the reform in every part of our public diſcipline, by adopting the moſt judicious and proper means. It is time to turn our backs with ſhame on the fabricated ſyſtems and abſurd poſitions of artificial and hypothetical divines, who uſurped or infringed the prerogatives of ſcripture, and to explore the Bible itſelf, that pure and genuine ſtore, that inexhauſtible fund of ſound theology: and, if ſyſtems are formed, to let them be only conſtructed on a ſcriptural foundation. It is time, in ſhort, to change, to ſhut up, or to pull down, the ſchools, thoſe monuments of ignorance for ages paſt. It is time to abandon diſputation and altercation, which at beſt are uſeleſs and unprofitable, and, inſtead of contending about nothing for an empty bubble, to go hand in hand in purſuit of the genuine prize; advancing with modeſty, with candour

dour and diſcretion; and following truth not for the ſake of triumph, but with an eye to charity. And, under the direction of ſuch a leader and logician as our own country has afforded, we need not be afraid of puſhing on our enquiries in the volume of *Nature*, or in that of *Grace*: if we do not examine, with too bold and profane an eye, into the deeper myſteries of religion; into that inner ſanctuary, in which the Deity alone reſides, and into which he has forbidden us to look.

But, though "the ſecret things belong "to the Lord our God," yet "the things, "which are revealed, belong to us and to "our children for ever[e]:" And 'let no one, 'ſays Lord Bacon, taking to himſelf the cre- 'dit of a ſobriety and moderation ill applied, 'think or maintain that men can ſearch too 'far in the book of God's word, or in that of 'his works, in *Theology* or *Philoſophy*: but 'rather, let them excite themſelves to the 'ſearch, and boldly advance in the purſuit of 'an endleſs progreſs in both; only taking 'care leſt they apply their knowledge to

[e] Deut. xxix. 29.

'ſwelling not to charity, to oſtentation not 'to uſe[f].'

Thus, the kingdoms of *Nature* and *Grace* are as two parallel lines following the ſame direction, but which can never be made to touch. Theſe ſtudies, by a general and cloſe analogy, reflect light upon each other, and are to be ſucceſsfully cultivated in a ſimilar way: but in their ſeparate proſecution, that great maxim of all ſound logic, *never to mix and confound them together*, ſhould be moſt ſacredly obſerved; the neglect of which will be ſhewn, in ſome future ſtage of theſe lectures, to be a fundamental cauſe of error[g]. And

[f] Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. 1.

[g] To this mixture of theſe different parts of learning we may trace the origin of HUTCHINSONIANISM, that ſtrange infatuation, by which the judgment of a ſect of very learned and worthy men, led away by whim and fancy and for want of a proper ſtrength and comprehenſion of mind, has been aſtoniſhingly betrayed; whom Warburton, in his rude ſtyle, denominated *a cabaliſtic crew, blind workers in dirt and darkneſs*. Lord Bacon, who knew the proper nature, and ſaw all the juſt dependencies and independencies of the different parts of learning, and what aſſiſtance they could mutually impart, has not only warned us againſt this mixture and

And another admonition with which that reformer of learning concludes the above remark is too important to the STUDY of DIVINITY to be neglected—'Taking care again, 'not to mix and confound theſe diſtinct 'parts of learning *Theology*, and *Philoſophy*, 'together [h].'

and confuſion in general, but has ſtigmatized this particular evil in the directeſt words—Alter exceſſus ejus modi præſupponit in ſcripturis perfectionem, ut etiam omnis philoſophia ex earum fontibus peti debeat, ac ſi philoſophia alia quævis res profana eſſet & ethnica. Hæc intemperies in ſchola Paracelſi præcipue, nec non apud alios invaluit. Initia autem ejus a Rabbinis & Cabaliſtis defluxerunt. Verum iſtiuſmodi homines non id aſſequuntur quod volunt: neque enim honorem, ut putant, ſcripturis deferunt; ſed eaſdem potius deprimunt & polluunt.—Quemadmodum enim theologiam in philoſophia quærere, perinde eſt, ac vivos quæras inter mortuos: ita, e contra, philoſophiam in theologia quærere, non aliud eſt, quam mortuos quærere inter vivos. De Augm. Sc. lib. ix.

[h] Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. i.

SECT. III.

Of the GENERAL INTERPRETATION of the Holy Scriptures.

THAT the Holy Bible, both in matter and manner, is a book totally different from all others that ever were or could be written, is a poſition founded on this great and eternal truth—that "the thoughts" of Him, by whom it was dictated, "are not as the thoughts, "nor his ways as the ways, of men." It will, conſequently, require a different INTERPRETATION.

In this volume of his Grace, as in that of Nature, the Almighty hath hidden under a veil the treaſures of his wiſdom, to furniſh employment to the learned; as well as opened thoſe of his goodneſs and mercy, to the uſe and enjoyment of all men: and, though its Interpretation has been the taſk of many ages, as a mine unexhauſted and inexhauſtible, it is calculated, as has been obſerved, to exerciſe the

the ſkill and ingenuity of the learned to the end of time.

The fathers and earlier commentators of the church filled the world with annotations upon the books of the ſacred volume: but, whether from the uſe of imperfect copies and inaccurate tranſlations, or whether from a partial and unphiloſophical method of interpreting, no great light has been reflected upon the bible from their numerous illuſtrations. Inſtead of collating and correcting the text, in the firſt place, and of eſtabliſhing, in the ſecond, ſome juſt and general rules of interpretation; their labours were waſted in framing notions and inventions of their own, as abſurd in themſelves, as repugnant from the author; or their learning was miſemployed in labouring every trifling particular with a great variety and extent of explanation, whilſt they totally overlooked things of real and general importance. We need not, therefore, wonder, if their ſcriptural lucubrations be of little uſe in leading us into the recondite meaning of the ſacred code.

In addition to theſe general defects, commentators of later date became the bigots of religious perſuaſion, or the ſlaves of factitious ſyſtem, which warped or obſcured their partial judgment. By a taint early contracted in a ſcholaſtic education, and confirmed by narrow habits of thinking and reaſoning, each became the furious antagoniſt of another, whoſe main object was to confute his ingenious and partial interpretations, and to ſupport his own. Interpretation aſſumed the character of *diſputation*; and, inſtead of critical explanations and luminous remarks, the ſacred commentators are filled with private bickerings and ſyſtematical altercations. Refinements on words and phraſes, twiſted by the ſubtlety of invention into every ſhape out of the right one, employed the reſt of their bulky labours. Things the moſt obvious and direct they wreſted from their meaning; and thoſe, which are involved in real difficulty, were left to remain undiſturbed in their obſcurity. 'The ſchoolmen,' ſays a great author in the reign of Elizabeth, 'ſpinne into 'ſmall threds and ſubtle diſtinctions many 'times

'times the plaineſſe and ſimplicitie of the 'ſcriptures: their wits being like ſtrong wa- 'ter, which eateth through and diſſolveth the 'pureſt gold—For God knows what a mul- 'titude of meanings the wit of man imagin- 'eth to himſelf in the ſcriptures, which 'neither Moſes, the Prophets, or Apoſtles, 'ever conceived [i].'

Thus, however much may have been writ- ten, much remains uninterpreted: and, nei- ther from the number of the commentators nor the ſize of their productions, can we con- clude, that the ſcriptures are yet explained. In conſequence of this partial, this frivolous, and this contentious, mode of interpreting, moſt of the bulky folios, with which the preſſes of Europe have groaned for ages paſt, are replete with an unmeaning jargon, inter- larded with the ſame unedifying diſputa- tions, and filled with the ſame unintereſting remarks.

That, out of the vaſt heaps of annotations, of matter and mixture of every kind, raked together by the dull induſtry of the elder and later commentators, ſome things valuable

[i] Ralegh's Hiſtory of the World, chap. ii. § 1.

ſhould

ſhould not be found, would be a paradox unprecedented in the courſe of human things: ſince there are few men, in any profeſſion or ſphere of life, who ſay much upon ſubjects which they profeſs to underſtand, without ſaying ſome things well. There are ſome lights which ſhine out of the ſurrounding heaps of darkneſs and confuſion, like diamonds out of the immenſe rubbiſh of the mine, worth treaſuring up for the elucidation of this myſterious book: and the interpreters of future ages are indebted to the indefatigable induſtry of a collector[k], whoſe laborious Synopſis has brought together every thing worth preſerving; by which he has ſaved them the trouble of diving into a vaſt and tumultuous ſea, in which the few pearls to be found would not reward their labour.

With theſe few advantages derived from the voluminous lucubrations of former times, a ray of brighter hope has dawned upon the bible in theſe later ages, from a more rational and philoſophical method of ſtudy, and that more candid and liberal enquiry, which do honour to the preſent impartial and enlighten-

[k] Poole.

ing

ing era: when men of different educations, countries, and perſuaſions in religion, eminent for learning and indefatigable in induſtry, abandoning the contentions, and deſpiſing the bigotry, of former ages, unite as Chriſtians in one great and common cauſe; when, inſtead of labouring to confound and to perplex, they are anxious to aid and to aſſiſt, each other; and, to the credit of learning and themſelves, go hand in hand, in the ſame honourable walk, with Truth only for their guide and Charity for their companion.

Impreſſed with an awful ſenſe of the authority of the ſacred volume, and of the importance of its immortal argument, the philoſophical interpreter will ſhake off the bias of prejudices however formed, of opinions however ſanctioned, and of paſſions however conſtitutional; and will bring to the work the advantage of a pure and impartial mind. Inſtead of waſting all his labour upon a number of minute and leſs ſignificant particulars, and of refining away plain and obvious ſenſe by the ſubtleties of a narrow and corroſive mind, his firſt object will be to inſtitute

ſtitute a theological enquiry into the general deſign and purport of the written word; and, from principles and inſtructions fully contained and fairly underſtood, to illuſtrate the true *Nature and Genius of the religious diſpenſation*, in all its parts. He will mark the difference between the *firſt* and *ſecond* Covenants, that of *Works* and that of *Grace*, and obſerve the connection that ſubſiſts between them. He will trace the temporary œconomy of the *Old Teſtament*, and weigh the nature and intent of the *partial Covenant* with the Jews, obſerving with aſtoniſhment how it was made introductory of better things to come: and he will follow it through the *Law* and the *Prophets*, in its wonderful evolutions, till he ſee this vaſt and preparatory machine of providence crowned and completed in the eternal Goſpel. This *New Teſtament*, the laſt and beſt part of the religious diſpenſation, he will purſue through the ſacred pages of that Goſpel with redoubled attention; contemplating, with pureſt love and profoundeſt admiration, the divine *foundation* on which it is built, the ſupernatural *means* by which it was executed, and the immortal *end* it has in view.

Upon

Upon this general foundation all the particular labours of the ſacred interpreter will be formed, as the object which they are to illuſtrate and diſplay. Great and awfully ſublime is the taſk of the Theologiſt in this moſt important department of his profeſſion—a taſk to the adequate performance of which many are the acquiſitions, qualifications, and accompliſhments, indiſpenſably requiſite; various and extenſive are the ſtudies to be purſued.

I. The *learned Languages.*

The LANGUAGES, in which the books of holy ſcripture were originally written and early tranſlated, form the firſt object of the interpreter's ſtudy and attention, as being the proximate matter of all theologic truth: for the book, which records the Teſtimony of God, is only to be competently underſtood in its original and primitive form.

Theſe are not to be ſtudied in a careleſs and ſuperficial way. They are to be purſued radically

radically and grammatically, through their inflexions and variations, their dependencies and connections, their dialects and changes; and, to a competent knowledge of the grammar and vocabulary of each, the ſtudent will call in the aſſiſtance of the beſt lexicons, commentaries, and concordances; to enable him to underſtand their peculiar genius and ſtructure, their anomalies and analogies, their relations, and their differences from each other.

The PRIMITIVE LANGUAGES of the Old Teſtament are too little known, and cannot be too accurately and minutely ſtudied by theologiſts. Fully convinced of the vaſt importance of this ancient and oriental learning to the better knowledge and illuſtration of the ſcriptures, learned men, of different univerſities in Europe, have applied themſelves with great aſſiduity to their grammatical and critical ſtudy. Since this part of theological learning, ſo eſſential to its ſucceſs, has been ſo zealouſly undertaken and ſo ably conducted, we may congratulate ourſelves upon the extenſive and accurate *collations* of the ſacred writings, and may hope to receive an improved and uniform tranſlation

tranſlation of the whole, the fruit of their joint and honourable labours.

The genius of the GREEK TONGUE, in which the New Teſtament was written, and in which we have a very ancient and invaluable tranſlation of the Old, which, for ſome ages before St. Jerome, was thought by the learned to have been aided in its formation by more than human ſkill, and which was certainly ſanctioned by Chriſt and his Apoſtles, 'is univerſal and tranſcendent, and, 'from its propriety and univerſality, made 'for all that is great and beautiful in every 'ſubject, and under every form of writing[1].' And it cannot excite our wonder, that the Holy Ghoſt ſhould employ the moſt perfect language that ever exiſted in the world, to be the general vehicle to convey and diſſeminate the treaſures both of the Old and New Teſtaments, and to be the ſtanding monument of religious truth through all future ages. The Greek tongue is, therefore, of infinitely more importance to Theology than all other languages. It is capable of a more *preciſe* and

[1] Harris, Hermes, p. 423.

adequate expreſſion, of being more *diſtinctly* and *accurately* underſtood; and, what is more than all, it is *univerſally applied*, that is, by taking the Septuagint as a part of the ſacred code, whoſe words and phraſes are uniformly applied in the New Teſtament, and whoſe authority is ſanctioned by that application, the Greek tongue is co-extenſive with the whole of ſacred writ: ſo that, by mutual reflection, one part can receive and communicate light to another, which is the true key of all ſcriptural interpretation. ✕

So great and important are the advantages derived to theology from this incomparable tongue: and, whilſt we may rejoice to ſee our divines bending their attention more generally to the oriental languages, we have to lament with deeper ſorrow, that this language, ſo much more generally uſeful, becomes leſs generally underſtood: I mean grammatically and critically, not ſuperficially, underſtood. Faſhion may ſometimes lead us right; but, unleſs carefully guarded, it will be ſure to lead men wrong, in every ſphere of life. Since, led on by a few great and illuſtrious characters, it has purſued the oriental

✕ Conſult Stuarius de dialecto languages Macedon. Alexandrinæ. Lipſ. 1808. Editor.

languages with ſo much avidity and applauſe, the Greek tongue, which it is indiſpenſably incumbent upon every divine to be well acquainted with, ſeems to have been proportionably neglected. This is an evil, which, perhaps more than any other, diſgraces the literary diſcipline of the preſent age: for which the univerſities of England would be juſtly reſponſible, were they not in great part ſhielded from the reproach by the ignorance or indolence of ſchoolmaſters, on the one hand, who want a Buſby to teach, or to chaſtiſe them; and by the indifference or obedience of prelates, on the other, who, ſeeing the firſt honours and emoluments of the ſacred profeſſion to be enjoyed without much Greek, too eaſily diſpenſe with it in thoſe whom they admit into the inferior orders of the church [m]. It is, indeed, a reproach to the

[m] When young men are ſent to the univerſity without having been well grounded in the rudiments of this various and extenſive language, it is ſeldom indeed that the induſtry of a college-tutor, if he will ſtoop from the higher departments of his office to this neceſſary taſk, can produce the deſired effect: for, whilſt they have before their eyes ſuch frequent and popular inſtances of men admitted, firſt into

the clerical learning of the age, that this, the moſt perfect of languages, in which the book of light and life was either originally written or early tranſlated, is ſo ſuperficially ſtudied, and ſo imperfectly underſtood[a].

The

the ſacred offices, and then into the beſt benefices, of the church, much more ignorant and unqualified than themſelves, the tutor may employ his labour and exhortation to little purpoſe. They will rely upon the intereſt which will be made for them with the biſhop; or, if they have not friends on whom they can ground this hope, they can, however, advance with confidence, encouraged by the band of *Reverend Captains* and others, who have ſo ſucceſsfully taken the field before them. And this indolence is confirmed by the cruel and mortifying reflection, that, whilſt they behold theſe men ſeizing the firſt emoluments of the profeſſion, they would be themſelves deſtined, without friends, to languiſh away their lives, with all the Greek of Cyril, upon a cure of 40l. a year.

[a] Theſe are evils, which have too long been a ſtain upon the credit of the church of England, the ſupport and glory of our conſtitution, and which are not entirely removed. But, if too many of its clergy are deficient in this fundamental branch of theological learning, what are we to ſay of that formal and pompous claſs of men, the Diſſenting Miniſters, who maintain, upon all occaſions, the utmoſt ſolemnity of profeſſion, and, on all ſubjects, the profoundeſt affectation of learning; whilſt 'the ſmell of Greek' has ſcarcely 'paſſed upon their garments:'—Inſtead of waſting their time in breeding civil mutiny and fomenting diſ-

ſenſion

The LATIN TONGUE was ſpoken by a people, who, though not ſo famous in arts and elegance as their eaſtern neighbours, were more renowned for arms, by which they extended the Roman empire over all the civilized parts of Europe and Aſia: and their dominions, ſo enlarged, lying between the ſcene of ſcripture-hiſtory and all the weſtern provinces and iſlands, their language, though leſs copious and in every reſpect much inferior to the other, became the vehicle by which the books of Holy Scripture and the works of the Grecian fathers were ſafely conveyed to us. In this tongue we have the Old Latin verſion called the *Vulgate* or *Italic* °, whoſe antiquity and authority are ſuperior to many of the Greek manuſcripts; and the number of commentaries, tranſlations, and diſſertations, which have been written in different ages ſince the Latin fathers, in pure, nervous, and elegant

ſenſion in the ſtate, if theſe ſuperficial and oſtenſible, but induſtrious, men would make the Greek grammar the ſubject of their labours, the nation might be more free from faction for fifteen years to come.

° See Simon's Hiſt. Critic. des verſ. du Nov. Teſt. in Martianay Prolegom.

ſtyle, are of the greateſt importance to theology. The main uſe, however, of this language is, that it is become the channel by which we arrive at the knowledge of the Greek.

II. Of the Scripture *Styles*.

From the Languages, the interpreter of holy writ will bend his attention to the STYLES, of Scripture; which will open a field of curious and important diſquiſition.

If he have analyzed the nature, and ſtudied the philoſophy, of human language, he will not want to be informed, that this diſtinguiſhing prerogative of man, which the Almighty hath employed in the revelation of his will, takes its origin from the *impreſſions*, which ſenſible and material objects make, through their reſpective organs, upon the mind, expreſſed in words or vocal ſigns, their arbitrary but inſtituted repreſentatives. He will alſo know, that it is by *transferring* theſe words or inſtituted ſigns, thus taken from ſenſible and material objects, to the thoughts and

and ideas of the mind, which are inapprehenſible by the ſenſes, from a *ſimilitude*, real or ſuppoſed, between them, that language is extended to the expreſſion of mental and abſtract ſubjects of whatever kind. And he will accordingly obſerve, that with theſe tranſferred modes of ſpeaking, though by habit often made inſenſible in their uſe, all languages abound.

The ſimilitude, which is the *means* of this extenſion to mental and abſtracted ſubjects, is of two diſtinct and different kinds. Sometimes it is *real* and *permanent*; in which caſe, the transfer of the words from their primitive and material, to their ſecondary, meaning, is called *Analogy*: but this ſimilitude is often *apparent* only, and *fluctuating*; in which caſe, the transfer is called a *Metaphor*. When the ſimilitude is real and permanent, the analogical term, by which it is expreſſed, becomes the *true* repreſentative of the thought, and is the neceſſary vehicle of information from one mind to another; the indirect, indeed, but the *certain*, medium, by which truth is communicated[p]. But, when the

[p] See Chap. iv. ſect. 3. of the firſt volume.

ſimilitude is only apparent or ſuppoſed, the metaphorical word, or figurative expreſſion, is *not the true* repreſentative of the thought, or neceſſary vehicle of information; it is of a more *arbitrary*, *uncertain*, and *poetical* nature, employed, not properly to convey, but to explain, to illuſtrate, to heighten, to adorn, and often to conceal, the truth. Analogy is, therefore, the inſtrument of the underſtanding: Metaphor the inſtrument of the imagination.

However ſimple it may appear, this diſtinction of language in general, as transferred from material impreſſions to mental operations, forms the two general STYLES of holy ſcripture.

If, to raiſe human language to the mental abſtraction and ſublimity of their thoughts, men are under the neceſſity of uſing theſe indirect and figurative modes of ſpeech, inſomuch that the frequency of the habit renders them inſenſible of the act; when God, that moſt pure and exalted mind, totally abſtracted from matter and removed from ſenſe, communicates himſelf and his immortal truths to men, whoſe words and ideas are replete with

with ſenſible and material images; however he may accommodate himſelf to their thoughts, to their words, and to their ways, we muſt ſee the greater neceſſity of his language being ſtill more replete with analogical and figurative expreſſion.

III. Of the *Analogical* Style.

ANALOGY is the inſtrument of the Underſtanding, and forms that ſpecies of Logic, which is peculiarly appropriated to ſubjects of theology, in every ſtage of that ſublime and extenſive ſtudy. It is the indiſpenſable vehicle, by which the divine truths of religion are conveyed to the view and apprehenſion of the human intellect.

In this dark and ſublunary ſtate, wedded to ſenſe, immured in body, and involved in matter, of beings which are perfectly immaterial, and eſpecially of God, that moſt pure and immaterial Spirit, men poſſeſs no faculties of body or ſoul, by which they can form any *immediate* conception. Between the viſible

ble and inviſible worlds an impaſſable gulph is fixed, an impenetrable chaſm, through which one ray of celeſtial light cannot *directly* dart. All our information of things that are divine muſt, therefore, be conveyed through an *indirect* channel: and, as we have ſeen human language capable of being transferred, by this Analogy, from material impreſſions to mental ſubjects, and of communicating the latter with certainty and preciſion; ſo, by a ſimilar, but higher, transfer from things which are human, material or mental, to thoſe which are divine, it is converted into an indirect, but certain, inſtrument of this celeſtial communication. Through the medium of this *neceſſary* expedient alone, we are rendered capable of receiving the myſteries of religion, which, in condeſcenſion to the apprehenſion and capacity of men, the Deity hath graciouſly and abundantly employed[q].

This

[q] Vates ſacri Naturam Divinam ſub humanis imaginibus adumbrant, eo quod illud neceſſario poſtulet humanæ mentis imbecillitas; eoque modo, ut quæ a rebus humanis ad Deum transferuntur, nunquam proprie accipi poſſint. Semper remittitur intellectus ab umbra ad veritatem, neque in nuda hæret imagine, ſed protinus quærit & inveſtigat id quod

This Divine Analogy, ſo neceſſary to revelation, is founded, like the human, upon a ſimilitude conſiſting in a *permanent reſemblance* and *correſpondent reality* between the terreſtrial things and ideas, which are the direct objects of the human intellect, and thoſe celeſtial truths, of which it can have no direct conception: and it is expreſſed by transferring the words which ſtand for the terreſtrial things and the ideas to the celeſtial truths; which words are to be underſtood in their plain and obvious, not figurative, ſenſe. So that the compariſon is founded on ſomething *real* as well as ſimilar; from which real ſimilarity, as a principle, reaſon deduces a juſt and true correſpondence [r].

By means of this, which forms the ANALOGICAL STYLE of Scripture, the eternal *relations* of the glorious inhabitants of heaven are

quod in Divina natura ei imagini eſt *Analogum*; grandius quiddam & excelſius quam quod poſſit plane concipere & apprehendere, ſed quod animum metu quodam & admiratione percellit. Ea enim eſt mentis noſtræ ignorantia & cæcitas in Divinæ naturæ contemplatione, ut ejus notionem ſimplicem & puram nullo modo poſſimus attingere. Lowth. Præl. De S. P. Heb. xvi.

[r] See the firſt volume, p. 56.

truly

truly and faithfully conveyed to us; thoſe of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*; their actions and operations of *Creator*, *Redeemer*, *Mediator*, and *Sanctifier*. All the other myſteries of our religion are, by this analogical medium, revealed to us, as far as the revealer thought neceſſary, by their correſpondent names and terms, as *begotten*, *proceeding*, and innumerable others; to inſtance which, would lead me into a field of ample and intereſting diſquiſition.

This language of analogy, thus real and permanent in its uſe, which forms the neceſſary ſtyle of holy ſcripture, however indirect, is *clearly* to be underſtood. When God is called the *Father*, in reſpect of Chriſt the *Son*; what the Father is to the Son here according to the law of nature, that God is to Chriſt by a ſupernatural generation. The word *Mediator*, in its familiar uſe with men, means a perſon who, by interpoſing his friendly offices, reconciles thoſe who were at variance; and it is ſubſtituted by Analogy to repreſent Chriſt interpoſing, in a ſimilar way, between God and man. And, though the manner of his

præternatural generation and alſo of his mediatorial interpoſition be inconceivable by us, and perhaps ineffable; yet the word *Son* fully and clearly informs us of his relation to the Father, and that of *Mediator*, as clearly and certainly expreſſes this comfortable truth—that, as one man reconciles two enemies, ſo men are reconciled to God the Father by the ineſtimable mediation of the Son.

Inſtead of giving men new and ſpiritual ideas of heavenly things, different from thoſe they have by nature, and inſtead of uſing a ſpiritual language or mode of communication calculated directly to expreſs his heavenly truths, (which would be to change their nature at once, and to make them different beings, contrary to the divine intention), this Analogy takes men as they are, and only transfers their words and ideas from earthly to heavenly ſubjects: by which divine and wonderful expedient, "the inviſible things of God," in the pointed expreſſion of St. Paul, are *clearly* ſeen, being "underſtood by the things that are made[a]."

Underſtanding both ſides of the compariſon, which are equally the objects of our ſenſes or

[a] Rom. i. 20.

reflection,

reflection, in human analogies, we can judge of the exact degree and proportion of the ſimilitude: whereas, in this divine analogy, as we underſtand only one, that is, the earthly ſide, we cannot judge of the ſimilitude at all. But we have an equivalent, more than ſufficient to anſwer this defect, in the *veracity* of Him, whoſe goodneſs hath vouchſafed us the ſupernatural communication, and whoſe wiſdom hath judged it to be ſufficient. Upon this we depend, that the reſemblance is certain, incapable of deceiving us, though incomprehenſible by us. The ſame benign and gracious Being, who hath ſupplied us with ſenſes by which we are not deceived, hath given us this diviner mode of information, and, ſince it is as neceſſary, and more important than they, it is as *certain*, as if we underſtood both ſides of the ſimilitude, or as if he had given us direct and adequate ideas of his celeſtial truths by a mode of communication directly adapted to them. It preſents us with clear and lively repreſentations, and we inſtantly infer their correſpondent realities, relying, as we do, upon his truth and wiſdom, and forming them, as we well may, into a foundation of our preſent faith and future hope.

Compared

Compared with that more direct and perſonal intuition of the Godhead, which we may be admitted to enjoy in future and more perfect ſtages of our exiſtence, "when this "mortal ſhall have put on immortality," this analogical view of things may be, as St. Paul expreſſes it, through the medium "of a glaſs "darkly and ænigmatically." But, though we ſee nothing in a glaſs of the real ſubſtance of a man, we have an exact view of his image, which implies the exiſtence of a correſpondent body: ſo, in this analogical mirror of divine truth, we ſufficiently behold the fair image of the Lord, and thoſe ſtupendous realities of the inviſible world with which we are concerned, without having the whole of the "great myſtery of godlineſs" unveiled at once, till we be changed and prepared for its enjoyment.

By this method of divine revelation, ſo *neceſſary*, ſo *real*, ſo *clear*, and *certain*, the Almighty bowed the heavens and came down, in wonderful condeſcenſion, to the blindneſs and imperfection of human reaſon; ſpeaking to us of himſelf,

himſelf, in our own ideas and words, with the utmoſt familiarity, "as a man ſpeaketh "with his friend[t];" and enabling us to think and to ſpeak of him, as far as we are concerned, with all reverence and adoration, but with as much eaſe and certainty, as of each other. 'In the explication of his myſ-'teries,' ſays our divine philoſopher, 'God 'vouchſafeth to deſcend to the weakneſs of 'our capacity, ſo expreſſing and unfolding 'them to us, as they may be beſt compre-'hended by us, inoculating, as it were, his 'revelations upon the conceptions and notions 'of our reaſon; and ſo applying his inſpira-'tions to open our underſtanding, as the 'figure of a key is fitted to the wards of a 'lock. We ought not, however, on this 'account, to be wanting to ourſelves; for, 'ſeeing God makes uſe of the faculty and 'functions of reaſon in his divine illumina-'tions, we ought every way to improve the 'ſame, in order that we may be more ca-'pable to receive and entertain ſuch holy 'myſteries[u].'

[t] Exodus xxxiii. 11.

[u] Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ix. cap. 1.

Viewing

Viewing it as the wonderful expedient, to which we owe that enlargement and extenſion of the human mind; without which the ſtupendous truths of revelation would for ever remain at a diſtance from our ſublimeſt apprehenſion, and as inconceivable by us as if they had no exiſtence; and without which the Deity himſelf would be very erroneouſly and obſcurely known, the interpreter of the bible will pay particular attention to the ANALOGIC STYLE. He will acknowledge a juſt idea of it to be of the laſt importance in forming a right conception of the Chriſtian myſteries, or however in preventing a wrong conception. He will allow its importance in preſcribing juſt limits to the human underſtanding, and in determining the proper office of reaſon in the interpretation of the holy ſcriptures. He will look up with ſolemn admiration to that divine method of communication, by which the Almighty bowed his divinity to the earth, to raiſe the human mind to heaven; by which he introduced us to an acquaintance with thoſe objects, of which we are incapable of an immediate view, till, this earthly tabernacle being diſſolved, we ſhall be admitted

mitted " behind the veil," to " behold them " face to face." When that great change, which we are taught by this analogical intercourſe to expect, ſhall come, we ſhall be advanced to higher capacities of knowledge and enjoyment, to the more immediate viſion and fruition of the Deity; though, in our neareſt approaches towards him, we ſhall remain unequal to the immenſurable power and wiſdom of the glory of God [v]. " When we " all, as with open face beholding as in a glaſs " the glory of the Lord, are changed into " the

[v] ' Even the higheſt order of angels, cherubim or ſera-
' phim, muſt probably have a method of forming concep-
' tions of God and his perfections, which do not come up
' to direct and immediate perceptions; ſuch as they have
' of one another and of all heavenly objects, and ſuch as
' *we* now have of things human and material. Their
' manner of conceiving the divine perfections, and of com-
' muning about them with one another, may probably be
' through the lively tranſcript of them in their own nature
' from their great archetype and creator. So that they
' think and diſcourſe about them with one another, if I
' may ſo ſpeak, as we do; but from inconceivably more
' *elevated* and *exact* repreſentations of them which they find
' in themſelves: which is but a kind of *Analogy* ſtill, though
' ſuch as hath a much nearer foundation or proportion of
' ſimilitude than ours. And though it is a ſtrain of divine
' knowledge

" the ſame image, from glory to glory, as " by the Spirit of the Lord [w]."

IV. Of the PARABOLICAL Style.

METAPHOR is the inſtrument of the Imagination, that inventive faculty to which we have aſſigned the province of Poetry [x].

In the analyſis of Poetic art, that ſpecies, of which *Words* are the materials, though leſs exact and perfect in its imitations than the other arts, was found to exceed them greatly in extent and operation [y]. But, however effective and ſuperior poetical words may be, being incapable of all imitation which is direct and proper [z], the *ſimilitude* which they

' knowledge in them vaſtly tranſcending the fartheſt reach ' of all our capacities, and may for ever ſucceſſively receive ' a gradual increaſe and improvement; yet probably it will ' never come up to *a direct and immediate intuition* of the ' divine *Nature as it is in itſelf.*'

Butler's Div. Analogy, p. 40.

[w] 2 Cor. iii. 18.

[x] See p. 268 of the firſt volume.

[y] See chap. xii. ſect. 2. of ibid.

[z] See p. 282, 283, of ibid.

expreſs, and in which conſiſts their poetic virtue, is, in every view, very different from that which is analogical; as it is applicable to a very different uſe. It is only the *fictitious* reſemblance, and *arbitrary* invention, of the poet, for the production of different effects.

From the difference of theſe effects, which are the ends of Poetry, it is divided into four general kinds, and according to the different means employed—Deſcriptive, Narrative, Dramatical, and Parabolical. Of theſe kinds the laſt, though the leaſt direct and proper in its imitations [a], has been ſupereminently diſtinguiſhed by being more particularly conſecrated to the ſervice of religion. 'Parabolical 'poetry,' according to an obſervation of Lord Bacon, 'excels among the reſt, and appears 'to be a ſacred and venerable thing; as reli-'gion herſelf makes uſe of its aſſiſtance, by 'which ſhe maintains an intercourſe between 'divine and human things [b].'

As words were at firſt employed to convey a meaning in the immediate act of ſpeaking;

[a] See p. 285 of the firſt volume.

[b] De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. cap. xiii.

ſo,

ſo, to convey it at a diſtance or to record it, *pictures* were employed in the act of writing. Again, as words, in order to convey mental operations and abſtract ideas, were converted into *metaphors*; theſe figures, for correſpondent purpoſes, were converted into *ſymbols*, or ſtanding ſigns, expreſſive of mental emotions or poetical ideas, firſt, by marking down their natural ſhape, as the figure of a *horn* for *ſtrength*, and then, by uſing the word anſwering to the ſymbol, either in ſpeaking or in writing, to ſtand for the general idea. Thus, by the addition of ſymbolical to metaphorical expreſſion, in all their variety, figurative language was increaſed to a vaſt extent[c]. Such is the origin and nature of the PARABOLICAL STYLE, which, by the various inventive addreſs of the imagination in tracing poetical ſimilitudes of different kinds, and applying them to different purpoſes, was diverſified and extended into all the forms of parable, alluſion, allegory, compariſon or

[c] De genere figurato jam dicturus, video mihi pœne infinitam rerum materiam, & immenſum quendam campum patere. Lowth Heb. Præl. v.

ſimilitude, apologue, imagery, ſymbol, perſonification, and repreſentative action[d].

This ſtyle, which originated in neceſſity, was at length converted to uſe and ornament. Under its dark and ænigmatical veil, the knowledge of earlieſt ages was propagated, and its wiſdom concealed. The prieſt inculcated his doctrines through the medium of myſterious rites; under the cover of allegory the philoſopher couched his ſcience; the legiſlator and the moraliſt conveyed their inſtructions by proverbs and parables; and, by a well-invented and conſiſtent fiction, in which every ſpecies of poetical expreſſion and imagery was interwoven, the poet delighted and informed mankind.

[d] Per Dictionem Figuratam eam intelligo, qua una pluresque Voces vel Imagines in aliarum locum transferuntur, aut etiam aliis illuſtrandis inſerviunt, ex aliqua quam cum iis habent *Similitudine*. Ea ſimilitudo, ſi innuitur tantum, fit *Metaphora*, ſi oratione continuata, Dicitur *Allegoria*: ſi aperte exprimitur, collatis inter ſe utriſque imaginibus, fit *Comparatio*: fundatur etiam in ejuſmodi Similitudine *Proſopopœia*, cum vel rebus fictis aut ſenſu carentibus datur actus & *Perſona*, vel cum veræ Perſonæ probabilis Oratio tribuitur. Lowth Heb. Præl. v.

Agreeably

Agreeably to this method of inſtruction, which prevailed in the eaſtern nations and in ancient times, the diſpenſation of religion was conducted. So various is the texture and compoſition of the poetic ſtyle employed by the ſacred writers in almoſt every part of the holy ſcriptures, excepting in that which is hiſtorical, to anſwer important ends of the inſpirer. Theſe ends may be divided into two general kinds: the one common to them with all other poets, to *illuſtrate*, to *adorn*, and to *exalt*, the ſubject[e]: the other proper and peculiar to themſelves, to *couch* and to *conceal* their meaning, in a way as ſingular as eſſential to the religious diſpenſation, of which it was the inſtrument. Theſe different ends are frequently mixed and involved in the ſame ſcriptural paſſage or expreſſion: they ſhould, however, be diſtinguiſhed as far as poſſible by all critics and interpreters of holy writ; and the latter ſhould be holden in conſtant and awful recollection.

[e] Etenim Dictionis Figuratæ, id conſilium, ea vis, ut Imaginibus aliunde tranſlatis res vel *evidentius* ac *clarius*, vel *grandius* atque *elatius* exprimantur. Lowth Heb. Præl. v.

We have an excellent critique on the *Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews*, from the pen of a late very learned and ingenious prelate, which was delivered in a lecture from a profeſſorial chair in this univerſity. The work is bold and magnanimous in the deſign, tempered withal with that circumſpective caution ſuggeſted by ſo awful and ſublime a ſubject: and, in the execution, it is difficult to determine, whether a refinement of critical judgment, or an elegance of claſſical language, predominates the moſt. The object of the elegant author of this admirable performance was not to eſtabliſh the principles of ſcriptural interpretation for the uſe of the theologiſt; but only to recommend, with the moſt pious and benevolent intention, the beautiful poems of the Hebrews to the poetical taſte and claſſical genius of his academical auditors, in order to invite them to the ſtudy of the holy ſcriptures[f]. Whilſt we ſee the firſt of the above-mentioned ends of the Poetic Style diſ-

[f] Ut meminerim me, non Theologiæ ſtudioſis divinæ veritatis oracula exponere, ſed juventuti in politiori doctrina & literarum elegantiis exercitatæ commendare lectiſſima poemata. Præl. ii.

played,

played, in this celebrated work, with all the acumen of criticiſm and minuteneſs of diſcrimination; we find the ſecond, which is the more particular and important, almoſt entirely overlooked. In conſequence of which inattention to this appropriate end of ſcripture ſtyle, we have to lament, that, with the pureſt and moſt liberal intention, this learned author inadvertently led himſelf and others into a method of criticiſm injurious to the right interpretation of the holy ſcriptures. By this method of criticiſm, the ſacred volume has, in all reſpects, been brought too much upon a level with human compoſitions; and its ſtructure, as well as meaning, is too much judged of and decided by their ſtandard.

In this opinion, I think, I am ſupported both by the deſign and execution of the work.

It is diſtributed into three parts. The firſt treats of the *Metre* of the Hebrew Poetry; and to the remark, however juſt, that whether founded in truth or not it is ingenious and plauſible at leaſt, I have only to rejoin, that, by bringing to the poetry of the Hebrews his ideas of Metre from the Grecian, Roman, and other poetry of more modern date, which

may

may uniformly be in meaſured verſe, he too haſtily concluded, that the *poetry*, and his own vague idea of the *metre*, of the ancient ſcriptures were co-extenſive. By this deciſion, he excludes all thoſe parts, which are not thus metrical, out of the poetic province; abridging thereby the *Parabolical*, which is, indeed, the *Prophetic* ſtyle [g]. In conſequence of this confined idea of the Hebrew Poetry, he excludes the whole book of Daniel from being poetical and parabolical, and of courſe, from being prophetical; for, without its proper vehicle, prophecy cannot exiſt.

The ſecond part is on the *Style of the Hebrew Poetry*, in which, after a diſſertation on what he calls the *Sententious* kind, he proceeds to the *Figurative*, which properly forms the Parabolical, Style. He gives a formal ſpecification of the different ends it has in view, to *explain* and to *illuſtrate*, to *aggrandize* and *exalt*, the ſubject; in which, it is remarkable that he has totally omitted the peculiar and appropriate end of the figurative ſtyle, to *conceal* the meaning [h]. In

[g] See the preliminary Diſſertation to his Iſaiah.

[h] See the fifth Prælection.

this part he has given a diſplay of the figures of rhetorical diction, of the *Metaphor* in all its variety of poetic imagery; of the *Allegory* and *Parable*; and, in the eleventh lecture, he treats of the *Myſtic Allegory* with great ability; in which, he certainly attends a little to the ſecond or ſpecific end of the Parabolical Style, as adapted to the purpoſe of prophetical concealment: but this attention is only partial and incidental, and confined to one ſingle figure. He then proceeds to the different kinds of *Compariſon*, *Proſopopœia*, or *Perſonification*; and employs four lectures on the *ſublimity of Diction*, *Conceptions*, and *Affections*.

In the laſt part, he gives a minute and critical analyſis of the *various ſpecies of Hebrew or Prophetic Poetry*, as they aſſimilate and accord with the various kinds of claſſical compoſition; the *Elegy*, the *Didactic poem*, the *Ode*, the *Hymn*, the *Dramatic Poem*; excluding out of the poetical calendar the whole books of Daniel and Jonah [i].

The whole of this celebrated performance is, therefore, a critique of ſacred Poetry by the

[i] Præl. xx.

ſtandard

ſtandard of profane; it is to judge of divine, by human, compoſitions. And, ſo far as this kind of criticiſm may be fairly and juſtly employed upon a book of moſt ſolemn and ſuperior import, which is profeſſedly concealed in its expreſſions and myſterious in many parts, with a view of diſplaying thoſe poetical ends which may be common to it and other poetical fictions, this work is entitled to the praiſe which has been beſtowed upon it. But where can we exactly draw the line? It deſerves to be well and maturely weighed, how far a ſacred critic may go in diſplaying theſe claſſical ends, and in judging of the poetical means employed, without intruding on the rights, and infringing the privileges, of that other end which is properly divine, and peculiarly adapted to the purpoſe of holy ſcripture. The very pious and ingenious author of the Prelections ſeems, indeed, to be occaſionally arreſted in the midſt of his critical career, by this awful reflection; as if he were ſenſible that he might be ſometimes treading with a profane ſtep on holy ground.

Without paying ſufficient attention, as a theologiſt, to that vaſt ſyſtem of prophecy interwoven,

interwoven, by means of the Parabolical Style in all its variety and extent, through the whole of the Hebrew Scriptures, he indulged the critic with great freedom, and indeed, ability: and, it need not offend the numerous admirers of this able author, of which number I profeſs myſelf to be one, if I ſay that this celebrated work betrays more of the claſſic than of the divine. After the example of a Longinus, and with the acumen of an Ariſtotle, his object was to diſplay the various and diſtinctive characters of the ſacred poets in the Sententious, the Figurative, and the Sublime, to illuſtrate their ſpecific qualities, and to trace the peculiar effects which they are calculated to produce on the imagination and affections. With ſuch an intention, the Profeſſor of Poetry choſe a field of criticiſm for the ſubject of his lectures, as fruitful as it was novel; in which his claſſical genius expatiated with equal taſte and judgment. But he overlooked the great end which the inſpirer of this poetry had principally in view, and which puts a reſtraint on our judgment in deciding upon theſe other; and he has confined the Parabolical Style within limits which

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are hypothetical and too much contracted: for, independently upon the metre and other fanciful qualifications, all ſcripture language, that is *indirect*, whether ſpeaking by parables, viſions, dreams, or repreſentative actions, is Parabolical, and capable of concealing a prophetic meaning. He acknowledges the intimate connection between *Prophecy* and *Poetry* in the Hebrew Scriptures, and conſiders them as the joint dictate of the Holy Spirit [k]; and it is difficult to conjecture why he has dwelt ſo partially and incidentally on this prophetic end of Poetry: unleſs it be, that by allowing its full weight in the writings of inſpiration, he would have blunted the edge of that inventive conjecture and critical refinement, in which his genius ſo much delighted, and in which he has ſo liberally indulged.

Conſidering the holy ſcriptures as different from all other books, both in their origin

[k] Ex quibus omnibus ſatis liquet, veterum Hebræorum ſententia cum Poetica Prophetiam arcta quadam ſocietate & cognatione conjunctam fuiſſe. Utriuſque facultatis idem erat nomen; eadem quippe origo, idem auctor, Spiritus Sanctus, &c. Præl. xviii.

and

and intention, the theologiſt will check the career of his claſſical and ſentimental criticiſm, however elegant and ingenious it may be, to bend his intention to the myſterious and appropriate end of the Parabolic ſtyle. He will awfully bear in mind, that a vaſt and various chain of *Prophecy* was employed by the omniſcient dictator of religion as its concomitant and ſtanding evidence: for the conveyance of which from age to age, to the moſt diſtant periods of futurity, he will obſerve an amazing texture of the moſt aſtoniſhing *concealment* interwoven in every part of the religious diſpenſation, from its earlieſt annunciation down to its final cloſe, when the Spirit of Prophecy withdrew from men his ſpecial communications. This texture he will diſcover to be wrought together with the moſt intricate and conſummate art, calculated to anſwer the private, but important, ends of the Inſpirer. He will ſee, that the *Poetic* or *Parabolic* diction, in its full latitude and extent, was the divine inſtrument, under which the Holy Spirit couched his prophetic intentions: and he will allow, that this was the main, and indeed, the adequate purpoſe, for which

which it is ſo much more abundantly employed in the holy ſcriptures, than in any other book. He will think, that fanciful and ſentimental criticiſm, even if it could be employed with the utmoſt ſafety and without the leaſt preſumption, is a very trifling and inferior office, when compared with that of the ſacred interpreter engaged in a learned inveſtigation of the artful ſtructure of this ſtyle, which, however various, is uniform and conſiſtent, by comparing one part with another, in order to develop the ſecret intention of the Spirit of Prophecy as it comes to be evolved in the prophetical event.

He will acknowledge two different cauſes of this Parabolical concealment, the one ſpecial, and the other general. The prophecies of the Old Teſtament were delivered under a temporary and inferior diſpenſation preparatory to the eſtabliſhment of one which was to be perpetual and more perfect. They were, therefore, concealed, that the temporary œconomy might not be diſgraced in the ideas of thoſe who were to live and to ſerve God under it, by holding up too clear a view of the brighter glory of that which was to follow.

" For,

" For that miniſtration which was made " glorious, had no glory in this reſpect, by " reaſon of that other glory which excel- " leth *." For the expreſs purpoſe of hiding from their view the abolition of the Law, and of preventing them from being loſt to its obſervance in the too earneſt anticipation of the Goſpel, ' Moſes put a veil over his face, ' that they could not ſtedfaſtly look to the ' end of that which was to be aboliſhed †.' And, to this ſpecial cauſe of concealment, he will add another which is general: for, the completion of prophecy being left in the inſtrumentality of free-agents, if the predictions were not thus concealed, ſuch a reſtraint would be put upon the human will in their fulfilment, as to deſtroy the nature of man; or human obſtinacy would be tempted to counteract the intent of providence, and thereby deſtroy the purpoſe of God. But, under the cover of this parabolical veil, the Almighty is turning the actions, the errors, and the vices, of men into the ſecret inſtruments of his deſign. On that greateſt of prophetic events, the crucifixion of his ſon, the ancient prophets are ſo full and clear, that it is difficult

* 2 Cor. iii. 10. † 2 Cor. iii. 13.

to conceive how the perſons, by whom it was executed, could be ignorant of what they did. Yet that they were ignorant, we know from his own authority, "Father forgive them; "they know not what they do[l]:" and St. Peter told them afterward, "That through "ignorance ye did it, as did alſo your rulers; "but the things that God had before ſhewed "by the mouth of his prophets, that Chriſt "ſhould ſuffer, he hath ſo fulfilled[m]."

And the ſame Parabolical diction was employed by Chriſt and his Apoſtles, in their prophetic character, for the purpoſe of couching under its veil his myſtical doctrines, exalted precepts, and prophetical anticipations.

The Parabolical Style of holy Scripture, in the different forms which it aſſumes, is that important and extenſive ſubject, which ſolicits the virtuous ſtudy of the theologiſt, and which, independently of the important end of his profeſſion, promiſes to reward his labour by gratifying a ſublime and laudable curioſity. In every ſtage of the inveſtigation, he will be filled with ſolemn admiration, as he traces the conſummate art, and contemplates the wonderful addreſs, of the Inſpirer,

[l] Luke xxiii. 34. [m] Acts iii. 17, 18.

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in couching the prophetic meaning under ſuch general deſcriptions, different ſenſes, ſymbols, allegories, images, repreſentations, dreams, and viſions, as were as myſterious as poſſible till the anticipated event arrived, and as obvious as poſſible, when that took place.

Poetry conſiſts of *generals*[n]; by the uſe of which, prophetical enunciations exhibit only the outlines of things, as of pictures ſketched out, but with ſuch an exquiſite pencil, that nothing but the events themſelves are able to fill up and to adjuſt the particular features, or to give a finiſhing hand to the celeſtial portraits. The general outline is, indeed, clearly and diſtinctly marked by the prophet; but, to give it all its perſonal and diſtinctive traits, is left to the unerring hand of time. Whatever is predicted in ſuch general terms, however clearly expreſſed, muſt remain an impenetrable ſecret, till the prophetical event arrive with its adjuncts, circumſtances, and exact occurrences, to diſcloſe it[o]. "And the Lord "anſwered

[n] See page 279, 280 of the firſt volume.

[o] Quod ſi Prophetiæ ipſius indoles in extremis tantum rerum lineamentis effingendis & in generalibus affectionibus deſcribendis amplificandiſque, præcipue verſetur; exinde

" anſwered and ſaid, Write the viſion and " make it plain upon tables, that he may run " that readeth it. For the viſion is yet for " an appointed time, and at the end it ſhall " ſpeak and not lye: though it tarry, wait " thou for it; becauſe it will ſurely come, it " will not tarry [p]."

The *double ſenſe* of prophecy implying the accompliſhment of the prediction in more events than one, in the ſame ſyſtem of religious diſpenſation, but in different periods and parts of it, is, doubtleſs, of great and general application. " The teſtimony of " Jeſus was the ſpirit of prophecy [q];" the end and object of the prophetic diſpenſation. A temporary œconomy was introduced preparatory to the introduction of his goſpel, affording a convenient vehicle of the prophetic enunciations, by which they were at once ſafely conveyed and effectually concealed.

ſatis intelligi poteſt, primo, quanto cum ſuo emolumento Poeſi adjutrice & adminiſtra utatur, quamque ad omnes ſuas rationes accomodatam habeat dictionem Parabolicam, cujus ea natura eſt, ut magnam præbeat copiam & varietatem communium imaginum quibus aliqua materies late ampleque in univerſum exornari poſſit. Lowth, Præl. xx.

[p] Habakkuk ii. 2, 3. [q] Rev. xix. 10.

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One ſenſe was made to look at the immediate objects and concerns of that temporal, though theocratic, polity; whilſt the other was preluding to Chriſt, to the nature, offices, and eſtabliſhment, of his ſpiritual kingdom. The ſame expreſſions, which, in their firſt and more literal ſignification, intended the fate and fortunes of the Jewiſh ſtate, adumbrated, in their ſecond and figurative ſenſe, the character and the ſucceſſes of the Chriſtian church. Future and more illuſtrious events were ſignified in preceding and leſs important tranſactions. Under the civil predictions the ſpiritual were couched: which different objects were accompliſhed by the help of a figurative and poetic language, capable of enlarging or contracting itſelf as circumſtances, in either caſe, required.

This method of prophetical concealment the elegant author of the Prelections has treated with great perſpicuity of language, and exactneſs of diſcrimination; though, perhaps, on too confined a ſcale. With a judicious caution and ingenuous reſerve, he acknowledges the great difficulty and danger of judging and criticizing upon a ſubject ſo profeſſedly

feſſedly involved in myſtery [r]. But the Myſtic Allegory is by no means the only ſpecies of Parabolical diction employed by the Spirit of Prophecy to conceal its predictive enunciations. Various images and viſions were indirectly uſed; and, often, where the predictions are not couched under theſe, but delivered as in a plain narration of facts, as in the prophecy of Jonah, or in oratorical ſtyle, like many predictions of Ezekiel, or in a mixture of both, like the whole of Daniel, the language is ſome way or other *indirect*, and of courſe *poetical*, in its extended ſignification: or elſe, where the expreſſion is *direct* [s], the ſame obſcurity is effected, by giving it a concealed and ænigmatic caſt.

So various and complicated is the art employed by the Spirit of Prophecy in the holy ſcriptures, to conceal, from the moſt diſtant apprehenſions of the human mind, the mean-

[r] Verum Allegoriæ Myſticæ leges ullas hæc in parte conſtituere & perquam difficile, & fortaſſe etiam temerarium, &c. Præl. xi.

Verum de hoc genere non eſt fas ſperare, quin in nonnullis magna ſubſit obſcuritas, quæ non ſolum ipſam rei naturam conſequitur, ſed ſuam habet utilitatem, &c. Ibid.

[s] See Ezekiel xii. 13, and Jeremiah xxxiv. 3.

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ing of its predictions, till they come to be unriddled by the events; which ſhould put a juſt reſtraint on criticiſm in judging and deciding upon the words of this myſterious book.

In one part of his work, the author of the Prelections acknowledges the *free* and *ſingular* genius of ſacred poetry, which is poſſeſſed of a boldneſs and eccentricity repugnant of all rule[t]: and he has aſſigned, in another, the important reaſon, becauſe it reſulted from the impulſe of the Spirit that inſpired[u]. If, to theſe juſt obſervations, he had added the authority of St. Peter, that "Prophecy never "came by the will of man; but holy men "of old ſpake as they were moved by the "Spirit of God[v]:" theſe arguments might have induced him to attribute more to the divine agency in moulding the language of the

[t] Per omnia in verbis ſenſibuſque ſua quædam vis atque audacia, nullis mancipata legibus, liberum Hebrææ Poeſeos genium unice ſpirans. Præl. x.

[u] Quod ad rerum ordinem ac diſpoſitionem attinet, formamque legitimam, quæ in hac ſpecie integrum Poema conficiat; nihil ſane ſtatui poteſt quod in univerſum videatur obtinere. Soluta plerumque, ut poteſt, & libera, ſuo impetu fertur, nullas ſervans leges, ſed materiæ rationem ſequens, & Divini Spiritus impulſum. Præl. xx.

[v] 2 Pet. i. 21.

prophets to its celeſtial purpoſe. This might have ſmothered, in the birth, that ſpirit of criticiſm, of which he was the father; and which, in the hands of others more adventurous, and leſs judicious, than himſelf, hath diſhonoured, I had almoſt ſaid, diſgraced, the volume of inſpiration*.

Inſtead

* This very learned and ingenious prelate, to whom the holy ſcriptures are much indebted for delivering them from the rabbinical prejudices by which they had been for ages entangled and obſcured, who with a great ſhare of biblical learning united a correct and claſſical taſte, endeavoured in his Prelections to open the ſacred volume to the more general ſtudy of our academical youth, by giving them a taſte of their ſuperior beauties, in a critique ſimilar to thoſe which had been ſo ſucceſsfully written on the heathen poets. 'Enimvero quid eſt cur Homeri, Pindari, Horatii ſcriptis 'celebrandis immoramur, Moſem interea, Davidem, Iſaiam, 'ſilentio præterimus? An id tandem ſtatuendum eſt, eo- 'rum quidem hominum ſcripta, qui tantum modo effece- 'runt, quantum ingenio & facultate conſequi potuerunt, 'ratione & via tractare oportere, & ad artis præſcriptum '& normam exigi: quæ vero altiorem habent originem, & 'Divini Spiritus afflatui vere tr buuntur, eorum vim etiam '& venuctatem ſuo lumine quodammodo elucere; ſed nec 'doctrinæ inſtitutis conſtare nec Artis finibus circumſcribi 'poſſe? Quamvis igitur ad occultos hujuſce veluti Nili 'cœleſtis fortes haud fas eſt penetrare, licebit tamen ſancti 'fluminis curſum & flectiones ſequi, aquarum auctus & 'receſſus

Inſtead of indulging his genius in a vain and viſionary criticiſm, founded on claſſical and

'receſſus notare, ac rivos etiam quoſdam tanquam in 'ſubjacentes campos deducere.' [Præl. ii.] The deſign is plauſible, and that plauſibility conſiderably increaſed by the flowers of diction. But the only plan upon which it can be executed, is upon the *Suppoſition*, that though the Spirit of Prophecy ſupplied the matter, the manner and the language were left to the natural genius of the inſpired. 'Alterum impetum mentis vocat Longinus το περι τας 'νοησεις αδρεπηβολον; alterum το σφοδρον και ενθουσιαστικον 'παθος, appellat. Utrumque ita in hoc argumento uſur- 'pamus, atque ita Sacris Valibus attribimus, ut nihil de- 'rogemus Divini Spiritus afflatui: etſi ſuam interea *pro-* 'priæ cujuſque ſcriptoris naturæ atque ingenio concedamus. 'Neque enim inſtinctu divino ita comitatur Vatis animus, 'ut *protinus obruatur Hominis indoles:* attolluntur & eri- 'guntur, non extinguuntur aut occultantur naturalis ur- 'genii facultates; & quanquam Moſis, Davidis, and Iſaiæ 'ſcripta ſemper ſpirent quiddam tam excelſum tamque 'cœleſte, ut plane videantur divinitus edita, nihilo tamen 'minus in iis Moſem, Davidem, & Iſaiam ſemper agnoſ- 'camus." [Præl. xvi.] But, even if we admit the ſuppo- ſition in part, the important queſtion occurs, How far is it to go? What human critic ſhall determine that the Holy Spirit had *no influence at all* upon the *manner* or the *language* of the prophet, in which his annunciations were delivered? Or what human critic ſhall ſay preciſely *how far* his afflatus was concerned? What human critic ſhall draw the line between the *Inſpirer* and the *Man?* The different

and ſentimental taſte, the ſober theologiſt will find himſelf more uſeful employment in developing

different and characteriſtic ſtyles of Moſes, David, and Iſaiah, will go a very little way, if any at all, to this important deciſion: for, when the Spirit employs human inſtruments, he takes them as they are, and by the act of employing them he makes them his own; ſo that, whether Amos ſpoke as a ſhepherd, or David as a king, they uttered the words of God.

Theſe difficulties beſet this ingenious critic, and all his management and addreſs felt themſelves unable to ſurmount them: and, at a time that biblical learning was making ſo laudable a progreſs under his auſpice, it is great pity, that he let looſe this critical refinement upon the ſacred ſcriptures. Though that diſcreet and cautious judgment, by which he was diſtinguiſhed, kept his pen within moderate bounds, the high reputation which the novelty and plauſibility of the undertaking conferred upon the work, the diſtinguiſhed eminence of the perſon, and the faſcinating elegance of his language, produced their effect on the minds of others in ſtimulating them to an imitation of his method, in order to participate his fame; who, poſſeſſing leſs of his ingenuity and high claſſical taſte, in which the chief value of the work conſiſts, could only diſtinguiſh themſelves by an outrage of its faults. Mounted upon this critical Pegaſus, an eminent profeſſor in an univerſity renowned of late for biblical learning, goes on, 'And if the poet Ezekiel has 'here and there *overloaded* his ſubject with ornaments, we 'ſhall be unable to refuſe our admiration to his genius not-'withſtanding theſe *defects*.—It almoſt ſeems that the Poet 'himſelf

loping the various methods of concealment furniſhed by the Parabolical Style, from principles

'himſelf felt the *hurtful conſequences* of his ample repreſen-
'tations; under this *he endeavoured to prevent them* by firſt
'giving a general ſketch, and then every thing more deter-
'minate and in detail. But I doubt whether *he has thus*
'*prevented them.* This method is rather productive of an-
'other *hurtful conſequence*; that he occaſionally ſeems *to*
'*correct himſelf, but really does not*; that he occaſionally
'ſeems to *retract* ſomething, which, when accurately con-
'ſidered, is not the fact. The Author of the Revelation,
'whoſe poetry is in the ſame ſtyle with that of Ezekiel,
'and full of imagination, for the moſt part has avoided *the*
'*rocks* on which his predeceſſor *ſtranded*; and for the moſt
'part has happily cut off the *wild ſhoots of a heated imagi-*
'*nation.* He alſo has fictions and giant-forms: but he has
'produced them only ſo far as to give the reader a full image
'before his eyes; he does not purſue them minutely,—and
'he does not *diſtract or pain* his reader. But as Ezekiel
'deſcribes, deſigns, paints, and exhauſts all minutiæ, he
'ſometimes *injures his poems.* According to my feeling,
'*he ſhould have broken off* after he had given the chariot-
'throne, reſtleſs wheels, and cherubim full of living mo-
'tions; but, as he continues to deſcribe the motion of the
'throne by his wonderful forms, he makes *unpleaſing im-*
'*preſſions.* Even where theſe conſequences do not ariſe
'from the *prolix details* of the Prophet, he is *miſled* by them
'to other *faults* which are equally ſtriking. They ſome-
'times carry him to things which are *unnatural.* Thus he
'has acted againſt nature in *ſlaying what is not food.* How
'much

ciples contained in ſcripture; in analyzing and arranging the different kinds of prophecy; and

'much ſuperior is Iſaiah in a ſimilar repreſentation! And 'ſhould not the great profuſion of learning in the Elegy 'and funeral lamentation over Tyre, when ſhe was de-'ſtroyed, *be quite removed from this piece?* On the con-'trary, it was a happy invention that his lofty Poems are 'ſometimes interrupted by ſhort ſpeeches. They are not 'only uſeful for the illuſtration of his ſymbols, but alſo for 'the repoſe of the mind. By this change his readers are 'agreeably entertained; and their imagination finds reſting 'places, ſo as to ſoar more eaſily after the imagination of 'the Poet. Ezekiel, therefore, remains a great Poet, full 'of originality notwithſtanding his faults; and, in my opi-'nion, whoever cenſures him as if he were only an imi-'tator of the old prophets, can never feel his power.' Eickhorn's Introd. to his Old Teſtament. See Newcome's Introduction to Ezekiel, p. 24, 25, 26.

Had this learned Profeſſor indulged his critical cavallo in trampling ſo unmercifully upon the works of the Great Poet who feigned the ten years ſiege of Troy, as freely as he has done upon thoſe of the prophet, who announced the deſtruction of the temple of Jeruſalem, who "ſaw the viſion "of God," [Ezekiel, 1 Chap.] and ſpoke the "words of "Jehovah," he would have been moſt deſervedly torn to pieces by a whole hoſt of critics.—The impetus of this critic is neither the το αδρεπιβαλον, nor the το ενθυσιαστικον, it is ſurely the το μανιακον, παθος.

Without employing his critical abilities the judicious Mr. Addiſon is only a diſtant and humble admirer. 'As

'the

and in unravelling the great "myſtery of

'the Jewiſh nation produced men of great genius, without 'conſidering them as inſpired writers, they have tranſmitted 'to us many hymns and divine odes, which excel thoſe that 'are delivered down to us by the Greeks and Romans, in 'the poetry, as much as in the ſubject to which it was con-'ſecrated.' Spectator, No. 453.

And, perhaps, the general idea of ſcripture poetry given by a French writer is ſtill more juſt, becauſe it does not ſeparate the poetry from the inſpiration. 'It is the true lan-'guage of poetry, of prophecy and of revelation: a celeſ-'tial fire animates and tranſports it. What ardour in its 'odes! What ſublime images in the viſions of Iſaiah! 'How pathetic and affecting are the tears of Jeremiah! 'One there finds beauties and models of every kind. No-'thing is more capable than this language of elevating a 'poetic ſpirit; and we do not fear to aſſert that the Bible, 'ſuperior to Homer and Virgil in many places, can inſpire 'ſtill more than they that rare and ſingular genius which is 'the portion of thoſe who dedicate themſelves to poetry.' And this learned Frenchman might have added the reaſon of this ſuperiority, by attributing it to its true cauſe, the Inſpirer himſelf.

Our great philoſopher is decided upon the queſtion. 'Alter autem interpretandi modus, quem pro exceſſu ſta-'tuimus, videtur primo intuitu ſobrius & caſtus, ſed tamen '& ſcripturas ipſas dedecorat & plurimo eccleſiam detri-'mento officit. Is eſt, ut verbo dicam, quando ſcripturæ 'divinitus inſpiratæ eodem quo humana ſcripta, explicantur 'modo.' Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ix.

"godlineſs,"

"godlineſs," by aſſorting predictions with events, and types with anti-types[x].

Much of the obſcurity in which the prophetic writings were involved at their firſt delivery is now diſpelled; and a new field of inveſtigation is opened to the theologiſt[y]. Although the prophetic ſyſtem, that vaſt and

[x] Tale eſſe debet hujus operis inſtitutum, ut cum ſingulis ex ſcripturis prophetiis eventuum veritas conjungatur, idque per omnes mundi ætates, tum ad confirmationem fidei, tum ad inſtituendam diſciplinam quandam & peritiam in interpretatione prophetiarum, quæ adhuc reſtant complendæ, &c.

Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. cap. xi.

[y] Equidem in Vaticiniis contra fit ac in cæteris omnibus Sacræ Poeſeos partibus; illa tum ſunt maxime obſcura, cum primum ſunt edita; quæque aliis tenebras inducit, illis infert lucem, vetuſtas. Adeoque iſta obſcuritas, quæ in hoc genere ab initio inſederat, aliqua ex parte jam tollitur: multa ſunt, quæ explicavit ipſius rei eventus, certiſſima oraculorum interpres: multa, quibus Divinus ille Spiritus, ea quæ primum induxerat involucra, dignatus eſt detrahere; pleriſque aliquam lucem intulit ejuſdem ſacratiſſimis Inſtitutionibus clarius illuſtrata Religionum Judaicarum ratio. Ita fit, ut, quæ pars Sacræ Poeſeos & ſingularem quandam naturam & maximam in ſe difficultatem habet, ad eam tamen cognoſcendam & perſpiciendam meliore jam conditione accedamus, iis ſubſidiis & adminiculis inſtructi, quibus plane veteres Hebræi, quæque nec ipſis quidem Vatibus Dei internunciis conceſſa ſunt. Lowth. Præl. xi.

various

various apparatus arranged by the inviſible hand of Him, " with whom one day is as a " thouſand years, and a thouſand years as " one day," for the teſtimony of his Son, may not be entirely evolved, till the preſent material ſyſtem be deſtroyed; time, by interpreting many predictions in their correſpondent events, hath ſupplied ſuch grounds of analogic reaſoning, as will lead us to the ſtructure and œconomy of prophetic language, and prepare us to acknowledge the accompliſhment of others, when their events arrive. However intentionally myſterious, the Parabolical Style is *uniform* and *conſiſtent*, and of courſe *reducible to rule*; one part ſupplying the key to another. It was the common mode of writing at the time the prophecies were delivered, and is conſtructed on ſuch general principles, as make it a ſubject of rational inveſtigation. Another key is, therefore, to be found by a learned and diligent ſearch in the archives of ancient and oriental learning; in the images of the eaſtern and weſtern poets; in the ſubſiſting monuments of Egyptian hieroglyphics, from which all eaſtern writings took its ſymbolic caſt; in thoſe pagan

pagan ceremonies and ſuperſtitions, which drew their origin from the Jewiſh; and, above all, in the holy ſcriptures themſelves, which, however the productions of many different pens, employ the ſame ſymbols, images, and other figures, which were intended by their one omniſcient dictator to be interpreters of each other.

By an extenſive compariſon of words with words, phraſes with phraſes, and metaphors with metaphors, the judicious interpreter may hope to develop the prophetic meaning which is deſignedly and artfully concealed, in order that, among other reaſons of the Inſpirer, it might afford a virtuous and ſublime employment to the human mind. And, if inſtead of waſting their labour in the fabrication of hypothetical ſyſtem, their learning in diſputation, and their ingenuity in critical refinement, learned men would, by an extenſive induction and judicious arrangement of particulars collected out of the Bible and other monuments of antiquity, ſupply the theological ſtudent with ſome *general rules* or principles of interpretation, (which is a great deſideratum in Theology,) they would bring an offering

offering moſt uſeful to the cauſe of ſcriptural learning[a].

Whilſt other proofs of his religion are weakened and obſcured by time, this of Prophecy, which challenges the particular cultivation of the ſtudent, is gathering ſtrength and clearneſs and gratifying him with an immediate and perſonal conviction: and, as in this important department of his theological ſtudy, his application will be, at the ſame time, made to hiſtory, whilſt he is growing in conviction, he will derive a ſublime and endearing enjoyment from contemplating the wonders of providence and the ways of men.

Thus we ſee the province of IMAGINATION, that exalted faculty of the human

[a] Something of this kind has been done by the learned Daubuz in the *Preliminary Diſcourſe and Symbolical Dictionary* introductory to his commentary on the Revelations. In 1730, Mr. Lancaſter *abridged* and *new-modelled* this learned work in a quarto volume dedicated to Dr. Potter, then Biſhop of Oxford, hoping that, under the patronage of ſo great a name, ſo valuable a work would have met with a general reception. It has, however, ſhared the fate of many of the beſt of books, to be known by very few, whilſt many of the worſt are in the libraries and hands of all.

mind, by which its affections are ſublimed and qualified for the imitation of the goodneſs, the adoration of the wiſdom, and the admiration of the power, of God, extenſively employed in the act of revealing his will to men, forming that indirect and poetical vehicle through which the truths and evidences of his religion are conveyed. 'In matters of 'faith and religion,' ſays Lord Bacon, 'the 'Imagination is elevated above Reaſon. Not 'that divine illumination reſideth in the Ima'gination, (nay rather in the higheſt tower 'of the mind and underſtanding); but, as in 'moral virtues divine Grace uſes the motives 'of the *Will*; ſo in illuminations it makes 'uſe of the *Imagination*: which is the cauſe 'that religion hath ever ſought an acceſs to 'the mind through ſimilitudes, types, para'bles, viſions, and dreams [a].

[a] De Augm. Sc. lib. v. c. 1.

SECT. IV.

Of the PARTICULAR INTERPRETATION of the Holy Scriptures.

THOUGH dictated and written in human language, as the indiſpenſable inſtrument of communication, by which the Teſtimony of God is conveyed to men; that the Sacred Volume, in *manner* as well as in matter, is *different* from all other books, is a theological axiom, which has, I hope, been ſufficiently eſtabliſhed in the preceding pages. This will have a powerful influence upon the particular ſtudy and interpretation of that myſterious book.

Other books contain the things that are 'on earth,' the obſervations and reaſonings of men on material objects, their thoughts and reaſonings on mental ſubjects, their teſtimony of facts and occurrences, and their poetical imitations; in a language as *direct* as it can be, and, when figurative, intended to be

plain: This book contains 'the things that 'are in heaven;' in a language, which is analogical and *indirect*, and which is often figurative and intended to be *concealed.*

Whilſt we view with pleaſure the ſtudy of the Holy Scriptures ſhaking off the fetters of hypothetical ſyſtem, and moving on in a more free and philoſophical direction; whilſt we rejoice to ſee the ſcience of Theology liberated from the forms of an ignorant and ſcholaſtic logic; and whilſt we behold with ſatisfaction the Volume of Inſpiration laid open to the diſcuſſion of a rational and learned, not viſionary, criticiſm, from which we may indulge the hope of receiving a faithful interpretation of all its parts; we are to hold in awful recollection, that it is *divine* in its origin and *myſterious* in its form, that, though the things which are therein "revealed be- "long to us and to our children," to inveſtigate and to contemplate "for ever, the ſe- "cret things," which are therein concealed, "belong unto the Lord our God," ſo to remain, till, in his wiſdom, he open them more fully to our underſtanding. This conſideration ſhould be kept perpetually in mind;

leſt, by exulting too much in the glorious liberty they have gained, critics and interpreters, commentators and tranſlators, grow too bold in their literary career; and leſt, after ſnapping aſunder the chains of prejudice and form, they ruſh into the oppoſite, and no leſs inglorious, extreme, of capricious judgment and fanciful invention.

From the General Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, and the principles on which it is to be conducted, we ſhall deſcend with advantage to their PARTICULAR INTERPRETATION.

The former conſtitutes the office of the theological critic and *Commentator*; the latter that of the theological critic and *Tranſlator*: which offices, however connected and allied, are ſo diſtinct in their proper exerciſe, that they ſhould never be confounded. The view, however, which has been taken of the former, will lead us to the true principle of criticiſm and the juſt method of tranſlating, according to which the latter ſhould be conducted. The *divine Analogy* of ſcripture language which pervades the ſacred volume,

and the frequent uſe of the *Parabolical ſtyle*, ſo important in its intention, will remind the *Tranſlator* of the delicacy and difficulty of his undertaking. They will admoniſh him, that the taſk of preſenting the bible in a new language is peculiarly ſacred, to be executed with more caution and fidelity than that of tranſlating any other book.

One of the many bleſſings which providence hath beſtowed on this favoured country, in different periods of its hiſtory, is the *Engliſh Tranſlation of the Bible appointed to be read in Churches*, which for ſome ages it has enjoyed: and, whilſt gratitude compels us to put a high value upon a work by which our forefathers were inſtructed to ſerve their God, juſtice will oblige us to think and to ſpeak favourably of its intrinſic merit. They, to whoſe learning and labour we are indebted for this Tranſlation, were men ſelected for the taſk by the diſcernment of a pious and learned prince, endowed with every qualification of heart and underſtanding, and poſſeſſed of every advantage of learning and erudition for the execution of the work, that the ſtate of biblical

cal knowledge, and the religious complexion of the times, afforded. They availed themſelves largely and judiciouſly of the learning and labours of former tranſlators, both Latin and Engliſh: and it may be conſidered as an encomium adequate to the beſt efforts of human ability, if we ſay, that, upon the whole, they excelled all that went before them. Their language is plain, nervous, and dignified; and, whatever the defects of this tranſlation may be in other reſpects, this in general will ever remain the object of our admiration and imitation.

After paying this tribute of praiſe, ſo juſtly due to our Engliſh Verſion, truth obliges us to own, that the tranſlators, however able, laboured under unavoidable difficulties and diſadvantages, by which they were at that time obſtructed in the execution; but which are now removed: and if, from the preſent improved and improving ſtate of biblical learning, the change of circumſtances in favour of the preſent age, and the aſſiſtance of their excellent Tranſlation, we preſume that, as they improved upon their predeceſſors, they may be improved upon in their turn, the

preſumption, or at leaſt the hope, will neither appear ungenerous towards them, nor unreaſonable in itſelf.

The firſt ſtep towards a good tranſlation is to procure an accurate and perfect *Copy*. Without this, whatever other excellence the verſion may poſſeſs, it can be only a perfect repreſentation of an imperfect original.

Such a Copy can only be obtained by a learned inveſtigation, and critical examination, of the moſt authentic monuments and authorities of the ſacred text, by an extenſive collation of ancient manuſcripts, and by the collateral elucidations of more ancient verſions made from manuſcripts more perfect than any that now exiſt.

The uncultivated ſtate of biblical learning at the time, particularly grammatical, thwarted the ſucceſs of our Engliſh tranſlators; for want of which, they could not have recourſe to ſuch monuments and authorities in order to prepare a copy ſo corrected and improved. Too confidently prepoſſeſſed in the genuineneſs of the Maſoretic text, corrupted by the ignorance and inaccuracy of tranſcribers, and diſguiſed

guiſed by the punctuations and ſiniſter practices of the more modern Jews devoted to rabbinical prejudices which it was made to countenance, they tranſlated from falſe and imperfect originals [b]: and, however exact and ſcrupulouſly faithful in rendering them word for word, by depending entirely upon them and neglecting more ancient and genuine authorities, their verſion muſt inevitably poſſeſs all their prejudices and defects. And by conſulting modern lexicons too much, they miſrepreſented the meaning of many words.

After the true text is determined and reſtored, the next qualification of a ſcriptural tranſlator is, on principles of juſt criticiſm and by a rational method of interpretation, to expreſs the very ſenſe of the author fairly and impartially. It is not, however, to be diſguiſed, that, attachment to ſect and the love of ſyſtem inflamed by habits of diſputation and polemical divinity, though more temperate in them than in their predeceſſors, laid an inſenſible bias on their free and impartial judgment.

[b] See Lowth's Preface to his Iſaiah and Kennicott's Diſſertations.

To

To theſe radical and permanent cauſes of imperfection in the tranſlators of the preſent verſion, another may be added, which is temporal and accidental. In the conſtant flux of the Engliſh, as of every living, tongue, ſome of their words have loſt their meaning and are become obſolete; others have changed it, and are now antiquated; and, in many places, the grammatical conſtruction is aukward, and, in ſome, confuſed.

From theſe cauſes, and others that might be aſſigned, particularly the want of uniformity, without any diſreſpect to the memory, or derogation from the acknowledged merit, of theſe very pious and learned men out of whoſe hands it came, we need not heſitate to pronounce, that, in our preſent Tranſlation, miſtakes and imperfections were unavoidable.

With this ſenſe of theſe numerous defects, and convinced, as every one muſt be, of the univerſal importance of the ſacred volume, and of the duty incumbent upon us to preſerve the genuine meaning of every word which it contains; it would be almoſt as diſgraceful to the improved learning and reformed religion of the preſent age, in which the remains

mains of every claſſical author are brought forward in elegant verſions, to ſuffer the bible to remain under theſe imperfections of tranſlation, as it was to that of ignorance and ſuperſtition which prohibited its being tranſlated at all,

Since the commencement of this century, biblical learning has begun to flouriſh in the univerſities of Europe; and it is, by being conducted on juſt and rational principles, and from the joint ſtudies of the learned of different countries and communities joining hand in hand in promoting the great work, that the volume of ſcripture is to be reſtored to its purity and perfection. At length, the rage for ſyſtem and hypotheſis has entirely ſubſided. We rejoice to ſee the old diſcipline of the ſchools upon the wain: and we may congratulate the learned on turning their attention from uſeleſs words and forms to things of real importance, and on applying themſelves, with the moſt benevolent and ingenuous views, to the genuine ſources of theological truth, biblical ſtudies, and Jewiſh antiquities.

Capellus,

Capellus, before this period, with a bold and daring hand, firſt ventured to remove the veil of ſuperſtition and credulity, which concealed the errors and deformities of the Jewiſh originals, and to emancipate the ſtudy of the ſcriptures from thoſe Maſoretic prepoſſeſſions and rabbinical prejudices, to which it had been ſo long confined. But, to ſhake off theſe chains, ſo diſgraceful and injurious to ſound Theology, and to clear the way to the genuine interpretation of holy writ, was a work reſerved for Houbigant, who, though too bold in ſome of his conjectural emendations of the ſacred text, from a copy corrected with great learning, grammatical ſkill, and critical acumen, preſented the world with an excellent verſion of the Old Teſtament, as a model for the imitation of all future improvers of biblical learning. As a ſacred critic and tranſlator, Houbigant holds the foremoſt rank, and is, doubtleſs, intitled to the choiceſt laurel. He has had the honour to be followed by a Lowth and a Michaelis, who, after him, took the lead in this high walk of ſacred criticiſm; whoſe labours, though ſometimes perhaps imitating

imitating the conjectural determinations of their leader more than the principles of ſacred criticiſm will bear them out, are judicious and well-conducted upon the whole, and are continued and improved by learned men of our own and other nations; by whoſe concurrent labours, ſince the charm was broken, many prejudices and obſtacles are now removed, and the avenues to the inviolable ſanctuary of religion have been gradually cleared.

Under the direction of ſuch leaders, ſacred learning hath gone on improving and to be improved. The firſt act conſiſts of an extenſive and critical *Collation* and compariſon of manuſcripts, parallel places, quotations, verſions, and editions; in which laborious department of biblical learning the lucubrations of a Kennicot hold a diſtinguiſhed rank. The ſecond act, conſequent upon the firſt, is a *New Tranſlation* of the bible, or rather perhaps, an *emended Edition of the Old.* Some few of the learned, actuated more by an honeſt zeal for the Old Tranſlation than directed in judgment by a knowledge of the true merits of the queſtion, have ſtrenuouſly oppoſed the work,

work, as in itſelf unneceſſary, as hazardous in its execution, and even dangerous in its effects: whilſt others, directed by better information, have been and are at this time employed in the uſeful, but arduous, undertaking, with every advantage of ingenuity learning and impartiality on their ſide, flattering our moſt ardent hopes, and promiſing to gratify our moſt ſanguine expectations[c]. They are not, however, exactly agreed in regard to the juſt and true *Method* of ſcriptural Tranſlation, a ſubject of the laſt importance to the ſucceſs of ſo great a work, and which ſhould be previouſly determined: but, from the liberal friendly and unaſſuming ſpirit which they breathe towards each other, and which is ſo manly and generous in them all, as to win the approbation and aſſiſtance of every one who can contribute in the leaſt to the promotion of ſo laudable an undertaking, we may cheriſh a pregnant hope, that one uniform, rational, and judicious plan will be ſettled, and invariably purſued.

[c] Bp. Newcome, Dr. Blaney, Dr. Geddes, Dr. Campbell, and others.

When

When the text of an original, whatever it may be, is once adjuſted, that ſound and accurate judgment, which underſtands the preciſe meaning of the words, diſtinguiſhes the idioms, and conſiders the genius, of the language from which, and of that into which, the verſion is to be made, forms the general qualification of a competent tranſlator; without which, he is unable to give a juſt repreſentation of any compoſition, profane or ſacred. But the exact *Method*, and the proper *Rules*, by which the work is to be conducted, are to be formed on principles derived from the nature and genius of the originals themſelves.

The theological axiom, therefore, which has been eſtabliſhed in the preceding pages, That the holy Bible, in its origin and formation, is *different* from all books of human compoſition, however different they may be from each other, will require that different *Rules* ſhall be obſerved in its Tranſlation as well as expoſition. In ſupport of this opinion I am happy to appeal to the judgment of Lord Bacon, whoſe authority in all ſubjects

of

of literature is juſtly ackowledged to be ſuperior and deciſive. 'The Scriptures being 'given by Inſpiration, and not by human 'reaſon, do differ from all books in the Au'thor; which, by conſequence, doth draw 'on ſome difference to be uſed by the 'expoſitor[d].'

How far human judgment is to be exerciſed in tranſlating the word of God, is the great queſtion, in the preciſe ſolution of which many different opinions always have divided, and ſtill continue to divide, the learned; and, till it be decided upon a firm and philoſophical ground, though our preſent tranſlators may poſſeſs more biblical knowledge and enjoy more advantages, than their predeceſſors did, their labours will exhibit an unequal and imperfect repreſentation of the ſacred text.

As the bible has one thing common with all other books, that it is written in the human language, the chief cauſe of theſe different opinions, and moſt certainly the great cauſe of ill-ſucceſs, is, that learned men, ſome more and ſome leſs, according to their

[d] On the Advancement of Learning, b. ii.

perſonal

perſonal taſte and private judgment, bring their rules and ideas of tranſlating from claſſical books to the ſacred volume. 'This 'manner of interpreting,' ſays Lord Bacon, 'ſeems at firſt ſight ſober and chaſte, yet 'notwithſtanding it both diſhonoureth Scrip-'ture, and is a great prejudice and detri-'ment to the Church: and this is, to ſpeak 'in a word, when divinely inſpired Scriptures 'are expounded after the ſame manner that 'human writings are. For it muſt be re-'membered, that there are two points known 'to God the author of Scripture which man's 'nature cannot comprehend, that is, the '*Secrets of the heart* and the *Succeſſions of* '*times*, which do make a juſt and ſound dif-'ference between the manner of expoſition 'of the Scriptures and all other books. For 'it is an excellent obſervation which hath 'been made upon the anſwers of our Saviour 'Chriſt to many of the queſtions which were 'propounded to him, how that they are im-'pertinent to the queſtion demanded: the 'reaſon whereof is, becauſe, not being like 'man, which knows man's thoughts by his 'words, but knowing man's thoughts im-

'mediately and of himſelf, he never an-
'ſwered their words, but their thoughts:
'and another reaſon is, that he ſpake not
'only to them that were then preſent, but
'to us alſo who now live, and to men of
'every age and place to whom the Goſpel
'ſhall be preached; which ſenſe in many
'places of ſcripture muſt take place. Much
'in like manner it is with the Scriptures,
'which, being written to the thoughts of
'men, and to the ſucceſſion and viciſſitude of all
'ages, with a certain foreſight of all hereſies,
'contradictions, differing and mutable eſtates
'of the Church, as well in general as of the
'Elect in ſpecial, are not to be interpreted
'only according to the latitude of the proper
'ſenſe of the place and reſpectively towards
'that preſent occaſion whereupon the words
'were uttered, or in preciſe congruity or
'contexture with the words before or after,
'or in contemplation of the principal ſcope
'of the place; but have in themſelves not
'only totally and collectively, but diſtinc-
'tively in clauſes and words, infinite ſprings
'and ſtreams of doctrine to water the church
'in every part: and therefore as the *literal*

'is,

'is, as it were, the main ſtream or river, ſo 'the *moral* ſenſe chiefly, and ſometimes the '*allegorical* or *typical* are they whereof the 'Church hath moſt uſe. Not that I wiſh 'men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or 'light in alluſions: but that I do much con-'demn that interpretation of the ſcripture, 'which is only after the manner as men uſe 'to interpret a profane book *.'

Theſe obſervations apply to particular, more than to general, interpretation; and if our tranſlators would honour this inſtruction of the great luminary of all ſcience with the attention it deſerves, it would ſupply them with a general Principle philoſophically grounded, from which certain Rules of tranſlating would be eaſily deduced, by which they might uniformly and ſucceſsfully conduct their labours: and ſurely, men who are as much diſtinguiſhed for their ingenuity as for their learning, will not diſdain to be directed in their interpretation of the volume of Grace, by a light which led a Newton through that

* This extract is taken partly from his book *De Augm. Scient.* in Latin, lib. ix. and partly from his book *Of the Advancement of Learning*, b. ii.

of Nature to immortality. This principle will admoniſh them, that, in unfolding the oracles of God, by preſenting them in a vernacular tongue, to the inhabitants of whole nations, they "tread on holy ground." It will warn them "to put their ſhoes from off "their feet," and to advance with fear and caution; leſt, by a mixture of human art, they injure or miſrepreſent the dictates of Him, who hath awfully declared, that "hea-"ven and earth ſhall paſs away; but that his "Word ſhall not paſs away[f]."

As his office is to give a faithful picture of the original, one Rule of the firſt importance to the ſucceſsful tranſlator, though one of the moſt difficult to put effectually in practice, is, to diveſt himſelf of every kind of *Prejudice* or bias. Prejudice wears itſelf inſenſibly into the mind, and is there ſo confirmed by time and habit, that it is an enemy in our own boſom the moſt difficult to conquer: but prejudices in Religion imbibed with our maternal milk, and cheriſhed not only with fondneſs, but with an eager and intemperate zeal, are

[f] Matth. xxiv. 35.

more

more obſtinate and inveterate than any other. To avoid all partial and private interpretation, the bane of ſound theology, he ſhould baniſh from his mind all ſyſtems and hypotheſes of human fabric; he ſhould diveſt himſelf of thoſe narrow habits of thinking, which he may have contracted in the uſe of a dogmatical and factitious logic; he ſhould forget the very perſuaſion in which he was bred, however orthodox it may be; and he ſhould be conſtantly and religiouſly upon his guard, leſt the ſpirit of a ſect ſhould ſuperſede that of a Chriſtian, and leſt he ſhew himſelf the diſciple of men, rather than 'taught of God[s].'

Since

[s] In this fundamental Rule all our preſent Tranſlators pronounce themſelves to be agreed.

'The critical ſenſe of Paſſages ſhould be conſidered; 'and not the opinions of any denomination of Chriſtians.— 'The tranſlation ſhould be philological, not controverſial.'

Bp. Newcome's XIIth Rule. See Pref. to Tranſlation of 12 Minor Prophets, p. 37.

'Unwedded to ſyſtems of any kind, literary, phyſical, or 'religious, a Tranſlator of the Bible ſhould ſit down to 'render his Author with the ſame indifference he would ſit 'down to render Thucidides or Xenophon. He ſhould 'try to forget that he belongs to any particularly Society 'of Chriſtians; be extremely jealous of his own rational

 'prepoſſeſſions;

Since human language hath been employed as the inſtrument of divine revelation, however analogically underſtood, we need not heſitate in concluding, that it is to be underſtood and conſtrued according to the *Grammar* of the tongue in which the revelation was given, and to be tranſlated according to that

'prepoſſeſſions; keep all theological conſequences as far 'out of his ſight as poſſible, and inveſtigate the meaning 'of his original by the rules only of ſound and ſober criti-'ciſm, regardleſs of pleaſing or diſpleaſing any party.'

Dr. Geddes' Proſpectus, p. 141, 142.

'Of ſuch conſequence it is to a Tranſlator to baniſh all 'party-conſiderations, to forget, as far as poſſible, that he 'is connected with any party, and to be ever on his guard 'leſt the ſpirit of the ſect abſorb the ſpirit of the Chriſtian, 'and he appear to be the follower of ſome human teacher, 'a Calvin, an Arminius, a Socinus, a Pelagius, an Arius, 'or an Athanaſius, than of our only divine and rightful 'teacher Chriſt.'

Dr. Campbell's Diſſertations to his Tranſlation of the Goſpels, p. 518.

'A Tranſlator is bound to abſtract from, and, as far as 'poſſible, forget all ſects and ſyſtems, together with the 'polemic jargon which they have been the occaſion of in-'troducing. His aim ought to be invariably to give the 'untainted ſentiments of the author, and to expreſs himſelf 'in ſuch manner as men would do amongſt whom ſuch diſ-'putes had never been agitated.' Ibid. p. 510.

of

of the other into which the verſion is to be made.

So far the Laws of Tranſlation, both ſacred and profane, perfectly coincide: in other reſpects they materially differ, according to the different nature of the works on which the tranſlator is employed; and firſt, in point of *Propriety*.

I. Preſuming that human judgment is at all times commenſurate to a human compoſition, the tranſlator, if fitly qualified for his office, ſits down to the taſk of rendering it in another language on terms of familiarity, and almoſt equality, with his author. That the new dreſs which he is making may ſit with eaſe, and appear with the elegance to which he is intitled; that it may loſe the ſtiffneſs which the peculiarities of the original language would entail upon it, he gives both the *Words* and *Sentences* ſuch an idiomatical change, as will enable him to caſt the ſenſe freely in the mould of the tranſlation, and to give it an air of originality. In ſhort he takes the thoughts of the author, and preſents them in his own expreſſion.

So far from preſuming that his judgment is equally commenſurate to a divine production, the judicious Tranſlator of the Holy Scriptures will ſit down to the work impreſſed with a ſenſe of this awful truth, That "the "thoughts of God are not as man's thoughts, "nor his ways, or words, as thoſe of men;" that the matter of Revelation is more the object of his Faith than of his Underſtanding; and that the manner is ſacred and frequently concealed. He will not therefore find himſelf upon the ſame terms of eaſe and familiarity with his author, nor repreſent his *Words* and *Sentences* with that freedom of change, which his own judgment might direct, his fancy ſuggeſt, or which he might think the genius and elegance of his language would require; conſcious that, as they ſtand in the original, they might be intended to convey a meaning, which, by ſuch change, might be loſt or injured. He will, therefore, endeavour, firſt, to find the true *literal*, and *grammatical* ſenſe, and then content himſelf by making choice of ſuch Words and Sentences as will, in the new language, moſt fully and *literally* expreſs it. In the propriety of this rule our tranſla-

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tors ſeem agreed [h]; though, from the difference of judgment in its execution, they vary in the practice of it.

As

[h] 'The firſt and principal buſineſs of a Tranſlator is to 'give the plain and grammatical ſenſe of his Author, the 'obvious meaning of his words, phraſes, and ſentences; 'and to expreſs them in the language into which he tranſ-'lates, as far as may be, in equivalent words, phraſes, and 'ſentences. Whatever indulgence may be allowed him in 'other reſpects, however excuſable he may be, if he fail of 'attaining the elegance, the ſpirit, the ſublimity of his 'author, (which will generally be in ſome degree the caſe, 'if his author excels at all in theſe qualities,) want of fide-'lity admits of no excuſe, and is entitled to no indulgence. 'This is peculiarly ſo in ſubjects of high importance, ſuch 'as the Holy Scriptures, in which ſo much depends on the 'phraſe and expreſſion; and particularly in the prophetic 'books of ſcripture, where from the letter are often de-'duced deep and recondite ſenſes, which muſt owe all 'their weight and ſolidity to the juſt and accurate inter-'pretation of the words of the prophecy. For whatever 'ſenſes are ſuppoſed to be included in the Prophet's words, 'Spiritual, Myſtical, Allegorical, Analogical, or the like, 'they muſt all entirely depend on the literal ſenſe. This 'is the only foundation upon which ſuch interpretations 'can be ſecurely raiſed; and if this is not firmly and ſe-'curely eſtabliſhed, all that is built upon it will fall to the 'ground. Bp. Lowth's Preliminary Diſſertation to Iſaiah, p. lii.

Biſhop

As there are no two languages which have a perfect ſynonymity and coincidence of words, the obſervance of this Rule will often become a taſk of the greateſt difficulty, to cope with which, the Tranſlator ſhould poſſeſs a very extenſive knowledge of both languages; he ſhould diſcriminate with the niceſt diſtinction, and chooſe with the matureſt deliberation. According to the direction of Houbigant, *Non fieri poteſt, ut duarum linguarum paria verba ſemper paribus reſpondeant; verba ſunt ponderanda non numeranda*[1]. Even words which correſpond etymologically, do not always correſpond virtually; ſo that,

Biſhop Newcome's 1ſt Rule is, 'The tranſlator ſhould 'expreſs every word of the original by a literal rendering, 'where the Engliſh idiom admits of it, and where not only 'purity, but perſpicuity and dignity of expreſſion can be 'preſerved.' See Preface to Tr. of 12 M. P. p. xvii.

'Firſt of all a Tranſlator of the Bible ought to be *faith-*'*ful*; that is, ought to expreſs all the meaning, and no 'more than the meaning, of the original.' Geddes' Proſpectus, p. 126.

'The firſt thing a Tranſlator has to do is to give a juſt 'and clear repreſentation of the ſenſe of the original, which 'is the moſt eſſential of all.' Campbell, Diſſertation x. part 1.

[1] Prolegomena, cap. v. art. 3.

howmuchſoever a Tranſlation of the Bible that is *ſtrictly literal* might be deſired, from theſe differences in all languages, it is impoſſible that a good one ſhould ever be obtained[k]: and it is well known that they who have been the moſt ſcrupulouſly attached to the latter, are, on account of theſe differences, often the fartheſt from the literal and grammatical ſenſe, the firſt object of all ſcriptural tranſlation[l].

This difficulty has beſet all biblical tranſlators, and divided them in their judgment of the juſt nature and limits of their office. Some, and theſe very learned men, upon conſidering this difference inherent in the texture and formation of languages, and obſerving, that they, who adhered the cloſeſt to the latter, were the fartheſt from the ſenſe, have given up the difficulty attending a literal tranſlation as inſurmountable, and taken refuge in a more looſe and diſtant mode of rendering. The idea of a literal tranſlation of

[k] 'It is abſolutely impoſſible to tranſlate literally from any 'language whatever without being often barbarous, ob-'ſcure, and equivocal.' Dr. Geddes' Proſpectus, p. 127.

[l] Pagninus and Montanus are leſs faithful guides than even Caſtalio, Michaelis, or Wynne.

ſcripture

ſcripture ſhould not, however, be abandoned. Though words cannot be made to correſpond to words, either as to their number, ſynonymity, or etymology; yet there is a middle-way, though ſometimes difficult to be found, by which they may be made to correſpond in equipollence and effect; ſo that the tranſlation, though not *ſtrictly*, will be *virtually literal*. Such a Tranſlation the Principle, which conſiders the Bible as a divine production, not only countenances, but requires: and, however others may indulge their genius in taking greater liberty with the words of Inſpiration, PROPRIETY will ſupport us in ſubſcribing to the opinion of Beza, as far as the difference of the languages will admit, *Quo propius abeſt a Græcis & Hebræis Latina Interpretatio, eo mihi magis probanda videatur* [m].

The *Idioms* of languages differ more than the Words, and the tranſlator of a prophane

[m] Beza, Nov. Teſt. Dedicat.

'Where a verbal tranſlation cannot be interwoven, 'one equivalent to it ſhould be ſubſtituted, and the idiom '[or the word] in the text ſhould be literally rendered in 'the margin.'

Bp. Newcome, III. Rule, p. 23.

author

author would not be read or tolerated, who does not invariably make the change, and adopt that of his own language. But, in tranſlating the ſacred volume, the ſame Principle, for the ſame important reaſons, will preſcribe to the tranſlator a different Rule of conduct. To retain all the ſmaller peculiarities in an Engliſh tranſlation, would, I know, be unneceſſary, and, indeed, abſurd: fortunately, however, for the exact coincidence of idiom and phraſe with the original, in all matters of more eſſential importance, there is a ſingular coincidence and ſimilarity between the Hebrew and Engliſh tongues[n]: Many Hebrewiſms of greater conſequence have long appeared in an Engliſh dreſs in former tranſlations, and are at length ſo fami-

[n] 'Our Language eaſily moulds itſelf into the Hebrew 'form; and it rarely happens that we are under any neceſ-'ſity of having recourſe to paraphraſe and circumlocution 'to expreſs the full meaning of the text. Even when the 'ſyntactical arrangement is different, there is a ſtriking 'equipollence of ſimplicity, conciſeneſs, and energy, to 'be attained; which, perhaps, no modern language can 'boaſt of; and which is not found in ours with regard to 'any other language but the Hebrew.'

Dr. Geddes' Proſpectus, Note, p. 128.

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liar to the ear by the frequency of repetition, that it would now feel itſelf ſtrange and even offended without them. They poſſeſs alſo that dignity which antiquity confers upon every thing with which it is connected; they have a warmth and animation unknown to modern languages, and raiſe the Engliſh above its natural level, qualifying it to become the vehicle of religious truths.

'There is a certain coldneſs,' ſays the judicious Addiſon, 'in the phraſes of our Eu-'ropean languages, when compared with the 'oriental forms of ſpeech; and it happens 'very luckily that the Hebrew idiom runs 'into the Engliſh tongue with a peculiar 'grace and beauty. Our language has re-'ceived innumerable elegances and improve-'ments from that infuſion of Hebrewiſms, 'which are derived to it out of the poetical 'paſſages in holy writ: they give force and 'energy to our expreſſion, warm and ani-'mate our language, and convey our thoughts 'in more ardent and intenſe phraſes, than 'any that are to be met with in our own 'tongue. There is ſomething ſo pathetic in 'this kind of diction, that it often ſets the

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'mind in a flame, and makes our hearts burn 'within us. If any one ſhould judge of the 'beauties of poetry which are to be met 'with in the divine writings, and examine 'how kindly the Hebrew manners of ſpeech 'mix and incorporate with the Engliſh lan-'guage; after having peruſed the book of 'Pſalms, let him read a literal tranſlation of 'Horace and Pindar, and he will find in theſe 'two laſt ſuch an abſurdity and confuſion of 'ſtyle, with ſuch a comparative poverty of 'imagination, as will make him very ſenſible 'of what I have been here advancing *.'

Caſtalio, both in biblical learning and critical judgment, was a ſuperior tranſlator: but, by an unhappy attempt to leave the Hebrew idiom behind and to clothe his verſion in all the elegance of the Latin phraſeology and conſtruction, upon the principle of profane tranſlation injudiciouſly applied, he has not only abandoned the fidelity, as well as others, but he has loſt all the dignity and ſimplicity, of holy ſcripture. Inſtead of being all that is elegant, and graceful, and ornamental, as he expected; every thing is finical and affected in this fancy-dreſs: and all the re-

* Spectator.

dundance

dundance of his poliſh ſubmits, not only to the ſimplicity of his rival Beza, but often to the more ſervile repreſentations of Tremellius and Junius, and even thoſe of Montanus and Pagninus.

For theſe, among other reaſons, a critical reviſion and improved Edition of the Old, is more deſirable than a New, Tranſlation: for, not only the Hebrew *Idiom*, but as many of the *Words* as poſſible of the old tranſlation ſhould be retained, on account of their ſimplicity and dignity, and alſo, to indulge the honeſt prejudice of the people[P]: for the re-

[P] 'When the Terms and Phraſes employed by former 'Interpreters are well adapted for conveying the ſenſe of 'the author,—they are juſtly preferred to other words 'equally expreſſive and proper; but which, not having 'been uſed by former Interpreters, are not current in that 'application.' Campbell's Diſſ. XI. p. 521.

'Words that are too *fine*, too *learned*, or too *modern*, 'are repugnant to the ſtyle of the ſacred penmen, are too 'flowery, too affected, and too modiſh, to ſuit their ſtyle, 'which is eminently *natural*, *ſimple*, and *dignified*. And, 'on the other hand, words that are *low* and *vulgar*, are 'ſtill more derogatory from the exalted ſublimity of the 'ſubject and language of holy Scripture.' Ibid. Diſſ. XI. p. 570.

'The ſimple and ancient turn of the preſent Verſion 'ſhould be retained.' Bp. Newcome's VIth Rule, p. xxxii.

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mark, from whatever quarter it may have come, is very juſtly made, 'that common 'minds can with difficulty diſcriminate be-'tween the language and the ſubſtance; and 'in loſing the one they will be in no little 'anxiety about the other: beſides that the 'long uſe of writings avowedly ſacred gives 'a venerable air to the language, and ſeems 'almoſt to conſecrate it to the ſervice of 'religion [q].'

But, to crown this general reaſoning in ſupport of the preſervation of the ancient idiom, we have two precedents whoſe authority will be allowed to be unqueſtionable. The Septuagint is a tranſlation of the Old Teſtament, of very high, if not of divine, authority; in which, though the language be Greek, the idiom is uniformly Hebrew: and in the New Teſtament itſelf, though the words are Greek, the ideas are Jewiſh, and the idiom Hebrew; which afford a convincing proof that the original *idiom* is, at any rate, to be preſerved.

In regard to the particular *Spirit*, *Style*, *Character*, and *Manner*, of each ſacred writer, the

[q] Critical Review, Nov. 1789.

tranſfuſion of which into their new language conſtitutes, in the idea of our modern tranſlators, the main difficulty, and the chief merit, of their art[r]: they are things much more

[r] "It is incumbent on every Tranſlator to ſtudy the 'Manner of his author; to mark the peculiarities of his 'Style; to *imitate* his *features*, his *air*, his *geſture*, and, as 'far a different language will permit, even his *voice*; in 'order to give a juſt and expreſſive reſemblance of the ori-'ginal.' Lowth. Prelim. Diſſert. to Iſaiah xxxv.

'The ſecond thing a tranſlator is to do, is, to convey 'into his verſion as much as poſſible, in conſiſtency with 'the genius of the language which he writes, the author's '*ſpirit* and *manner*, and, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, the very 'character of his *ſtyle*.' Campbell's Diſſert. X. part 1.

'The fifth quality of a good tranſlation is that diverſity 'of *ſtyle* which characterized the different ſcripture writers, 'which, however difficult to attain, ought certainly, by 'all means, to be aimed at.—Every writer, whether ſacred 'or profane, has ſomething peculiar to himſelf, and it 'ought to be the endeavour of a tranſlator to retain as 'much as poſſible of that peculiarity.' Geddes' Proſpectus, p. 137, 138. This learned author then quotes the above words of Bp. Lowth, as authority, which, I hope, he does not embrace without conſidering what precedes and follows them.

'To convey into his Verſion as much of his Author's 'Spirit and *Manner* as the genius of the language which he 'writes will admit,' is the ſecond qualification of a ſcripture Tranſlator mentioned by Dr. Campbell, and Mr. Wakefield

more arbitrary and uncertain than either words or idioms, varying more in different authors, than theſe do in different languages; and to transfuſe them in tranſlating is an act of imitation which is fanciful and capricious, depending on the taſte and genius, more than the ſound judgment, of the tranſlator, without ſo much as a limit to reſtrain the imagination. This favourite Rule is obviouſly taken from profane tranſlation, without ſufficiently attending to the different nature of inſpired productions; and is too vague and licentious for the ſevere principle of ſcriptural tranſlation to admit. Tranſlators ſhould reflect, that by labouring to obſerve this rule, they are in the act of infringing the preceding, to which they are more ſtrictly bound, and of defeating their own deſign.

To give his production all the beauties and advantages of the original, the tranſlator of a human work, eſpecially if it be poetical, ſees that, in this imitation, lies his fulleſt and faireſt ſcope, and that his ſucceſs will depend on his poetical genius. In the execution, he not only

Wakefield is of opinion, that a conſiderable ſhare of *human Ingenuity* and *Invention* is requiſite in order to preſerve this *Spirit* and *Manner*. See his Preface.

leaves many of the words and idioms of his author, but his figures too, and flies to the recourſes of his own fancy to ſupply him with ſuch others, as, whilſt they in a good meaſure convey the thought, ſuit the nature and elegance of his own language, and riſe of themſelves to that proportion of ſpirit and animation, and to that particular ſtyle and character, which he conceives his author to poſſeſs. And if, to heighten and improve theſe qualities, he ſometimes give a new turn to the thought, the licence has been commended; as, by making the author ſhine in the tranſlation with a higher luſtre than his own, it makes amends for ſome of the many particulars in which every tranſlator muſt fall ſhort of his original. And, however different it may be in many particular inſtances, if the tranſlation produce the general effect of the author, the tranſlator has arrived at the ſummit of his art, to which, though all hope and imagine they have attained, their ſucceſs is in proportion to their genius, and their imitations as various as their taſte.

Such imitation of the *ſtyle*, *character*, and *manner*, of the ſacred writers, whoſe language

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is always analogical, and often more highly poetical than the claſſic authors, is an effort of human genius, of which, I humbly conceive, the nature of the originals, and the ſevere laws of tranſlation which they dictate, cannot, in any degree, allow. This would be to mix too much of what is vague and human with what is unchangeable and divine; and is, indeed, ſubverſive of that literal and idiomatical fidelity for which we have been contending.

The late learned and ingenious prelate to whom biblical learning is ſo much indebted, who brought too much claſſical refinement to the criticiſm of ſacred poetry, introduced this imitative tranſlation alſo from claſſical authors to the ſacred volume; under the perſuaſion that it is perfectly compatible with a ſtrictly literal verſion. Here the ſame queſtions recur in regard to tranſlating, which were propoſed in regard to criticizing, inſpired productions. How far is this imitation to be carried? and who ſhall draw the line where it is to ſtop? He has ably obſerved, that in tranſlating the works of the beſt claſſic poets, much depends not only in giving the ſenſe of

the author with equal force and elegance, but in taking off his characteriſtic feature, his complexion, his perſonal mien, and very motion. And he owns that whoever has thus attempted to tranſlate the ſacred poets into Greek or Latin verſe, if not quite inferior, they muſt neceſſarily be *diſſimilar*, to them[a]. And notwithſtanding this conceſſion, he has himſelf attempted to reconcile this characteriſtic imitation with his Engliſh verſion. He declares the deſign of his tranſlation of Iſaiah to be 'not only to give an exact and faithful 'repreſentation of the words and of the ſenſe 'of the prophet, by adhering as cloſely to 'the letter of the text, and treading as nearly 'as may be in his footſteps; but, moreover, 'to imitate the *air* and *manner* of the author, 'to expreſs the *form* and *faſhion* of his com-

[a] In exprimendis alia lingua egregiorum poetarum operibus, multum in eo poſitum eſt, ut non tantum iidem ſint intimi ſenſus, par in ſenſibus explicandis vis & venuſtas, ſed ut quantum fieri poteſt externa etiam oris lineamenta effingantur, ut ſuus cuique color atque habitus, ſuus etiam motus & inceſſus tribuatur. Qui itaque ſacros Vates Græco vel Latino carmine exprimere adeoque eorum veluti perſonam ſuſtinere conati ſunt, fieri non potuit quin toto genere & forma, ſi non inferiores, multum certe ab iis diſſimiles eſſent. Præl. iii.

'poſition,

'poſition, and to give the Engliſh reader 'ſome notion of the peculiar *turn* and *caſt* 'of the original[t].' The latter part of this deſign coincides, he thinks, perfectly with the former: and, whatever his ſucceſs may have been in the execution, his ingenuity deſerves to be commended, however it may be with his conſiſtence. His example, however, rendered the more attractive by the celebrity of his learning, the brilliancy of his genius, the dignity of his ſtation, and the faſcinating elegances of his Latin ſtyle, others, poſſeſſed of leſs judicious caution, may have been too eager to follow, without keeping within the bounds of imitation which he preſcribed[u],

[t] Preliminary Diſſertation to his Iſaiah, p. 1.

[u] His idea of imitation ſeems to have gone no farther than to an attempt to repreſent the prophet's *manner*, the *form* of his compoſition, and his *character* as a writer, ſo far as relates to their *verſe*, *meaſure*, *and rhythm*; without affecting the *ſtyle* properly underſtood, the *idioms*, *metaphors*, *images*, and *expreſſions* of the ſacred writers. And this imitation is, perhaps, founded in caprice and fancy rather than in fixed and certain principles. He hoped, however, that it was perfectly conſiſtent with the literal ſenſe. 'I muſt entreat the 'reader to be ſatisfied with my endeavour to expreſs the 'literal ſenſe—this is what I have endeavoured cloſely and 'exactly to expreſs.' Ibid. p. 74.

relying too confidently on this falſe preſumption, that, though the matter was furniſhed by the inſpirer, yet the *form* and *manner* of uttering it was left entirely to the natural genius and inclination of the inſpired; agreeably to the words of Caſtalio, *Res dictat Spiritus, verba quidem & linguam loquenti aut ſcribenti liberam permittit*[v].

That inſpiration conſiſts in the communication of ideas, and not in words, which are only the inſtrument and mode of that communication, is an opinion confidently maintained by many of the learned; with all deference to which, I would contend, that the Inſpirer was intereſted in the *manner* as well as in the *matter*, in the *words* as well as in the *ideas*.

In his ſupernatural intercourſe with men, the Almighty has recourſe to human inſtruments. It was ſhewn, in the preceding pages, that he condeſcended to employ human words to be *analogically* underſtood, in order to convey his divine truths to their underſtanding. But, becauſe the inſtruments are human, no one will preſume to take the liberty of giving

[v] Def. contra Bezam.

them

them any change or different repreſentation by any effort of human genius. No one will preſume to change the words *Father*, *Son*, *Redeemer*, *Mediator*, which the inſpirer hath adopted. It was alſo ſhewn, that, for ſpecial purpoſes or revelation, he made uſe of that *parabolical* expreſſion, thoſe *poetical ſymbols* and *figures*, which abound in the eaſtern languages: and why are not they as ſacred as thoſe analogical words[w]?

Upon this ground of reaſoning, we may juſtly attribute their different *ſtyles*, their appropriate *ſpirit* and *character* to the natural genius, or to the particular education, of the prophets: at the ſame time, that, as the Spirit of prophecy employed their language, whatever it might be, with all its images and figures, to his own purpoſes, it became his inſtrument, as well as the prophets were themſelves, and was, in that view, properly his own[x].

But,

[w] Metaphors are in general to be retained, and the ſubſtitution or unneceſſary introduction of new ones ſhould be avoided. And, if the original metaphor cannot be tranſferred, it ſhould be rendered in the margin.

Bp. Newcome's VIth Rule, xxxv.

[x] Utrumque [το περι τας νοησεις αδρεπηβολον et το σφοδρον και ενθουσιαστικον παθος] in hoc argumento uſurpamus,

But, who can affirm that his divine afflatus had no concern in the immediate act of animating and forming theſe ſeveral ſtyles? or who ſhall draw the line and determine preciſely how far he was concerned[y]? Whether he addreſſed the world by Amos in the ſtyle of a ſhepherd, by Daniel in that of a courtier, or by David in that of a King; whether he ſpoke in *figures*, in *ſymbols*, or by *double ſenſes*, he would mould their minds, and why not their *words*, their *ſtyles*, and even *actions*, to his heavenly purpoſe. And, ſince under the cover of theſe ſtyles and ſymbols he generally concealed the main burden of prophetic enunciation from the prophets themſelves, his influence may be conſidered as more immediate over theſe, than over their

pamus, atque ita Sacris Vatibus tribuimus, ut nihil derogemur Divini Spiritus afflatui: etſi ſuam interea vim propriæ cujuſquam ſcriptoris naturæ atque ingenio concedamus. Lowth, Præl. xvi.

[y] Hanc ſpeciem ἐνθουσιασμὸν appellarem Naturalem, niſi viderer plane inter ſe repugnantia conjungere: eſt certe longe diverſus, & altioris quidem originis, verus ille & germanus ἐνθουσιασμὸς, eoque nomine unice dignus, quo ſolummodo Hebræorum Poeſis ſublimior, ac maxime Prophetica, incitatur. Ibid. Præl. xvii.

minds

minds—" Go thy way, Daniel; for the words " are cloſed up and ſealed to the time of " the end[z]."

When the Prophetic ſtyle conveys a *double ſenſe*, a literal and a figurative, the words are the vehicle of the literal to him who underſtands the language only, and the literal ſenſe is the vehicle of the figurative to him to whom it may be given to 'diſcern the things 'of the ſpirit:' but, if the tranſlator, upon the idea of imitating what he imagines to be the ſtyle and ſpirit of the prophet, in order to transfuſe them into his verſion according as his taſte and genius may direct, make the leaſt change in the images or even in the words, in vain will the interpreter ſeek for the figurative meaning. And, however the prophetical ſenſe be couched, whether under *metaphors*, *ſymbols*, or other cover, ſimilar conſequences will reſult from ſimilar changes.

'That the difference of ſtyle in the writers, 'who were alike the organs of inſpiration, is 'no objection to their having been inſpired,' is, therefore, a poſition to which I readily concede. The Almighty can employ the or-

[z] Daniel xii. 9.

gans

gans of free agents as the inſtruments of his revelation, without making in them any ſenſible change. The ſacred writers might be permitted to uſe the ſtyle moſt congenial to their taſte and education, whilſt the inſpirer was bending it, by his ſecret operation, to his prophetic purpoſes, and even privately ſuggeſting ſuch words and phraſes, ſuch figures and images, as were adapted to his end: which ſecret and ſupernatural operation upon the mind of man is the peculiar prerogative of the Holy Spirit, both in his extraordinary and ordinary communications. "The wind "bloweth where it liſteth, and thou heareſt "the ſound thereof, but cannot tell whence "it cometh or whither it goeth: even ſo is "every one that is born of the Spirit[a]."

If, therefore, *things* were the firſt object of inſpiration, *words* and *forms of words* were the ſecond; and the favourite poſition, upon the ſtrength of which critics and tranſlators make as free with Moſes, David, and Iſaiah, as they do with Homer, Sophocles, or Virgil, That, whatever the *matter* may be, the *words* and *manner* are, in both caſes, equally their

[a] John iii. 8.

their

their own, has no foundation, but in a weak and narrow-minded vanity, by which they hope to entertain the learned, and to aſtoniſh the ignorant, with a diſplay of their ingenuity and ſelf-invention.

How, then, it may be required, are the *Spirit*, and *Manner*, and *characteriſtic Style*, of the ſacred writers, thoſe prominent and diſtinctive qualities, to be preſerved and repreſented in an Engliſh tranſlation? I anſwer: ſufficiently by rendering them as *verbally* and *idiomatically* as poſſible, without attempting any ingenious imitation at all; in which opinion I have the concurrence of one of the moſt ſober and judicious of our tranſlators, who obſerves, that, 'by a literal rendering 'not only the matter of the ſcriptures, but 'the peculiar turn of the language, will be 'faithfully repreſented [b]:' and, I think, with a better and more diſtinctive effect, than by the moſt ſucceſsful attempts of the tranſlator, which, in ſpite of his utmoſt endeavour to vary with the variety of each author, muſt retain throughout the whole a characteriſtic ſimilarity

[b] Bp. Newcome's Præf. to 12 Minor Prophets, p. xvii.

of

of his own. The Engliſh tongue, having been in the long habit of expreſſing Hebrew ideas in Hebrew phraſes, is, by uſe as well as nature, adapted for this effect. Without labouring to mimic the Jewiſh character and expreſſion, it can put them on at once, and, however various they may be, they will not only ſit with eaſe, but appear with elegance. That all poetry is confined to metre is an idea as falſe, as it is contracted: and, whether the original be in verſe or not, the tranſlation, though in proſe, will retain the poetic ſtyle and ſpirit, which is the main object, and enough of the meaſure, whatever it might be, to preſerve the native dignity of the original. This is acknowledged by the late ingenious prelate[c], who took the lead in imitative tranſlation,

[c] Duo hic occurrunt adnotanda, quæ ex jam dictis quaſi conſectaria quædam enaſcuntur. Primo quidem, Poema ex Hebræa in aliam linguam converſum, & oratione ſoluta ad verbum expreſſum, cum ſententiarum formæ ædem permaneant, multum adhuc, etiam quod ad numeros attinet, priſtinæ dignitatis retinebit, & adumbratam quandam carminis imaginem. Hoc, itaque in vernacula ſacrorum poematum interpretatione cernitur, ubi plerumque

" Invenias etiam disjecti membra poetæ :"

quod in Græcis aut Latinis verſibus eodem modo converſis, longe aliter eveniret.

and

and who, after labouring, in a preliminary apology, with his utmoſt ingenuity and addreſs, to aſcertain the meaſure, ſtructure, ſtyle, and character, of the Hebrew writers, in order to imitate them, felt at laſt the difficulties and inconſiſtencies in which he was entangled, and ingenuouſly confeſſed, that the ſubject was *opiniative* in the foundation, and *precarious* in the event [d].

By the rules of PROPRIETY, therefore, reſulting from the principle of ſcriptural Tranſlation founded on the nature of the ſacred volume, an Engliſh verſion of the bible ſhould be as *verbal* and *idiomatical* and exactly *repreſentative* of the original, as the language into which it is made will poſſibly admit.

I. From the Rules of Propriety let us proceed, on the ſame ſcriptural principle, to thoſe of PERSPICUITY, that other tribunal at which tranſlators are to be judged.

[d] 'I venture to ſubmit to the judgment of the candid 'reader the preceding obſervations upon a ſubject which 'hardly admits of proof or certainty, which is rather a mat-'ter of *opinion* and *taſte*, than of ſcience.' Diſſ. Prelim. xxxiii.

Perſpicuity is a quality of firſt importance in all human compoſition, and ſo eſſential to its perfection, that, whenever the author is obſcure, the tranſlator makes no ſcruple to ſtep out of his province to give him light at all adventures, even if he have recourſe to conjecture; the too haſty and licentious uſe of which, in criticizing and tranſlating claſſic authors, has, however, been ſeverely and juſtly cenſured. On the contrary, it has been obſerved, that, in dictating the holy ſcriptures, obſcurity and concealment were often in the intention of the inſpirer: which different intention will require a different conduct in the tranſlator. In ſcriptural tranſlation, therefore, Perſpicuity ſhould ever give place to Propriety; and we ſhould take care, leſt, in the purſuit of the ſecondary and inferior rule, we ſhould loſe ſight of the primary and ſuperior. As he treads on ground which is every where ſacred, and often involved in myſtery, the tranſlator ſhould religiouſly confine himſelf to the literal and grammatical ſenſe of the words. After the text is brought to all the perfection of which it is capable, when that ſenſe is given,

given, if the meaning of the inſpired writer remain obſcure, or even apparently abſurd, the ſeverity of the rule, which Propriety enjoins, will require, that it be left ſo under a literal and grammatical tranſlation. Even Caſtalio, though a very free tranſlator, felt the force, and acknowledged the juſtice, of this obſervation. *Hunc locum non intelligo, ideoque ad verbum tranſtuli.*

Upon this principle of ſcriptural tranſlation the determination of Le Clerc is warrantable. *Tranſlatio, ubi archetypus ſermo clarus eſt, clara; ubi obſcurus, obſcura eſſe debet*[e]. And that of Houbigant, who, taking his ideas from profane tranſlation, attempts to turn it to ridicule, is inadmiſſible. *Obſcurus eſt non ſemel Horatius; num igitur laudanda ea erit Horatii Gallica interpretatio, ubi clarus clare, ubi obſcurus obſcure loquentem reddit.* And, in a ſort of triumph over Le Clerc, he proceeds, *Dubitandum non eſſet quæ ſacri ſcriptores ſcripſerunt, perſpicue ſcripſiſſe.* Underſtood with this reſtriction, That what they were given clearly to underſtand themſelves, and intended that their readers ſhould clearly and immediately underſtand, they delivered clearly, or,

[e] Prolegom. in Pent. Diſſert. ii. § 4.

That grammatically they were ſufficiently clear, the obſervation may be juſt: but, taken at large, and extended to every ſort of perſpicuity, it is indeed fallacious; and, from his high reputation as a biblical critic and tranſlator, his authority hath miſled, and is in danger of miſleading, others [f].

A ſenſible tranſlator has obſerved, on the contrary, that 'the Holy Spirit of God often 'intends

[f] 'Perſpicuity is the ſecond moſt eſſential quality of a 'good tranſlator; nor need we the authority of Horace or 'Ariſtotle to eſtabliſh a propoſition ſo agreeable to com-'mon ſenſe.' Of ſcriptural tranſlation unfortunately neither Horace nor Ariſtotle could be *judges*. 'The Jewiſh, 'like all other writers, certainly wrote to be underſtood.' Theſe Jewiſh writers were, in this important reſpect, totally *unlike* all other writers. 'The poets and prophets them-'ſelves are not obſcure on account of their ſtyle, which, 'though bold and figurative, muſt have been perfectly in-'telligible when they wrote.' How far perfectly intelligible? Was it not by that bold and figurative ſtyle, that, in their prophetical, the moſt important, ſenſe, they were often *unintelligible*? 'A Tranſlator, therefore, who, under 'pretext that his originals are obſcure, affects to give an 'obſcure tranſlation, betrays either his idleneſs or ignorance, 'offers an inſult to his readers, and throws an oblique 'ridicule on the author he pretends to interpret. If the 'ſcriptures are at all to be tranſlated, of which we have no 'doubt, they ſhould be made as plain and perſpicuous as 'poſſible, and not a ſingle ambiguity ſhould be left in them 'that

'intends a myſtery, and ſo leaves the letter 'ſeemingly obſcure: ſuch ſeeming abſurdi-'ties are left for the honour of God's Spirit, 'which clears the difficulty, and ſets all 'right[g].' Time is that only interpreter which can bring a light in the prophetical event to vindicate this honour by diſpelling all ſuch *intended* obſcurity, and which is not *incidental* to the letter. Critics and tranſlators ſhould, as far as poſſible, diſtinguiſh between theſe different kinds of obſcurity; to the want of which diſtinction, I am perſuaded, we may attribute the different opinions by which they are divided. The latter it is incumbent upon the ſacred critic and tranſlator to make clear by all poſſible means: with the former he has no manner of concern, but to take and leave it, under a literal verſion, as he finds it[h]. Even, though to

'that can any ways be removed. That there are certain 'myſterious words of the originals that ſhould not be ren-'dered, may be a pious, but is not a rational, notion.' [Dr. Geddes' Proſpectus, p. 128, 129.] Without making the juſt diſtinction between *grammatical* or *idiomatical* and *prophetical* obſcurities, does not this very learned and liberal tranſlator ſacrifice *Propriety* to *Perſpicuity*, the firſt law of ſcriptural tranſlation to the ſecond?

[g] Dr. Gell.

[h] 'There are ſome things that our Saviour ſaid as well 'as did to his diſciples, which it was not intended they

to us in theſe diſtant ages myſteries may be diſcloſed, which, when the ſcriptures were written, were hid in the womb of time, a tranſlator, whoſe office is to give a repreſentation, not an explanation, of his original, (in which conſiſts the difference between a tranſlator and commentator,) ſhould not avail himſelf of this light. He ſhould preſerve the cover under which the prophetic meaning was concealed, though that meaning may now be clearly underſtood [i]: and, much more, ſhould he

'ſhould underſtand then; but which they would underſtand 'afterwards. *Theſe things*, ſaid our Lord, *I have ſpoken 'to you in figures; the time cometh, when I ſhall no longer 'ſpeak to you in figures, but inſtruct you plainly concerning 'the Father.* It was, therefore, not intended that every 'thing in the Goſpel ſhould be announced at firſt with 'plainneſs. It is withal certain that the veil of figurative 'language thrown over ſome things was employed to ſhade 'them only for a time, and, in the end, to conduce to their 'evidence and greater luſtre. *For there was no ſecret that 'was not to be diſcovered, nor was ought concealed, that was 'not to be divulged.* Now juſtice is not done to the wiſe 'conduct of the Spirit, unleſs things be repreſented, as 'nearly as poſſible, in his own manner.' Campbell's Diſſertation, p. 625.

[i] 'Though many of the events foretold which are now 'accompliſhed, have put the meaning of ſuch prophecies 'beyond all queſtion, we ought not, in tranſlating them, to 'add

he keep inviolable the veil, under which ſecrets may yet remain concealed. All that he ſhould attempt or hope, is, to render the bible ſo, as to be now literally underſtood as it was when originally written; to make it, if poſſible, as intelligible to the learned reader of the preſent age, as the writings of Moſes were to the Iſraelites, and thoſe of the Apoſtles to the ancient Jews [k]: and it is the duty of the divine, (and a moſt weighty part of his miniſterial function,) to make that tranſlation intelligible by the vulgar.

This is that exact and faithful repreſentation which the dictates of inſpiration require, guarded as they are by a ſolemn prohibition that a word ſhall be added, diminiſhed, or diſguiſed. Though, from their

'add any light borrowed merely from the accompliſhment. 'By ſo doing, we may materially injure the hiſtory, and 'render thoſe miſtakes incredible, which, on a more exact 'repreſentation of things as they muſt have appeared at the 'time, were entirely natural.' Campbell's Diſſertation, p. 625.

[k] 'It is the duty of a tranſlator to give every thing to his 'readers as much as poſſible with the ſame advantages, nei-'ther more nor leſs, with which the ſacred author gave it to 'his contemporaries. Ibid.

greater familiarity with words, idioms, and cuſtoms, the contemporaries of a revelation may be ſuppoſed to have underſtood the literal meaning better than we do; we enjoy more of the ſpiritual than they: and, if with theſe advantages over us, they were ſuffered to remain under a thicker cloud of darkneſs, why ſhould we either wonder or repine, that a part of that cloud ſhould be ſtill left to hang over our heads? or why endeavour, by a fruitleſs ingenuity, to remove it? When he has reaſon to ſuppoſe that from his eye time has removed the veil, let the tranſlator adhere to his literal duty; and, as a commentator, he may give the full meaning in the notes: And, where the myſtery remains involved in futurity, let him obſerve the rule of Caſtalio, an exact though finical tranſlator, by rendering the words literally, and acknowledging his ignorance of their true meaning in the margin.

In attempting to carry Perſpicuity, by the ingenuity of conjecture or by any other means, beyond the juſt limits which Propriety preſcribes, let the tranſlator of ſacred writ awfully reflect, that he, who walks on common earth, is not only ſtepping out of his province

province into the ſhoes of an inſpired writer, who trod on holy ground, but even over his head into the perſon of the inſpirer in heaven, who frequently thought proper to hide his meaning from thoſe who gave utterance to his words[l]: and, becauſe holy ſcripture is often obſcure in the delivery, let him not too haſtily imagine that it is therefore imperfect, and ſtands in need of his emendation and improvement[m].

III. But

[l] When Caiphas determined in council in regard to Jeſus, that *it was expedient that one man ſhould die for the people, and that the whole nation periſh not*, the evangeliſt informs us *that this he ſpake not of himſelf, but, being high prieſt that year, he prophefied that Jeſus ſhould die for that nation*; which he neither intended nor underſtood himſelf.

[m] See Lowth's Prelim. Differt. to Iſaiah, p. 64.

'I am fully perſuaded that the words, as they ſtand in the 'preſent Hebrew text, are utterly unintelligible. There 'is no doubt of the meaning of them ſeparately; but put 'together, they make no ſenſe at all—In this difficulty 'what can be done, but to have recourſe to *conjecture*? This, 'it may be ſaid, is impoſing your ſenſe upon the prophet; 'but, however, it is better than to impoſe upon him what 'makes no ſenſe at all.'

Lowth's Notes on Iſaiah, p. 271, 272.

When the text, if wrong, cannot be made right by collation, nothing ſhould, I think, be done but to render the words as they ſtand verbatim.

III. But, though by the cover of a figurative and parabolical ſtyle, in all its forms, the Holy Spirit threw a temporary veil over the whole prophetic diſpenſation, he prepared the

This reaſoning from the Principle laid down, may, perhaps, militate in ſome reſpects againſt the 15th rule propoſed by a very learned prelate in his preface to his tranſlation of the 12 Minor Prophets, whoſe ſober and judicious conduct as a ſcriptural tranſlator, meets my ideas upon the whole more than that of any other. 'Of dark paſſages which 'exhibit no meaning as they ſtand in our preſent verſion, 'an intelligible rendering ſhould be made on the principle 'of ſound criticiſm.' He then quotes the authority of Dr. Lowth, 'that it is better to impoſe your own ſenſe 'upon the prophet, than to impoſe upon him what makes no 'ſenſe at all.' As the authority and example of Houbigant miſled this author, we cannot wonder that his ſhould miſlead others.

'I cannot help diſapproving,' ſays our northern tranſlator, 'the admiſſion of any correction merely on conjec-'ture; for were ſuch a method of correcting to be gene-'rally adopted, no bound could be ſet to the freedom which 'would be uſed with ſacred writ—This is an extreme, 'which, ſhould it prevail, would be much more pernicious 'than the other extreme of adhering implicitly, with or 'without reaſon, to whatever we find in the common edi-'tion.' [Campbell's Diſſertation, p. 646.] What he ſo well obſerves of *correcting*, will apply with equal force to *tranſlating*, by conjecture.

way

way to its removal, in his own proper time, by preſerving an uniformity of language as the immediate key to unlock the ſacred oracles, when the prophetic events took place. In addition, therefore, to the rules of Propriety and Perſpicuity, that of UNIFORMITY ſhould be ſacredly regarded in all ſcriptural tranſlation.

Notwithſtanding the many different ſtyles of ſcripture ſo much contended for by the modern critics, this Uniformity is interwoven through every part of the ſacred volume, which, though written at very different times, and by very different pens, retains every where the ſame or ſimilar *figures* and *ſymbols*, and often the ſame *words*. Poſſeſſed only of the Spirit "by meaſure," the ancient prophets were unacquainted with the whole of that vaſt diſpenſation, of which they were the partial inſtruments, and which was conducted under the univerſal eye of that omniſcient Mind, to which "a thouſand years "are as one day." What one foretold partially and darkly, another, at a different period, more fully and clearly ſignified, in the ſame ſtyle and almoſt the ſame words, but with

with more pointed and particular circumſtances: by which conſiſtency light was reflected from prophecy to prophecy, and the whole ſyſtem was made to be illuſtrative of itſelf. If the Spirit of prophecy held in contemplation an uniform and conſiſtent ſeries of events, he was no leſs careful to expreſs their predictions in a language which was correſpondently uniform and conſiſtent, exactly caſt and moulded for the purpoſe. This is ſtrikingly apparent through every part of the ſacred code; and is no where more conſpicuous than in the uniformity which is wonderfully preſerved between the Old Teſtament and the New. As the prophets were bred in the ſame ſchool to qualify them for this neceſſary uniformity of prophetic ſtyle; ſo the Evangelical writers were all Jews bred under the Law of the Prophets, and thus qualified to extend it from one diſpenſation to another, and to make it pervade the whole religious ſyſtem [n]. The Greek is known to

[n] The reaſons aſſigned by Dr. Campbell in his Diſſertations, p. 12, for the Apoſtles mixing Hebraiſms and Chaldaiſms in their writings are extremely defective, as this *Uniformity of Scripture* is, I apprehend, the chief.

5 differ

differ from the Hebrew and other oriental tongues, as much in idiom and conſtruction as it does in character: notwithſtanding all this, though the words of the New Teſtament be in Greek, the idiom and phraſeology are invariably Hebrew. The whole is, indeed, Hebrew ideas and phraſes clothed in Greek. To prepare for this extraordinary mixture by adapting the Greek tongue to the Hebrew idiom, and to familiarize it to their uſe, the Septuagint verſion of the ancient ſcriptures had been providentially made, which is the Hebrew phraſeology in Greek words; and which formed a model for the uſe of Evangeliſts and Apoſtles. And thus, by an uniformity of language, the figurative and ſymbolical predictions delivered under the Law are enabled to meet their correſpondencies in the Goſpel; where they were either interpreted, or extended to future ages of the church.

This UNIFORMITY *, as the key of interpretation, ſhould, therefore, at any rate be preſerved

* The tranſlater of Ezekiel and the Minor Prophets ſeems to adopt this idea of *Uniformity*. 'The ſame original and 'its

preſerved in tranſlation: and, upon this ground of reaſoning, we may ſubſcribe the opinion of Eraſmus

'its derivatives according to the leading different ſenſes, 'and alſo the ſame phraſe, ſhould be reſpectively tranſlated 'by the ſame correſpondent Engliſh word or phraſe; ex- 'cept where a diſtinct repreſentation of a general idea, or 'the nature of the Engliſh language, requires a different 'mode of expreſſion.—Not only the ſenſe, but the beauty 'and force, of many paſſages depend on a verſion not de- 'viating from Uniformity without a deciſive reaſon.'

Bp. Newcome's Pref. 24, &c.

'A fourth quality of a good tranſlator is as ſtrict an 'Uniformity of ſtyle and manner as is conſiſtent with the 'foregoing properties.' Dr. Geddes' Proſpectus, 136.

I wiſh the arguments for *Uniformity*, ſupported by theſe two great authorities, would weigh with our northern tranſlator of the Goſpels, and induce him either to reconſider the following poſition, or to be very careful of indulging in that *Variety* which he ſeems to cheriſh. 'There are caſes 'wherein ſome things may be done, nay, ought to be done 'by a tranſlator for the ſake of Variety; for the ſacred hiſto- 'rians do not always confine themſelves to the ſame words 'in expreſſing the ſame thoughts. This is owing to a free- 'dom from all ſolicitude about their language. An unva- 'rying recourſe to the ſame words for expreſſing the ſame 'thoughts, would, in fact, ſhew one to be ſolicitous about '*Uniformity*, and uncommonly attentive to it.'

Campbell's Diſſ. XII. part i. p. 594.

The language of the inſpired writers is of various kinds; ſententious, didactic, parabolical, and narrative; and the Uniformity

Eraſmus and Beza. *Veterem interpretem*, ſays Beza, *Eraſmus merito in eo reprehendit, quod unum idemque vocabulum ſæpe diverſis modis explicat. Atque in eo ipſo quoties peccat? Leviculum hoc eſt dices. Ego aliter cenſeo, niſi cum ita neceſſe eſt, in his quidem libris in quibus ſæpe videas mirifica quædam arcana veluti unius vocabuli involucris tegi.*

IV. In regard to the ELEGANCES OF LANGUAGE and HARMONY OF PERIODS, thoſe qualifications of good tranſlation held in eſteem by our modern adventurers, they have their foundation in the ſhifting caprice of faſhion and in the varying refinements of taſte, and are thoſe ſuperficial accompliſhments with which the tranſlator of a claſſic author may ſacrifice to popular fame. He feels himſelf a ſort of rival of his author, and partly intereſts himſelf in the ſenſe and entirely in the lan-

formity of ſome may be of more importance than of others; but which theſe are it may not be eaſy or neceſſary to determine. Their meaning can be only known from their words, and where theſe differ, the other may not be preciſely the ſame. This paſſion for Variety is no favourable omen in a ſacred tranſlator.

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guage; the latter of which, tricked up in the fashionable, but fading ornaments of the day, may be a fairer candidate in the present age for public favour. The dignity and simplicity of scriptural version, in which the translator has no power over the sense or over the letter, reject these whimsical and adventitious ornaments. Where the grosser inelegances and improprieties of language are avoided, *ea effiges laudatur*, says Le Clerc, *non quæ vultum formosum, sed qualis est revera spectantium oculis offert* [p]. The Holy Bible will appear in a more characteristic and becoming dress, invested in its native simplicity and grandeur, than if adorned in all the fancy of modern elegance; whether dilated through the finical and affected sentences of a fashionable historian, or swelled out in all the pompous and unclassical formalities of the Johnsonian period.

This idea of Scriptural Translation, grounded upon the principle that 'The Holy Bible, 'in manner as well as in matter, is different 'from all other books, and, therefore, re'quires a different treatment,' is more or less

[p] Prolegom. in Pent. Diss. ii. § 4.

repugnant

repugnant from the opinions advanced by our modern tranſlators, and the rules which they ſeverally preſcribe. In ſupport of the preceding arguments for a tranſlation of the bible which is as *literal* and *idiomatical*, as *faithful*, without attempting to do away any obſcurities which do not attach upon the letter, and as *uniform*, as poſſible, I ſhall, therefore, quote one example out of many that may be produced.

In the 21ſt Chapter of Saint Matthew and the 20th of Saint Luke, our Lord repreſents himſelf and the kingdom of the Goſpel under the ſymbol of a *ſtone* λιθος, as the ancient prophets had uniformly done before him [q]. To this he applies the two verbs συνθλασθησεται and λικμησει, figurative expreſſions, which had alſo been employed by the ancient prophets [r]. Of the former tranſlators have given a literal rendering *conſingetur*, *he ſhall be broken*; but the latter, which is a bolder figure taken from the ruſtic employment of *winnowing corn*, like many other prophetic figures, appearing, in their judgment, when applied to a ſtone in

[q] See Geneſis xlix. Iſaiah xxviii. 16, viii. 14. Daniel ii. 34. Pſalm cxviii. 22. Rom. ix. 32, 33.

[r] Zechariah xii. 3. Iſaiah vii. 13, 14, 15. xxx. 14. Jeremiah xix. Daniel ii. 34, 35, 44.

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its literal ſenſe, not only obſcure but utterly abſurd, rather than impoſe upon our Lord in their tranſlation what they thought no ſenſe at all, they judged it better, by ſome pious rule or other, to impoſe upon him, and to help him out with, a little ſenſe of their own [s]. Inſtead, therefore, of *ventilabit*, *it will blow him away like chaff*, they have rendered it by *conteret* [t], *comminuet* [u], *will grind him to powder* [v], and one very lately, *ſhall cruſh him to pieces* [w]; in every one of which the original figure is totally loſt, and ſubſtituted by another, by which the meaning is completely changed [x]. And, after all their pious labour to give the paſſage ſome meaning of their own, it has puzzled commentators and critics more than any other in the Goſpels; inſomuch that their explanations of it are not only vague and conjectural, but quite different from each other.

[s] See Lowth's Notes on Iſaiah lxiv. 5. p. 271, 272.

[t] The Old Verſion, Eraſmus and Caſtalio.

[u] Beza.

[v] Engliſh Tranſlation.

[w] Dr. Campbell.

[x] All the tranſlations I have ſeen entirely miſrepreſent the figure except the Gothic of Benzelius, which renders it by *diſſipabit*, and gives *ventilabit* in the margin.

In applying theſe two figures to the emblem of the ſtone, our Lord was, in the *uniform* uſe of the prophetic ſtyle, illuſtrating, confirming, and extending, as he and his Apoſtles often did, two ancient and very important prophecies. In the verſes directly preceding, he quotes the prophetic words of the 18th Pſalm[y], telling the Jews that they were on the point of being fulfilled in the Goſpel being taken from them on account of their inveterate obſtinacy, and given to others better qualified to receive it. "Did ye never read "the ſcriptures, The *ſtone* which the build-"ers rejected, the ſame is become the head "of the corner: this is the Lord's doing, "and it is marvellous in our eyes? There-"fore I ſay unto you, The Kingdom of God "ſhall be taken from you, and given to a 'nation bringing forth the fruits thereof[z]." And in the next verſe he repeats the ſame ſymbol to which he applies the two figures in queſtion, confirming two farther prophecies relating to the Jews—by that of being *broken*, *συνθλασθησεται*, he confirms the prediction of

[y] Verſe 22.

[z] Matt. xxi. 42, 43. See Luke xx. 17.

Iſaiah and Jeremiah, which ſignified that, after ſuch rejection from the kingdom of the Goſpel, the Jews ſhould have their theocratic polity diſſolved, and that their community would be broken. "Sanctify the Lord your "God," ſaith Iſaiah, "and let him be "your fear, and let him be your dread; and "he ſhall be for a ſanctuary: but for a ſtone "of ſtumbling, and for a rock of offence to "both houſes of Iſrael, for a gin and for a "ſnare to the inhabitants of Jeruſalem, and "many among them ſhall ſtumble, and fall, "and be *broken*[a]:" which figurative and ſymbolical enunciation is more directly expreſſed by Jeremiah in his repreſentative action of *breaking the potter's veſſel*[b].—Notwithſtanding this ſevere enunciation, there was a reſerve in the divine mercy in favour of this people of God, that, though rejected and broken, "a remnant ſhould be ſaved[c]," and which, however diſperſed throughout the world, ſhould, at ſome diſtant period, be reunited and reſtored. The ſubject of prophetic enuncia-

[a] Iſaiah viii. 13, 14, 15.
[b] See xix. chap. and Iſaiah xxx. 14.
[c] See Iſaiah xxvii. 32. and Rom. xi.

tion were the four great empires of the world, which were finally to give place to this kingdom of the ſtone; and, by the ſecond figure λικμησει, our Lord confirms another illuſtrious prophecy reſpecting a different people reſerved to a different fate, the laſt of theſe empires, the ſucceſſor and repreſentative of the three former; which prophecy foretold that it was not only to be broken, as the Jewiſh polity, but that every trace and veſtige of it ſhould vaniſh as a ſpectre from the earth, and *be blown away as chaff.* That department in the prophetic ſyſtem, which relates to the future fate and fortunes of this new and ſpiritual kingdom of the ſtone, fell eſpecially to the ſhare of the prophet Daniel, whoſe prophetic words in his declaration of Nebuchadnezzar's dream are exactly correſpondent to this figure, "Thou ſaweſt, till "that a ſtone was cut out without hands, "which ſmote the image upon his feet of iron "and clay, and brake them to pieces. Then "was the iron, the clay, the braſs, the ſilver, "and the gold, broken to pieces together, and "became *like the chaff of the ſummer threſhing* "*floors*; *and the wind carried them away,*

" *that no place was found for them*[d];" and in the interpretation which directly follows, as tranſlated by the LXXII, the prophet explains theſe laſt words by λικμησει, the very word which our Lord employs[e].

Of theſe three prophecies relating to his Goſpel, to which Chriſt gave a confirmation and extenſion, the two former have been completely and wonderfully fulfilled, in the rejection of the Jews, and the diſſolution of their polity; and no inconſiderable portion of the third has met with its completion in the hiſtory of the world. For, of the three great prophetic empires, the Babyloniſh, the Medo-Perſian, and the Macedonian, no more trace or veſtige hath remained for many ages, than if they had never exiſted; and in regard to the fourth, which is the Roman in its full extent, Imperial and Papal, it has been long upon the wain, and ſeems to be vaniſhing as a ſhadow from the globe: when the " ſtone " that ſmote the image will become a moun- " tain, and fill the whole earth; when the " kingdoms of the world ſhall become the " kingdoms of the Lord and of his Chriſt[f];

[d] Daniel ii. 34, 35.

[e] Daniel ii. 44. Αυσ̃ησει ὁ θεος τ̃ ὐρανν βασιλειαν, ἡις λεσ̃υνει και ΛΙΚΜΗΣΕΙ πασας ̃ας βασιλειας. [f] Ibid.

" But

"But the viſion is yet for an appointed time;
"but in the end it will ſpeak and not lie[g]."

Inſtead of putting a new ſenſe upon the word λιμψεται, by which the figure was loſt, had tranſlators only rendered it literally and directly, that *uniformity* would have been preſerved, which is the true key of interpretation[h]: and, inſtead of having recourſe to conjecture and invention in order to remove the difficulty of the paſſage which ariſes from a falſe tranſlation, commentators would have been led to its juſt interpretation in the book of Daniel; and one of the moſt important and extenſive prophecies of our Lord would not have been loſt to our underſtanding for many ages[i].

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[g] Habakkuk ii. 3.

[h] Inde hoc ſaltem collegi poteſt, uno eodemque vocabulo Græcum ſcriptorem uti; ideoque locum unum cum altero conferri debere. Hen. Steph. Præf. in Nov. Teſt.

[i] Our Northern tranſlator of the Goſpels is a ſtrong advocate for *Variety*, as a qualification of ſcriptural tranſlation; by which he muſt frequently ſacrifice that *Uniformity* of words and phraſes, which is here contended for. In labouring at this variety, he has given us no promiſing ſpecimen of his tranſlation in the place before us: for he is not only guilty of the ſame fault with his predeceſſors in departing from the literal rendering, but, in his love of variety, he has differed

An *unprejudiced*, a *literal*, a *faithful*, and an *uniform* tranſlation of the whole bible, both Old and New Teſtaments, is that learned work, which is more earneſtly to be deſired than any other. Beſides all other advantages,

from them all, and is juſt ſo much inferior. He has not only loſt the figure in λικμησει by rendering it *will cruſh them to pieces*, but that of συνθλασθησεται too, by tranſlating it *bruiſed* inſtead of *broken*; by which the prophetic meaning is totally deſtroyed. His Diſſertations promiſe better: and I hope his rendering of this paſſage is not a true ſpecimen of his work; as it is, in every reſpect, much inferior to the old tranſlation. The ſymbol, which had been employed by Moſes, David, Iſaiah, Zachariah, St. Paul, and Chriſt himſelf, to repreſent the kingdom of the Goſpel, the old tranſlators have dignified by the proper article THE *Stone*, by which it is rendered *particular* and *ſupereminent*; but the above tranſlator has diminiſhed it into A *Stone*, making it *general* and *common*. In our Lord's prediction of the rejection of the Jews and the call of the Gentiles, the words και εστι θαυμαστη εν οφθαλμοις ημων, which the old tranſlation rendered, *and it is marvellous in our eyes*, he has rendered, *and we behold it with admiration*. Now *wonder* or *ſurpriſe*, expreſſed by *marvellous*, is one idea, and *admiration*, though akin, is quite another, having in it a mixture of *love* and *approbation*: in which light the Jews, of whom the words are ſpoken, could not be ſuppoſed to view their own rejection.

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this would do more in reconciling parties and perſuaſions in religion, by laying a foundation of one true interpretation of ſcripture, and in bringing them together into one fold under one ſhepherd (a conſummation by all Chriſtians devoutly to be wiſhed!), than any other human expedient. In the execution of this great work the books of the Hebrew Scriptures cannot be too minutely ſtudied, too extenſively collated, and too accurately compared: and the Septuagint, which is a ſafe and general guide to the knowledge of them all, ſhould never be neglected. It ſhould, indeed, be particularly conſulted, and attended to through the whole of the ſcriptural tranſlation, as forming the general model of the work. When the Old Teſtament has been thus conſiſtently and uniformly tranſlated, it will prepare the way for the execution of what remains: for the tranſlation of the New Teſtament ſhould be engrafted upon that of the Old; and made a part of the ſame whole through the medium of the Septuagint.

As this is a work to be deſired and contended for by Chriſtians of all denominations; in the preparation for it the learned of all

countries ſhould concur, and in the execution of it thoſe of every communion ſhould unite their labours. Too much learning cannot be employed, if ſeaſoned with humility, too much ſagacity cannot be exerted, if tempered with ſobriety, too much judgment cannot be exerciſed, if conducted with diſcretion. In this important undertaking all party opinions ſhould be loſt in oblivion: otherwiſe, inſtead of one, we ſhall have as many bibles, as there are ſects. Certain rules ſhould be enacted and religiouſly obſerved: for if men be left at large to tranſlate the bible with the ſame capricious taſte and variety of genius by which they tranſlate other books; we ſhall have as many texts as men employed, and as many ſtyles as geniuſes. The bible, which is one conſiſtent body of light and truth, will be more varied in its meaning and metamorphoſed in its form, than any other book; in proportion as it is more different in its authors, more various in its language, more myſterious in its ſenſe, more complex in its deſign, and more important in its end.

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In this chapter I have attempted a compendious ſketch of THE RIGHT USE OF REASON IN MATTERS OF RELIGION, as a general out-line of the Study of Divinity.

So far from ſuperſeding the exerciſe of REASON, Theology, we ſee, opens the largeſt, the richeſt, and the moſt various field for its cultivation; in which all the powers and provinces of the UNDERSTANDING, the WILL, and the IMAGINATION, are engaged. And to prevent error in this vaſt and various walk of ſcience, which is more eaſy and more uſeful than to correct it, a general remedy will be to mark diſtinctly the different offices of Reaſon as it advances from one ſtage to another in rearing the edifice of the Chriſtian Faith.

1. The Divine Teſtimony or Record, the Principle of Theology, is contained in a book preſenting a certain form of words: and to trace Reaſon up the aſcending ſcale, in the reverſe of the order purſued in the preceding pages, its firſt office is to enquire into the *hiſtory* of that book—The AUTHENTICITY of the holy Scriptures.

2. This

2. This book profeſſes to have been written by men divinely aſſiſted and inſpired, and of courſe infallible in what they wrote; a ſecond office is, therefore, to inquire into the truth of this *Inſpiration*—The AUTHORITY of the Holy Scriptures.

3. This Book is found to contain a number of truths doctrinal and moral, which are called myſteries, and which are aſſerted to be the immediate dictates of God himſelf; and, to evince this great point to men, a number of ſupernatural *Teſts* and *Evidences* are inſeparably connected with theſe Myſteries, ſo that if the former were true, the latter muſt be ſo; a third office of Reaſon, is, therefore, to examine theſe Teſts and Evidences—The DIVINITY of the Holy Scriptures.

4. This book was written and early tranſlated in ancient languages, and has its meaning conveyed, and often couched and concealed, in particular Styles and forms of writing; and a fourth office is, to underſtand theſe *ancient Languages*, and to unfold theſe peculiar *Styles* —The INTERPRETATION of the Holy Scriptures.

5. And

5. And as this Book was given for the uſe and advantage of all *Nations*, a fifth office of Reaſon in matters of Religion is ſo to *convert* it into different Languages, that it may be rightly and properly underſtood by thoſe who ſpeak them—The TRANSLATION of the Holy Scriptures.

When theſe ſeveral offices are duly executed, the edifice of Theology is complete, Reaſon reſigns to Faith, which takes immediate poſſeſſion, and embraces at once, with an implicit and firm aſſent, all the contents of this myſterious Book. They are as the *Principles* of truth, which reject all direct attempts to judge, to compare, or to account for them. They are not the *Poſita* of Philoſophers; but the *Placita* of God.

6. But though Reaſon may not directly intrude into the temple of Faith, which ſhe hath thus erected, it is her farther duty, as the handmaid of Religion, to honour this queen of heaven with all attention and obſervance, to contemplate her excellence, to illuſtrate her doctrines, to promote her intereſts, to behold her fair beauty, and to bring all her children, the arts and ſciences, to miniſter

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in her courts. And, as her *Precepts* or moral duties are delivered as the immediate will of God, a further office is, to propoſe them to the will of men with all the advantage of their truth and excellence ſeconded by all the powers of perſuaſion—The MORALITY of the Holy Scriptures.

In all which various offices of Theological Reaſoning, which is different in the aggregate from every other kind, a ſound underſtanding and a good heart will be found more uſeful and propitious guides than Mood and Figure.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of Theological TRUTH.

THUS, the prize cannot be won without labour in the race: and, when the prize is won, though, in its principle, in its utility, and in its end, THEOLOGICAL TRUTH tranſcend every other kind, in proportion as the heaven is higher than the earth; yet, derived as it is into the human underſtanding through ſuch a various and complicated train of Reaſoning, and viewed in its juſt logical proportion, it is not only *different* from all others, but INFERIOR in its force and evidence. Its objects are not only removed from the apprehenſion of all Senſe, but many of them are placed out of the comprehenſion of all Intellect. Though its *moral* evidence be ſtrong and convincing, that is not

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of itſelf ſufficient to ſupport its claim: and the ſcene in which its *external* evidences were diſplayed to men, on which its authority mainly reſts, has been ſhifted for many ages. However divine and infallible in itſelf, the Teſtimony of God is conveyed through the channel of human tradition, and made dependent on the fallible ſupport of the *Teſtimony of men:* and the ſubſtance of this truth itſelf, as recorded and conveyed to us, is a matter of various and difficult *interpretation.*

The aſſent by which this ſingular ſpecies of Truth, ſo ſuperior in its intrinſic worth, but ſo inferior in its logical conſideration, is diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Faith*, which, however tranſcendent both in its origin and in its end, is humbled by the *means* through which it takes poſſeſſion of the mind; and is, by that very circumſtance, rendered, "the 'greateſt of all virtues."

If this TRUTH be of ſuch univerſal and immenſe importance, why, it may be aſked, does its omniſcient author, whoſe mercies are over all his works, keep it ſo much concealed from men? Why are its doctrines ſo myſterious?

myſterious? Why are its evidences put at ſo great a diſtance from our view, and made ſo painful and laborious in the acquiſition? Why is the written word ſo obſcure and concealed, couched in parabolical expreſſion, and involved in ſymbols and emblematic figures? and why is the conviction reſulting from the whole of revelation ſo much *weaker* and logically *inferior* to that of the other kinds of truth, which are much leſs univerſal in their uſe, and much leſs important in their end? Other truths can only lead men with comfort and advantage through the preſent tranſitory life; this profeſſes to open them a paſſage and to enſure them a portion in a future and a better, which will be permanent: and why, rejoins the mathematician, is it not founded on principles as ſelf-evident, why is it not ſo clearly and eaſily to be deduced, and why is it not crowned with as ſtrong and full conviction, as my demonſtrations?—And the ſame queſtions may be put by the patrons and profeſſors of all other parts of learning in their turn. They may jointly demand—Why does this celeſtial knowledge, which flows immediately from the fountain of light and truth, derive

derive from him ſuch weak and clouded beams, as to ſhine upon the human mind through a denſer and more complex medium than any other?

To theſe queſtions one general anſwer might ſuffice, That Truth, like every thing elſe, is of many and different kinds, each of which has it its own proper nature, by which it is adapted to the particular uſe and end for which it was deſigned: that this difference, in whatever it may conſiſt, cannot operate to the rejection of any; but that all, of whatever kind, are equally entitled to the reaſonable aſſent of the human mind, for which they were intended, though not operating with equal degrees of evidence: that ethical is not to be exploded becauſe it is not phyſical, nor phyſical becauſe it is not mathematical: and that the uſes and ends, which they are ſeverally calculated to anſwer, are by no means in proportion to their ſtrength and brightneſs: that it is, therefore, incumbent on all reaſonable men, inſtead of preſcribing the conditions on which Truth is to be received, to embrace it with gratitude upon the terms on which it is given; valuing it according to the meaſure of its

its utility; and reſolving its different appearance and effect into the reaſon of Him who gave it, whether that reaſon can be known or not.

But, beſide this general anſwer, a ſpecial one may be made from the *End* which Theological Truth has profeſſedly in view; from which we may infer an obvious reaſon, why it is conſtituted what it is.

Future Happineſs, in the more immediate fruition of the Deity, exalted by his preſence and crowned by his love, is the end of that Faith by which this truth is to be embraced. Frequent and explicit are the declarations of holy ſcripture, that the "pure in heart ſhall "ſee God[k]," and that "without holineſs "no man ſhall ſee the Lord[l]" It is therefore neceſſary that this *purity of heart*, which is ſo indiſpenſable to the end, ſhould become an ingredient of the mean, which is deſtined to open the way and to lead men to it. In order, therefore, to give Faith this purifying influence over the heart, the Truth, which is its object, is withdrawn from the fuller and more immediate view of the underſtanding.

[k] Mal. v. 8. [l] Heb. xii. 14.

By this divine expedient an intermediate diſcipline is inſtituted, in which all the beſt affections of the heart are voluntarily diſplayed, and all the moral virtues exerciſed, in the act of embracing, honouring, and obeying, the truth.

In this ſhort probationary ſtage of being, men are only in the infancy of their exiſtence; and, to train them up to a maturity of moral virtue in which their manhood is to conſiſt, they are appointed to "walk by faith, and not "by ſight." In the whole of his religious diſpenſation, therefore, he is "a God that "hideth himſelf;" and the ſearch of him in his world of Grace, is calculated by his wiſdom to call into action every generous diſpoſition and virtuous inclination of the heart, which is devoted to religion. The taſk of making its firſt offering at the ſhrine of Faith may be painful and laborious; for all the evil affections, which ſtand in the way, are firſt to be removed. By exerciſe and habit, however, it will become not only eaſy but delightful; till the pleaſure which reſults, independent of the reward, will amply repay the labour.

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In the inſtitution, therefore, of this *probationary Diſcipline*, ſo requiſite to the end, we have an adequate ſolution of all the objections which can be made to the difficulty and obſcurity of Theological Truth. He, whoſe ſuperabundant love undertook all that was requiſite to be done, in the reconciliation between God and man, who had the excluſive privilege of 'knowing what is in man,' and who treated him according to his nature, ſaw the neceſſity of this diſcipline, and adapted the condition of his religion to it: which, we may conclude, could not have taken place, had the Truths of Theology been any other, or unfolded in any other way, than what they are; and had the Faith by which they are to be embraced, been a different ſpecies of aſſent.

Were the evidences and objects of our moſt holy Faith placed upon a level with thoſe of Senſe, this moral diſcipline, ſo neceſſary to the end in view, would be removed from earth; and other evil conſequences would have enſued to mankind in general.

Being as full, and obvious, and eaſy to be evinced, as thoſe of many other kinds of truth,

the evidences of religion would force the conviction of the underſtanding independently of the will, without calling forth the exerciſe of thoſe moral virtues, by which alone man is qualified for all the ſublime offices of religion, and deſerving its reward. Reſting upon ſuch proofs as invite no ſpontaneous deſire or emotion of the mind, and require no application of induſtry or labour of diſcuſſion, and aſſenting to ſuch truths as are obvious of themſelves and eaſy of admiſſion, Faith would not be what it was intended: it would be a very eaſy and ſuperficial accompliſhment, in the exerciſe of which, though the underſtanding might be improved, the heart would have ſmall concern; and though an intellectual, it could not be a moral, virtue. It could not be the condition of a Religion whoſe criterion is *holineſs*, and which is accommodated to every character and deſcription of men.

But, from the conſtitution of Theologic Truth, Faith becomes a moral, more than an intellectual, virtue; more the voluntary offering of the heart, than the neceſſary reſult of the underſtanding. The evidences of religion are not ſo overpowering as to compel the aſſent

of all: they are only made ſufficient for the rational conviction of every candid and well-diſpoſed, and for the religious conduct of every virtuous and willing, mind. And thus it is that Faith, being a moral virtue, is equally accommodated to all men, and that its reward is equally laid open to their enjoyment.

To ſearch and to know the truth by which they are to be ſaved, is, indeed, the duty of every one: it is, however, experimentally known that, according to the œconomy of this world, and the condition of human life, all do not enjoy equal opportunities, all are not bleſt with equal powers. As the end of Faith is, however, equally the privilege of all; it is ſo conſtituted, that they who ſeek the truth with diligence and deſire, with a humble and willing mind, and with a hope full of immortality, according to the advantages they enjoy; and make it, when found, the rule of their religious conduct, will be entitled to all its benefits. And, the objects of Faith, which men are commanded to embrace with the firmeſt truſt and confidence, on the authority of him "that beareth witneſs," are many of them concealed from the moſt learned in-

veſtigation and the moſt penetrating eye: ſo that, in the houſehold of Faith, the learned and the unlearned are eventually put on equal terms, and may jointly exclaim in admiration, "Lord, I believe, help thou mine "unbelief."

Thus, Faith is not ſo much to *know*, as to *embrace*, the truth: and to all, whoſe minds are willing and well-diſpoſed, the evidences of religion, after ſuch a probationary and preparatory diſcipline, will be abundantly ſufficient, and its objects will be ſufficiently clear, to enſure that ſalvation which is the end of Faith; but to all others, however ſuperior and excellent their knowledge, they will prove, as they were intended, totally inſufficient.

Were their evidences as eaſy and obvious, the truths of religion would, by the vulgar, be held in ſimilar eſtimation with the commoneſt truths of common life; ſubject to that indignity and neglect ſhewn to whatever is of eaſy acquiſition and common uſe. To the learned they would not afford that extenſive field for the exerciſe of reaſon, in which all the active virtues of the mind and imagination

are

ire put in motion, and ſupported, by the beſt ffections and exertions of the will. And, were the objects of Faith revealed in all their glory, were the heavenly manſions diſplayed :o view, all the powers of intellect would be loſt in exſtatic wonder. Inſtead of being employed in thoſe duties and occupations neceſſary to their exiſtence and accommodation here, the faculties of men would be abſtracted from all thoſe earthly objects and concerns, with which they are connected. Inſtead of employing themſelves in thoſe offices, which are adapted to their probationary ſtate, as inhabitants of this earth, and by which they are to be prepared to become inhabitants of heaven, they would be led to undervalue and deſpiſe them, in the anticipation of that ſuperior and celeſtial ſtate, before they were qualified for its enjoyment.

Thus, though the aſſent which accompanies the conviction of all the other kinds of truth, be only a virtue of the underſtanding, conſtituting the Wiſdom which is human: Faith is of the Wiſdom which is divine, which is ‘ firſt pure, then perfect,’ penetrating the

heart and ſubduing its affections. This *purity of heart*, which alone can qualify men to ſee and to enjoy their maker in the intercourſe of his love, is the great object which religion invariably holds in view, and which it every where promotes. The nature of its evidences, the ſublimity of its doctrines, the excellence of its precepts, the perfection of its examples, its regenerating grace—every part of the Chriſtian ſyſtem has a direct tendency to improve the heart and to perfect moral virtue. The image of God, that celeſtial character, originally impreſſed on the human mind, however injured and effaced, it is the buſineſs of religion to repair, and to reſtore, after a courſe of probationary diſcipline, to more than priſtine beauty.

In conſequence of this *inferiority* of THEOLOGIC TRUTH, that ſuch is the true nature of that *Faith*, which, in the act of embracing it with a full confidence and aſſent, becomes the greateſt of virtues, is ſtrikingly apparent from the different diſpenſation of religious information to men in different circumſtances and

ages

ages of the world—to thoſe *holy men of old*, in reſpect of the diſtant objects of the faith by which they were juſtified—to the *Apoſtles and more immediate witneſſes* of Chriſt—and to *ourſelves in theſe diſtant times.*

To men placed in ſuch very different ſituations Theologic Truth appeared with a very different aſpect, as viewed from different points: notwithſtanding which, the whole religious œconomy is ſo wonderfully adjuſted, that the Faith, by which it is entertained, and by which they are to be juſtified together, is in all the ſelf-ſame virtue, intereſting the will as much as engaging the intellect, and addreſſed to the heart more directly than to the underſtanding.

1. Though the evidences of a ſupernatural interpoſition were diſpenſed with a liberal hand through the patriarchal ages, the celeſtial light ſhone upon them as in a dark, and from a diſtant, place; and the objects of their faith could be ſeen only as through an indiſtinct and clouded medium. Excepting that which regulated their moral conduct, all other religious inſtruction was wrapped up in a figurative

figurative and ænigmatical cover, and made inacceſſible, in its moſt important ſenſe, by the apprehenſion even of thoſe through whoſe mouth it came. Relying upon a *Promiſe* delivered, at firſt, in obſcure and general terms, and exhibited, in future generations, under ſuch types and figurative repreſentations, as were only a ſhadow of better things to come [m], their Faith was founded on a truſt in God reſulting from their piety and virtue. Under this dark and dubious cloud, which nothing but the perſonal riſing of the ſun of righteouſneſs could effectually diſpel after the lapſe of many ages, the holy men of old were placed; and their Faith was only 'the ſub-'ſtance of a future hope,' deriving that excellent quality, by which it was ſo triumphant, from that obedience and pious reſignation by which it was accompanied [n]. Although, to their dim and imperfect ſight, "clouds "and darkneſs were round about him," they reſted in a confident aſſurance, which their virtue had ſupplied, that "righteouſneſs and "judgment were the habitation of his throne."

[m] See Col. ii. 17. Heb. viii. 5. x. 1.

[n] See xi. chap. Heb.

Prophecy

Prophecy was the principal mean of religious inſtruction in theſe early ages. This was delivered in a myſterious and ænigmatical ſhape, that it might afford exerciſe to the moral faculties and voluntary diſpoſitions of the willing and well-diſpoſed; and that, whilſt it was calculated to be the teſt of truth, it might be, at the ſame time, the reward of virtue. Of this ſublime intention of the inſpirer we have a full and unequivocal aſſurance in the angel's reply to the prophet Daniel, who was kept in ignorance of the very predictions he was commiſſioned to pronounce. "And I heard," ſaid the prophet, "but I "underſtood not: then ſaid I, O my Lord, "what ſhall be the end of theſe things? And "he ſaid, Go thy way Daniel; for the words "are cloſed up and ſealed to the time of the "end. Many ſhall be purified and made "white, and tried; but the wicked ſhall do "wickedly: none of the wicked ſhall under-"ſtand; but the wiſe ſhall underſtand[o]."

The faith of Abraham ſtands forward as a prominent example, and will ever remain a ſplendid monument, of his virtue. Dark in

[o] Daniel xii. 8, 9, 10.

its

its evidence and diſtant in its object, it was ſanctified by his ready and unreſerved obedience to the will of God; and from thence "accounted to him for righteouſneſs." By virtue of ſuch a Faith he was denominated "The Righteous," and conſtituted "The "Father of the Faithful," of all the religious in all future ages, who believe and obey after his example, and who, in participation of his future reward, will be "bleſt with faithful "Abraham [p]." As a temporal reward for that ſingular and magnanimous inſtance of ſuch a Faith diſplayed in ſtretching his ſon upon the altar, the Almighty, indeed, indulged the aged patriarch, in the illuſtrious act, with an indirect and diſtant view of that future day, when the whole myſtery of his faith was to be evolved in the perſonal ſacrifice of his Son upon the croſs [q]. For as, on the part of Abraham, this was the moſt ſignal example of obedience; ſo, on the part of God, it was a ſignal inſtance of the language of prophetic action, which was interpreted by Chriſt himſelf, in that ſingular declaration, by which the Jews were ſo much offended, and by

[p] See Gal. chap. iii. [q] See Gen. chap. xxii.

which

which commentators have been as much confounded—" Your father Abraham rejoiced " to ſee my day, and he ſaw it, and was " glad[r]."

Had the information and conviction of the underſtanding been the ſole, or, indeed, the main, object, in the intention of the inſpirer in theſe early ages; inſtead of delivering his religious information in ſuch a dark and myſterious form, he would have adopted a mode of ſupernatural communication more immediate and direct: but He, who had determined by an unalterable decree, that " without " holineſs no man ſhould ſee him," had a farther and greater end in view. Religious inſtruction was communicated in ſuch a way and with ſuch qualifications, as to excite the deſires, to exerciſe the induſtry, and to improve the virtue, of theſe venerable men: ſo that the firſt and beſt offering which they made to religion, became the neceſſary offering of the heart.

Such was the nature of that holy Faith, by which " the elders obtained a good report," anticipating its object in dark and diſtant proſ-

[r] John viii. 56.

pects,

pects, but full of pious affection, anxious deſire, and holy truſt. And, after enumerating an illuſtrious phalanx of ſaints and martyrs, who were juſtified by this faith, the Apoſtle has given a reaſon why they were withheld from the enjoyment of the Promiſe, moſt encouraging to the virtue, and flattering to the hope, of the partakers of ſuch a faith, in all times ſince it was fulfilled. "God "having provided ſome better thing for us; "that they without us ſhould not be made "perfect[1]:" but that the whole family and houſehold of the faithful, in every age, as children of their father Abraham, ſhould be juſtified together.

2. The circumſtances and ſituation of things at the advent of Chriſt, and his conduct and that of his Apoſtles in preaching the goſpel, will afford us more ample illuſtration of the true genius of Faith.

His divine commiſſion was opened by an illuſtrious ~~prophet~~ ſpecially ſent to prepare the way for his reception, by preaching "the "baptiſm of repentance," or the internal

[1] Heb. xi. 40.

purgation

purgation of the heart, as the prelude to that external baptiſm which is emblematical of it, and which he, therefore, ordained to be the initiating rite of his religion.

On aſſuming his prophetic character, he firſt addreſſed himſelf to thoſe learned Jews, who, from the ſuperiority of their ſtation and the ritual offices which they filled, ought to have been prepared to receive him as the Meſſiah, both by hearts purified after the inſtitution of the Law, and by the application of Prophecies fulfilled in him, to which it was their office to attend. Wanting, however, the firſt qualification, they became totally loſt to the ſecond. By a perverſion of judgment the moſt obſtinate and vicious, they were led to miſinterpret the obvious meaning of their prophets: and when he diſplayed before their eyes the moſt ſtupendous miracles, "their "hearts being hardened [t] through the deceit-"fulneſs of ſin," their underſtandings revolted from the conviction of the double light [u]. Their Faith was blaſted by an obduracy of mind, the effect of many groſs and habitual vices, particularly the predominant one of

[t] John xii. 40. [u] John xii. 37, 38.

pride,

pride, and that of the moſt invetorate ſpecies —the pride of knowledge. Wanting that charity which alone could edify, their knowledge was vain and puffed up. The vices of the heart obſtructed the light of the underſtanding, "therefore," ſaith the beloved apoſtle, "they could not believe:" which wonderful perverſion of all the faculties of the human mind in rejecting his Goſpel, was an event ſo ſingular and important as to be the ſubject of a ſignal prophecy, by which it was converted into an evidence of the very truth which it rejected. "That the ſaying of "Eſaias might be fulfilled, He hath blinded "their eyes and hardened their heart, that "they ſhould not ſee with their eyes, nor "underſtand with their heart, and be con- "verted, and I ſhould heal them[v]."

Habitual goodneſs of diſpoſition was the object of his ſearch, and the only ſubject of his improvement. To try whether their faith could have its foundation laid in virtue, he delivered his ſaving truths under the cover of parables[w], that he might provoke

[v] John xii. 40. See Rom. x. 21.

[w] See Matth. xiii. and Mark iv.

their

their voluntary endeavours to underſtand. Had he given them in open terms, their divine power, ſupported by the miracles by which they were confirmed, would have diſarmed their obſtinacy, and they would have been converted and healed by a compulſive power, in oppoſition to their will, contrary to the whole intent of his religion. But, by couching them under parables, he held them in reſerve, ſo "that ſeeing they might ſee, and not "perceive, and hearing they might hear, and "not underſtand[x]."

From ſuch unpromiſing ſubjects of a holy Faith he turned his attention to others of an oppoſite deſcription, with this ſevere and pointed ſentence, "For judgment am I come "into the world, that they which ſee not, "might ſee; and they which ſee, might be "made blind[y]." Theſe were thoſe humble characters, who were poſſeſſed of the firſt, but who had no great pretenſion to the ſecond, qualification of a rational faith: in whom he fulfilled another prophecy, by "being found of them that ſought him not; "and being made manifeſt to them that aſked

[x] Mark iv. 12. [y] John ix. 39.

"not after him[a]." Their minds, though uninformed, were well-diſpoſed; though ignorant, unprejudiced; though weak, yet innocent. Poſſeſſed, in a ſufficient degree, of the firſt and more eſſential qualification, they were proper ſubjects of a kingdom to be founded and adminiſtered in righteouſneſs: and, under the care and diſcipline of ſuch a maſter, they would in time acquire the ſecond, by having their underſtanding enlarged and ſtrengthened. From his miracles they acknowledged, with an ingenuous candour, his divine authority. By ſhewing themſelves ready to obey him and willing to be inſtructed, they poſſeſſed the neceſſary qualifications to be his diſciples. "He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, I will love "him, and will manifeſt myſelf to him[a]." If "any man will do his will, he ſhall know of "the doctrine whether it be of God[b]."

But, however open their hearts and willing to obey, their minds were weak and tender: he, therefore, diſciplined them with the moſt attentive caution, leſt, by alarming their apprehenſions, he ſhould ſubvert or check thoſe

[a] Rom. x. 20. [a] John xiv. 21. [b] John vii. 17.

virtues

virtues which were to be of voluntary growth; improving by degrees the one, and ſtrengthening by degrees the other. He did not unfold to them all at once the myſteries of his kingdom, unable as they were to underſtand ſuch deep, or to bear ſuch diſmal, truths. To excite in them, however, a voluntary curioſity and deſire to be informed, and, at the ſame time, to conceal from them, till they were ſtrengthened and prepared for its reception, the awful ſubjects of his information, he taught them in parables: and, after they had ſufficiently employed the beſt affections of the mind in a virtuous endeavour to know their meaning, thoſe which he had delivered in public before the Scribes and Phariſees, he explained to them in private, as they approved themſelves "able to receive them[c]." Upon their requiring the reaſon why he taught under this parabolical diſguiſe, and not openly; to encourage them to go on from virtue to virtue, he ſet them, mean as they were in their own eſteem, above their haughty teachers. "To you it is given to know the myſ-
"teries of the kingdom of heaven; but to

[c] Mark iv. 2.

" them in parables[d]," to ſtigmatize their obſtinacy, to puniſh their vice, and to confound their pride. And, to illuſtrate this important point of the progreſſive diſcipline and voluntary eſtabliſhment of his kingdom in the heart, he delivered two expreſſive parables; that of the *Sower*[e], and that of the *Talents*[f].

After the choſen twelve were ſufficiently diſciplined and confirmed, he commiſſioned them to preach the kingdom of God with power, and " appointed Seventy others alſo " to go before his face into every city and " place whither he himſelf ſhould come[g]:" and, when theſe humble inſtruments told him, on their return, of their ſucceſs in preaching the Goſpel and the progreſs they had made in Faith, " in that hour Jeſus rejoiced in " ſpirit and ſaid, I thank thee, O Father, " Lord of heaven and earth, that thou haſt " hidden theſe things from the wiſe and pru- " dent, and revealed them unto babes: even

[d] Matt. xiii. 13, 14.
[e] Matt. xiii. 3 to 23. and Luke viii. 4 to 15.
[f] Matt. xxv. 14 to 30. and Luke xix. 11 to 27.
[g] Luke x. 1.

" ſo,

"so, O Father; for so it seemeth good in "thy sight [h]."

He could have opened their understandings in an instant, and have filled it with all knowledge: but, "knowing what is in man, and "whereof he is made," he treated him as a rational and moral being, leaving the mind to its own voluntary motion, to furnish itself with virtue, to strengthen in goodness, and to grow in grace. As it improved in virtue, he increased its knowledge: the latter of which, without the former, was no qualification of a religion which is holy and undefiled. Failing of this moral improvement so indispensable to a sound and saving Faith, after all the wonders he had seen, and the divine instructions he had received, one of the Twelve fell an unhappy victim to this important truth. Even the Eleven, who continued faithful to the end, were suffered, for the same moral purposes, to remain in ignorance of the true nature of his spiritual kingdom, till after his resurrection [i]. Knowing, however, that they were vessels seasoned and prepared, by a long course of severe and try-

[h] Luke x. 21. [i] See Matt. xx. 21. and Acts i. 6.

ing diſcipline, for its full reception; at laſt he poured upon them his Holy Spirit, to open their underſtanding, and to lead them into all truth.

Such was that Diſcipline by which the Apoſtles were trained, through ſcenes of darkneſs gradually enlightened, in a virtuous and holy Faith, by the hand of Chriſt himſelf: and his example towards them they followed in their conduct towards others, obſerving on all occaſions the great rule of Faith which he had delivered—"Whoſoever hath, to him "ſhall be given, and he ſhall have more "abundance; but whoſoever hath not, from "him ſhall be taken away even that he "hath[k]."

3. Whether it be that of the patriarch, that of the apoſtle, or that of the modern believer; as it was in the beginning, it will continue unto the end: for as there "is one "Lord, and one Baptiſm, ſo there is only one "Faith[l]," which is the ſame virtue in all

[k] Matt. xiii. 12. & xxv. 29. Luke xviii. 26.

[l] Eph. iv. 5.

ages,

ages, requiring the ſame joint qualifications of heart and underſtanding.

Before the advent of Chriſt, "Faith was "the ſubſtance of things hoped for," brought into the mind by anticipation: and, ſince his final departure and the præternatural operation of the Holy Ghoſt, it is "the evidence of "things not ſeen," brought into the mind by retroſpection *. It is evermore the glory of our Religion, that it conſtitutes a willing as well as a reaſonable, ſervice; and the ſituation and circumſtances under which we are placed, in theſe diſtant times, in regard to its truths and evidences, are ſuch as render neceſſary the ſame virtuous endeavour and voluntary exertion; ſuch as arouſe every lovely affection of the mind, in the ſearch and adoption of theologic truth; and ſuch as conſtitute our Faith the ſame compounded and exalted virtue.

The truths of our religion are the ſame ſublime and unfathomable myſteries, to be firmly embraced on the ſole authority of the word of God: and the evidences of that word to us are diſtant and indirect. The road to

* Heb. ii. 1.

theſe evidences is lengthened and laborious, where numerous difficulties and obſtructions are thrown acroſs, to give exertion to the moral, as well as to the intellectual, powers; that the ſtudent may improve in virtue as he improves in knowledge. In this laborious ſearch, his induſtry is excited, his deſires kindled, his love promoted. Whether we view him travelling through the annals of civil and eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, to prove the authenticity of the ſacred code; whether we regard him as employed in the painful taſk of comparing ancient manuſcripts, copies, editions, and tranſlations, for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing an uncorrupted text; whether he be engaged in collecting the evidences of chriſtianity in order to deduce the immortal argument from the whole; or whether he be interpreting or tranſlating different parts of the holy ſcriptures: we behold him traverſing theſe regions of various learning with a breaſt throbbing with deſire, and with a hope full of immortality. However deep his erudition and indefatigable his induſtry, his attention and perſeverance will prove unequal to the taſk, unleſs animated by the cauſe which leads him on.

Thus

Thus disciplined in virtue, whilst he advances in knowledge, and encouraged by the example of those pious men, who, in every age, have trod the same learned and laborious walk, and are gone before him to receive the wages of their virtue, the same hopes by which they were animated enable him to persevere: and, whilst he looks up to them with gratitude and veneration for their useful labours, he will attribute their success as much to the goodness of their heart, as to the strength of their understanding.

But the great glory of our Faith is, that, if we turn our eye from the theological student to the humble believer, who, employed in any of the honest occupations of civil life, reads his bible, or hears it read, who "thinks "of the Lord with a good heart; and in simplicity of heart seeks him, he will be found "of him that tempts him not, and sheweth "himself to such as do not distrust him[a]." It is the peculiar glory of our Faith, that it is made for all men, accommodated to the use, and intended for the benefit, of every class and description in civil life; that he, who breathes

[a] Wisdom i. 1, 2.

with

with a virtuous deſire after the prize of his chriſtian calling, however ignorant and uninformed his head may be, if his heart is good, will be accepted "according to what he "hath, and not according to what he hath "not[a]."

Since the inhabitants of every age and nation could not poſſibly enjoy the evidence of eye-witneſſes, let it be our glory to reſt our Faith with firmneſs on the teſtimony of thoſe who did; in the ſanguine hope, that the greater piety, aſſiduity, and confidence, we exert in the exerciſe of our religion, the more abundant will be our reward. "Thomas, "becauſe thou haſt ſeen me, thou haſt be-"lieved: bleſſed are they that have not ſeen, "and yet have believed[b]." When thoſe unhappy numbers, who beheld the miracles of Jeſus, rejected his doctrines, and aſcribed his works to Beelzebub; whilſt we, in theſe diſtant ages, repoſe our Faith with confidence on the teſtimony of others: at a future day, this will, doubtleſs, redound to their misfortune and to our advantage. "We are kept "by the power of God, through this faith,

[a] 2 Cor. viii. 12. [b] John xx. 29.

"unto

" unto ſalvation, ready to be revealed in the
" laſt time. Wherein we greatly rejoice,
" that the trial of our faith, being much more
" precious than of gold which periſheth
" though it be tried with fire, may be found
" unto praiſe, honour, and glory, at the ap-
" pearing of Jeſus Chriſt, whom having not
" ſeen, we love, in whom, though now we
" ſee him not, yet believing, we rejoice with
" joy unſpeakable, and full of glory; receiv-
" ing the end of our faith, the ſalvation of
" our ſouls [q]."

In every age of the world the Chriſtian Religion is a ſchool of moral diſcipline, in which "the wicked will do wickedly. None " of the wicked ſhall underſtand; but the " wiſe ſhall underſtand [r]." Had its truths and evidences been made to ſhine upon the underſtanding with that full glare of light and palpable conviction, which ſome have ignorantly required; they would have forced from the wicked his hard and unbelieving heart, and rendered it poſſible to be a chriſtian againſt the prerogative of his will, in total ſubverſion both of the end of religion and the nature of

[q] 1 Pet. i. 5, 6, 7, 8. [r] Dan. xii. 10.

† See Butler's Analogy man. Part. 1. Chap. 5.

man. He who "knows whereof we are "made," hath dealt with his moral agents in a way more ſuitable to our condition, and to the honour of his own government, by affording us ſuch a degree of light, as, whilſt it gives exerciſe to our liberty and virtue, is fully ſufficient to convince the willing and well-diſpoſed: but which does not ſhine with ſuch powerful and irreſiſtible force, as to convince thoſe, who "love darkneſs rather than "light, becauſe their deeds are evil[a]."

THUS, from the nature of THEOLOGICAL TRUTH, it becomes the privilege of Faith to be the greateſt of virtues, comprehending all moral and intellectual good, and forming that exalted union in which all the virtues of the Heart and Underſtanding join in one. It is that inviolable bond, in which TRUTH and CHARITY meet together in that WISDOM[b] which is only from above; which is firſt pure, ſubduing the affections, and then perfect, excelling all other knowledge: and this FAITH, by which, in every age, ſhe is to be "juſti-"fied of her children[c]," however varied in

[a] John iii. 19. [b] See firſt volume, chap. i.
[c] Matt. xi. 19.

its

its object by circumſtance and ſituation, is the ſame quality in all men, more the voluntary dictate of the heart, than the neceſſary reſult of the underſtanding.

So pure in her origin, ſo progreſſive in her increaſe, and ſo perfect in her end, let it reflect no diſhonour on this Wiſdom that ſhe can be juſtified only of her children, nor diſcredit on that Faith by which this celeſtial virtue is entertained, that the names of ſome men of brilliant parts and ſuperior endowments are not enrolled under its banners. It is not, that they reject and diſhonour her: it is, that ſhe rejects and diſhonours them. Either a cold and evil ſpirit of unbelief hath chilled the heart; or the ſtomach is ſo vitiated and depraved, that it turns the moſt wholeſome food into deadly poiſon. Whilſt we admire their talents and emulate their learning, to theſe ſplendid monuments of human folly let us look up with pity, as our Lord did with tears to the temple of Jeruſalem, that ſuperb edifice erected for the ſervice of the living God, and once worthy of his abode; but which was then

then defecrated and prophaned, and deſtined ſoon to be deſtroyed.

You deiſt, you free-thinker, you minute philoſopher, you unbeliever of whatever name, however inveterate the prejudices or abandoned the habits with which you labour, we can truſt you with this important queſtion, "Which of you convinceth me of ſin?" Which of you can impeach the morality of the Goſpel? One advantage you muſt allow us to enjoy over you in the great utility of its precepts and examples, which contribute ſo much to the happineſs and enjoyment of civil life. And to this advantage reſulting from the "Charity of the goſpel, which, we know, "will never fail," we will join another of equal or ſuperior moment to our happineſs, derived from the "Hope" we have in believing, which throws a beam of perpetual comfort over the mind, which cheers and enlivens every ſcene of life, although our faith ſhould be a dream, from which, when we paſs into the ſleep of death, we are never to awake. For this virtuous, this happy dream, which ſoftens all our cares, alleviates all our pains, animates all our joys, whilſt we

are paſſing through this vale of tears and ſorrows, permit us to look up to the divine founder of that faith, with affections of gratitude and love. Such a founder you do not allow. Suffer us, then, to offer them up to God and to his Providence for ſo great a bleſſing. But ſome of you deny that God, and more of you his Providence, convinced that if you admit of them, they will too powerfully imply the reſt. If you will, then, take from us every real ſource of truſt and comfort, allow us to look up to heaven and to thank our ſtars, for the many and great advantages, even in this deplorable ſtate of things, which, by embracing the Goſpel, we enjoy above you. But conſider, ſeriouſly conſider, if what you ſo much deride, ſhould eventually prove no dream, how ſuperabundant then will be our joy and conſolation! and how diſmal will be your mortification and condemnation!

But "thanks be to God who hath given "us" not only the advantage, but "the "victory," over you and the world, even the victory of our "Faith," "through our "Lord Jeſus Chriſt;" which is, indeed, no dream,

dream, but a virtuous, a pious, and a reaſonable conviction, built on ſubſtantial grounds, and to be crowned with ſure enjoyment. The truths which it embraces are ſo divinely authoriſed; the evidences by which they are atteſted are ſo well authenticated; they are accompanied by ſo many concurrent circumſtances and credible qualifications, the perſonal knowledge, the honeſty, the number, the conſiſtency, of the witneſſes, men who had neither intereſt nor ability to forge ſuch a great and intereſting falſehood, in the very ſcene, and almoſt at the time of action, when all men had the immediate power to diſprove it; they are tranſmitted through ſo many different and oppoſite channels, and come atteſted by ſo many collateral authorities, as to raiſe in every mind that is rational and truly candid, a conviction, though not ſo palpable, yet as indubitable, as the ſtrongeſt evidence: inſomuch "that, If the Goſpel be hid, it is "hid from them that are loſt; in whom the "God of this world hath blinded the minds "of them that believe not, leſt the light of "the glorious Goſpel of Chriſt ſhould ſhine "unto them[r]."

[r] 2 Cor. iv. 3, 4.

The

The prejudice of habit, the pride of ſcience, or the impertinence of curioſity, may make ſome men diſſatisfied, unleſs they can climb up to the confines of demonſtration, for the proof of every queſtion. We eſteem it, on the contrary, not only the privilege, but the honour, of every fair and rational enquirer, willingly to embrace and thankfully to acquieſce in ſuch evidence and grounds of aſſent, as are *ſufficient*; more particularly in ſuch, as are *naturally adapted* to the kind of truth in queſtion; and moſt eſpecially in ſuch, as are accommodated *to the nature* of the ſubject*. Better and fairer can in no caſe be required: and with ſuch the Chriſtian Religion is abundantly ſupplied. God hath revealed himſelf as he thought beſt for his own glory and our good; and, if ye cannot believe him, becauſe he has not given you exactly that degree of light, which your own wayward fancy may require, but of which things do not admit, "he will not be mocked," ye muſt take the blame upon yourſelves: and all the aſſiſtance which we can give you, is to pray, that "He who commanded the light

* See Hurd's Serm. Vol. vi.

" to ſhine out of darkneſs, may ſhine in your " hearts, to give you the light of the know- " ledge of the glory of God, in the face of " Jeſus Chriſt [x]."

" The kingdom of God is within you [y]," was the anſwer of our Lord to the interrogating Jews, implying that it has its origin in the heart. To repreſent this fundamental truth to the full view of his diſciples, " Jeſus " took a child and ſet him in the midſt, and " ſaid, unleſs ye be converted and become as " little children, ye ſhall not enter into the " kingdom of heaven." And, to illuſtrate it ſtill farther, he employs the two parables of the *ſeed* [z], and the *ſeed of muſtard* [a]. By the former he ſignifies, that at firſt it is ſmall, and that its increaſe will depend upon the goodneſs of the ſoil, which is to be prepared and cleanſed from the weeds of vice, and that, in ſuch a ſoil, it will make gradual advances from one ſtage to another, producing, " firſt, the " blade, next the ſtem, then the ear, and, " laſtly, the full corn in the ear [b]:" And, by

[x] 2 Cor. iv. 6. [y] Luke xvii. 21. [z] Matt. xiii. 3. &c.
[a] Matt. xiii. 31. [b] Mark iv. 28.

the

the latter he ſignifies, that, however ſmall at firſt, it will become at laſt the great and reigning principle of the human mind. Thus "the path of the juſt," in the courts and offices of religion, "is as a ſhining light, "which," by a perpetual increaſe of faith, and by a perpetual ſupply of virtue, "ſhineth "more and more unto the perfect day[c]."

For the admiſſion, as well as for the fruition, of the truths of a religion which is pure and undefiled, the requiſite qualification is that of purity and renovation of heart, expreſſed in ſcripture by the figure of being *born again* or *from above:* Accordingly the great Apoſtle of the Gentiles admoniſhes the Epheſians "to "put on the new man, which after God is "created in righteouſneſs and true holi-"neſs[d];" and his Roman converts, "not "to be conformed to this world, but to be "transformed in the renewing of their mind. "that they may be able to prove what is the "good and acceptable and perfect work of "God[e].

In conſecrating his labours at the temple of religion, whilſt he cultivates Truth with his

[c] Prov. iv. 18.
[d] Eph. iv. 24.
[e] Rom. xii. 2.

Underſtanding, let the child of Wiſdom nouriſh Charity in his heart, as the firſt and moſt eſſential ingredient of a ſound and ſaving Faith; ~~awfully~~ reflecting on the predictive admonition of the laſt great prophet—"He "that is unjuſt, let him be unjuſt ſtill: he "that is filthy, let him be filthy ſtill: he "that is righteous, let him be righteous ſtill: "he that is holy, let him be holy ſtill[f]."

FROM this logical view of the province of THEOLOGY, in its *Principle*, in its *Reaſoning*, and in its *Truth*, the ſtudent in Divinity will entertain an awful ſenſe of the dignity, as well as of the difficulty, of that ſcience, which leaves behind all terreſtrial things, and opens his proſpect into future and diſembodied ſcenes. With the humility, which becomes his preſent ſtate, he will feel himſelf to be only in the infancy of his exiſtence, and that his knowledge is proportioned to the immaturity of his age. In reſpect of the manhood of his being, he only thinks and underſtands as a child; and, in this ſchool of terreſtrial diſcipline in which he is training

[f] Rev. xxii. 11.

for

for immortality, "he walks by faith and not "by ſight." He will acknowledge, that this life does not admit of any adequate view of things, and that even the eye of faith, by which they are ſpiritually diſcerned, can only "ſee them imperfectly and in part, and as "through a glaſs darkly." He will be convinced, that there are innumerable and ineffable truths repoſed in this divine, out of the preſent comprehenſion of the human, mind: from whence will ſpring a lively hope, that, in the future periods of his exiſtence, he may be admitted to their knowledge and enjoyment; when, diveſted of this mortal body, and removed from this material ſyſtem, he will be tranſplanted into a purer climate under the influence of a brighter ſun, and advance by perpetual approaches toward HIM, who is now "enſhrined in clouds and darkneſs," but who will then preſent himſelf, "to be ſeen even "as he himſelf is ſeen;" "when he will "behold his preſence in righteouſneſs, and "awaking after his likeneſs, he will be ſa-"tisfied with it[s]."

[s] Pſ. xvii. 15.

CHAP. IV.

he expected. Thus the plan, which I hoped to execute, in ſome meaſure, in a courſe of ten or twelve lectures, is not half finiſhed: and, though I have endeavoured to treat the important topics of various diſquiſition as they occurred, with all the conciſeneſs in my power, I am only arrived at the point from which I intended to take my general ſcope.

This may, I fear, be a tax upon the future patience of my auditors; and it is, I am ſure, a preſent diſappointment to myſelf. But, before I ſtart again, if I ſhould find opportunity and encouragement to go on, and can overcome that indolence which is a vice I feel too deeply rooted in my conſtitution, it may be proper to take a general view of the ground over which I have come, by way of ſettling accounts as I go along, and alſo to give my reader a ſhort ſketch of the country, through which I may be tempted, perhaps, at future periods, to lead him: unleſs ſome one elſe better qualified than myſelf ſhould undertake the taſk; 'et gaudebo certe, ſi alii, quod nos 'inchoavimus, melioribus ipſi auſpiciis et neceſſariis ad tantum opus præſidiis inſtructiores 'perfecerint'[a].

[a] Cauſabon, p. 406.

WISDOM, with which I commenced these philoſophical reſearches, is that univerſal virtue both of the *Heart* and *Underſtanding*, which comprehends all *moral* and *intellectual* good; and which is accordingly divided into two collateral branches, *Truth* and *Charity*, the foundation and conſummation of all things.—TRUTH is of the nature and eſſence of God, incapable of a verbal definition, but to be illuſtrated by the ſimilitude of *Light*. From the *divine* Mind, it becomes by communication an attribute of the *human*, and is proportioned to the mind in which it is. In the divine mind it is *univerſal*, *intuitive*, *equal*, and *infallible*: in the human, it is *partial*, *progreſſive*, *various*, and *hidden*, to be ſought by a virtuous and aſſiduous inveſtigation: in both, it is *immutable*[b].

In the inveſtigation of Truth, the PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, of which it is an attribute, is the *firſt* in natural order, though the *laſt* in the courſe of human ſtudy, and, therefore, called METAPHYSIC; a ſcience which, in its juſt and proper cultivation, is of great importance, as it lays the philoſophical foundation and diſtinction of all other ſciences; diſ-

[b] Chap. i. of firſt volume.

tributing

tributing the human mind into three general provinces, the *theoretic*, the *practic*, and the *poetic*, or the *Intellect*, the *Will*, and the *Imagination*; and classing Truth in general under these different provinces, as it divides into *special* relations, according to the operation of these different faculties on their respective internal and external objects [c].

All truth, to whichever province it belong, is deduced from PRINCIPLES as they exist in the nature and constitution of things, which are of two general kinds, *Primary* and *Secondary*: the Primary are the *Evidence of External Sense*, the *Evidence of Internal Sense*, and the *Evidence of Memory*, &c.: the Secondary are *Axioms* or *Universal Propositions*, derived from the former by a process of reason. These two sorts of Principles divide all direct Reasoning into two kinds or methods [d].

Truths are deduced from Principles by an act of REASON, their common instrument, consisting of Perception and Judgment, and acting by Comparison; whose office is to judge of *Evidences*, to form and apply *Axioms*, and to trace *Similitudes*—According to the Prin-

[c] Chap. ii. of first volume. [d] Chap. iii. of ibid.

ciples

ciples, their *Reaſoning*, and their *Truths*, forms a general CHART of their diſtinct and ſeparate provinces, and their ſubdiviſions; and, by placing them in juxta-poſition and a comparative point of view, furniſhes a general SCALE, by which the proper nature and weight of the TRUTH of each may be adjuſted[s].

Every thing that is the ſubject of human knowledge, belongs either to *Mind* or *Body*. Metaphyſic is the univerſal ſcience, Logic the univerſal art, which treat more immediately of the former: Phyſics of the latter. Between them lies a ſcience which relates to and partakes of both, having its ſubject derived from the ſenſible qualities of *body*, but abſtracted by an act of *mind*; which is MATHEMATICS, confined to *Quantity* continuous and diſcrete, or *Magnitude* and *Multitude*, and accordingly dividing into *Geometry* and *Arithmetic*.—The *Evidence of the external Senſes* exerciſed upon bodies in reſpect to quantity, from which all other attributes are abſtracted with ſo much eaſe as to ſuperſede the neceſſity of induction, is the primary principle of Mathematical ſcience; which begins with *general ideas*,

[s] Chap. vi. of firſt volume.

capable

capable of a clear and adequate *definition*, of being exhibited to the eye by *diagrams* and *ſigns*, being *ſimple modes* diſtinct from all other ideas, *abſolute* and *unchangeable* in themſelves, and exactly *meaſured* and aſcertained. Theſe ideas being compared, form a few general propoſitions which are Axioms or *ſecondary Principles*, which compel conviction from a ſingle act of judgment, and are, therefore, *ſelf-evident*, but not *intuitive*—From theſe axioms Mathematical *Reaſoning* is perfectly *Syllogiſtic*, reducing *general* Truths under *more general* till they terminate in the *moſt general*; which concluſions or demonſtrated theorems to be applied, in the ſame way, to the proof of others almoſt ad infinitum—The *Truths* reſulting from ſuch a proceſs are purely *ſcientific*, carrying the moſt *abſolute* and *irreſiſtible conviction* [b].

The ſcience of PHYSICS or NATURAL PHILOSOPHY inveſtigates the *Qualities* of individual and particular things, the properties and operations of natural body—The *Evidence of the External Senſes* is the *primary Principle* of Phyſics, aſſiſted by *experiments* and philoſo-

[b] Chap. vii. of firſt volume.

phical

phical *obſervations*—The method of *Reaſoning*, from a number of theſe experiments and obſervations to general cauſes or ſecondary principles, is purely and excluſively *Inductive* extended by *Analogy*. When theſe ſecondary principles or laws of Phyſic have been thus eſtabliſhed, they will account for the truth of particulars by *Superinduction* only, without the help of *Syllogiſm*: but *Mathematics* apply, with great effect, to thoſe phyſical forms, which are capable of menſuration.—As experiments do not penetrate into the eſſences of things, but only inform the ſenſes of apparent qualities or effects, as the induction is partial and confined, and the concluſions particular only, *Phyſical Truth* is inferior to mathematical, and, however certain, *not abſolutely neceſſary*. Phyſics are, however, a moſt uſeful and intereſting part of ſcience [1].

Facts form an extenſive and important ſpecies of truth—Their *firſt* and *ſole Principle* is the evidence of the *External Senſes*, requiring to their proof the coincidence of a particular tranſaction, perſon, time, and place—

[1] Chap. viii. of firſt volume.

Being

Being themſelves as firſt principles, reſulting directly from the ſenſes, they require no direct reaſoning, either inductive or ſyllogiſtic—But *Reaſon* is employed in examining the *Senſes* by comparing them with themſelves in order to know, whether they be ſound and well-informed, ſubject to no impediment from nature, impoſition from art, or fallacy from accident. —The *Truth* which reſults is immediate and irreſiſtible, ~~both~~ *ſelf-evident* and *intuitive* [k].

Facts are enlarged, and extended to diſtant times and places by HISTORY—The *firſt Principle* of hiſtorical knowledge is the faculty of *Memory*, ſupported by that univerſal affection the *Love of truth*, operating together and producing the *ſecondary Principle* of *Teſtimony*—The *method of Reaſoning* is firſt *inductive*, from the primary principle, exerciſed in innumerable particular inſtances, to the general truth of the ſecondary: Teſtimony is, however, different from other general principles, and the *reaſoning* from it very different. It is not, like them, the cauſe of truth, it is only the medium by which truths derived from other cauſes are conveyed, producing

[k] Chap. ix. of firſt volume.

different degrees of conviction, according to the different circumſtances, perſons, times, and places, with which it is connected, and requiring to be particularly inveſtigated, through the competency of witneſſes, the fidelity of relators, the authenticity of records, and collateral vouchers.—*Hiſtorical Truth* is only *ſecondary* and *indirect*, varying in its ſtrength with theſe circumſtances, the fidelity of the inveſtigation, and the clearneſs or obſcurity of the media by which it comes, through all the *degrees of probability* [1].

All theſe kinds of truth belong to the province of the UNDERSTANDING.

The practic functions are in the province of the WILL, and relate to MORAL ACTION, the end of which is *Happineſs*.—The *primary Principle* of Morality is *Internal* or *Moral Senſe*, an inſtinct of our common nature, informing us of *Good* and *Evil*, of the exiſtence of the *Will*, by which men chooſe the one, and avoid the other, and of *Reward* attaching on the performance of the one, and *Puniſhment* of the other: from whence are inferred a ſuperior Law and moral Government, the

[1] Chap. x. of firſt volume.

foundation

foundation of moral obligation, fixed in the attributes and will of God—From the operation of theſe primary principles, in innumerable particulars, *Reaſon* derives, by a kind of tacit *induction*, two univerſal propoſitions as ſecondary principles,

All voluntary good will have reward:
All voluntary evil will have puniſhment.

But, as morality conſiſts of particular actions which are innumerable, ariſing from various relations, the chief office of *ethical reaſoning* is, to range theſe by *induction* into claſſes called Virtues and Vices, Sins and Duties, with their appropriate attributes; and ſo to form leſs general propoſitions as *middle principles*, under which particular actions are to be referred by *ſyllogiſm*—The *truths* ſo deduced are *Ethical*, which, however *clear* and *ſtrong* in their conviction, are very different and *inferior* to mathematical demonſtrations. The moſt perfect ethics is the morality of the Goſpel [m].

POETRY belongs to the IMAGINATION, and is employed by *Imitation* in producing ſome

[m] Chap. xi. of firſt volume.

Effect. It conſiſts of the *Elegant Arts*, whoſe end is *Pleaſure* with *Inſtruction*, and whoſe excellence depends on their correſpondence to truth, under the conduct of reaſon—The *firſt Principle* of poetical or imitative art, is a *native and internal Senſibility* recognizing the objects and events which produce the different modes of pleaſure and pain—Of theſe different effects often experienced *Reaſon* firſt inveſtigates the proper *cauſes*, which it then ranks, by *induction*, into general claſſes as poetical ideas or ſecondary principles, from whence the poet draws the reſources of his art, which he applies in all the different acts of Imitation, to produce the poetical effect—If theſe generals be well formed and judiciouſly applied, if the imitation be true, and the reſemblance which it exhibits juſt, the *effect* produced upon the mind will be *uniform* and *certain*, which conſtitutes *poetic Truth*, operating on the ſenſibility of all, according to its powers [n].

Music is alſo an imitative art, though complicated and involved in myſtery, which de-

[n] Chap. xii. of firſt volume.

ſerves

ſerves to be particularly analyzed and critically aſcertained [o].

In the concluſion of the firſt volume, I have offered ſome ſtrictures on the ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC, in order to trace its origin, and to eſtimate its worth [p]: and alſo on the DISCIPLINE OF THE SCHOOLS, with a cordial view to its improvement [q].

THEOLOGY is a ſcience more different from all the preceding, than any of them are from each other, not taking its origin, like them, from any *material ſubject* or from the *mind of man*, but from another, and much higher ſource, the *mind of God*, in which all the provinces of INTELLECT, WILL, and IMAGINATION, are concerned. Its Logic will, however, derive important elucidation from a compariſon with them.

The Theological PRINCIPLE, is, accordingly, totally different from and infinitely ſuperior to every other, being the TESTIMONY or WORD OF GOD, conveyed to men by a ſupernatural mode of communication called *Revelation.*

[o] Chap. xiii. of firſt volume. [p] Chap. xiv. ibid.
[q] Chap. xv. ibid.

lation. The nature of this Divine Teſtimony is ſomewhat ſimilar to human Teſtimony, from which *ſimilarity* it takes poſſeſſion of the human mind: but, when the poſſeſſion is ſecured, it is not only *univerſal* in its operation, but ſo much *ſuperior* to all other principles, and ſo *tranſcendent* in its power, that it rejects all reaſoning, both in deducing its truths, and in properly deciding upon them. They reſult of themſelves from its divine authority and produce an *effect* in proportion to the principle, which is the ſtrongeſt and moſt implicit aſſent of the mind diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Faith.* Theſe Truths are *Myſteries*, different from all other kinds, to be thought upon with reverence, and embraced with confidence [r].

But, though REASON may have no proper or direct concern with the Principle or the Myſteries of Revelation, its office in THEOLOGY is various and important; which is to enquire, Whether ſuch a Revelation, containing ſuch a Principle, with its Myſteries and Credentials, was actually given by God, and received by men.

[r] Chap. i. of ſecond volume.

The

The GROUNDS of Reaſoning in Divinity are, therefore, the various *Means* by which the Goſpel, which contains this Principle or Word of God, was confirmed, is conveyed to us, and is to be underſtood by us: and the METHOD it purſues, is, 1ſt, By eſtimating the *Morality* or *Internal Evidence* of the Goſpel. 2dly, In judging of that part of its *External Evidence* called *Miracles*. 3dly, In the ſtudy of *Prophecy*, that other part of *External Evidence*. And, as both the time and place of this Revelation are far removed from ours, Reaſon has to enquire, by an hiſtorical inveſtigation, Whether the *Witneſſes* of ſuch Evidences were *well-informed* and *faithful*, whether the *written record*, in which the whole is contained, was aided by *inſpiration*, and whether the *bible* which we have be a true and *authentic tranſcript* of the original [*].

In the ſtudy of the HOLY SCRIPTURES, ſo confirmed and authenticated, Reaſoning is an act of *Interpretation:* and the *right* and *true Method* of interpreting the Volume of Grace is analogous and ſimilar to that which

[*] Chap. ii. ſect. 1. of ſecond volume.

has, of late years, been adopted by the beſt natural philoſophers in interpreting the Volume of Nature: not by hypotheſis, factitious ſyſtem, and diſputation, but from *grounds* and *documents* contained in ſcripture[t].

In the GENERAL INTERPRETATION of the Holy Scriptures, the firſt object of the ſtudent's attention are the *Learned Languages*, in which they were originally written or early tranſlated: the ſecond is the *Analogical Style*, and the third, the *Parabolical Style*, of the ſacred writings in all its variety and extent[u].

In the PARTICULAR INTERPRETATION or TRANSLATION of the Holy Scriptures, the firſt object is, by an able and accurate collation, to procure a *genuine Copy*; and the next, to render it in another language according to the Rules of *Impartiality*, *Propriety*, *Perſpicuity*, and *Uniformity*, which the particular nature of inſpired and divine productions warrants and requires.

The TRUTH reſulting from this various and extenſive train of Reaſoning in regard to the Evidences, the Authority, the Authen-

[t] Chap. ii. ſect. 2. of ſecond volume.
[u] Chap. ii. ſect. 3. of ibid.

ticity,

ticity, the Interpretation, and Tranſlation of the Holy Scriptures, is THEOLOGICAL, totally different from every other kind, and requiring a different aſſent, and though ſuperior in value, *inferior* in force, from which logical inferiority, *Faith* by which it is embraced and entertained by the inhabitants of every age, the Patriarch of old, the Eye-witneſs, and the modern Believer, is the greateſt of virtues, engaging all the beſt affections of the Heart as well as the faculties of the Underſtanding, and conſtituting that pure and perfect WISDOM in which *Truth* and *Charity* are united, with which theſe lectures commenced, and with which they end[v], as being, in the language of our great philoſopher, 'the port and ſabbath of all human 'contemplations[w].'

In this general CHART or Geography of TRUTH, I have attempted to give a *Parallel* and *Comparative View* of the different *Kinds*

[v] Chap. iii. of ſecond volume.

[w] Cum ſit portus et ſabbatum humanarum contemplationum omnium. Baconus de Augm. Sc. lib. iii. cap. 1.

of learning human and divine, claſſing and arranging them under ſeparate provinces, and analyzing them according to their reſpective nature and conſtitution: ſo that, whilſt all may be ſeen at one view in their relative ſituation, each, in its proper cultivation, may be kept diſtinct; its own Principles aſſerted; its own Proofs employed[x]; and the conviction

[x] Supereſt artis judicandi appendix quædam inſignis, quam deſiderari ſtatuimus: Siquidem Ariſtoteles rem notavit, modum rei nullibi perſecutus eſt. Ea tractat, quales demonſtrationes ad quales materias ſive ſubjecta applicari debeant; ut hæc doctrina tanquam judicationes judicationum contineat. Optime enim Ariſtoteles, Neque enim demonſtrationes ab oratoribus, neque ſuaſiones a mathematicis requiri debere monet: Ut, ſi in probationis genere aberretur, judicatio ipſa non abſolvatur. Quando vero ſunt quatuor demonſtrationum genera, vel per conſenſum immediatum & notiones communes, vel per inductionem, vel per ſyllogiſmum, vel per eam (quam recte vocat Ariſtoteles) demonſtrationem in orbem, (non a notioribus ſcilicet, ſed tanquam de plano,) habent hæ demonſtrationes ſingulæ certa ſubjecta & materias ſcientiarum in quibus pollent; alia, a quibus excluduntur. Etenim rigor & curioſitas in poſcendo probationes nimium ſeveras in aliquibus, multo magis facilitas, & remiſſio in acquieſcendo probationibus levioribus in aliis, inter ea ſunt numeranda, quæ detrimenti plurimum ſcientiis attulerunt. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4.

of

of its Truths meaſured and aſcertained by a mutual SCALE. This appeared, in my mind, to be the juſt and philoſophical method to keep the underſtanding clear and ſteady in its reſearches, to render it ſucceſsful in its inveſtigations, ſenſible of its own weakneſs, and thankfully acquieſcent in every kind of Truth, particularly in that which is the ſubject of THE CHRISTIAN FAITH, TO GROUND AND ESTABLISH which, upon a broad and ſolid baſis, is the principle object of theſe lectures.

This various and extenſive taſk I have executed in a treatiſe of more than ſufficient length, if we conſider the number and value of its pages; but much too ſhort, I fear, if we conſider the extent and importance of the ſubject. It was not, however, in my intention to deſcend to a full diſcuſſion of the ſeveral branches of learning; but only to take a general and curſory view of each: in which I do not preſume to teach others in the ſtyle of one that dictates, but to invite them to ſtudy for themſelves, in the language of a friend and fellow-labourer. And, though I ſhould not have leiſure or ability to execute the other parts of my projected plan, this will

not

not be thought imperfect on that account, as it embraces the firſt object I had in view as entirely and independently, as if I was to execute the whole deſign.

The future purpoſes to which this general Chart will be preparatory, after putting Theology upon its diſtinct and proper bottom, will be more fully to CONFIRM THE CHRISTIAN FAITH; and alſo to develope the CAUSES OF HERETICAL AND SCHISMATICAL ERRORS, by which it is oppoſed.

To theſe purpoſes nothing can ſo effectually contribute as extenſive views, which break all narrow habits of thinking, and ſet the mind at liberty, which enable it to embrace the moſt diſtant and diſſimilar parts of learning, and which give it a command over the general expanſe of knowledge, as the eye elevated upon a rock has over the whole country below, which can ſee the bearing and connections of every part, can allow to each its proper latitude and extent, and contemplate the whole ſcene without mixture or confuſion.

The

The ſecond part of my plan will be, if I ſhould be tempted to purſue it, to apply thoſe parts of human learning, which have been analyzed and digeſted in the firſt volume, to Theology: in order to diſcover exactly how far, when cultivated according to the *Rule of Reaſon*, they contribute to its introduction and ſupport, and where their application ought to terminate; which will give us a comprehenſive view of the RIGHT USE OF LEARNING[7]. In the execution of this part we ſhall obſerve the ſeveral branches as they ſpring out of the general tree of knowledge; we ſhall diſtinguiſh their affinities, connections, and dependences; and we ſhall ſee how one kind of Truth is built upon another, and how far thoſe which are human miniſter, in their ſubordinate and proper exerciſe, to thoſe that are divine.

And the third part will very conveniently run along with the ſecond: for, by turning our attention from this right uſe of Learning, in which theſe different branches are thus

[7] See p. 76 of the firſt volume.

logically

logically contributing to Theology, to the ABUSE[z] of it, in which the *Rule of Reaſon* is neglected or infringed, and they are illogically confounded and mixed together, we ſhall be able to diſcover the true and adequate *Cauſes* of thoſe Heretical and Schiſmatical Errors, which only want to be diſcovered to be eradicated.

The execution of this part, which forms the completion of the plan laid down, if attended with that ſucceſs, of which an author may be permitted to indulge a hope, promiſes to be an effectual ſupport of ſacred truth, by a radical ſubverſion of its opponents; at the ſame time that it is calculated to reward his labour by conferring a high gratification upon his mind, through every ſtage of the inveſtigation, 'Suave eſt ſpectaculum, ſtantem aut 'ambulantem in littore, navem intueri tem-'peſtate in mare jactatam; ſuave itidem ex 'editâ arce duas cernere acies concurſantes in 'planitie: at nil dulcius eſt homini, quam 'mens per doctrinam in arce veritatis collo-'cata, unde aliorum errores & labores diſ-'picere poſſit[a].'

[z] See p. 77 of the firſt volume.

[a] Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. i.

All

All Falſehood is oppoſite to Truth. Error is that Falſehood, which, availing itſelf of the weakneſs of the Underſtanding, the depravity of the Will, or the undue influence of the Imagination, aſſumes the colour of Truth, by which Reaſon is deceived. Truth is the health, Error the diſorder, of the mind: the one leading to honour and happineſs; the other to diſgrace and miſery.

The human Body is a machine or ſyſtem conſiſting of many different parts and operations: the Mind is alſo a machine or ſyſtem conſiſting of ſimilar parts and operations; and, though their union be myſterious, their analogy is conſpicuous. The health of both conſiſts alike in a due and regular diſcharge of their reſpective parts and operations; and the diſorder of both ſprings reſpectively from their ſuſpenſion or irregularity. To cure the diſorders of the Body is the duty of the phyſician, and to cure thoſe of the Mind is the duty of the philoſopher. But, before either can apply his remedy, he muſt find out the *Cauſe*; for the maxim, '*Sublatâ cauſâ tollitur* '*effectus*,' holds as good in philoſophy as in medicine, and has there, indeed, a more full

and

and effectual operation: for, after the phyſician has found the cauſe, he has to invent and to apply his medicines without a certainty of ſucceſs in the event; whereas, in philoſophy divine or human, the invention of the cauſe, will, in generous minds at leaſt, be itſelf the cure.

To enable him to inveſtigate a diſorder, the phyſician is acquainted with the anatomy of the human Body, has ſtudied its œconomy and analyzed its functions, and in their obſtruction or irregularity he remarks thoſe ſymptoms which diſcover to him the cauſe. By a ſimilar analyſis of the Mind, and an acquaintance with its faculties and operations, and by knowing the proper exerciſe of reaſon in every department of knowledge, either in its *Suſpenſion* or in its *Miſapplication*, the philoſopher is enabled to diſcover the different *Cauſes* of Error.

The *firſt general Cauſe* ſprings from a total neglect or *Suſpenſion* of Reaſon, in conſequence of which, men embrace falſehood for truth with an implicit truſt, upon the bare credit and blind authority of others.

From

From this cauſe ſpring all thoſe *Vulgar Errors* cheriſhed from age to age by the blindneſs of prejudice and the inveteracy of habit; and alſo *Errors of Superſtition* differing from the former only as they obtain in matters of religion, and growing more inveterate in proportion to the greater ſerioufneſs and ſolemnity of the ſubject, and the univerſal intereſt which it involves. Equally the children of ignorance and obſtinacy, they embrace as ſiſters. They have always grown and thriven together in the ſame ſoil and climate, under the ſame civil adminiſtration and the ſame friendly cloud of darkneſs and prejudice; and are together annihilated and diſpelled by the approach of learning wherever it gains admittance, as night is by the approach of day. Under the deadly ſhade of ſuperſtitious errors, ſeperinduced by the artifice of intereſted and ambitious men, and thickened by the baſe and corrupted policy of degenerate ſtates devoted to the god of ſlavery, the Religion of Aſia and the greateſt part of Europe has languiſhed for many ages. As knowledge, however, advances, they naturally decline. In the provinces of Europe they have been long

upon the wain, and are rapidly haſtening to decay. Thoſe of the Jews have been ably refuted[b]. Thoſe of the Roman Pontiff, notwithſtanding all the gloſs and varniſh with which they have been diſguiſed, have been ſufficiently expoſed[c]. And thoſe of the falſe Prophet of Arabia, though under the cloud of Aſiatic ignorance more explicitly eſpouſed, are ſtill eaſier to be refuted[d].

The *ſecond general Cauſe* of Error ſprings from a different ſource, the *Perverſion* and *Miſapplication* of Reaſon, more deceitful and difficult to be found and extirpated; which, in all the different ſhapes that it aſſumes, will be the ſubject of my future ſtudies. This is the ABUSE OF LEARNING from the violation of the *Rule of Reaſon*[d], in all theſe different ways.—Firſt, by reaſoning from *no*

[b] Limborch de Veritate Religionis Chriſtianæ amica collatio cum erudito Judæo. Gouda. 1687.

[c] Chillingworth's Safe Way to Salvation.

[d] Jenkins's Reaſonableneſs of the Chriſtian Religion. Bp. Gibſon's Second Paſtoral Letter. Grotius De Veritate Chriſtianæ Religionis. Prideaux's Life of Mahomet, and Dr. White's Bampton Lectures.

Principles

Principles at all: or, ſecondly, by reaſoning *from the Principles of one branch of learning in the Method of another:* or, thirdly, by reaſoning from the *Principles of one to the Truths of another:* or, laſtly, by *expecting the ſame kind and degree of Conviction in the Truths of one, which belong to another*, and of which it does not admit. So that this ſecond general ſource of Error divides into *four particular Cauſes*, which, in their ſeparate or joint operation, will account for all Scientifical and Theological Errors, however different they may appear to be, according to the acute obſervation of the great philoſopher, 'that 'of oppoſite errors the cauſes of erring are 'commonly the ſame[a].'

Springing from a different ſource theſe *Learned Errors* have a different effect from thoſe of Ignorance. As theſe are on the wain, they are on the increaſe. Strenuouſly defending themſelves in the uſurped fortreſſes of Truth, and jealous of their hold, they ſupport their falſe claim by all the formalities of reaſoning and appearance of conviction, and lead in the chains of ſophiſtry a conſiderable

[a] Bacon's Adv. of Learning.

part of the learned world. Aſſuming various ſhapes and poſtures of defence, ſhifting from ground to ground, and relieving each other with the changes of time and faſhion, while the mind is ſubject to vice and infirmity, they threaten to prevail, and to keep pace with Truth herſelf. They are the only enemies religion has to dread; for, though its truths will overcome at laſt, for a time they weaken its force and retard its progreſs.

The uſual method of combating with theſe Errors is to attack them, with the arms of polemical divinity, as they appear in ſome ſtage of their *Effects* equipped in the accoutrements of falſe reaſoning: but the more ſucceſsful and compendious mode of exterminating them will be to find and expoſe their *Cauſes*; which would immediately defeat their conſequences in every ſtage. Inſtead of levelling bold and efficient ſtrokes at the root of the tree of Error, controverſy, however well conducted, is only like beating among the branches; where, if one be cut off, two ſpring in its place. This method has prevailed, becauſe it is friendly to that polemical contention and that ſcholaſtic diſputation which de-

light to keep up the ball from age to age, in which many a champion of truth has been defeated by the patron of error, and many a battle drawn. The method which theſe lectures would adopt and recommend, is, not to combat particular errors under the diſguiſe of truth, by particular arguments, but to inveſtigate and expoſe their general Cauſe; under the perſuaſion, that it will contribute more effectually to their extirpation, than if I were to write volumes of controverſy to attack the various forms and appearances of error prepared to deceive and miſlead mankind: for, when the tree is cut at the root, all its branches with their poiſonous fruit muſt come down together.

The *general Cauſes* which I have mentioned, and to which, in their joint or ſeparate operation, all learned errors are to be attributed, originate either in the *Pride* or *Prejudice* of the human mind.

The *firſt*, which conſiſts in *reaſoning from no Principle at all*, however abſurd it may appear even to common ſenſe, is of great influence and extent. The powers of the human mind are, doubtleſs, great; but her *preſump-*

tion is ſometimes greater[f]. Not content to be employed upon ſuch principles and materials as are furniſhed for her uſe by Providence and the natural ſtate of things, in a ſlow and ſober exerciſe, ſhe vainly preſumes, by an action and operation of her own, to invent others of a ſuperior order, by the help of which, ſhe can ſoar with a rapid wing into the poſſeſſion of the ſublimeſt truths. Buoyed up into the air by theſe ſelf-inventions, ſhe attempts unbounded flights into the fertile but deluſive regions of imagination. In theſe regions

[f] Alius error fluit ex nimia reverentia, & quaſi adoratione intellectus humani, unde homines abduxere ſe a contemplatione naturæ, atque ab experientia, in propriis meditationibus & ingenii commentis ſuſque deque volutantes. Cæterum præclaros hos opinatores & (ſi ita loqui licet) intellectualiſtas, qui tamen pro maxime ſublimibus & divinis philoſophis haberi ſolent, recte Heraclitus perſtrinxit, *Homines*, inquit, *quærunt veritatem in microcoſmis ſuis, non in mundo majori.* Reſpuunt enim quaſi abecedarium naturæ, primumque in operibus divinis tirocinium: quod ſi non facerent, potuiſſent fortaſſe gradatim & ſenſim, poſt literas ſimplices & deinceps ſyllabas, ad textum & volumen ipſarum creaturarum expedite legendum aſcendere. At illi contra, jugi mentis agitatione, urgent & tanquam invocant ſuos genios, ut vaticinentur eis edantque oracula, quibus merito & ſuaviter decipiuntur. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. i.

was

was erected the edifice of Hypotheſis, filled with golden dreams and enchanted fictions, with which the pride and ſelf-ſufficiency of philoſophers make them to be enamoured, and to embrace them for the moſt valuable truths. From theſe fictitious principles we ſee even Ariſtotle, Plato, and Pythagoras, the ancient, and more particularly the modern, metaphyſicians led, by trains of ſolid reaſoning, to the temple of ſplendid and deluſive errors: for when the mind, that complex machine, has its firſt wheel ſet wrong, which gives movement to every other, though all the reſt go right, the whole will terminate in wrong.

The peculiar nature and myſtic ſublimity of Theology open a two-fold door for the introduction of this Cauſe—Either on principles of human invention to erect nominal truths that have no exiſtence—or, to attempt, from ſuch principles, to prove or to diſprove truths, which are to be embraced on no other principle than the Teſtimony of God.

The other which have been aſſigned as the general Cauſes of Error, conſiſting in the

Adoption of wrong Principles, in the *Application of a wrong Method of Reaſoning*, or in the *Expectation of a wrong Species of Conviction*, have their origin in *Prejudice* ſpringing from partial and inveterate *habits*.

Man is altogether a creature of *habit*. All his virtues are habits; all his vices are habits: and habit has a wonderful ſway over the mind not only in the elegant, but alſo in the ſcientific, parts of learning. As the ear is prepared and qualified by habit for the enjoyment of muſic, the eye for that of painting, and every other part of the mental and corporeal frame adapted to its proper object: ſo is the mind prepared and qualified by habit for the ſearch and reliſh of every kind of truth. But this ſame habit, which is the friend of all virtue and all knowledge, by being too long and too cloſely confined to the ſame objects, employments, and purſuits, as it is obſerved to contract and even diſtort the body, ſo it generates in the mind a prejudice and confirms a partiality, which not only cramp and confine, but often weaken and deſtroy its powers.

It

It is the mark of a living writer, who is no ordinary philoſopher, that 'cuſtom and 'ſome other cauſes have made many deviations from the natural pleaſures and pains of 'the ſeveral taſtes; but then the power of 'diſtinguiſhing between the natural and the 'acquired reliſh remains to the very laſt. 'A man,' ſays he, 'frequently comes to 'prefer the taſte of tobacco to that of ſugar, 'and the flavour of vinegar to that of milk, 'but this makes no confuſion in taſtes, whilſt 'he is ſenſible, that the tobacco and vinegar 'are not ſweet, and whilſt he knows that 'habit alone has reconciled his palate to theſe 'alien pleaſures[s].' Unfortunately, however, for the intereſts of truth, it is not ſo well with the mind as with the palate; for when that has been enſlaved by long uſage to the cultivation of one kind of truth, it not only reliſhes and prefers it, but becomes often inſenſible to the diſtinction and even exiſtence of other kinds.

Thus addicted to one ſet of Principles, thus habituated to one train of Reaſoning,

[s] Burke's Introd. to Eſſay on the Sublime and Beautiful. See Ariſtotle's Metaph. Book ii. chap. 3.

and thus accuſtomed to one ſort of Concluſions, men are often diſqualified, by the very habit of ſtating, reaſoning, and concluding, and by their very ſucceſs, in ſome parts of learning, from proſecuting truth in others. Wedded by an intemperate fondneſs and admiration to their own ſtudies, and, not knowing as they ſeldom do, much beyond them, they are unwilling to allow that truth can exiſt in any other way. In every part of ſcience, either their principle muſt be adopted, or their method of reaſoning employed, or their concluſions drawn: and they refuſe to be ſatisfied with any other [h].

When, under the influence of theſe prejudices and partial habits, philoſophers turn their attention from their other ſtudies to

[h] Alius error huic poſteriori finitiſſimus eſt, quod homines ſæpius imbuant & inficiant meditationes & doctrinas ſuas opinionibus quibuſdam & conceptibus propriis, quos potiſſimum in admiratione habent, aut artibus, quibus maxime addicti & conſecrati ſunt; cætera omnia illis deliciis inficientes & quaſi intingentes, licet ſuco admodum fallaci. Sic ſuæ philoſophiæ immiſcuit Plato theologiam, Ariſtoteles logicam, ſecunda ſchola Platonis (Proclus ſcilicet & reliqui) mathematicas. Iſtas enim artes ſolebant illi tanquam filiolos ſuos ſuaviari. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. i.

Theology,

Theology, they are either defeated, in their attempt to reaſon at all, or elſe they reaſon in a wrong way, or elſe they are diſappointed that its truths do not bring the ſame conviction they have been accuſtomed to expect: which will account for a phænomenon much to be deplored, that ſome of the brighteſt ornaments of human learning have reaſoned themſelves out of the ſacred temple of light and truth, into the gloomy priſon of infidelity.

Theſe I apprehend to be the true CAUSES of the moſt dangerous and inveterate ERRORS that beſet the Chriſtian Faith; and which are the more to be lamented, as they raiſe enemies to religion in the perſons of thoſe, who, from the love of learning, would, by a proper uſe of it, prove its ableſt ſupport. After ſhewing, therefore, how far thoſe parts of learning which have been analyzed in the preceding volume, miniſter to religion, I would endeavour to trace theſe Errors to their proper Cauſes, in the joint or ſeparate operation: which method of combating with error will relieve me from two evils attendant on that other of polemical controverſy—*diſputation*,

tion, which terminates in logomachy—and *intemperate warmth*, which ends in animoſity.

1. Inſtead of adding to the general ſtock of learning on the one hand, by drawing from its true and genuine reſources, and guarding it from error, on the other, by enquiring into the Cauſes from which it ſprings; learned men ſhut up what they had, or ſuppoſed they had, in ſciences and ſyſtems[1], as the miſer does his money in cheſts and boxes; and then defended them with all the fury of a clamorous diſputation. Hence polemical controverſy, took its riſe, in which the combatants and defenders of ſyſtems took the field, each equipped in his own private armour, which he employed in his own partial way: and the whole merit of the conteſt conſiſted in lengthening out the diſputation by univocating, equivocating, and defining, by terms divorced from things, and propoſitions without a meaning. The ſame queſtions, which had been agitated for ages, were left undetermined:

[1] Alius error eſt præmatura atque proterva reductio doctrinarum in artes & methodos; quod cum fit, plerumque ſcientia aut parum aut nihil proficit.

Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. i.

and

and the fields, which were neither loſt nor won, were always ready to be fought again.

Of the three expedients propoſed by its great reformer to remove the difficulties of learning, the moſt important, he obſerves, is that 'wiſdom *of deſign*, which ſtrikes out the right 'way to accompliſh what we want: that 'prudent choice of the means to be employed, 'which conduces more effectually to the end 'in view, than the application and accumu-'lation of the greateſt force[k].' If the plan, which I have laid down for the invention of different kinds of Truth, be ſound and philoſophical, it will point out that which is to be purſued in the detection of Error, which is its oppoſite: for as the way to the one is in a right line exactly preſcribed, every deviation from that will lead to the other; and we have only to mark with care that particular *cauſe* or obſtacle, which interferes to throw reaſon out of the direct, into the oblique,

[k] Inter hæc tria merito primas tenet *Conſilii prudentia & ſanitas*; hoc eſt monſtratio & delineatio viæ rectæ & proclivis, ad rem, quæ proponitur, peragendam—*medii prudens electio* efficacius conducit ad rem, quam virium aut intentio aut accumulatio. Baconis De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. cap. i.

road.

road. And by ſhunning the *Cauſe* we ſhall avoid the error.

This is to detect error by the light of truth, immediately applied; which would bring all reaſoning, which has been ſo various and ſo clamorous, to a certain and ſilent iſſue, by prefcribing a general and ſtanding law,—That the matter in queſtion be referred to its proper province,—that the combatants come out of their private ground, and meet it on its own *principles*, and none elſe; that they leave their prejudices and habits, which are their private armour, behind, and argue in the *method* which is its own, and in no other; and that they go hand in hand in the philoſophical, not diſputatious, ſearch of Truth and Error, obliging themſelves to embrace the one, and to diſcard the other, *what or wherever they may be.*

2. As to the other evil incident to controverſy, if the temper of the theological reaſoner were ever ſo irritable, the method here propoſed would relieve him from the effects of an unbecoming warmth. It can trace Errors to ſome of the cauſes which have been aſſigned, without charging them indiſcriminately

ſtately on vice; and, in the fair purſuit of its object, it can allow their patrons all the merit they poſſeſs, and forgive their faults, convinced of the validity of this axiom,—that Truth is never ſo graceful and ſucceſsful as when led by the hand by Charity.

The ſpirit of this Wiſdom, we are told, "is firſt pure, then peaceable, gentle, and "eaſy to be entreated, full of mercy and "good fruits, without partiality, and with-"out hypocriſy[1]:" and of ſo lovely a portrait, it becomes her children, in the act of juſtifying her, not to injure or diſtort the features. Why ſhould intemperate heat be ſuffered to take place of ſober argument? Why ſhould candour be ſupplanted by illiberality, and benevolence by ſcorn?—By the favour of providence and the liberality of kings, the Chriſtian Church has ample endowments, if properly beſtowed, for the ſupport of advocates who are able and willing to maintain her cauſe; and why ſhould they ſwell with anger, that the temple of religion ſhould be attacked? Experience would inform them that they have better reaſon to rejoice;

[1] James iii. 17.

ſince

ſince her truths will be ſure to triumph from examination, and in that triumph to gain larger and firmer ground.

Sacerdotal pride, inflamed by ignorance, has too often injured and diſgraced her cauſe: for when ignorance felt its weakneſs to defend, it had recourſe to pride to come forwards with a volley of anathemas and abuſe. How much more becoming the children of Wiſdom to ſay, 'Come on ye champions of Hereſy and Infidelity, put on your beſt-proved armour and meet us fairly in the field. Ye ſhall be generouſly and kindly treated. We will fight you upon equal terms, and that for the ſake of truth and charity, not of victory and triumph. The ſubject of this amicable conteſt is ſome part of Theology, ~~take which you will~~; and we deſire no other conditions than thoſe which providence and the nature of the queſtion have made common to us and you. Together we will examine theological truths on theological principles, as we would do natural phænomena on phyſical experiments. We will reaſon together fairly and logically, that is in the method theſe principles preſcribe;

and

and together embrace the conviction that results. The terms are not of our making; we take them as we find them: Neither ſhall they be of yours. But, if ye will contend only on thoſe which ye make yourſelves, all that we can do is to ſay, that we are ſorry ye put it out of our power to meet you, by flying from this fair and open ground; for ſhould we follow you to contend on your own partial and private ground, error and confuſion, not truth and conviction, will attend the conteſt. That ye remain under the dominion of Errors is, therefore, entirely your own fault. They are, we ſuppoſe, the effect of habit, which may in other caſes be eſſential to much virtue, but which, in the caſe of Religion, is unfortunately the cauſe of hurtful prejudices. We would endeavour to ſoften and remove theſe prejudices, by giving you enlarged and comparative views of things, and to diſcover to you the cauſes of your errors and miſtakes: and, if our endeavours ſhould not have the deſired ſucceſs, we would only exhort you to live good lives, and to be as virtuous as ye can, (which is in all reſpects the beſt antidote to Error), and

we

we will hope and pray, that the God we ſerve will of his goodneſs forgive the effects of theſe prejudices, and that he will have a reſerve in his infinite mercy to reach unto you.'

An excellent Prelate, whoſe learning and virtues do honour to this age in which he lives, in his zeal for moderation, thinks it an act of wiſdom, 'to ſhew condeſcenſion to 'the very prejudices and humours of men;' and is alſo of opinion that 'their Errors may 'ſometimes be removed by arguing with them 'on their own *miſtaken Principles*." To this one act of his condeſcenſion the author of theſe lectures cannot conſiſtently ſubſcribe, as it is diametrically oppoſite to the whole ſcope and tenor of this work, and has been ſtated as a principal cauſe of Error. In all other points his Lordſhip's condeſcenſion and moderation do equal honour to his heart and underſtanding. 'The Errors of men,' he goes on, 'may ſometimes be removed by 'allowing all that truth and reaſon will warrant to their opinions; by putting the fairеſt 'conſtruction upon their deſigns, inſtead of 'fiercely declaiming againſt them; above all, 'by teſtifying a ſincere diſpoſition to advance

'Truth

'Truth and Goodneſs, without any indirect 'views to our own intereſt. Or, were all 'other conſiderations out of the caſe, we 'could never be excuſed from proceeding in 'the way of gentleneſs and civility, from 'treating them with due reſpect, and ex- 'preſſing the ſincereſt good-will to their *per-* 'ſons. Be their *moral* and *religious* defects 'what they ~~will~~, we ſhould hardly be *wiſe*, 'if we reproved with bitterneſs, adviſed 'with inſolence, and condemned with paſ- 'ſion. In all addreſſes to miſtaken and bad 'men, where our purpoſe is to inform or 'amend them, the gentleſt applications are 'ſurely the beſt, becauſe theſe excite no paſ- 'ſion to counteract their ~~virtue~~ [m],'

Thus I have executed, to the utmoſt of my power, the firſt part of this new Logic, or general Inveſtigation of Truth and Error, and given a Proſpect of the other two: ~~and, though~~ I acknowledge myſelf under great obligations to different writers and philoſophers, particularly the two champions of

[m] Hurd, 2 Vol. 2 Serm.

learning, Ariſtotle and Bacon, I have exerciſed the privilege of an author, by ſubmitting their doctrines to the examination of my own judgment; making myſelf ſolely and properly reſponſible for the whole. And, if I have been too bold and too much ſelf-directed in the exerciſe of this privilege, to ſay that I am ſorry for it, is what I deem a very weak and inſufficient apology. The beſt amends ~~that I can make~~ to the authors I have injured, and to the public, will be to ſolicit, ~~and I do,~~ the fair examination of all ſcholars and philoſophers, and to promiſe, ~~and will~~ to retract, to change, to correct, and to improve any or every part upon fair conviction. Senſible, as I fully am, of the many faults and imperfections which muſt have overtaken me in my various and extenſive walk, and profeſſing, as I ſincerely do, that the improvement of ſound learning is not only the reigning motive, but the ſole object, of my heart, I have to requeſt of the *Few* who ſhall do theſe volumes the honour of a peruſal, (for, from the nature of the work, it neither expects nor hopes for *many* readers,) that, with a free and independent mind, they will read with care

and judge with candour; and no one will, I hope, have reaſon to complain of the tenacity or diſingenuity of their author. And, ſhould this humble eſſay, which I preſume to call a NEW LOGIC, have the ſingle good fortune to lead men, who are ſons of ſcience, *to think and to judge for themſelves, and not in the thoughts and opinions of others:* this one effect, by opening the door to that ſound improvement, will be more than a ſufficient reward of all my labour.

Now to You, my benevolent and learned auditors, for the patience and attention with which I have been indulged, may my tribute of love and gratitude be duly paid: and to Him, whoſe gracious goodneſs hath enabled me, with whatever ability, to execute this part of my intended plan, to whoſe honour and ſervice it is more eſpecially dedicated, " who is of power to eſtabliſh you " according to the Goſpel of the Evangeliſts " and Apoſtles, and the preaching of Jeſus " Chriſt, according to the revelation of the " myſtery which was kept ſecret ſince the " world